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GLASGOW:  
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The

# INVESTIGATOR



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# The Investigator.

"All things, put to the test; the good retain."—1 Thess. v. 21.

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No. 49.

## THE TRUTH: WHAT IS IT?

### I.

"Ye shall get to know the truth."—Jesus.

THE Lord Jesus has said, "The Truth shall make you free" (John viii. 32). And how? By getting to know it. "Ye shall-get-to-know the truth, and the truth shall-make-you-free"—*gnōsethe tēn alētheian kai hē alētheia eleutherōsei humas*. Here are two ideas—

1. Getting-to-know the truth.
2. Being-freed by the truth.

*Getting to know* is a gradual process, as is apparent from its connection. Jesus is saying to "those Jews who had believed, 'Ye, if ye-abide in my word, truly disciples of-me are-ye; and ye shall-get-to-know the truth, and the truth shall-free you.'" From this it appears that only such as are "truly disciples" are in the position of getting to know the truth. All others are debarred, because outside discipleship. The various steps, according to Jesus, are 1—Believing in him. 2—Continuing in his word. 3—Being true disciples, by consequence. 4—Getting to know the truth. 5—Being freed thereby.

It must be evident that what is here termed "the truth," is not what is conventionally known amongst us as "the truth"—meaning thereby a set of propositions which vary in number and character according to the idiosyncracies of the one formulating them. For according to such formalists, one cannot believe in Jesus, and continue in his word, and so be a true disciple, without a prior knowledge of "the truth" as they may define it in a certain number of propositions. Jesus, however, reverses the process. With him no one had got to know the truth, but disciples were in the way of getting to know it and of being freed thereby. And in the nature of things, the getting to know the truth could not be an instantaneous acquisition, but the steady work of a life-time in the obedient believer. The term I render "get-to-know" is *ginoskein*—to learn, or become acquainted with. The term denotes knowledge, partial or full, according to the tense \* of the verb used in any given case, the present (*ginōskō*) signifying "I-am-getting-to-know," not "I know;" the aorist (*egnōn*), "I-got-to-know," i.e., I knew; the perfect (*egnōka*). "I-have-got-to-know," i.e., I know. Examples of each of these may here be instanced—*Present* tense: "In this we-are-getting-to-know," i.e., realizing, 1 John ii. 3; *Aorist* tense: "At no time got-I-to-know-you," Matt. vii. 23; *Perfect* tense: "He that says 'I-have-got-to-know him' . . . is a liar," 1 John ii. 4.

The knowledge of the truth of which Jesus speaks is not to be confounded then, with the apprehension of elementary truths, which is open to all, but re-

\* The tenses of the Greek verb do not denote the time in which something is done, but associate with the root idea the further notion of *process, prospect, or accomplishment*.



fers to something which is possible only to such as come within the category of Jesus in John vi. 47: "Truly, truly, I-tell you, he that-is-believing into me has aionian life" ("I, I-am the bread-of-the life," he immediately adds). Such as "understood his word, and trusted the one who sent him," had, he says, "got eternal life," and had "passed indeed out of (*ek*) the death into (*eis*) the life" (John v. 24). This was no mere *promise* of a life relating them to the aion to come, but a present fact, a necessity, indeed, to a getting to know the truth. This Jesus himself plainly affirms, when he explains the *raison d'etre*—the reason why—of aionian life, in John xvii. 3, "And the aionian life is this—in order that they-might-be-getting-to-know (*ginoskosin*) thee, the sole true Deity, and (he) whom thou didst send, anointed Jesus."

62 Saint Vincent Street, Glasgow.

*Editor*

## A CONTRIBUTION TO "THE SPIRIT IN MAN."

*To the Editor of The Investigator.*

GOD, the great Omnipotent, Omnipresent, Omniscient Spirit, He has no brain nor organism. The fact that He is the sole universal One, of whom and to whom are all things, fixes His immortality of necessity. All creatures are His offspring, directly or indirectly detached portions of His spirit-essence. They live and move and have their being in Him. But, to uphold them in existence, under certain conditions, it becomes a necessity that they be encased in bodies or organisms. A man's spirit, therefore, is a something separable from his body, and his spirit's immortality is dependent upon God. The while 'The Spirit in Man' has been under investigation in your magazine, I have taken part in a discussion in the *Glasgow Weekly Herald* on "The Divisibility of Matter," which latter subject leads to a consideration of the nature of matter and spirit, and thence to a survey of the being of God and of the creation, which standpoint I feel to be the truest and best for your question in hand, and, therefore, I beg to give these extracts from my *Herald* letters, as they set off your question in its natural light, and may interest otherwise:—

*To the Editor of the Glasgow Weekly Herald.*

[From *G. W. Herald*, 22nd May, 1897.]

SIR,— . . . Good natural philosophy has it that the particles of matter are infinitely divisible; that a particle, however small, has length, breadth, and thickness, and can, therefore, be divided, and parts sub-divided, and so on *ad infinitum*. Of course, in the process we come to the chemical atoms, which good chemists tell us are practically indivisible, though not theoretically so. And to be sure we can all easily conceive of the rigid chemical atoms losing their rigidity, and each one becoming a fluid speck, fluid to its infinitesimal depth. We can go further than Tennyson, when he wrote—

The hills are shadows, and they flow  
From form to form, and nothing stands;  
They melt like mists: the solid lands  
Like clouds they shape themselves and go.

We can imagine the chemical atoms in the course of eternity melting into fluidity, leaving the whole of space without the faintest fraction of an atom of *terra firma*; and then, out of this fluidity, solidity becoming again. Well, now, I have my own belief concerning what could cause solidity. But William Ackroyd, in "Science for All," says—"There are philosophers

who have gone so far as to suppose that the ultimate parts of matter which chemists call atoms are but infinitesimally small vortex-rings of a very peculiar fluid. Such is Thomson's theory of vortex-atoms, destined, it is thought, to play a great part in the science of the future." Now, what tickles me in this is the phrase, "very peculiar fluid." I think, for my part, that this fluid is the normal condition of substance. But would those who cannot get their brains round about the conception of this ultimate fluidity of matter, and who stick fast at hard, rigid, ultimate points, say what they think makes the substance of each single rigid point in their dusty universe hold together, so as to become a rigid point?—I am, &c.

[From *G. W. Herald*, 12th June, 1897.]

SIR,—The conclusion I arrived at on the above subject in your issue of 22nd May has not been questioned, nor the query I put been answered, so let me shriek my note of triumph. The conclusion was—the sole substance, the eternal essence, "the perfect fluid" out of which evolve the atoms. The theory of Thomson (now Lord Kelvin) is that vortex-rings, a peculiar kind of infinitesimally small whirlings, of this perfect fluid make the atoms. That I don't believe. But here is my triumph-shout—when you get to this fluid you touch God. For, look here, we have only space and this simple substance in it. Now, consciousness exists. It is not the space that is conscious; it must be the substance. Therefore, this perfect fluid is God's spirit-substance to begin with. This is logic that is eternally, utterly impossible to overthrow. And, of course, the rigidity of coherency (holding together) of the substance to form the solid ultimate points or atoms originates in will force, where all forces, directly or indirectly, originate.

A word to "H. B.," your poetical correspondent. The spirit of man, or any other finite spirit, being a detached portion of the Great Spirit, cannot possibly have a single chemical atom in its composition, for the free movement of its spirit-substance would dis-shape or dissolve such.—I am, &c.

[From *G. W. Herald*, 3rd July, 1897.]

SIR,—Your correspondent, Alex. Macfarlane, F.C.S., misses or misunderstands the point altogether. He writes—"Matter can be weighed, it can be made to combine, but it ever remains susceptible of definite handling and sub-division down to the minimum visible?" Who contradicts? "Down to the minimum visible!" But that's not very far down. What about "sub-division" down beyond the "minimum visible" of the most powerful microscope, "sub-division" of the atoms themselves and beyond? That's the point. No one can conceive of a limit to the sub-division of substance. I repeat what I said in my first letter, "that in the process" (of sub-division) "we come to the chemical atoms, which good chemists tell us are practically indivisible, though not theoretically so. And to be sure we can all easily conceive of the rigid chemical atoms losing their rigidity, and each one becoming a fluid speck—fluid to its infinitesimal depth. We can imagine the chemical atoms in the course of eternity melting into fluidity, leaving the whole of space without the faintest fraction of an atom of *terra firma*; and then, out of this fluidity, solidity becoming again." Here we have a perfect fluid, or "protyle," as Crookes calls it in his "Genesis of the Elements." And the question is, What makes the atom? What makes the substance in each atom hold together, so as to become an atom? Lord Kelvin's theory, which I don't believe, is that vortex-rings, peculiar, infinitesimally small whirlings of the perfect fluid, are the chemical atoms. Your correspondent says that I gratuitously assume we have only space and these vortex-atoms as the sum total or complete inventory of creation. I didn't assume we had these vortex-atoms at all. I didn't believe in them. What I stated was, "We have only space and this simple substance in it." That is not an inventory of the "creation," but of the "increase." Your correspondent enumerates "light, heat, electricity, sound, magnetism, colour, &c.," as his inventory, I suppose, for he tickets them as "entities." And he goes on to say, "You cannot weigh sound or electricity," &c. Of course not; nobody said we could. These that you ticket "entities" all belong to the category of motion. Sound, for instance, you couldn't have it, unless first you had aerial atoms to vibrate. How do you get atoms? That's the question. It is too late in the day for your correspondent to mystify us with modes of motion. Science long ago arrived at matter and motion. The universe consists of a substance in movement, said a French philosopher. Well, but what about that which is conscious? That which is conscious cannot be mere empty space, much less mere motion, but must be the "substance," then, by infallible logic. That which is conscious is capable of voluntary movement or motion. Here is the everlasting doctrine of the spiritual origin of force. By a reasoning as simple as that two and two make four we see that the sole substance, the great Eternal Spirit—

essence, by His will-power, is the Originator, directly or indirectly, of the forces of the universe. And so He can easily create atoms by simply pressing together or holding together minute portions of the substance of Himself.

I beg to point out that the Gifford Lectureship was established by Lord Gifford for the express purpose of having lectures about this One Sole Substance, and that if the lectures fail in this respect they are illegal. (See Lord Gifford's will.) And I beg to protest against our men of science who, having arrived at the perfect fluid or Sole Substance, ignore the fact that it is God's spirit-substance.—I am, &c.

[From *G. W. Herald*, 24th July, 1897.]

SIR,—Your correspondents labour under misunderstandings immense. They should read article "Atom" in "Enc. Brit." The writer there says—"Though the primitive fluid is the only true matter, yet that which we call matter is not the primitive fluid itself, but a mode of motion of that primitive fluid. The primitive fluid, the only true matter, entirely eludes our perceptions when it is not endued with the mode of motion which converts certain portions of it into vortex-rings, and thus renders it molecular." Now Lord Kelvin says that to generate vortex-atoms in the perfect fluid can only be an act of Creative Power. True: for all force must have its origin in will. But vortex-atoms would be so essentially brittle they would break up. Well, now, as that which is conscious cannot be mere space, much less mere motion, but must be the substance, therefore this primitive perfect fluid being, as it must be, the Great Spirit from whose will-acts proceed force and motion, can easily give the start for solidity by holding minute portions of itself firm together, from which can be formed atoms of differing degrees of density and shape.

The chemical atoms, once made, are passive, so long as they remain atoms. They possess that great property called inertia. This proves them not independent pieces, acting of their own wills, but solid portions of the one Great Spirit. As such they are living substance, but temporarily passive and inert. Now they float in their parent fluid, by whom they can be controlled. And they are subject to the general beating and surging of forces and motions around them. One atom or body exposed by itself would receive as many blows on one side as on another, and would not, therefore, be moved out of its place. But two atoms or bodies exposed would each screen or shield the other from a certain amount of the blows, so that fewer blows would strike either body on that side which is next the other body. Each atom or body would therefore be urged toward the other by the excess of blows it would receive on the side furthest from the other. This is a modification of Le Sage's theory of the cause of attraction, gravity, or weight. Chemical atoms are acted upon and moved, therefore, and do not move and act of themselves. To move and act of themselves, their solidity would have to give way and resolve itself into infinite fluidity, and in that case they would cease to be chemical atoms, and their substance would cease to exhibit attraction, gravity, or weight.—I am, &c.

(See an original contribution, "A Clue to the Causes of Chemical Action," by the Author, in Feb. 23, 1895, *Pharmaceutical Journal*, epitome, page 61.)

Now, this view of the constitution of things shows that a man's body, being built up of chemical atoms, is passive; that a man's spirit, being a detached bit of the fluid *non-atomic* essence of God's spirit-substance, though encased in the body, is separable from it, and that the spirit acts upon the brain, that key-board to the muscles of the body, by touching or stimulating the motor-centres thereof, and so moves the muscles of foot or hand or face in fibre connection therewith. Robert Roberts, the editor of *The Christadelphian*, in a large review-article of my "*Eternal News*," says:—"We have called this a new philosophy. So it is. . . . This philosophy has traced facts to their ultimate mechanical relations. . . . Mr. Brown carries them to the final induction which they yield to the necessities of reason, with the wholesome result of demonstrating the truly philosophical character of the doctrine taught in the Bible, that God, the Eternal, is the creator of all things by the incorporation of His own energy in organised forms and motions according to His will. The result is to be cordially welcomed in an age when science is supposed to have excluded the possibility of personal Deity and creative volition. Wherein Mr. Brown's views may appear defective to any one

fully enlightened in the Scriptures would be in the relation of the divine will to Spirit considered as the universal primitive 'substance.' Mr. Brown makes this 'will' reside in every part of this substance, with the result that wherever there is a bit of the substance cut off (as we might say), a bit of the will goes with it, and constitutes a human or animal spirit, as the case may be, possessed of a bit of the original eternal will-power. This, when thought out, will be found to lead to confusion. It would mean the sub-division of God, and the immortal perpetuation of every living thing that comes into being, great or small, good or evil." Ah! but, hold there, Mr. Roberts! "This" . . . "would" *not* "mean . . . the immortal perpetuation of every living thing that comes into being." But if any view shows *immortality* to be of absolute necessity *conditional*, "this" does. Rather, the difficulty lies in how a finite spirit is to be perpetuated—how its mass, for in that lies its individuality, is to be prevented from mingling to its destruction, like as a drop of water mingles in the ocean. Under certain favourable conditions the will power of each spirit-mass may be sufficient to prevent the contact of naked spirit with naked spirit from flowing into actual oneness. But it is as well for us that our spirits on the surging surface of this planet are mailed with bodies composed of hard chemical atoms provided for us by God. Maybe, in the vast ether spaces betwixt planets, spirits are clad in a loose enswathement of ether atoms; or maybe they may need no such thing there at all. But God alone can guarantee our "immortal perpetuation" if He will. And there rests the basis of our immortality. He will, under conditions. For our only way to immortality is the "narrow way" Christ pointed out.

Dr. Alfred Russel Wallace, the father of Darwinism, came across my "*Eternal News*," and in a letter to a London philosopher, says, in reference to books, "purporting to solve the great problems of the universe by a process of *reasoning* on more or less disputable data. I continually receive such especially from America." But referring to the "*Eternal News*," he declares:—"One of the cleverest and briefest of these metaphysical treatises I have met with is that which I now send you, and which please return when done with. Though pure reasoning, it is for the most part clear and logical, and its data are almost self-evident." Dr. Alfred Russel Wallace is a believer in spirits, and that they may sometimes over-hear and answer our prayers. Well, but, to me one direct manifestation from The Great Infinite Spirit is more than a million manifestations from, say, the whole universe of finite spirits put together. Look here! Give me God, the one Great Father of Spirits, and I can stand up before the universe and defy and be independent of all other spirits.

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J. J. Brown.

### THE SPIRIT IN MAN.

A TRIANGULAR CANVASS OF THE SUBJECT BETWEEN BROS. J. W. DIBOLL, JUN.,  
R. S. WEIR, AND THE EDITOR.

[The four paragraphs which follow appeared on cover of last issue, and are reproduced here to preserve the continuity, in the body of the magazine, of Bro. Weir's contribution.—EDITOR.]

His next paragraph deals with Rom. viii. 6-9, showing that he and I agree (contrary to Dr. Thomas' teaching in "Elpis Israel"), that it does not prove that "the flesh thinks."



He next enquires "If the spirit of all in their natural state be properly described as the inward 'man,' by what means is the 'inward man renewed day by day,' and what would happen to it if not renewed?" The renewing here alluded to is a moral affair, which I have already shown that the spirit is susceptible of, and by means of which the person is improved morally; if not *renewed*, of course, the opposite obtains.

Bro. Nisbet further says, "This 'inward man' cannot be a separable entity." Why not? This is part of the point at issue, and must not be coolly *assumed*—evidence is necessary.

Again, he says "The 'inward man' is more than *mind*. According to Paul (Rom. vi. 22), it covers and includes 'the law of the mind' (*nous*), enlightened in Jesus. Bro. Weir recognises this under the term *improved* 'spirit.'" Quite so, and I submit that this is the most orderly method by which to set forth the *Psychology* of Scripture. Recognise a "spirit in man" such as I am contending for, and the whole becomes pleasantly explicable: deny it, and explanation is impossible apart from resort to violence.

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**B**RO. NISBET'S contribution to this discussion does not appear in October issue, but he has, "meanwhile, felt constrained to correct, by footnotes, an error or two on the part of Bro. Weir, who is" (says he) "seriously astray, as will be seen, in at least one of his facts."

I feel equally constrained to reply promptly to these "footnotes," in order to prevent their being used to mar the progress and transparency of this discussion.

(1). I do not affirm that *ruach* is mentioned in the text of Gen. ii. 7: it is not, but, still, "Moses is" *not* "silent about it." He mentions it in chap. vii. 22—"All flesh died that moved upon the face of the earth, both fowl, and cattle, and beast, and every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth, and every man, all in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life" (*nishmath ruach chayyim*). Moses here affirms that *ruach* was in the nostrils of all that died by the flood; and, inasmuch as *ruach* (spirit) is that by which the body *lives*, it must have been in the nostrils of all from the *very commencement of their animate existence*. It seems, then, to me, that the common-sense way of treating Moses here, is to regard chap. vii. 22 as containing the *full* text, and chap. ii. 7 as elliptical.

In Gen. vi. 17, *ruach chayyim* is rendered "breath of life"—"Behold I do bring a flood of waters upon the earth to destroy all flesh wherein is the breath of life" (*ruach chayyim*). Again, in chap. vii. 15—"They went in unto the ark, two and two of all flesh wherein is the breath of life" (*ruach chayyim*). Now it will not be denied that these three passages, Gen. vi. 17, vii. 15, and vii. 22, all refer to the same thing, yet in the last only does the *full or entire statement of the fact* appear. Shall we make the *full* the gauge of the partial? or the *partial* the gauge of the full? The former most unquestionably. It would be just as reasonable for Bro. Nisbet to say that the animals (man included) had *no breath*, because in Gen. vi. 17 and vii. 15, *neshamah* does not appear, as that man has *no spirit*, because *ruach* does not appear in Gen. ii. 7. If (as I believe), these four references by Moses to the same subject must be made to harmonise, I see no way of doing so except by making the *first*

three elliptical. The term *neshamah* by Bro. Nisbet's own verdict is not the equivalent of *ruach*, therefore, one cannot be substituted for the other. The position must be taken, either that the *fourth* passage, Gen. vii. 22, has a superfluous word (*ruach*) in it, or the *three preceding* ones must be amended to correspond with it.

Dr. Thomas, in "Elpis Israel," pp. 28, 29, practically sets forth this view—"Quadrupeds and men are not only 'living souls,' but they are vivified by the same breath and spirit. In proof of this, I remark first that the phrase 'breath of life' in the text of the common version is *neshamah* in the Hebrew, and that as *chayyim* is in the plural it should be rendered 'breath of lives.' Secondly, this *nishmath chayyim* is said to be in the inferior creatures as well as in man. Thus, God said, I bring a flood of water upon the earth to destroy all flesh wherein is *ruach chayyim*—spirit of lives. And all flesh died that moved upon the earth, both of fowl, and of cattle, and of beast, and of every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth, and every man, all in whose nostrils was *nishmath ruach chayyim*—breath of spirit of lives. Now, as I have said, it was the *nishmath chayyim* with which Moses testified God inflated the nostrils of Adam; if, therefore, this were *divina particula auræ*, a particle of the divine essence, as it is affirmed, which became the immortal soul in man, then all other animals have immortal souls likewise; for they all received breath of spirit of lives in common with man."

The Dr. here says, distinctly, that "all the other animals received 'breath of spirit of lives' in common with man." Did they receive it *all when vitalised*, or only a part of it—*nishmath chayyim*? If *all*, my contention is proved: if only part, it devolves on Bro. Nisbet to show when and how the balance (*ruach*) was communicated to their nostrils, also, how they lived without it.

There is, it seems to me, a painful tendency on the part of Bro. Nisbet to interfere, almost wantonly, at times, with the translation. A sample of this occurs here. He says "the original for breath of life in Gen. ii. 7 is simply *nishmath chayyim*—respiration of lives."

Even if "*respiration*" were the equivalent or synonym of "breath" (the term employed, I believe, by all the best translators), there is no apparent reason why it should be adopted here in preference to breath. It is neither *briefser* nor *clearer*: the adoption of it would seem to savor of pedantry. But, what can be said when it does not possess the merit of being a *synonym*? "*Respiration*" according to *Walker* and *Webster*, is "the act of breathing." The passage, then, translated with "*respiration*" in place of "breath," would read—"The Lord God breathed into man's nostrils the *act of breathing* (*respiration*) of lives."

But this is not all. In the following par., p. 82, Bro. Nisbet says—"This fact is an important one in this enquiry. It amounts to this, that man when formed into a living soul is without a *ruach*, at least, Moses is silent about it: he simply says, 'he breathed by his nostrils *nishmath chayyim*—respiration of lives.'"

Who breathed, God or man? What is the antecedent of the pronoun "he?" If the answer be "God breathed," then, literally, the passage would read—"God breathed by his nostrils the '*act of breathing of lives*, and man became a living soul." If, on the other hand, *man* be the antecedent, it would read—"Man breathed by his nostrils the *act of breathing of lives*, and man became a living soul." Yet another form it may be intended to take, viz:—

"and He (God) breathed by his (man's) nostrils *the act of breathing of lives,*" &c., &c. Now, in any of these forms, to me, the translation makes nonsense; but the climax is reached in the 3rd par., where Bro. Nisbet says,—“Nor does *neshamah* mean—when physically applied—more than the act of respiration in most of its occurrences.” “Act of respiration,” that is, *act of the act of breathing.* A strange meaning surely!

*Neshamah*, from *nasham* to breathe, literally means “*breath,*” and in every instance where it occurs, can be so rendered with very good sense. By Bro. Nisbet’s method, however, it *never means “breath,”* but *the act of breathing*—an operation performed by the nostrils—not a something breathed *into* them. Gen. vii. 22 then, should read.—“All flesh died, . . . all by whose nostrils was the *nishmath ruach chayyim*—*act of the act of breathing of spirit of lives*”—accept this who can!

Again, Bro. Nisbet says—“still *ruach* is everywhere—*ruach elohim.* This, presumably, means that the Spirit of God is everywhere. I firmly believe *that*, but be it remembered that we are not discussing about the “Spirit of God” at present, but “The Spirit in man,”—*Man’s Spirit*, and we know that when *it* leaves the body, *man dies* (Jas. ii. 26). God’s Spirit, however, being “everywhere,” is present in *all matter*, whether living or dead,—organic or inorganic; therefore, man’s Spirit *not* being “*everywhere,*”—not even in his own body *always*, cannot be identical with *ruach elohim*—God’s Spirit, though, “ultimately, it must be referred to it,” in the sense that the *ruach elohim* is the basis of all created things. Man’s Spirit is as much a “*created thing*” as is his body,—both were “*formed,*” *originally and directly,* by God.

Thus, it appears to me, the alleged “error” consists, not in my having credited Moses with *more* than he had said, but in Bro. Nisbet crediting him with *less than that*: and, also, in his attempting, by altering the translation, to make Moses’ words convey, in a very confused manner, something very different from what he (Moses) intended. For a variety of reasons, I think that brethren should hesitate to interfere with the translation, as it stands in the Revised Version, unless an obvious gain be in sight from so doing.

(2). When I inserted the word “*only*” into Bro. Nisbet’s sentence, my object was not to take any advantage of him, but, if possible, to make quite clear to readers, what was my impression of, as well as what I was objecting to, in his remarks. I do not admit that this was an “error” on my part. In par. 4, p. 55, where he says that he thought “it had been made quite plain,” the words “*as such*” do not appear appended to “*body,*” and, indeed, the whole of that paragraph is, to me, very perplexing. But, even had it been “quite plain,” and easily understood, clearness, which is one of the first requisites in controversial writing, would demand some such insertion as I took the liberty of making, alike in the interest of Bro. Nisbet and myself, and of all our readers; as no writer should tax the mind of the reader, when the insertion of a single word would obviate it.

It will, no doubt, be a disappointment to many, that Bro. Nisbet’s contribution does not appear in October issue. If “want of space” was the only reason for this, his 4 page reply to me on “The Nature of Jesus made Christ,” might have waited. It was not promised a place in *each issue* as the discussion had been, nor would the shelving of it for a little have caused any dislocation as this has. Owing to the infrequency of publication of the “Investigator,” years may be spent in this discussion, especially if gaps of this kind should occasionally occur. Bro. Nisbet, however, is a very busy man, and is in the

best position to judge and act, when emergencies of this sort arise,—I am simply suggesting—not complaining.

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WHAT most strikes me in Bro. Diboll's contribution to "The Spirit in Man" is his complaint that he never for one moment supposed that the assumption "that in the same sense every man has a spirit" was one that "would be called in question." Then I fear I must take this as evidence that he has not looked all around this subject before arriving at his conclusions, and he may have to begin anew. If he say the usual Christadelphian teaching is that spirit is a something which is in all alike, I quite admit it, but not in the sense in which he may seek to utilise the admission. "All have one *ruach*"—spirit (Eccl. iii. 19), but I am not aware that Christadelphians admit that "the spirit of the man which is in him" which Paul has in view in 1 Co. ii. 11 is identical with the *ruach* of Eccl. iii. 19. They don't: Christadelphians distinguish, and rightly, between the spirit *in* a man and the spirit *of* a man, just as they do between the spirit of God (Gen. i. 2) and "the spirit of the world" (1 Cor. ii. 12); while I think it may fairly be said that Bro. Diboll's position is that these are essentially one. Christadelphians are all agreed that "there is spirit (*ruach*\*) in man" (Job xxxii. 8). They recognise the presence of spirit in everything; that spirit is absolutely essential to the life of all animals and to the very existence of shapes, animate and inanimate, to the integration even of that of which these shapes are made, of "matter" itself; that the partial "withdrawal" of this spirit results in death to all organisms so deprived, and in the resolution into elemental forms of those organisms and of all other shapes; indeed, by the absolute "withdrawal" of *IT* the organic world would itself dissolve, and even the matter of which it consists no longer be. So spirit holds all things together, even the ultimate atom. Let that spirit be wholly "withdrawn" and atoms assume once more their original and only essential formless form of spirit! What we call matter would have ceased to be, for the monad or ultimate atom is, as I take it, but a mode of spirit, the mode being dependent upon the will of Him who sent forth his spirit (Ps. civ. 30); and matter with its shapes, personal and impersonal was. *Ruach* was therefore antecedent to matter. So "all things are out of God" (*ek tou theou*—1 Co. xi. 12). Now although all Christadelphians might not express themselves thus, yet I believe they think along these lines.

Now, no doubt the Philosophers tell us—among other things which we take leave, some to doubt, some to deny—that we have no more knowledge of matter than we have of spirit—nay, very much less, according to some, since, say they, it is only the ego—with which they confound the *ruach*—which has immediate knowledge, and that too only of its own self, which is in itself a huge error; for it amounts to this, that the knower can at the same time be the known, both subject and object in one, both ego and non-ego—for, say they, we have never seen nor touched matter, we have merely, by means of certain sensations, perceived certain properties or qualities, primary and secondary, appertaining to matter, but not the matter itself; but as the philosophers are seldom right, and are often even ridiculous in the things they affirm

\* I omit the indefinite article as it expresses more than the original Hebrew, which but affirms that "there is *ruach* in man": "a *ruach*" individualises, and is a gloss upon the text.



or deny, we need not be too confiding in their statements. In the very teeth of common sense the generally accepted philosophy tells us that we do not see with our eyes, hear with our ears, or smell with our noses; that we have never really come into actual contact with matter; we have merely had certain sensations, but these sensations come between us and matter. Seeing we see not, and hearing we hear not. But the common sense of humanity which believes that it has an immediate perception of the things themselves is probably right. We see *things* instead of merely perceiving a sensation. Indeed, sensation *is* perception, for consciousness appertains to the senses and so to the entire ego, which ego is not necessarily confined to the brain, although the central consciousness may most reasonably be considered to be there.

But to leave the philosophers—for we can make little of them and can do less for them—and return to Bro. Diboll: that such a spirit, as he postulates in his interpretation of passages, is in every man, Christadelphians repudiate. They believe that every man has a spirit, of his own, doubtless, but in this conception there is a departure from the notion of spirit as present in every man—which is One Spirit and *alike* in all—to a use of the term spirit which suggests character or disposition, what one mentally breathes out or exhales, so to speak; the which spirit being *different* in each cannot be that spirit which is alike in all. They further believe that “the spirit of Christ” which every one must have in order to be his (Rom. viii. 9) is possessed by the obedient believer only. They may not, I admit, have given this important fact the prominence in their lectures and literature, when dealing with the term “spirit,” which the importance of the subject demands, and equally with Bro. Diboll they have misquoted and misapplied passages of scripture in argument. But negative error does not necessarily destroy positive truth, although it must be admitted to affect, more or less prejudicially, the thinker’s thoughts. Still, one may hold fundamental truth after such a fashion as to render the negative error almost innocuous, and this seems to be largely the case with ourselves as a community.

Christadelphians, then, hold that there is spirit in man, and that it is there wedded—so to speak—to an organism of the most perfect soulical kind from which a high order of individuality is evolvable. In such an organism the *ruach* makes itself manifest in ways not possible in the brute with its lower organisation and consequently more limited capacity. But to hold that the *ruach* is part of the man—as Bro. Diboll holds, and, in a lesser degree only, Bro. Weir also—and, indeed, the essential man, is to hold a fundamental error which constructively—if not actually—destroys the truth concerning man and his relation to God in the natural order.

Bro. Diboll has again quoted a large number of passages in which the term “spirit” occurs; some of these are now from the Old Testament, but the others are merely a repetition, in the main, of those passages previously quoted by him from the New. He remarks, “it will be noticed how frequently *mental* capacity is attributed to this part of the human constitution.” But the existence of a spirit such as he postulates is not to be inferred from such passages as speak of Moses’ “anguish of spirit” (Ex. vi. 9) or of “the spirit of Cyrus” (2 Chron. xxxvii. 22) or of Job (Job vii. 11) or of Nebuchadnezzar (Dan. ii. 1). I shall not attempt to deny such a spirit as these passages indicate, but I decline to infer so much from the phraseology as Bro. Diboll does. If I did there would be no logical reason for refraining from drawing the same inference

with regard to another possession of all men, viz., the heart. Jesus speaks of "people *understanding* with the *heart*" (Matt. xiii. 15), that "out of the *heart* proceed evil *thoughts*" (Matt. xv. 19); he accused some of *reasoning* in their *hearts* (Mar. ii. 8). Very many passages are to be found both in the Old and New Testament which present us with the idea of a '*heart*' in every man which is capable of various mental activities," coupled with such expressions as afford to Bro. Diboll proof—when these and similar powers and possibilities are affirmed of the "spirit"—proof that "all men possess a spirit with powers of thought." Such are the following, culled from the New Testament, but also common to the Old Testament scriptures. This heart is spoken of as being "troubled" (Jno. xiv. 27); in "anguish" (2 Cor. ii. 4); as having "thoughts and intents" (Heb. iv. 12); as desiring and praying (Rom. x. i.); believing (Rom. x. 9); rejoicing (Jno. xvi. 22); understanding (Jno. xii. 40); in sorrow (Jno. xvi. 6); as conceiving ideas (Acts v. 4); purposing (Acts xi. 23); and so on.

While in my last I quoted a number of passages with the intention of showing that those who are Christ's have "spirit" which the natural man has not, I was not needing to do this as proof of my position being scriptural, but merely as reflecting the fact, which, indeed, in one of the passages quoted, is expressly affirmed. I refer to the 19th verse of Jude, where we read of some who were "soulical (*psuchikos*) not having spirit" (*pneuma*). The *soulical* or "natural" is here put in sharp contrast with those who possess *pneuma*. This *pneuma* it is which, according to Jude, differentiates the natural man from the man in Christ Jesus. It is evidently the same thing which Paul terms the "*pneuma* of Christ" in Rom. viii. 9, which anyone must have in order to be Christ's.

Bro. Diboll, if he thinks it worth while to continue taking part in this discussion, would need to begin at the foundation, as Bro. Weir has been seeking to do, and show that such a spirit, as he postulates, is possessed by every man. The passages he quoted are by no means—when understood in their true bearing—inconsistent with other views of "the Spirit in man" than he and Bro. Weir take.

Referring to the use of a singular noun with plural pronouns: Paul's use of language is not to be set aside by quotations from other writers. If the writers had been all mere pens rather than penmen, I might consider myself under an obligation to explain what would certainly be a diversity in form of expression. Let Bro. Diboll show from Paul's writings that he is ever inconsistent with himself, or indulges in loose and inaccurate or ambiguous expressions in the conveyance of truth. It may be said that one of the passages he quotes is from Paul (Rom. iii. 13, 14), but this is not Paul's phraseology, but is a quotation from the Old Testament. The Old Testament is indeed the source of all such expressions (without exception) which he quotes. This, of course, is in no way derogatory to the Old Testament: it, properly enough, expresses itself after its own fashion, or *idiom*; but it will never do to explain or determine the meaning of such expressions in the Greek by reference to Hebrew usage. This is bad criticism. Nor would it be justifiable to make either John's, or Peter's, or James' style of expression determine Paul's. Of course I am not just now speaking of doctrine—in which they are one—but of the to-be-expected variety of verbal expression which distinguishes individual writers. Bro. Diboll will, I think, agree with me in this.

Dealing now with Bro. Weir: I find I have a double supply from him—

the latter portion, of 2 or 3 pages, growing, as my readers will see, out of the fact that I had indicated by a footnote, and some remarks in Editorial, that I regarded Bro. Weir as "seriously astray in at least one of his facts." Bro. Weir has had an opportunity of admitting this error, but he seeks in his latest communication to justify all that he has said upon the matter. I therefore return to it. He says he does "not affirm that *ruach* is mentioned in Gen. ii. 7." The uninstructed, reading what he twice affirmed in express terms, certainly would conclude that Moses had said "The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the *nishmath ruach chayyim*, and man became a living soul," and had I not known better myself, I should have concluded, in view of Bro. Weir's assertion, that *ruach* must be in the text. In No. 47, on p. 49, par. 6, Bro. Weir had said, "in Gen. ii. 7, it says, The Lord . . . breathed into his nostrils *nishmath ruach chayyim*, literally, breath of the spirit of lives"; and on p. 51, at end of first paragraph, referring to the *ruach*, he speaks of it as that which God "originally formed and 'blew into the nostrils' of that other constituent" [of Adam] "which he 'formed of the dust.'" I took occasion then to remark (see cover, p. xi. of same issue, par. 5): "There is no evidence that what Bro. Weir calls 'this hidden constituent of our being' was originally formed and 'blown into man's nostrils,' for the kind of 'spirit' mentioned in Gen. ii. 7 is blown out again with every breath, the *nishmath chayyim* or respiration of lives." But in the issue following (October, page 78) Bro. Weir returns to the charge and reiterates his assertion as follows: "This is what was done—the Lord God breathed into man's nostrils *nishmath ruach chayyim*, not simply *neshamah* (breath) but *ruach* (spirit) as well," and in the second paragraph succeeding he even goes as far as to say that "it is not correct" for me "to say that the kind of 'spirit' mentioned in Gen. ii. 7 is blown out again with every breath," adding, let him prove it." Not having space in that issue—since all the matter excepting an inch or two of Editorial was already in type—I was able to make but a very brief reference to the matter in my Editorial, together with a footnote on page 78, to the effect that the proof was to be found in the fact that *ruach* was not in the text in question (Gen. ii. 7): it was simply *nishmath chayyim* = respiration of lives. But that was really all the proof or disproof needed—proof of what I have asserted; disproof of what Bro. Weir not merely unintentionally suggested, but which he, in terms, had asserted. However he does not now affirm—what I think he must himself now see that he had expressly done—that *ruach* is mentioned in Gen. ii. 7: he admits that it is not. But all the same that does not hinder him from afterwards writing on page 8, par. 4, of the present issue as follows: "Thus it appears to me the alleged 'error' consists not in my having credited Moses with *more* than he said, but in Bro. Nisbet crediting him with *less than that*; and also, in his attempting, by altering the translation, to make Moses' words convey, in a very confused manner, something very different from what he (Moses) intended." Bro. Weir would have been well advised if he had left this sentence unwritten. The first half doesn't seem to be in accord with his own admission that *ruach* is not in Gen. ii. 7, and seems like a reiteration of the error I drew attention to; while as regards the last half—perhaps the less said the better. If, however, Bro. Weir does not mean all that he seems to say, the introduction of a little of the clearness that he so much desiderates in me would be desirable. But possibly he means all he says here, and occasionally throughout his most recent contributions. The tone of some of these remarks has somewhat surprised me. Of course

I don't object to a little hard knocking, only the debate seems to be deteriorating, and it may become a question if we had not better stop it altogether. With these remarks perhaps I had better say no more about it, and continue the examination of the *argument* of Bro. Weir.

Gen. ii. 7 is in terms given up by him, as we have seen, but still he says "Moses is not silent about *ruach*" elsewhere. No, as I have said, and as we all admit, *ruach* is everywhere. But Bro. Weir affirms, upon what he believes to be the authority of Moses in Gen. vii. 22, "that *ruach* was in the nostrils of all that died by the flood," and he concludes that "it must have been in the nostrils of all from the very commencement of their animate existence." But here again Bro. Weir's "facts" are not facts. Moses never once mentions *ruach* as being *in the nostrils* of any creature. Let him read again his three texts adduced as proof—Gen. vi. 17 (*ruach chayyim*), vii. 15 (*ruach chayyim*), vii. 22 (*nishmath ruach chayyim*), and he will see that *ruach chayyim* = spirit of lives is not said to be in the nostrils but in the creatures themselves, while in the last of these only is a something said to be specifically in the nostrils: that something is not *ruach* but *neshamah*—the *neshamah* of *ruach chayyim*. Now the *neshamah* is not the *ruach*: the *ruach* is not the *neshamah*, Respiration (*neshamah*) is performed *through* the nostrils; hence its specified location: the *ruach*, on the other hand, permeates the creature; hence it is said to be *in* the creature. Of course *ruach* being everywhere is also in our nostrils, but not specifically so. And it is not *us*.

Now, as we have seen, Moses does not say that "*ruach* was in the nostrils of all that died by the flood": it is Bro. Weir who says it. *Neshamah*, as we have seen, is said to be "in the nostrils," and properly so, since *neshamah* (from *nasham*, to pant, to blow, to breathe) denotes the complex act of inspiration and expiration, in brief, *respiration*; and the nostrils, as both Moses and the practice of the brute teach us, are the proper channels by means of which the lungs are enabled to perform their appropriate work. We shall probably be taken by Bro. Weir to Job next, now that Moses fails him, for Job speaks of "the *ruach* of God being in his (Job's) nostrils" (Job xxvii. 3); and so it was, God's *ruach* being everywhere. But there is not a single passage in scripture which speaks of *ruach chayyim* being specifically in the nostrils.

Bro. Weir expresses his belief that my theory of the soul "seems to be still in the incubatory stage, and unfit, as yet, for any sort of use." In this he is wrong as anyone may see who cares to procure the Four Nights' Debate with Dr. Jamieson, in which the theory I hold stood the test of the Socratic method in public debate six years ago. But at what stage is Bro. Weir's theory of the spirit when he can say as he does on the page preceding (page 79): "I have not yet said that the spirit is self-conscious, that is to say possesses consciousness apart from its union with the body. . . . I may be compelled by the force of logic, at a later stage of this discussion, to take that position; but at present my belief is, that consciousness is *entirely dependent on the union of spirit with body*." That looks tentative enough; although not to be condemned.

Bro. Weir objects to *respiration* taking the place of *breath* in Gen. ii. 7. He perceives "a painful tendency" on my part "to interfere almost wantonly, at times with the translation." Here is a nice distinction of terms. Not *altogether* wantonly, if only "almost." But if Bro. Weir meant "wantonly" he should have said it, and I should have understood him. Surely Bro. Weir does not suppose breath to be anything in itself. And it is quite evident from the use of the term *neshamah* in scripture (see *Marginal Jottings* in



the *Investigator* for July, 1892) that it denotes an act rather than a result.

It does not matter a pin's point whether a various rendering be "briefer" or not; if it be more correct it will certainly give a "clearer" idea of the original, even if it should rival in length some Teutonic-like agglomerations. But "respiration" more accurately reflects the force of *neshamah* than "breath," and certainly they are not synonymous terms; otherwise the change would be altogether wanton—in this case.

There is much else to which I might reply in Bro. Weir's seven pages, but space does not permit, even with the extra four pages of reading matter (besides the index, which is also additional) in this issue.

62 St. Vincent Street,  
Glasgow.

*Thos. Nickef*

## The Investigator.

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Publishing Department: JAS. PARIS, 24 South Albion Street, Glasgow.

JANUARY, 1898.

THIS number begins a new volume, and contains eight extra pages including Index. I should like to draw attention to my Publisher's remarks under "Renewals" on p. ii. of cover. Readers who have no practical knowledge of the difference between a cash and a credit business, may be disposed to think that it doesn't matter much whether they pay their florin in advance or not. Others who have that knowledge will know that it matters much, but even such may not quite realize the intricacies and troubles of magazine book-keeping. Only those who have been in it realize the value of subscriptions *when paid in advance*: witness the object lesson given by Bro. J. S. Smith, of Edinburgh (formerly Publisher), who, as may be seen from the Remittances column, is forward with his subscriptions (48/) for 1898. *He has been in it and knows what it is.* Of course we do not look for all Ecclesial Agents to do as he does, for some of these are not themselves paid in advance by subscribers—who might, perhaps, help to mend this a little—and while we quite reckon on this, yet individual subscribers should, if they possibly can, always pay in advance. Those, therefore, who have not yet remitted might kindly do so *at once*, and so help to reduce to a minimum the labour which Bro. Paris has undertaken on their account. The general rule to send only to such as have remitted—ecclesial agents are, of course, excepted—will be put in force so far as the April and succeeding issues are concerned—unless by

special arrangement with the Publisher—who, if informed by such as cannot pay for the year in advance would, I have no doubt, greatly prefer to send them the magazine free rather than debit them at the beginning of the year with 2/ and have to credit them quarterly with 6d. I use great plainness of speech, but mean no offence whatever, as I quite understand that there are those who cannot pay 2/ in advance. Such are entirely welcome to the magazine free, and all that is needed is for such to send their address to the Publisher indicating their desire.

\* \* \*

THE subject of "The Spirit in Man" is not making much headway; and as a three-cornered discussion it seems something of a failure. Bro. Weir and the Editor seem disposed to give too much attention to side issues, and would do well to confine themselves to the subject when they feel tempted to expose the nakedness of each other in a fashion which might be construed by some as uncharitable. The Editor has allowed Bro. Weir a free hand, and one is disposed to think he has fully availed himself of the opportunity; and as there is nobody to look after the Editor and keep him within due bounds in the use of controversial weapons—well, the possible outcome may be left to the imagination. But I believe we are each of us—Bro. Diboll included—anxious only to get at the truth of the matter, and if that governs our words we shall not err too egregiously in what we may write.

Then what we want to get at are the bottom facts, not mere inferences from more or less extraneous matter. We want to know what man is in a state of nature—the "natural"—apart from all light of knowledge which may bring him into touch with the "spiritual." If such come within the category of the "*psuchical* (soulical, "natural")

having no *pneuma*” (“spirit”)—Jude, 19th verse—can they also be described as possessing *pneuma* or *ruach* in any individual or personal sense, such as brethren Diboll and Weir contend for?

The space, however, must be curtailed somewhat, and as Bro. Weir and Bro. Diboll are practically one in their contention as to the possession of “a spirit,” the discussion might be confined to one or other of them and the Editor. Personally I should prefer Bro. Weir, as he hits hardest, but I don't object to Bro. Diboll. Three pages from each is enough for each issue. In these circumstances there would be room for one who could argue out the matter from what I have called the ordinary or “Orthodox Christadelphian” standpoint. I should welcome such.

#### BROTHER STAINFORTH'S CRITICISM CRITICISED.

DEAR BRO. NISBET.—I had the intention, with your favour in this issue, of replying in full to Bro. Stainforth's criticism of my reply to the question you submitted to me on the Moriah and Pascal lambs; but work in other directions intervened, and I had to desist.

Should you, therefore, have space enough to spare in your next issue, I will take up his objections and assertions and reply to them *seriatim*. I think there will be no difficulty in bringing the rafters of his substitutionary theory down about his ears, and floating the foundation of it from under his feet. He is too dogmatic and unreasonable to be super-

ficially passed over; too devoid of the “*suavitor in modo*” to be gently dealt with.—Yours fraternally,

W. D. JARDINE.

#### A NEW PAMPHLET.

ETERNAL LIFE AND THE SPIRIT OF LIFE.—This is a pamphlet of some 36 pages by the Publisher of the *Investigator*, Bro. Paris, described on the title page as “an attempt to discover how we can get and retain Eternal Life; and what and whose is the ‘spirit’ which is said to return to God who gave it.” These subjects are treated on somewhat different lines from the usual and should be equally helpful to the brethren, as well as useful and attractive to those still strangers to the “Truth as in Jesus.” A perusal of the lecture on “Eternal Life” should assist to correct notions as to the true perspective of this subject in the picture presented to us by Jesus and his apostles, while an attempt at a rational exposition of the term “spirit” in its various connections in the scriptures should prove both interesting and instructive to brethren. I can heartily recommend a reading of these “Two Lectures,” not merely on account of the fact that I can largely agree with what is taught on these two subjects, but because I have found the treatment of the subjects attractive in itself from a literary standpoint. The pamphlet costs 3½d, post free, of the author, 24 South Albion Street, Glasgow.

#### ON THE SONSHIP OF JESUS MADE CHRIST. BRO. NISBET'S VIEWS.

(1). “GOD was not the father of the infant Jesus unless in the sense in which he was also the father of the child Isaac, power from on high overshadowed both Sarah (Heb. xi. 11), and Mary (Luke i. 35); result, a man child in both cases.”

(a) This generalisation looks plausible, but particulars exhibit a wide difference between their respective Conceptions. (a). Abraham was Isaac's father: “Jesus” (according to Bro. Nisbet), “had no father as an infant.” (b). Jesus is called “The Only Begotten Son of God” (John iii. 16-18): Isaac “The only begotten son of Abraham, of whom it was said, ‘In Isaac shall thy seed be called’” (Heb. xi. 18, R.V.) (c). Sarah received power to become mother of *Abraham's Son*: Mary “knew not a man.” (d). Isaac was not superior to his parents: Jesus was superior to *Mary and every one else*,—a result, the basis of which was laid in his extraordinary

begettal. (e). The R.V. reads—“Sarah herself received power to conceive seed when she was past age:” Bro. Nisbet says, “Power from on high overshadowed both Sarah (Heb. xi. 11), and Mary (Luke i. 35); result, a man child in both cases.” This is a very *free* style of quoting. There's no authority for saying that Sarah was *overshadowed*.

(b) Sarah (hitherto “barren”) although past the prime of life, had yet 36 years to live, and simply needed to receive “strength,” fitting her to conceive, and so perform her part as wife of Abraham, in giving birth to HIS “son of promise.” With Mary it was very different: a Hebrew maid of sound constitution, betrothed to Joseph, but nothing more, conceives and is “with child!” The marvel is, to some extent, explained to her by the Angel Gabriel, in language as unique as the event it chronicles. An explanation is also given to Joseph, by means of which his suspicions are allayed, and he recognises her as his wife. The child in due time is

born, accompanied by wonderful circumstances. The whole affair is neatly summarised in a phrase by John, chap. i. 14, "The Word became flesh." Herein is the grand distinction betwixt Jesus and Isaac, which Bro. Nisbet does not seem yet to have noticed.

(c) This expression of John cannot possibly apply to any one save the infant Jesus,—either to his infancy or not at all. If, then, Isaac was called son of Abraham, because begotten in the womb of Sarah *by Abraham*; why not call Jesus Son of God who was begotten in the womb of Mary, by the Word or Spirit of God? It seems to me that this conclusion is unavoidable, both from a Scriptural and logical standpoint. Had Bro. Nisbet selected the begetting of John the Baptist as a parallel to that of Isaac, his reputation as a reasoner would not have suffered. What he has attempted is not a parallel at all, but only partial analogy,—a resemblance, in part, with the important feature left out.

(2). "The relationship of 'son' had knowledge as its basis. It is knowing God rather being known of Him (Gal. iv. 9), which constitutes true sonship such as Jesus became the subject of." . . . "The fundamental law—'Not first the spiritual, but the soulical: after that the spiritual, is as truly applicable to Jesus who became 'Son of God,' as to any of us his brethren. If Jesus were first a Son of God, then he was never soulical—never came in flesh. The soulical or natural basis must exist before the spiritual is possible."

(a) This proposition is the natural complement of the preceding one; for if, as an infant, Jesus was not "Son of God," he must needs become such afterwards. When, then, and by what means did he attain to that degree? Certainly not as *we* become sons. Our sonship is by *adoption in him*, through faith in his name and baptism,—*"putting on Christ"* (Gal. iii. 27). Not one passage of Scripture affirms that Jesus became "Son of God" through learning to know God."

(b) How else, then, might he become a Son after infancy? By no means whatever. His position was unique. The nearest resemblance to it is that of Adam, who was a figure of him (Rom. v. 14). Adam at first was natural (soulical), but innocent. Had he not sinned, he probably would have become "pious" (a term Bro. Nisbet has seen fit to use, not very fairly, I think). But Adam being sinless at first, there could not be anything answering to our idea of *spiritual begetting* in his career. His progress would be a gradual ascent from an *untried* to a *tried* innocence. Correspondingly, Jesus who "did no sin;" in whom "was no sin," would also be incapable of spiritual begetting,

and therefore must have been "Son of God" (if at all) from his earliest infancy. He was "born" (as Adam was "created") a "very good" soulical, or natural basis for the gradual inflow of spiritual ideas,—a condition which Bro. Nisbet says "must exist before the spiritual is possible;" but Bro. Nisbet is entirely in error when he says, "If Jesus were first a 'Son of God,' then he was never soulical—never came in flesh." There is nothing inherently offensive in flesh as it was in Adam before he sinned,—the Divine verdict "very good" resting on it. The offensiveness has been contracted since, and attaches to every ordinarily begotten descendant of his. If Adam was "a figure of Jesus," it is unreasonable to hold that he was inferior to Adam in this respect,—the "substance" inferior to the "shadow." We may not have him born superior to *unfallen* humanity, but neither can we accept him *inferior* to it.

(c) Bro. Nisbet, however, practically contends that *he was inferior*—that he was *made holy*. He says: "While believing that such an high priest became us, who is holy (*hosios*), harmless, undefiled (Heb. vii. 26), yet no testimony of an angel from heaven could convince me that Jesus was born *pious* of Mary, he became so and remains so."

(d) This is a false issue introduced under cover of mere verbal definition. I have not said anything so absurd as that Jesus was *born pious*. True, *hagios* is used in Luke i. 35, and *hosios*, Heb. vii. 26, but what of that? The terms are almost identical in meaning, and are used interchangeably,—*e.g.*, *hagios*, is rendered "Holy One" 4 times (Mark i. 24; Luke iv. 34; Acts iii. 14; 1 John ii. 20), *hosios* twice (Acts ii. 27; xiii. 35). In Acts ii. 27 and iii. 14, Peter is the speaker, and he uses *hosios* in the second, and *hagios* in the third chapter, when speaking of Jesus; showing that, in his mind at least, they were, to some extent, similar in meaning. Liddell & Scott give as the literal meaning of *hagios*, "devoted to the Gods, and so in good sense, sacred, holy." *Hosios* they render "hallowed, *i.e.*, sanctioned or hallowed by the law of God or of nature." Both words set forth prominently the idea of *consecration* or *sacredness*, which manifestly was characteristic of Jesus from his infancy. Rotherham renders Heb. vii. 26, "For such an high priest as this for us was even suited, sacred, harmless, undefiled, set apart from sinners, and become higher than the heavens." A baby may be *sacred* but not *pious*.

(e) Then, again, the title "only begotten Son" points to a *singular* begetting. On the other hand, *we* are begotten by the Word,—*"of his own will begat he us with the word of truth"* (Jas. i. 18). If begotten thus, he

could not be called the "Only begotten."

(3). Bro. Nisbet says "No argument from the life that Christ Jesus lived will prove him to have been at birth what he is testified to have been throughout his life." "The same argument," says he, "would prove us to have been always [saints (*hagioi*), seeing we are so at present." Could the same be affirmed of *our* lives *throughout* (from beginning to end), as has been of *his*, it would be difficult to resist such a conclusion, but this is not an admissible analogy in the circumstances. I have not argued that he was *everything at birth* which he was "throughout" (or during) life, but that he was *throughout without sin*, and as regeneration implies sinfulness, he could not have been *regenerated* or begotten again. I do not profess to know all that is included in the phrase, "The Word became flesh," but I find it difficult to conceive of the Word or Spirit of God being entirely absent (however temporarily) from its own *embodiment*, while life continued, which it must have been if *sin were present*, and regeneration necessary, or possible, in the person of Jesus.

(4). Bro. Nisbet further says—"No Jew required to keep the law from infancy, only from their 'youth up.'" These are the words of the "young man" who questioned Jesus concerning "eternal life." There's nothing in them to show that Bro. Nisbet's limitation is justifiable. Common sense would, of course, dictate that responsibility could not precede a certain measure of mental development in a Jew any more than in a Gentile. This, no doubt, was the idea the "young man" had of the matter—it is really too absurd to raise a question of this kind. Jesus was "*born under the law*" (Gal. iv. 4, R.V.) "When the fulness of time was come, God sent forth his Son, born of a woman, born under the law." This shows (1) that he was God's son *when he was born* of Mary, and (2) that he was born *under the law*. It is strange that he should be *under* and yet *not amenable* to it. At what stage of youth does Bro. Nisbet say amenability begins? and before it begins can one commit sin?

(5). Bro. Nisbet's remarks that "Mary was never authorised to call her child 'Son of God,'" &c., are very remarkable coming from one who admits the genuineness of Luke's narrative. The words of Gabriel to Mary are, "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee: wherefore also that which is to be born shall be called holy, the Son of God." "Wherefore" here means *for this reason*. If, then, *for this reason* he was called "Son of God," his *sonship* has to do with his *begotten through Mary* and nothing else.

(6). ETERNAL LIFE—REWARD OR GIFT?

There are, it seems to me, but three views possible as to how Jesus became possessed of eternal life." (a) He must have been born with it ("a free life"); or (b) have received it afterwards as a *gift*; or (c) have proved his title to it through obedience to the law. Bro. Nisbet, if consistent, cannot favour (a), because he has laid down the principle that the "soulical" must precede the "spiritual," and if Jesus had eternal life from birth (infancy), he could not have been "soulical" to start with, as "eternal life" and spirituality are inseparable associates. His choice, then, must be either (b) or (c). If the former, it devolves on him to show *when, how, and why* the *gift* of "eternal life" passed from the Father to the Son; also how the following remarks of his are to be understood in relation to it:—"I think," says he, "it is going beyond the testimony to say that Jesus *earned* eternal life. He doubtless justified his claim to its possession." This is a specimen of Bro. Nisbet's "fine hand" in drawing distinctions. To most minds his phrase would appear simply as equivalent to my term "*earned*," but he means something different by it. I do not wish to quibble about *words*, however. He seems disposed to think that Jesus became possessed of the "*gift*" at his baptism in Jordan: if he also thinks that "His claim to possession of it was justified" (in brief "*earned*"), from my point of view, during the *previous* years of his life, "under the law," he holds a view which will assist him to "rightly divide the word of truth," and, if logically followed, will extricate him from his present "confusion of thought." It is eminently reasonable to hold that the Father's utterance, "In whom I am well pleased," had a special reference to the life of singular purity, and fidelity to law, which Jesus had led up to that time. With what else could he have been "well pleased"? The temptation in the wilderness had not yet been encountered, but this, and all that follows during his ministry may, quite appropriately, be regarded as an *additional work*—something required of *no other Jew*, and for the performance of which he had received the special bestowal (anointing) of Holy Spirit, as a qualification. It was a superhuman task which lay before him, and superhuman qualification, in a very marked degree, was required for its accomplishment. The utterances of Jesus, from *baptism to crucifixion*, concerning his relationship to the Father, eloquently proclaim the fact that he had "eternal life" abiding in him:—"As the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself" (Jno. v. 26); the *reward*, doubtless, of his unblemished service, "under the law," during that portion of his probation *before entering on his ministry*.



7(a) ETERNAL V. ENDLESS LIFE.—It is not strictly accurate to say that "Bro. Weir's conception of 'eternal life' is evidently that of 'endless life,'" if by that you mean to suggest that I hold *endlessness* to be its *only* attribute. I can agree with much that you have written concerning *aiónios*, in No. 25 of the "Investigator" (opening article), but, from what I now know of your mind on the "eternal life" question, would be disposed to examine very carefully any use you might make of it. I cannot conceive of age (*aión*) apart from the element of time: it may be *endless* duration, or *limited* duration, but duration of some sort must be in it. When the young man asked Jesus, saying, "Good Master," &c., it was not merely a "quality" which was implied. The answer of Jesus to both him and Peter shows that *endlessness* was involved in it. Jesus himself has been "made a priest after the power of an endless (*akatalutos*—indissoluble, not loosed down), life" (Heb. vii. 16). Peter and all aspirants to "eternal life" are taught to look for association with him in both *nature* and *function* (see John x. 28; xi. 26; and Luke xx. 31), therefore (without multiplying words), I conclude that I am warranted in insisting on *endlessness* being implied in *aiónios*, in this connection, whatever else it may contain. In some passages, where the Master is dealing with the same topic, *aiónios* is not used at all, e.g., "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments" (Mat. xix. 17). "Strait is the gate, and narrow is the way that leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it" (Mat. vii. 14). *Aiónios* is absent from these quotations, yet the duration of the life in question is, no doubt, *endless*. Concerning the former quotation (Mat. xix. 17), I remarked (*Investigator*, p. 57, par. 1), "The reward of *perfect* obedience to the law was 'eternal' life." On this Bro. Nisbet says (p. 61, par. 1), "For such a statement there is, I believe, absolutely no authority." Well, this is not the only passage regarding which I have a difficulty in accounting for his *belief*, if, indeed, there *be* any accounting for it! In addition to this "young man's" case, Luke records one of "a certain lawyer" who "stood up, and tempting him, said—Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life? He said unto him, what is written in the law? How readest thou? And he answering said, thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind: and thy neighbour as thyself. And he said unto him, thou hast answered right: this do and thou shalt live" chap. x. 25-28). The question in both cases is the same, and so, in effect, is the answer. "Eternal life is the issue, Is the Master's answer *direct*, or is it *evasive*?

It must be borne in mind, that the commandment (law), was ordained to life" (Rom. vii. 10): it was a *second* "tree of life," by means of which the *second* Adam was proved. The *first* Adam violated the obligations connected with the *Eden* "tree of life," and so brought death: the second Adam honourably and perfectly discharged his obligations under the *Mosaic* tree of life, and so brought life—"eternal life," I contend, and I challenge refutation. If, then, these passages be "absolutely no authority" for saying that "the reward of perfect obedience to the law was 'eternal life,'" will Bro. Nisbet kindly furnish us with a sample of what, in his opinion, would constitute "authority?"

(b) I would also suggest that Rom. iv. 4 is *authority* for the principle I was contending for when I used the term "*earned*." "Now, to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt." If I arrange with one to do certain work for me, at a specified price or *reward*: when the work has been done perfectly, he has earned the reward: I have become his *debtor* to that extent; what he gets from me is not a *gift*, but the *reward* of his services which he has faithfully EARNED. This is, to my mind, how the matter stands as between Jesus and the Father.

(c) In conclusion, I would invite Bro. Nisbet, if he wishes any more discussion of this important subject, to come out into the "open" and, in an *exegetical* article, set forth his theory in *all its bearings*, so that we may know what to think and do about it.

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SPACE does not permit me to make more than a few passing remarks upon the various points of what Bro. Weir submits as "Bro. Nisbet's Views" on the Sonship of Jesus. In his concluding remarks he asks me "to come out into the 'open,'" with an *exegetical* article upon the subject; but if there is anything that I can say more plainly than I have said—if there is, I do not know of it—it clearly cannot be on this occasion, in the absence of space. I shall therefore say no more than seems really necessary, and shall pass by, without remark, some things which I should otherwise take exception to. I note a good deal of strong assertion, and a corresponding absence of proof, in much that Bro. Weir says. It doesn't seem to strike him that proof is needed for much that he asserts. For instance, he says under (d) in the second paragraph, that Jesus, at his birth, was "superior to Mary and every one else." Now, no one who

accepts Christ will deny that the man Christ Jesus was superior to all who called him "Master"; but to affirm that the babe was superior to his mother, Mary, would be to say that she could teach him nothing. No doubt he became greatly superior, since even on the testimony of his enemies "never man spake like this man" (Jno. vii. 46). Another example is to be seen under (b), where Mary is credited with having conceived "the only begotten son of God," that is to say, Mary was the mother of "an only begotten God" (Jno. i. 18\*). Now, although the man Christ Jesus was the only begotten Son of God, and therefore Divine, Mary was not the mother of this "only begotten God." How could she, a mere human, be the mother of "a God," or "a Son of God?" But she was the mother of the Cherub who afterwards when grown to man's stature, was acknowledged, but on other than physiological grounds—as God's "Son, the beloved in whom he delighted." So much for what is regarded by Bro. Weir as beyond the need of proof.

The remarks which follow bear upon the various sections as numbered by Bro. Weir. (I have also indicated the different paragraphs in these sections alphabetically).

1 (a) Bro. Weir objects that "there's no authority for saying that Sarah was *overshadowed*." Well, I am willing to use any other terms instead of "overshadowed" which will fairly describe the fact, viz., that it was the same "power" which operated in both cases alike. I shall not haggle with him about a term if we can agree about the fact. If, however, he thinks that this is not fairly described as an "overshadowing" of Sarah, what term has he to suggest as defining the fact which obtained in Sarah's case in some, to him, less objectionable way? Then he also says, "this is a very free style of quoting"—referring to my use (which see) of the term "overshadow"—but if he looks again he will find I am not quoting but describing, in a convenient fashion, what took place in both cases.

(b) The "*strength*" which Sarah received is not a different thing from the "power" which operated in Mary's case: it is *dynamis* = power, in both cases (Luke i. 35; Heb. xi. 11), the difference between "strength" and "power" being a purely gratuitous one on the part of the Translators of King James' version. Then Bro. Weir will find it difficult to prove that "the word became flesh" when Mary brought forth her "first-born son" (Luke ii. 7). I have not yet noticed the "grand distinction" betwixt the babes Jesus

and Isaac which he has, but I have noted another viz., one of personal character, which did not exist in babyhood.

(c) If Bro. Weir takes the expression "the word became (*egeneto*) flesh" (Jno. i. 12) to apply to the infant Jesus—he says it must apply either "to his infancy or not at all"—then I must say that this is equally true of Isaac, for in his case also a word became flesh, as we read in Rom. ix. 9—"For the word (*logos*) is one of promise: 'At this time *will I come* and Sarah shall have a son.'" But it is both illogical and unscriptural to apply such a statement as "the word became flesh" to the coming into existence of the babe Jesus; the babe Jesus is not the *son* of the word—he is the son of Mary and becomes himself the word made flesh—not antecedent to his knowing the Father but coincident therewith, and *so* Son of God. Jesus, regarded as a physiological fact, could not be both Son of God and son of Mary at his birth. This were a physical impossibility. If Jesus at his birth was physically the same as we are—as I maintain and as Bro. Weir believes—then he was no Son of God at birth any more than we are at birth. Still if I, being "now Son of God" (1 Jno. iii. 2) can be spoken of as born A.D. 1849, Jesus, the Son of God, might also be spoken of as born A.D. 1, while as a matter of fact the sonship in either case is a later accretion. The parallel I have drawn is complete as regards the fact drawn attention to, viz., that Isaac was the result of the special operation of God upon the system of a woman. And if Jesus is to be termed "Son of God" because of this fact, then so must Isaac; and so argued Dr. Thomas in *Phanerosis*, and it will take something more effective than Bro. Weir has been able to advance, to dispose of the argument of either of us. The suggestion that my "reputation as a reasoner" will suffer doesn't come within the category of argument.

2 (a) It is certainly just as we become sons that he became Son. Knowledge is the basis—a getting to know God. Jesus had to be "made Christ" (Acts ii. 36); so have we. He was made Christ in his sonship; so are we. And our "sonship" is not *adoption*, if by that Bro. Weir means something less than being real sons. *Adoption*, as I have pointed out elsewhere, *is* sonship, and *whiothesia* ought to be so rendered. It is the same sonship of God in kind as Jesus had, but differing, no doubt, in degree. "Not one passage in scripture," we are told by Bro. Weir, affirms that Jesus *became* 'Son of God' through learning to know God." What does Bro. Weir say to Rom. i. 3—"Paul . . . separated unto a gospel of Deity which he before announced . . . about the son of himself, the one that was made out of seed

\* See remark as to Westcott & Hort's *Text* there, and the Revisers' *margin*, in footnote on p. 82 of last issue—"only begotten God."

of David in accordance with flesh, the one determined (*horizō*, to mark, limit, define; see Luke xxii. 22; Acts xvii. 26, 'determined'), a Son of Deity in power in accordance with a spirit of holiness out of an upstanding of dead ones, Jesus Christ, the Lord of us." This agrees with the whole body of apostolic teaching regarding his sonship: and Jesus' own claims. I go farther and say that Jesus as a babe is never once called God's Son. Jesus never refers to his peculiar conception by Mary as the ground of his claim to being "a Son of God" (Jno. x. 37); but appeals to his "works" (verses 37-38) as the proof of it: it was on the ground that he was "in a form of Deity" that he did not think that he was claiming what was not his own (Phil. ii. 6). And Paul evidently put no stress upon this fictitious sonship: he never once glances towards it: certainly he did not seek to maintain that it was "in his infancy if at all" that Jesus was the Son of God, as Bro. Weir does. I accept the testimony of Matthew and Luke as to his conception, but I do not seek to make more of it than Paul does; or Peter; or James; or John; or the writer to the Hebrews. Both instinct and reason forbid it. A mawkish sentimentality, derived from the churches, seeks to make it everything.

(6) Adam is not said to be "a figure of Christ." If he were, Jesus would be a poor Christ. What Paul says is: "a type of that about to be"—those "who sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression." I see no difficulty in Adam being spiritually begotten when in the innocent *soulical* (*psuchikos*, I Cor. xv. 44) state. And Jesus was surely no less susceptible of spiritual begetting. The *soulical* or "natural" is not essentially a state of sin, although sin reigns at present. Bro. Weir labours under the common hallucination that spiritual begetting implies previous sin in the subject of it. If this were true it would mean that no Son of God could begin to be apart from a state of sin. There must truly be "first the natural" and "afterwards that which is spiritual," but the "natural" is as much a creation of God as is the spiritual, only they occupy different planes.

Bro. Weir concludes this paragraph by saying, "we may not have him [Jesus] horn superior to *unfallen* humanity, but neither can we accept him inferior to it." But Bro. Weir just does the former. He makes the babe Jesus the "Son of God"—which Adam was not, for he, Adam, is not once so termed, the italics of the Translators in Luke iii. 38 to the contrary notwithstanding. It beats me to see how Bro. Weir avoids the theory that Jesus had "life in himself." His pre-

mises all point to that conclusion, while I know he does not draw it.

(c) Bro. Nisbet does not "contend that Jesus was inferior to Adam." Adam, previous to his "fall," was as much needing to be made holy (*hosios*=pious) as Jesus was. Both were soulical, and both needed to learn to obey and so become pious (*hosios*). Both, however, might be described as holy in the *hagios* sense, if *set apart* (*hagios*) for a purpose—as both undoubtedly were.

(d) Bro. Weir has no right to say that the distinction between *hagios*-holiness and *hosios*-holiness is a merely verbal one. It is not: it is a distinction in thought, and a very clear and definite one too; and I have submitted the evidence upon which that distinction rests, and Bro. Weir does not set it aside by such a remark. The terms are neither "almost identical in meaning" nor are they ever "used interchangeably." Surely he knows better than to suggest that because the two terms are sometimes rendered "holy" in the English Bible that therefore the holiness is identical in both cases. It is Bro. Weir who is playing with words. If he is bold enough, let him conclude his paragraph thus—"A baby can be born as *hosios* as *hagios*" (which I deny): and he will have said something.

(e) As a sufficient reply to Bro. Weir's argument from the term "*only* begotten" it is merely necessary to remind him that Isaac was termed Abraham's "only begotten" (Heb. xi. 17) when he wasn't even his *first* begotten.

(3) "Regeneration" does not necessarily "imply preceding sinfulness": it is a being "born from-above"—*anōthen* (Jno. iii. 36). So Jesus could say "I am from above" (*ek tōn anō*), while to the Jews he said "ye are from beneath" (Jno. viii. 23). I am glad to agree with Bro. Weir when he makes such a lucid statement as the following: "I find it difficult to conceive of the Word . . . being entirely absent from its own embodiment while life continued." And yet Jesus could say while still alive, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" (Matt. xxvii. 46). If the embodiment were material—God incarnate!—this could not be. But God did forsake him; therefore, the embodiment was not material, but mental, as is seen by the fact that Jesus felt himself forsaken.

(4) Gal. iv. 4 shows that "when the fullness of the time came the Deity sent forth his Son," but it does not show that he sent him forth a babe! We find from Acts xiii. 24 that John "preached *before* his (Christ's) coming": hence I conclude that Jesus had arrived at man's stature before he was "sent forth." It is true that the Revisers read

"born of a woman, born under the law," but Bro. Weir knows, I presume, that the word rendered "born" in both cases is a form of *ginomai*, to happen, to become, to come about, and does not distinctively mean "born" (which would have required *gennaō*, as in Matt. ii. 1, 4). God's Son was not, as Jesus was, "born of a woman" but "got-to-be (*genomenou*) out of a woman, got-to-be (*genomenou*) under law"—*genomenou ek ginaikos, genomenou hupo nomou*. This indicates both his soulful basis—"out of woman"—and his spiritual development—"under law"—to redeem others also under law in order that the sonship, which was his, might become ours. The Son was "made" not "born."

(5) Section 5 is answered in what I have already said.

(6) ETERNAL LIFE—REWARD OR GIFT? Truth consists in fine distinctions, but Bro. Weir objects to these. The loss is likely to be his own. But the distinction to which he objects is, after all, not very fine. There is a very clear distinction, and an essential difference, between justifying one's claim to be in the present possession of "eternal" life (however got) by the evidence of works consorting therewith; and earning the right to come into possession of it (by keeping the law). In the latter case he acquires, by works, the right to it; in my view, room is left for it being what it is—"the free gift (*charisma*) of God in Jesus Christ" (Rom. vi. 23)—"as the Father hath life in himself so hath he given the Son to have life in himself" (Jno. v. 26). But there is no evidence that Jesus *earned* "eternal" life (immortality is quite another

thing). The purpose of "eternal" life partly explains its nature—"it is in order that one may get to know God" (Jno. xvii. 3), and when, after coming into possession of it,—as we do in Christ—we "bring forth fruits meet for a thinking with" God we also "justify our claim to its possession" in the present. To justify, then, one's claim to be in possession of "eternal" life is a very different thing from having "earned eternal life." Perhaps Bro. Weir may now better understand the distinction. But I do not say, nor do I know, "when" Jesus became possessed of "eternal" life. I only know he had it, else he could not have given it to others also, but I *think* he must have had it at the time he said "Wist ye not that I should be about my Father's business?" (Luke ii. 49).

I also know "eternal" life was in "the Word"—"In it was life and the life was the light of the men" enlightened thereby (Jno. i. 4)—and that that was the only "*how*" Jesus could get it. "*Why*" Jesus got it—or "*why*" any one else has received it, is because it pleased the Father to bestow it. There is no other "*why*" that I know of.

(7) ETERNAL v. ENDLESS LIFE.—This topic must stand over at present. It may form a subject by itself for future discussion, and drawing nice distinctions "with a view to the exact knowledge of truth" (1 Tim. ii. 4).

*Editor*

## THE ATONEMENT AS TAUGHT BY BRO. STAINFORTH VIDE THE SCRIPTURES.

ON p. 89 (Oct., 1897) Bro. Saunders "suggests the bestowal of time and attention on *huper*," but if any profit is to follow it must not be on the lines he indicates, for when giving its various significations he omits without warning "instead of," the one upon which I have laid such stress that he cannot possibly have overlooked it, and which is just as distinct in *Liddell & Scott, abridged*, as those which he prefers. The unlearned, therefore, for whom he is apparently writing, might, for all he cares, go down to *Sheol* and never hear that Jesus had died—instead of

them—the second death. So much for his "suppression of truth," which lawyers say "amounts to suggestion of falsehood."

He then proceeds to illustrate another rendering of *huper*, viz., "excess, a surpassing over," and so on, saying that "those who grasp the full import of *huper* have no difficulty in understanding 2 Cor. v. 14," which he renders—"If one died in excess of all unto the sin," &c. Now *Liddell & Scott* does indeed give, as Bro. S. says, "excess" as a meaning of *huper*—but, observe! only when it is connected with or "governs" the accusa-

tive case. But Bro. S., having ignored that vital stipulation, actually proceeds to prop up his baseless doctrine by quoting a passage where *huper* governs, *not* the essential accusative case, but the genitive (!) whose sign is, among others, as I have all along told him, "instead of." There is an illustration of these two constructions in Philemon, verse 13, "I would have retained Onesimus that he might minister to me *huper* son." *Huper* son is translated in the R.V. "in thy behalf," but since A cannot act on behalf of B unless he has his authority, it is plain that "in thy stead" (A.V.) is correct. In this case *huper* governs the genitive case "son," as per *Liddell & Scott*. This is not set before the unlearned by Bro. S. But to prove this let Bro. S. take his list of renderings and try to find one to take the place of "instead of," and see if he can make sense with any one of them. Did Paul mean that he had wished Onesimus might have served him "in excess" or "surpassing over" what Philemon could have done? Even the unlearned can see through that. Well; in 21 we further read (R.V.), "I write to thee knowing that thou wilt do even—*huper* ha, beyond what—I say." Here in construction with "beyond" we find *ha* in the accusative case, just as per *Liddell & Scott* again. There are some brethren who can think; what do they think of such exegesis as these specimens of "grasping the full import of" a Greek word?

Now, let me once more appeal to the thoughtful, to those who desire to get at the mind of Christ in the Scriptures. When you read "*huper* a good man some one would die . . . but while we were sinners Christ died *huper* the ungodly," do you also believe that Paul meant "that some one might die in excess, above and beyond that good man, while Christ likewise died in excess of sinners?" Since no one can deny that Jesus died that we

might escape our deserts—the second death,\* and that if *he* had not died *we* must—what is that but "vicarious 'sacrifice' according to the Scriptures?" (1 Cor. xv. 3). But he certainly did not *die in excess of us* (what *does* that mean?) Believing in the wisdom as well as the love of God for His perfect son, I do not believe that Jesus suffered one smallest pang more than was absolutely essential for the fulfilment of God's purpose. Christ did nothing superfluous—in excess—He worked no "works of Supererogation," as the Catholics teach. For there is no limit to good works short of perfect obedience, and no one can exceed perfection. Where then do "excesses" of salvation come in?

Having passed through a voluminous correspondence with Bro. Saunders by post, the cat got out of the bag when he wrote of Jesus as "*the son of Joseph!*" There you are *at last!* For how could a son of Joseph be anything more to us than John the Baptist, Peter, or Paul,—a mere example. Jesus is thus brought down at once to a level with "James, the Lord's brother." But was the birth of James announced with the information that having no human father, he was to be styled Son of God? Could James have said "I am the son of the Deity" (John x. 36), without the audience bursting out laughing? Did James, the Lord's brother, ever claim to "have come down from Heaven?" When Jesus said "I and my Father are One," was he referring to "his father Joseph?" In what sense were Jesus and Joseph "One?" When he said "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work," did he refer to harmonious labours at the bench? When he said "No man knoweth the

\* Personally I should deny this. The death of Jesus does not preclude our dying either a "first death" or a "second death." He died that we might live, not that we might not die. Our not dying the second death will depend upon our own actions.—Ed.

Father save the Son, and he to whom the Son wills to reveal Him," Mat. xi. 27, was he offering an introduction to the carpenter? Is Jesus now sitting on his father Joseph's throne? Rev. iii. 21.

I strongly disapprove of having been inveigled into a laborious private correspondence in ignorance that it was with an ordinary Unitarian. Let all come to the light. Bro. Saunders closes with unblushing Romanism!—"The sacrifice of Christ is not yet complete." Of course not, Bro. S. has first to supply his contribution. But that is just the way Papists defend the Mass. They "deny that it is a repetition, it is the one offering continued, and requires, that it may secure our salvation, to be supplemented with our good works, our self-denials and sufferings. There are Jesuits *everywhere!* "Brethren, save yourselves from" doctrines of demons *i.e.*, of lunatics (or worse). See Mark iii. 11.

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NOTE ON *HUPER* IN CONNECTION WITH DIFFERENT CASES OF NOUNS IN THE GREEK.—A few remarks to the interested—who may also be uninstructed—on the force of the preposition *huper* seem desirable here, in view of the discussion of the subject of atonement between Bro. Stainforth and Saunders. It is necessary first to explain that, in the Greek, nouns fall into what are called "cases," of which there are, strictly speaking, but three, viz.: the Genitive, Dative, and Accusative—the Nominative (as also the so-called Vocative), not being a "case" in the strict sense of the term, since "case" implies dependence, and the Nominative is independent, being the "case" of the subject of a sentence. It may be represented by an upright line, from which the Genitive, Dative, and Accusative bend off at different angles; hence termed the *oblique* cases. The Genitive case originally signifies *motion from*, and then more generally *separation*, and denotes relationship in general, answering the question, *Whence?*

The Dative denotes *rest in, conjunction with, or juxtaposition*, and answers the question, *Where?* The Accusative denotes *motion towards*, and answers the question, *Whither?* Now, while some prepositions are found in construction with one case only (which may be either the Genitive, Dative, or Accusative), yet there are those which "govern" two or more cases (1), the Genitive and Accusative; or (2), the Genitive, Dative, and Accusative. It will be evident from this fact, that the *meaning* of the preposition will vary with the particular "case" with which it is construed, and the force of the "case" will determine the particular *meaning* of the preposition. Now *huper* is sometimes construed with a Genitive, sometimes with an Accusative, as Bro. Stainforth has already pointed out, hence it is of the first importance in a discussion of this sort that the particular "case" should be noted and given due weight to.

With the Genitive *huper* signifies "over and separate from"; and when used in connexion with *persons* may be rendered *on behalf of* (as *covering* so as to protect, in which it is opposed to *kata*=against), as in 2 Cor. v. 14-15: "on behalf of all he died"; when used in connexion with *things* it means *for their sake*, in various ways, as in 1 Cor. xv. 3—"he died for the sins of us—in line with the scriptures."

With the Accusative, it signifies "over and towards," and may then be rendered *beyond, above*, as in 2 Cor. 1, 8: "beyond strength we were oppressed"; and Matt. x. 24: "A disciple is not *above* the teacher."

As to the question of the "vicarious" death of Jesus, for which Bro. Stainforth contends, it seems strange that, if this were a scripture doctrine, that other preposition *anti*, the primary signification of which is "OVER AGAINST" (with the notion of equivalence), and means *instead of, in the place of, for*, should not have been used instead of *huper*, which primarily signifies "OVER" (with the notion of aid). It seems to me that it is next to impossible to get the idea of *instead of* into *huper* in any of its connections, and if one were to succeed in this, it would mean that Jesus died *instead of our sins*, as in 1 Cor. xv. 3, appealed to by Bro. Stainforth as a case of "vicarious sacrifice": "died *huper* (instead of!) our sins." But here *huper* teaches, as elsewhere, that Jesus died as a *covering for* the sins of certain ones, not *instead of* their sins. No doubt one can get sense out of many passages by reading *huper* as *instead of*, but one does not therefore get the meaning of the writer.

Now, while I do not agree with Bro. Stainforth's conclusions, nor with some of his verbal criticism, I take no less exception to



the treatment accorded to *hyper* by Bro. Saunders and the strained conclusion arrived at thereby. "Dying in excess" may be a clear enough thought to him, and it may be a true thought in a certain connexion, but

*hyper*—in its various connexions—cannot justly have this thought fathered upon it to the extent that Bro. Saunders apparently seeks to do. What would "dying in excess of our sins" be—I Cor. xv. 3?—EDITOR.

### CORRESPONDENCE.

#### ON WHICH SIDE IS THE FICTION?

DEAR BRO. NISBET,

Your favour in relation to my last encourages me to make further effort. I hope I am not moved by any captious spirit, but I feel a kind of dread lest I be found believing for Divine truth, human fiction.

I may say I have never been able to confine my thoughts to the orthodox Christadelphian groove; consequently I have a grave suspicion that, as a body, we have not been altogether free from the leaven, the working of which, I think, is the cause of most of the disturbances amongst us. I cannot endorse what is practically expressed in some quarters, that we have *proved all things*, and are *only holding fast that which is good*. At the same time, I fully and gratefully acknowledge the great and noble work of Dr. Thomas in his discovering for us a sure anchorage for true faith, or the relation of God's covenants to salvation.

Now, my suspicion is, that some mischievous editorial hand or hands have been at work upon the writings we call "Holy Scriptures," and I apprehend that, could the truth of this be made apparent to all, little cause would remain for division and strife; but while this, or one side of it, is a forbidden subject for discussion, unity is next to impossible. On this account I see great reason for less exaction in regard to essentials: I should like to see essentials confined to clear positive evidence, based on the testimony of not less than two witnesses, whose testimony must be unconflicting and unquestioned. I

think I discern two distinct pictures of Christ in the Bible—one Hebrew, taken from life; the other Gentile, and the work of imagination to a great extent. The reason why this is not generally noticed is through the discernment being hampered by sentiment; in fact, the sentimental Gentile picture is so attractive through its supposed loveliness, that the real is scarcely recognised. So important and interesting is this subject to me, that were I capable, I should attempt to write a book. However, it is not my intention to deal with this question now, but to say a word or two on your remarks upon my criticisms in your last issue.

(1). *The Two Genealogies*.—You say you have always considered these two distinct lines, one Joseph's, the other Mary's. I am aware that such is our "orthodox" idea, to which I have assented, I cannot say I have believed it, because it is a most difficult thing with me to persuade myself that inspiration dictated the omission of a name with the intention that I should read it in. I am well aware that such an attitude is likely to endanger my standing, but that has become a secondary matter with me. I think it is far better not to pretend to believe what we cannot possibly believe.

This is not the only difficulty in relation to the two genealogies. I have not yet seen it shown to my satisfaction how the same two links can form a part of two distinct chains. I cannot admit that the writer intended here that we should read some unnamed woman into the genealogy. Your revision of parenthesis may be quite fallible; and do you suggest that by "of" the writer did not intend

“son of,” with the one exception in which italics are not placed? Here an interesting query suggests itself:—By whom was Jesus *supposed* to be the son of Joseph, and at what period did the miraculous conception become an established and essential doctrine in the church?

(2). “*The Lord from Heaven.*”—This is closely related to the foregoing. In this expression you seem to see a parallel to the passage, “I came down from heaven,” thus, it seems, making Paul teach the doctrine of incarnation, for the Apostle is no more *mystical* in this expression than in its contrast “of the earth earthy.” If Jesus was flesh and blood like Adam, how could he, in the days of his flesh, be said to come down from heaven? The reply will be, I assume, “Because God was his father.” If so, I must ask if I am to believe that God stood in the same relation to Jesus as Joseph did to Mary’s other children? If not, then strictly speaking, he had no father, or his mother must have been father as well, if Joseph was not; or we may say he had no more a real father than Adam had; for what was there in his constitution that was not in Adam’s? both being earth animated by the same life power; the only difference being that one was produced from inanimate, the other from animate earth.

The expression quoted by you—“He that hath seen me hath seen the father,” suggests the thought that by the “Lord from heaven” you believe that Paul meant God the Father.

(3). “*Sin in the Flesh.*”—With regard to this question it would be interesting to know if this “thing,” “sin in the flesh,” is to be considered an attribute of the body or mind, and whether this sin is included in the sins that are remitted at conversion. Here I must add that I consider when contentions make friends into adversaries, and are the cause of divisions,

they are most certainly, in that sense, unprofitable. If that could be avoided, the “threshing out” process might be not only profitable, but also pleasing.

(4). *The Human Spirit.*—Just one thought in regard to “the human spirit.” I suppose there is no one who has given any thought to the subject but will readily allow that the brain has very much to do with the process of thinking. This is never recognised by writers of the Scriptures, but the functions of the brain are generally attributed by them to the heart. Where then is the wisdom of going to the Scriptures to discover the seat of thought? There is no question but that the motive power that moves the mental machinery is “spirit.”

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[NOTE.—*The two Genealogies.* My revision of parenthesis is fallible, but I think correct.

All the italics in Luke iii. from verse 23 to verse 38 *must be rejected* as without authority. All that the “of” affirms is a certain relation, but not that of *son*, otherwise Adam would be “Son of God” on the mere score of physical existence, which is an unscriptural, and, indeed, impossible conception.

The supposition regarding Jesus’ paternity was on the part of those who didn’t know any better. Joseph stood in that legal relationship to Jesus, but he was not his father *de facto*: in the nature of things only those concerned need have known this; hence the supposition.

*The Lord from heaven.* I have not been understood here. He was “the Lord from heaven”—if indeed he is yet fully “the Lord from heaven”—

in the character manifested—just as he was the “Son” in whom the Father delighted. It is not as “flesh and blood” or the “natural” that Jesus is “the Lord from heaven” but as the “only begotten Son”—which he was not at his birth of Mary. He was only Mary’s “first-born son” at that time. If we “judge after the flesh,” as the

generality of the brethren do on this subject, we shall not understand it. “The flesh profiteth nothing.” Jesus was not “the Lord from heaven” in A. D. 1. What I have written elsewhere in answer to Bro. Weir may help to make plain my whereabouts on this subject. “God the Father” is not “the Lord from heaven.—EDITOR.]

## APOCALYPTIC STUDIES.—No. XVII.

### CHAPTER XXI.

“AND I (John) saw a new heaven and a new earth; for the first heaven and the first earth are passed away; and the sea is no more.” A first implies a second. New contrasts with what has become old, and has become of no further use. John’s Apocalyptic visions had brought him to the upstanding of the dead ones in Christ, the chief of whom he saw being exalted to sit on thrones and to reign with Christ. The kingdoms of this world were become the kingdom of our Lord and His Christ. That was a new heavenly constitution of things which was to embrace all mankind in its beneficent rule. There was a heavenly constitution on the earth in former ages, but it was not universal in its jurisdiction. It only embraced the twelve tribes of Israel, and was confined to a very small portion of the earth’s surface. Its code of laws was “holy, just and good,” and its administrators who were appointed by God, were commanded to rule in accordance with that God-given law. They were not at liberty to add to it, or to diminish aught from it, or to alter it in any way. However, in course of time they did tamper with it. Jesus accused the rulers of making void the commandments of God through the traditions of the elders. And of having left undone the weightier matters of the law, judgment, and mercy, and faith. And he accused them of being “blind leaders of the blind.” On that account, God was to bring destruction on the temple, cause its forms of worship to cease—cause the people to be carried away into captivity, and to bring the land into a state of desolation. All these things, said Jesus, “shall come on this generation.” When that tribulation should come upon them, “the sun shall be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and the stars shall fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens shall be shaken.” In 2 Peter iii., the apostle describes that calamity as a

time “in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall be dissolved with fervent heat, and the earth and the works that are therein shall be burned up.” That dissolution brought the first heaven and the first earth to an end. The law of Moses and its divine administration passed away. The arrangement was entirely confined to the people of Israel and the land which was given them for a possession. The xxiv. of Isaiah graphically describes the state of the land and the people, when the heaven and the earth shall pass away. “The land shall be utterly emptied, and utterly spoiled; for the Lord hath spoken this word.” The constitution belonged to the people and the land by God’s arrangement, and therefore could not be carried away by the people out of the land, nor could it be transferred to any other people, nor to any other land. There has been no other arrangement of a national character entitled to be called “the heavens and the earth” since the Mosaic arrangement passed away. “But,” says Peter, “according to his promise we look for new heavens and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness.” It was this new arrangement which John saw in vision, after the dead had been raised. It is yet to come. When it does come into existence, it will embrace all peoples, nations, and tongues, and give laws and government to all lands. “Then judgment shall dwell in the wilderness, and righteousness remain in the fruitful field, and the work of righteousness shall be peace, and the effect of righteousness quietness and assurance for ever” (Is. xxxii. 16-17).

As it is written that, “the Lord made the heaven and the earth,” the terms cannot be applied to any mere human government. All the kingdoms outside the kingdom of God over Israel, were the kingdoms of men, and had their origin from the troubled sea of human ambition and strife. The prophet

Daniel had a vision of the kingdoms of men, as recorded in ch. vii. His vision embraced a period of time reaching from Nebuchadnezzar's reign onward to the coming of the Lord, when all people, nations, and tongues should serve and obey him. None of these came from God. It is said that Daniel saw them all "come up from the sea." "The wicked are like the troubled sea, that casteth up mire and dirt." Governments have been found necessary in order to restrain disorder and strife. Authority, at first, was that of parents over their children, which in course of time would extend over related families formed into tribes acknowledging a chief father, called patriarchal government. All such authority is therefore, in a sense, from God. However, that natural form of rule had passed away by the time that Daniel had his vision of the beasts rising out of the sea. So far, then, as the government of nations is concerned, the laws and administration are entirely human, and are of the troubled sea character, and associated more or less with oppression and discontentedness. Under the administration of "the new heavens and the new earth" the "sea will be no more." There will be no rival governments to break the peace. "Wars will cease to the ends of the earth." The people "shall learn war no more." The new state of things will bring "peace on earth, and goodwill to men."

"And I saw the holy city, New Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, made ready as a bride adorned for her husband." Jerusalem, according to the prophets of old, is to "be built upon her own heap" (Jer. xxx. 18). In Jer. xxxi. 38-40 we have an account of it as a city to be "built to the Lord—and shall be holy unto the Lord; it shall not be plucked up, nor thrown down any more for ever." The topographical description of its site, given by God to the prophet, shows that it will be built where Jerusalem then was, when the prophet received the message. Jer. iii. 17 shows that in the future that city "shall be called the throne of the Lord; and all the nations shall be gathered to it, to the name of the Lord, to Jerusalem." That being the prophetic testimony, how are we to reconcile it with John's testimony that he saw "New Jerusalem coming down from God out of heaven"? As the Apocalypse deals with the future in relation to the church of God in Christ Jesus, while the prophets deal with it in relation to Israel and the nations, the New Jerusalem of the Apocalypse will of necessity be understood to bear a relation to the church. Jerusalem under the law of Moses was the centre of rule and worship, by God's appointment. The Jerusalem which shall be built to the Lord, in the same place, will be the centre of

rule and worship for all nations (Is. ii. 1-4). The rule will be an entirely new order of things divinely arranged for universal application. The ruling powers of a city are as much entitled to bear the name of the city as the buildings that compose its material form. On the same principle the rulers of a country are associated with the name of the city which forms the seat of government. So the holy city, New Jerusalem, will be the name of the corporate body who are not only to rule the city, but shall also rule all nations from that city as the capital of universal rule. That corporate body "shall come from God out of the heaven, made ready as a bride adorned for her husband." The church of God in Christ is said "to be espoused to one husband as a chaste virgin to Christ" (2 Cor. xi. 2). The angel said to John:—"Come hither, I will show thee the bride the wife of the Lamb." What he saw was "the holy city, Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, having the glory of God." That seems to identify the city and the bride, the Lamb's wife. Another figure used is the "tabernacle"; "Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and he shall dwell with them," &c. A tabernacle state is a movable one, and indicates that the glorified ones will tabernacle with men wherever "men" are to be found. The rule will be universal. The description of the city is highly figurative: gates of pearls, foundations of precious stones, jasper wall, and the city itself, and its street, pure gold as it were transparent glass. There is no doubt but that God could form a city composed of all these materials, in a literal sense, although the known source of pearls could not produce a single one large enough to form a city gate. But as we are told that these gates bear the names of the twelve tribes of Israel, and that the foundations of the wall bear the names of the twelve apostles of the Lamb, the figurative idea accords with similar figurative language applied to the church of God in Christ; which is said to be "built upon the foundation of apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner stone" (Eph. ii. 20). Peter calls those to whom he wrote "living stones built up a spiritual house." In 1 Cor. iii. 10-16 we have similar figures:—"Other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ. But if any man buildeth on the foundation of gold, silver, costly stones, wood, hay, stubble; each man's work shall be made manifest: for the day shall declare it, because it is revealed in fire; and the fire itself shall prove each man's work of what sort it is. If any man's work shall abide which he built thereon, he shall receive a reward. If any man's work shall be burned, he shall suffer loss;

but he himself shall be saved; yet so as through fire. Know ye not that ye are a temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" We also read that "the covenants of promise" belong to Israel, and that "salvation is of the Jews," and that the arrangement is called "the commonwealth of Israel"; hence the gates. These references furnish a key to the figurative character of the city, indicating purity, beauty, glory, and indestructibility. Its measurement presents a difficulty in understanding it as a literal city. It has only one street, yet it forms a square of twelve thousand furlongs. I suppose Roman measure is meant. Well, 12,000 Roman stadia, as the breadth from west to east, would reach from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean. 12,000 in length from north to south would require both Assyria and Egypt along with the promised land. The limits of the promised land were the river Euphrates on the north, and the Nile on the south, which would measure about 5,200 stadia. Part of Egypt and part of Assyria would be required for 6,800 in order to make up the 12,000. The whole land of promise would not be large enough to hold such a literal city. There is a curious prophecy in Isaiah xix. 23, 24, which says:—"In that day shall there be a highway out of Egypt to Assyria, and the Assyrian shall come into Egypt, and the Egyptian into Assyria; and the Egyptians shall worship with the Assyrians. In that day shall Israel be the third with Egypt and with Assyria, a blessing in the midst of the earth; for that the Lord of hosts hath blessed them, saying, Blessed be Egypt, my people, and Assyria the work of my hands, and Israel mine inheritance." A highway from Egypt to Assyria must necessarily pass through the land of Israel, and would seem to indicate an alliance of the three peoples of a closer character than that of other peoples. Here we have the complete length of the city, 12,000 stadia. But perhaps Egypt and Assyria may be representative of all nations. Ver. 2 seems to indicate that the burden of Egypt covers other kingdoms in the latter days; that under the name of Egypt a war of kingdoms shall be waged: "they shall fight every one against his brother, and every one against his neighbour, city against city, and kingdom against kingdom." Egypt combined with Sodom seems to have a figurative meaning embracing the extent of the Roman empire, if not all the kingdoms of men. See Rev. xi. 8.

The dimensions of the city present another difficulty, namely, in its height: "the length and the breadth, and the height are equal." Supposing we were to divide the 12,000 by four, we would still have a cube of 3000

stadia. Such a height would be quite out of proportion to the height of the wall, which is stated to be 144 cubits. Walls were built as a defence to the dwellings within, from assailants without, and were therefore built higher than the houses inside. But here we have a city with buildings, say 375 miles high, surrounded with a wall only 144 cubits high! It seems to me that there is a mistake somewhere. In verse 16, only the length and the breadth are mentioned in connection with its size. Then follows the statement that the angel measured the city with the reed twelve thousand furlongs. The words in the beginning of the 17th verse, "and he measured," is regarded by Griesbach as doubtful. They are not in *Codex Vaticanus*, nor in *Vat. MS.*, 1160. It appears to me that the repetition of the words are unnecessary, and that their presence spoils the sense. By omitting them, we have a consistent narrative in verses 16 and 17. The verb *esti* translated *are*, is in the singular, and should be *is*. Now read verses 16 and 17, as follows:—"And the city lieth four-square, and the length thereof is as great as the breadth: and he measured the city with the reed, twelve thousand furlongs the length and the breadth. And the height of it is equal to the wall thereof, a hundred and forty-four cubits, according to the measure of a man, that is, of an angel." Thus by omitting the doubtful words, "and he measured," we find that the height of the city and the wall correspond, and is in harmony with what walls in relation to cities have always been. The walls as well the gates may have a relation to the twelve tribes of Israel, as enclosing the household of faith. The 144 cubits, and the 144,000 sealed ones of the tribes of Israel, are both squares of twelve.

The holy Jerusalem of the prophets will have a temple built in it, but the New Jerusalem of the Apocalypse will be both a city and a temple in itself, and will bear the glory of God. "For the righteous shall shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father."—Mat. xiii. 43. "The glory of the Lord shall be revealed and all flesh shall see it together; for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it."—Is. xl. 5. Since all flesh shall see it together, the glory bearers will be located among all peoples, and in all countries. "The nations shall walk amidst the light thereof." "Blessed be the Lord God, the God of Israel, who only doeth wondrous things; and blessed be his glorious name for ever; and let the whole earth be filled with his glory."—Ps. lxxii. 18-19.

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# The Investigator.

"All things, put to the test; the good retain."—1 Thess. v. 21.

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## "A PROPITIATION, THROUGH THE FAITH, IN HIS BLOOD" (ROM. III. 25).

*(Being an Address after the Breaking of Bread, delivered in the Shepherds' Hall, 25 Bath Street, Glasgow.)*

THE 3rd chapter of Romans, read this morning, contains much food for thought and very close study. We have brought before us by the Apostle the method of becoming righteous before God, apart from observance of the Mosaic law; and the problem with the Jews of Paul's time was how it was possible to become righteous and reject that law as the means. In this, as the Apostle elsewhere affirms, they manifested their blindness. They forgot evidently that Abraham, their father, was justified apart from that law, and at the same time they manifested their ignorance of the purpose which the law served—namely, to lead them onward, under control, in a way suited to the condition and standing of the multitude, till the Christ should come, the hope of the faithful ones in all ages of their national existence, and before—the one in whom the hope of Abraham reposed before the nation or the law had an existence. All that Paul could do in bringing them away from seeking a righteous standing in law-keeping was to point them to the promises made of old to their fathers concerning the one who was to come, showing what progress had been made in the way of fulfilment, and to what extent the promises were ratified by the death-sealed testimony of Jesus—who, as the Christ, was the foundation and stay of all that was to be—and from that lead them on, step by step, to the higher conception of things of God in Christ—how a more excellent righteousness was possible in a more excellent way than in ritualism and law-keeping.

In verse 25 of the chapter read we have a most significant statement made. Concerning Jesus it says, "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God." We might, for a short time, look at this matter of "propitiation;" and in considering the passage we may ask first, What is a propitiation? Many there be who would not have the slightest difficulty in answering the question, and would reply, in perfect harmony with most of the present day dictionaries, that a propitiation is something which propitiates, and to "propitiate" is to "conciliate," "render favourable," "appease;" consequently, as applied to Jesus, he is regarded as a "propitiation" on our behalf God-ward, "conciliating" God, rendering Him favourable to us, subduing His wrath towards us by means of Jesus' sacrifice on Calvary. Such an explanation is the product of a false theology, the outcome of a narrow and distorted conception of the Deity, who is scripturally set forth as a God who is loving, merciful, and gracious; and if there be an element of



truth in the foregoing meaning of a "propitiation," God set forth Jesus to propitiate *us*—for our best good, no doubt—but on His *own* behalf, for His *own* purpose, to conciliate us, to subdue our natures as children of wrath or impetuosity in a way not His, and bring us unto Himself.

Taking the word "propitiation" etymologically, it is derived from the Latin "propitius" or "prope," signifying "near;" and supposing we went no further than this simple idea of "propitiation," it would mean, as applied to Jesus, "one near;" and it will be granted that in this sense he was a "propitiation," with every notion of "appeasing" and "conciliating" God excluded; for in him the Deity himself "drew near to us, and that in a manner He never did before. Jesus, the anointed, was "The Deity with us;" they who saw him—not superficially—saw the Father. This explanation of Jesus as a propitiation seems true, even although it be not what Paul meant to convey. It is reasonable, in harmony with the fitness of things, and a decided improvement upon the notions of current theology. God did not call for anything or any one at any time to appease His wrath, to conciliate Him in the manner required by orthodoxy. Such an idea is defamatory in view of His action all down the ages, for in dealing with His people He has always shown Himself, while just, a God rich in mercy and great in love. He it is indeed who conciliates *us*, for it is *we* who require it. He has always been the prime mover when redemption was possible for the impulse-driven children of men.

However, this idea of a "near one" may not be exactly what Paul meant to convey, and this is probable from a consideration of the Greek word rendered "propitiation," which is *hilasterion*. This word *hilasterion* is the term used by the translators of the Hebrew Old Testament into Greek to represent the Hebrew word *kopher*, which is the word rendered "atonement" in our version of the Old Testament. Now this word *kopher* is as near an approach to our English word "cover" as it will be possible to find; in fact, our English word is derived from it, and that is its signification in the Hebrew—"a cover" or "covering." The word is used in its first occurrence in connection with the painting with pitch of Noah's ark in the 6th chapter of Genesis. It is also applied to the covering of the ark of the covenant, which is called the mercy-seat in Exodus xxv. 22. The great day of atonement was the great day of coverings. Atonement or covering under the law was effected by many means—the slaying of animals, payment of money, offering of incense, prayer, &c., and was enjoined in connection with everything in Israel—the houses, the tabernacle, the altar, the people and the priests; atonement or covering had to be made for everything animate and inanimate. But these things availed nothing as touching the heart and the conscience. The multitude could never rise above the gross visible practice of sacrificing—which, as a matter of fact, was self-imposed, and not commanded *primarily* by God, but was a regulated adoption of the people's own method of rendering Him service, arranged and enjoined by Him to teach them His supremacy and other lessons in the only way possible till the Christ should come, and find them more tractable and teachable, capable of being lead in the more excellent way. But as to "atonement," as used in the Old Testament, its signification is that of a "covering," represented by *hilasterion* in the Greek translation; and inasmuch as Paul uses the Greek word when he speaks of Jesus as a "propitiation"—according to our English New Testament—he may have meant those to whom he wrote to understand a "covering." How this "covering" is effected may be gathered from what follows in the passage,

"through faith in his blood," or, as the passage reads, according to Newberry, "through the faith, in the blood of him." There is no "covering" apart from the faith. In drawing near to us in the person of Jesus Christ, God did so "through" or "by means of the faith." Jesus came preaching the glad tidings of the kingdom in order to bring men to God, and no one, apart from faith in the message, and apart from him who was the herald, could come to the Father. 'Twas all by means of "the faith," which was given "for the obedience of faith;" and God set forth Jesus, his anointed, as the one around whom men should rally, into whose fellowship they must come who would participate in the special blessings of the Deity. Thus Jesus Christ is a "covering" to those who come through means of the faith. "There is no other name given" by God, "whereby we can be saved;" and immersed upon the name of the Lord Jesus we come into that relationship in Him with the Deity in which it is His good pleasure to have those high dealings with us in view of perfecting us for the age of the ages.

But what did Paul mean when he said "in his blood?" A literal interpretation of the phrase is farthest from the truth. To be "in the blood" of Christ is to be in that circle in which his divine life operates. As those in him, in the same "bundle of life," we are covered, we are "in his blood," and all "through the faith;" and viewing "propitiation" as a "nearness" of approximation, we are "made nigh in the blood of Christ." This resolves itself into the apostolic teaching of the "one body," Christ the head, those in him the members. As the Apostle says, "We are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones," and we may with all reverence complete the figure and say, "we are of his blood." In a sense other than fleshly we have been by God created conjointly with him, "all of one blood;" and all that Jesus is to us as the one who revealed the Father, as the one in whom all the promises of the Deity are yea and amen, and in his own exemplary life—and that is saying a great deal—is to us *his* blood, the blood that justifies or puts us right before God, the blood that cleanses by operating upon our hearts and consciences, driving out all that is impure—the blood that brings us nigh to God, in that it incites us to approximate ourselves to the divine, in maintaining a living active relationship with him who is divine. "By his blood" we are, "in his blood," made alive, nourished, strengthened, conformed to his image, who is an image of the invisible Deity; and with this spiritual life-force pulsating in our members we are sympathetically constrained to do those things which well please the Father, putting "away our sins by righteousness," developing and exercising that love in the spirit by which multitudes of sins may be covered.

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## NEW ZEALAND ANSWERS TO QUEENSLAND QUESTIONS

(*Appearing on Cover of issue for April, 1897.*)

Question 1.—*Was the sacrifice of Christ absolutely necessary for the salvation of the race?*

*Answer.*—The salvation of the *race* was never contemplated, but the sacrifice of Christ is *absolutely necessary* for all of the race who will be saved, as there is no *other way* to the Father, *i.e.*, than by self-sacrifice, which was Christ's.

*Q. 2.*—*Is the human race under sentence of death?*

*A.*—Can a duck swim? Yes, given the opportunity. So, all of the race who have had the opportunity of sinning, by being put under law, are under sentence of death, but where no law is, there is no transgression, therefore no sentence of death, nevertheless all die, because they were all made to die, *i.e.*, mortal, sentence or no sentence.

*Q. 3.*—*Did Christ come in the flesh common to humanity?*

*A.*—Yes. There is only "one flesh of men" (1 Cor. 15, 39).

*Q. 4.*—*Was evil part of the flesh of Adam before he fell?*

*A.*—The question is wrong. It is not once affirmed in scripture that Adam fell. What is usually spoken of as the "fall" was in reality a rise from ignorance to knowledge, the first step in the ladder by which man was to ascend from earth to heaven. Evil is no part of the flesh at any time; evil is the product of the flesh thinking, set in motion by the law of God saying, thou shalt not covet or lust.

*Q. 5.*—*Has the human race any evil principle in its nature as a result of Adam's transgression?*

*A.*—As well ask, had Adam an "evil principle" in his nature, as the result of the transgression of the human race, only the absurdity of the question would have been more apparent, though not more real. The nature of Adam was the nature of the race, and the nature of the race was the nature of Adam. Adam was only the first in which the flesh was set in motion; he created nothing (which all teach who say there was something in his nature after his transgression that was not there before). He simply transmitted to the race the nature he himself received, without adding to, or taking from, its inherent capabilities by the most infinitesimal fraction conceivable. The idea that Adam was made better (or worse) than the race he represented is a vile imputation on the character of a holy and a just God. He was made an animal, utterly incapable of producing a spiritual idea, until he was taught by God how such an idea could be acquired. And man (the race) is just in the same position still.

*Q. 6.*—*What is "sin-in-the-flesh" as used by Paul in Rom. viii. 3?*

*A.*—The thinking of the flesh.

*Q. 7.*—*If sin be a transgression of law, how can you speak of it as dwelling in you (Rom. vii. 20)?*

*A.*—All transgression of the law is sin, but all sin is not transgression of the law; the law takes cognizance of overt acts only, but the thinking of the flesh is sin in God's sight. This is the sense of Rom. vii. 20.

*Q. 8.*—*If the Lord Jesus was absolutely without sin, how did the Apostle Paul apply the 27th verse of the 7th chapter of the Hebrews to him?*

*A.*—Paul was not speaking of the Lord Jesus in Heb. vii. 27, but of the work by which Jesus was made Lord, and if he (Jesus) was absolutely without sin, it is absolutely absurd to speak of him offering for his own sins.

*Q. 9.*—*Did sin have hold upon the Lord's nature?*

*A.*—No, if by "nature" is meant the nature after it was made Lord, which was then spirit nature; yes, if by "nature" is meant the nature of Jesus which was animal nature, like all the rest of the race. Sin, otherwise "the thinking

of the flesh," was the enemy or the *diabolos* that required to be bound and destroyed, and God accomplished this great work by putting his Spirit on Jesus, whereby he was enabled to bring every thought of the flesh into obedience to his Father's will. But if there was no "thinking of the flesh" that was contrary to the "thinking of the Spirit" in Jesus, then we are yet without an *atonement*.

*Q. 10.—How did sin come into the world?*

*A.—*By one man sin entered into the world, but we must not imagine for a moment that that one man differed in the slightest degree from "the many" that constitute the *genus homo*: he was but the sample that all the stock were like, and it mattered nothing what part the sample came from, beginning, middle, or end, top, bottom, or centre, they would have been all alike. In testing the sample, therefore, it is clearly demonstrated what the stock is; and it was not Adam's overt act of transgression (which was his own and could not by any possibility be transferred or imputed to any one else) but it was the "thinking of the flesh" that conceived the sin that is common to all flesh (or animal nature), Jesus of Nazareth included, and of which he testified his cognizance when he prayed, "Not my will but Thine be done."

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#### QUESTIONS ANSWERED.

*Q. 1.—The Serpent in the Garden of Eden: Was it a literal Serpent?*

*Ans.—*Like the brief statement recording the creation of man this matter of the serpent is—almost painfully—without details. The human mind craves for details—especially in regard to things which are out of the ordinary course of human experience. A serpent, if we except this one, has never been known to speak; nor can we readily conceive it as being able to speak, and much less to think or reflect in the manner and to the extent which this account of it seems to imply. And not only because it is an animal merely, but, among other reasons, because its tongue is not adapted in its formation—as that of many animals is—for the articulation of speech.

It may be conceived as able to think to the extent, for instance, of devising and selecting means or alternative means for securing its prey, or of avoiding being caught as a prey by another animal or by man. But the kind of reflection here attributed by implication to the serpent—which involves the idea that either it had overheard angelic conversation and was capable of understanding what was said; of interpreting its significance, and of judging for itself the primary or secondary meaning which it was designed Adam and Eve should understand by the words used, or to be used; or that, otherwise, it was specially endowed for the time being with the power of speech and reflection—is undoubtedly difficult to realise.

The information available, however, is very deficient, and is very far short of what is needful to enable us to judge as to how far the incident related of the serpent was the result of miraculous agency, and how far it might have been due to powers normally possessed by it at the stage of creation previous to the fall of Adam. Animals do not speak now; but it does not follow that they—or some of them—were not originally endowed with speech of some

kind. It is quite possible that they might have been in a position to converse in some intelligible way with Adam while he was in a state of innocence, and that, as one of the results of the curse pronounced by God on Adam and on the ground, after the fall, the power of speech which enabled them to some extent to hold converse with him was removed. It is entirely reasonable to suppose that at the time when Adam was introduced on the scene the nature and character of animals, as well as of the food they ate, must have been very different from what it is now. We are told that at a future time:—"The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb; and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young goat and a little child shall lead them. And the bull and the bear shall feed together; and the ox and the sucking child shall play on the hole of the asp; and the child shall put his hand on the cockatrice's den. I will destroy in all my holy mountain: for the earth shall be desolate, and the cities shall be laid waste, and the mountains shall be broken up, and the hills shall be removed, and the high places shall be levelled, and the towers shall be brought down, and the strong holds shall be destroyed, and the citadels shall be laid waste, and the towers shall be brought down, and the strong holds shall be destroyed, and the citadels shall be laid waste, and the towers shall be brought down, and the strong holds shall be destroyed, and the citadels shall be laid waste." (Is. xlii. 11.) This suggests a complete change in the nature and habits of animals, which will permit of their free association with man on a mutually agreeable and safe. What is thus prophetically foreshadowed may easily have been the condition of things at the time the serpent is represented as speaking to Eve; and if so, the miraculous element in what is recorded would give place, to a great extent at least, to a conception of the incident as being capable of explanation on what may be termed natural grounds—that is to say, on the ground that the relations existing between Adam and the animals involved mutual and intelligible communication with each other, if not by actual speech, then by some competent equivalent practically equal to it.

The record states that it was "the serpent"; and from the considerations I have advanced, as well as from the fact that the record is inspired, and that at this early stage of the inspired word there is no evidence of the use of figurative language, there is, it seems to me, no particular reason—if God so willed—why it should not have been a literal serpent or some such reptile.

Whether the serpent and other animals before the fall, while possessing to some extent the power of speech or its equivalent, were also capable of reflection on matters outside the range of their own nature, is a question which the record given is sufficient to enable us to give a partial answer in the affirmative—at least as regards the serpent, which, it is said, "was more subtle than any beast of the field which the Lord God had made." If we exclude the miraculous element—that is, if we suppose the serpent to have been acting on its own initiative, and not specially acted upon by God for that particular purpose, the record would seem to show that it could not only reflect and think, but could direct the thinking for a sinister end—to beguile the woman; for the context shows that what must have been a very dreadful punishment was inflicted by God *because* of what it had done: "And the Lord God said unto the serpent, BECAUSE thou has done this, thou art cursed above all cattle, and above every beast of the field; upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life" (Gen. iii. 14). The infliction of this punishment seems to imply that the serpent had a wicked and sinister purpose in view, the very nature of which involves thought and reflection beyond what was needful for the necessities of its own bodily nature.

God's purpose, for the development of the man he had made, *required* that an impulse from outside the innocent and untutored man should be brought

to bear upon him, so as to afford the necessary scope for testing his obedience, which, otherwise, it would never have occurred to him to question. This was the first lesson in the discipline and subjugation of Adam's free-will. If the suggestion had never been made, the *intelligent* and *willing* subjection of his will to God could never have been brought about. He would have continued obedient; but it would have been the obedience of a helpless and innocent child—not that robust and intelligent obedience which can be entrusted to perform useful work in connection with the purposes of God. God must have foreseen that this impulse would be given, and, as a matter of fact, must have known by what agency it would be given—though the fact of foreknowledge does not necessarily imply that the particular agent was purposely provided and compelled to act as the serpent did; for, if so, the punishment inflicted would have been unreasonable, and quite out of harmony with our conception of His character.

This subtle serpent, endowed with speech and capable of reflection, in doing what it did, probably meant to serve some purpose of its own, and had no thought of the terrible results to follow from it. But, like many other Bible accounts in analogous directions, the purpose, whatever it was, being in some way to gratify itself, God, as it were, took possession of it and directed it into a channel in which the serpent, while intending only to serve itself, really worked out God's will, and thus fulfilled a necessary purpose connected with the evolution of man, by which such as are effectively operated upon will ultimately reach that stage of perfection with which immortality of being can safely be associated to the glory of God, according to his purpose in creating him.

We are not obliged to fathom all God's ways—nor can we. His ways are not as our ways, nor his thoughts as our thoughts. God has chosen to put the record of this incident in the form in which we find it. Some of God's ways and methods cannot be fully understood by the medium of human language, nor grasped by human intellect. Things which cannot be reconciled with human experience may, so far as they are revealed, be accepted in faith.

Q. 2.—*Is there any Scriptural testimony that Christ is now immortal?*

Ans.—Yes. We have his own testimony to the fact, given to John in Patmos—Rev. i. 17-18:—"I am the first and the last, and the living one; and I was dead, and behold, I am alive for evermore." Paul, in his epistle, 1 Tim. i. 17, says:—"Now unto the king"—God himself is never spoken of as king, if we except the particular sense in which the word is used in Samuel and elsewhere as God being king over the Israelites—"Now unto the king eternal (of the ages), *incorruptible*, invisible, the only God, be honour and glory for ever and ever" (unto the ages of the ages). And again, 1 Tim. vi. 15-16, where Paul, in exhorting Timothy to keep the commandment, without spot, without reproach, until the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ, says:—"Who is the blessed and only Potentate, the King of kings, and Lord of lords: who only" (of mankind) "HATH IMMORTALITY; dwelling in light unapproachable; whom no man hath seen, nor can see." That is, man, as he is now, is not capable of approaching this ineffable light, nor can mortal eyes behold him in the glorified condition to which he has attained. Also, Rom. vi. 9:—"Knowing that Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more: death hath no more dominion over him." And, inferentially, from Luke xx. 36; John viii. 35, xiv. 19; Heb. vii. 25, xiii. 8; Ps. cx. 4, cxlvi. 10; Rev. iv. 9, and many other passages.



Q. 3.—*Who are the Angels that sinned? See 2 Pet. ii. 4, and Jude 6.*

Ans.—Nothing has been revealed to us as to what may be called the domestic affairs and conduct of those angelic beings who have doubtless existed with God long before the era of man on the earth. It is entirely out of the question to suppose that any such immortal beings could sin at all; for the fact of being so endowed implies that they were beyond the stage in which—as we are—sin is possible.

It would be a reflection on the wisdom of God to suppose that he could ever have left it open for such a contingency to arise as that any of the angelic beings who had been admitted to such close and favoured intimacy with Himself could act in any other way than that of loving harmony and obedience.

The word translated “angels” in both these passages is *angelloi*, signifying messengers—the very same word as applied to John the Baptist, and translated “messenger”; and also applied to men in Luke vii. 24 and 27; ix. 52; 2 Cor. xii. 7; and James ii. 25. The “angels” therefore referred to in 2 Pet. ii. 4 and Jude 6 were *men* and not angelic beings like those sent to Abraham and others as related in Genesis, Exodus, &c.

Moses, Aaron, Levi and his sons were in the position of angels to the children of Israel; and it is recorded that some of these angels, namely, Korah, Dathan, and Abiram took men with them and charged Moses and Aaron with taking too much upon them. “Ye take too much upon you, seeing all the congregation are holy, every one of them, and the Lord is among them: wherefore then lift ye up yourselves above the assembly of the Lord?” These men, it is probable, almost, if not quite, to the extent of certainty, are “the angels that sinned” by seeking to go beyond the functions allotted to them in the Mosaic arrangements, and envying the higher functions pertaining especially to Moses and Aaron; or, as stated in Jude, “which kept not their own principality”—for they were princes in Israel—“but left their proper habitation”; that is, the limits of their own proper official sphere, for which sin “they and all that appertained to them went down alive into the pit”—the earth having opened up for the purpose—“and the earth closed upon them, and they perished from among the assembly.” The entire account is given in Num. xvi. 1 to 40, and a very terrible thing to them and to the onlookers it must have been. These angels—Korah, Dathan and Abiram, &c.—being thus cast down to the pit—to hell (*Sheol*, the grave)—are there retained in everlasting—perpetual—chains or bonds of darkness, the darkness of death and the grave, and reserved by the record of their fate—or, to speak metaphorically, the smoke of their burning—for the judgment or discrimination of all who can read it with understanding.

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*Jainustaris*

Bro. Smith, to whom the foregoing was submitted, with the request to add anything he might have to say on the subject, writes as follows in answer to the first question, *Was it a literal serpent?*

We can see no ground for thinking that the crawling reptile we call a serpent was the tempter of Eve. It does not answer the description of being

"more subtil (or crafty) than any beast of the field." Jesus, whose teaching was given mostly in parabolic language, said to his disciples, "Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves; be ye therefore *wise as serpents* and harmless as doves" (Matt. x. 16). And in prayer to his Father, he says, "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the *wise and prudent*, and hast revealed them unto babes" (Matt. xi. 25). When these same *wise and prudent* came to John the Baptist, he styled them "vipers," that is, serpents. And Jesus called the same class "serpents, generation of vipers," saying to them, "how can ye escape the damnation of hell?" In the parable of the unjust steward, Jesus says, 'The children of this world are in their generation *wiser* than the children of light.' In sending forth his disciples, he instructs them, in the language of parable, to be *wise*, as the men of the world, but to be unlike them in character. Those men, Jesus said, "devour widows' houses, and for a pretence make long prayers." He said, "Behold I send unto you prophets, and wise men, and scribes, and some of them ye shall kill and crucify." His disciples were to be harmless, but to be wise as they.

There are three Hebrew words rendered "serpent" in the Scriptures, and a fourth, "fiery serpent." *Nah-ghash* is the term rendered "serpent" in the case of Eve's temptation. The root idea of this term is—to hiss, to whisper, specially used of the whispering of soothsayers, whose work was evil, in seducing men from the worship of the true God. From this it seems to me as if this term, in many cases of its use, had in the Old Testament the same place as *devil* has in the New, being the term used for the seducing elements of unregenerate human nature, and also to that nature in its sin-stricken state.

We have no direct revelation as to the personality of the serpent which tempted Eve; but there are some side-lights from which one may gather a little information. When Cain was driven from THE FACES of the Earth, which were *the* FACES of JEHOVAH—the four Cherubic Faces, which were the symbol of his purpose, he was driven out of the way of approach unto God; cast down, as it were, from the heavens to the earth. It was, however, only the first heavens from which he was cast down. Cain, cast away from approach unto the divine manifestation of mercy, said, "Every one that findeth me shall slay me." This implies that there were people on the earth, and people from whom Cain had no protection when away from the protecting presence of the Faces of the Earth. But Jehovah gave him a mark that would protect him. He went to the land of Nod, on the east of Eden, and we find him there having a wife. We are not informed where his wife came from, but the natural inference is that his wife must have belonged to those of whom he was afraid of being slain, until he received the protecting mark.

The implication is, that there existed men on the earth before Adam was created, and this is in harmony with what may be observed, in nature, of God's method of working from a lower to a higher—an inferior race, more subtle than any beast of the field, under no law but the law of their existence, like the other animals. Adam was created to be lord over all, which purpose will be accomplished in the second Adam. Craftiness and duplicity has been a characteristic of the inferior races of mankind. However, the exact personality of the serpent is of no moment; the important thing to us is the teaching which springs from it.

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## THE SPIRIT IN MAN.

I REMARKED in Editorial for October last that while *ruach* is not mentioned in connection with man in Gen. ii. 7—a fact which Bro. Weir has neither disposed of nor accounted for by all he has written—yet, “*ruach* is everywhere—*ruach elohim*.” In answer to this, he says, on page 8 of the January issue, “we are not discussing about the ‘spirit of God’ at present, but ‘the spirit in man.’” That is so, as far as he is concerned, but from my standpoint we are discussing both—the one being the other, as I see it in this connection. I have denied that man, whose formation is described by Moses in Gen. ii. 7, had such a spirit as Bro. Weir contends for, and whose existence he postulates as explaining many allusions to “spirit” (*ruach*) in Scripture. We are both agreed that there is *ruach* in man: will Bro. Weir tell us what else this *ruach* is if it be not *ruach elohim*, “spirit of God”—not God, but spirit of God? *Ruach* may be free or it may be combined—so to speak—with an organism; the former idea being exemplified in the passage in Ps. cxxxix. 7:—“Whither shall I go from thy *ruach*?” the latter in Ps. civ. 30:—“Thou sendest forth thy *ruach*, they are created.” God is the cause of life by his *ruach*; and to live, man must breathe, but breathing (*neshamah*) is merely a condition of life, without which, life cannot continue. But life (*chai*) is not to be confounded with either *ruach* or *neshamah*. *Ruach* is a cause, *neshamah* is a condition; and “If God take unto himself his *ruach* and his *neshamah*, all flesh shall perish, and man shall turn again to dust” (Job xxxiv. 14). Hence no speculations about life and its origination *in embryo*, such as Bro. Weir favours us with in an extract from Joseph Cook (which Bro. Weir actually calls “the teaching of science!”—see October issue, p. 78, foot-note), will tell us one iota about life in its inception or origination. The extract assumes that life is a cause, whereas, all we know about life—all the egg can tell us—is that life comes from life. I cannot, therefore, allow Bro. Weir to jump from “life” to “spirit,” nor to think that he is arguing when he says:—“Spirit, or (synecdochically) life, is the cause, not the consequence of organization:” in the process of gestation, the *individualised* spirit is literally formed *within* the organism.” Besides, we are not discussing “life,” which is what Cook, incoherently, I must say, seeks, but utterly fails, to elucidate in the extract given: we are discussing whether man, possessing life, has such a spirit, individual and personal, as Bro. Weir pleads for, and which “resists disintegration after death” (April, 1887, p. 35).

It is indeed a very singular fact, and I do not intend that it should be lost sight of, that “spirit,” *i.e.*, *ruach*, is not mentioned by Moses in Gen. ii. 7. He says “*Yahweh Elohim* formed man of dust of the ground, blew into his nostrils” (or caused him to breathe by his nostrils) “the respiration of lives (*neshamah chayyim*), and man became a living soul (or person),” *nephesh chayyah*. This fact discounts all Bro. Weir’s inferential reasoning, by which he seeks to improve upon Moses here. Granted, there is the hypostatic *ruach* and the all-pervading or “free” *ruach*, but this *ruach* is neither man nor man’s, except in the Scripture sense that “flesh is *ruach* which passeth, and cometh not again” (Ps. lxxviii. 39); or in apostolic language, “Ye are a vapour, appearing for a little and then disappearing” (Jas. iv. 14).

The onus of proof naturally rests with Bro. Weir who affirms the existence of a spirit (*ruach*) personal and distinct from the body, but he has not given

us this proof: it is quite evident he believes in "a spirit in man," which is not spirit of God, for he says on p. 8 of January issue, "man's spirit is as much 'a created thing' as his body,—both were 'formed,' originally and directly, by God." And we are told (p. 78, October issue) that he could "easily conceive of the Almighty 'forming' and *locating* this hidden constituent of our being by the same act in the same instant." And as Bro. Weir there says that his "main argument is, that the spirit was formed as well as the body," it would be well if he would set himself to prove the truth of it. Such a spirit (*ruach*) is neither mentioned nor implied in Gen. ii. 7. The *ruach* is mentioned in Gen. i. 7 as "brooding" (*m'rachepheth*): creation followed; and assuredly, man was not formed without it, and cannot exist apart from it. Yet "he has no power over *ruach* to retain the *ruach*" (Eccl. viii. 8), which is somewhat singular if the *ruach* in man is all that Bro. Weir thinks it is.

THOS. NISBET.

I REGRET the misunderstanding which has arisen anent Gen. ii. 7. The words used by me, I now see, admitted of the interpretation put upon them by Bro. Nisbet, therefore I authorise him to debit me with lack of clearness at that point, *but not with error*.

As to "side issues," I am at a loss to understand exactly what the Editor means. True, I have followed and examined some criticisms of his which I thought rather irrelevant, but such was my duty, and had I not attended to it he might have inferred that the criticisms were unanswerable, and would have reminded me of them, as I now remind him of some of my strongest arguments that *still call aloud for attention*.

Bro. Nisbet's argument in January number seems to me the least to the point which he has yet written. In the part devoted to Bro. Diboll appears a first-class specimen of "side issue," in the form of a reverie about philosophers, together with a kind of running commentary on Christadelphian habits of thought, and which, by the way, he is not sure that they will endorse. This may be very interesting reading, but I fail to see why space so precious should be given to it, while the main arguments were *crowded out or neglected*. If "bottom facts are what we want to get at," let us settle down and keep our minds fixed on the main issue, diverging only where subsidiary evidence deserves notice.

Bro. Diboll has written to me, consenting to withdraw from the discussion should I be willing to continue in it. As to this, I may say frankly that I am *in it to stay*, if the Lord will, to the finish, but am sorry that there should be any need for Bro. Diboll's withdrawal. Seeing that he has kindly consented to withdraw, it will be my duty to attend to his part of the reply this time, as well as my own.

For the sake of clearness and convenience of reference, I shall take each paragraph in its order, beginning with Bro. Diboll's part.

(Par. 1 and 2.) Here Bro. Nisbet says—"Christadelphians distinguish, and rightly, between the spirit *in* a man and the spirit *of* a man." This seems odd, in view of the passage he had just quoted (1 Cor. ii. 11)—"The spirit of man which is *in* him"; or of (Isa. xxvi. 9)—"With my spirit *within me* will I seek thee"; or of (Dan. vii. 15)—"I, Daniel, was grieved in *my spirit in the midst of my body*." If Christadelphians make such a distinction, they are evidently at variance with Paul, Isaiah, Daniel, and others, who teach clearly that the spirit *of* man is the same which is *in* him. (Ecc. iii. 19.)—"All have

one *ruach*." Compare with this (1 Cor. xv. 39)—"There is one flesh of men." This does not hinder each man from having his own individual form of flesh, *i.e.*, body; why then may not the same rule apply to his spirit, as is affirmed by Zechariah (chap. xii. 1)—"The Lord formeth the spirit of man within him"? This has been argued at length in my first contribution to the discussion (July No., pp. 50 and 51), and has *never been seriously dealt with* by Bro. Nisbet. According to his last, there are but two kinds of spirit predicable of the natural man. Will he tell us in his next, which of them "The Lord formeth within him"? and will he at the same time come out into the "open," as he has been invited and has promised to do, and give readers a *frank and full* statement of his *theory* as the writer has? That is to say, if he have such, which is very much open to doubt. Readers will then be able to see for themselves whether it is in the "incubatory stage," or whether it is well developed.

Bro. Nisbet now launches into a philosophy seemingly all his own, although in some respects bearing a resemblance to that of Mr. J. J. Brown, which appears in same issue. "Christadelphians are agreed," says he, "that there is spirit (*ruach*) in man (Job xxxii. 8). They recognised the presence of spirit in everything; that spirit is absolutely essential to the life of all animals, and to the very existence of shapes," &c. . . . "Let that spirit be wholly withdrawn, and atoms assume once more their original and only essential formless form of spirit." Much more follows to a similar effect.

Now I am not averse to a little philosophy, if it can be clear and easily grasped by plain men like myself, but I confess to some surprise that Bro. Nisbet should himself appear in the *role* of a philosopher, in view of the disparaging remarks he makes here about men who, like himself, have engaged more or less in investigating the value of mind. Are we to understand that he, as a philosopher, is an exception to the "*haverin' bodies*," concerning whom he winds up by saying, "But to leave the philosophers, for we can make little of them, and can do less for them," &c. This appears very *unbrotherly* on his part.

But how about his philosophy? Spirit in everything? Scientists say that electricity pervades everything, and magnetically produces cohesion. Are electricity and spirit one and the same? Bro. Roberts and I think Dr. Thomas have said they are. But is it not something revolting to a reverential mind to think of the Spirit of God being harnessed by avaricious men; and as a propellor of railway cars, or some other means of amassing "filthy lucre," made to cater to the lusts which it so unsparingly denounces in His Word? This would seem like chaining the Most High to the chariot wheels of Mammon; making the Creator serve the vilest of his creatures, and that, too, *against his will!* God is everywhere by his spirit, as set forth in Psal. cxxxix. —"Whither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend into heaven thou art there: if I make my bed in Sheol thou art there," &c. Here God's spirit (*ruach*) is made synonymous with himself, and it is absurd to make God himself synonymous with the magnetism which holds the atoms together. If Bro. Nisbet says that spirit (*ruach*) is the name given in Scripture by the ancient Hebrews to what we call electricity or magnetism, all right; but, then, let him argue along that line, and some progress will be made. I may say here, that I believe electricity to be the Agent employed by God; but it is not to be confounded,

as Bro. Nisbet seems to be doing, with God's spirit (*ruach elohim*). If he still adhere to this, let it be proven forthwith.

But does the passage quoted by Bro. Nisbet (1 Cor. xi. 12) teach that "All things are out of God" in the comprehensive sense contended for by him? Apparently not—that, at least, is not its *immediate* teaching, as will be seen by the preceding verse—"Neither is the woman without the man, nor the man without the woman, in the Lord. For as the woman is of the man, so is the man also by the woman, but 'all out of God.'" That is: "All—man and woman—in the Lord, are out of God"—spiritually. Just as Jesus says (Jno. xvii. 20), "Neither for these only do I pray, but for them also who believe on me through their word; that they may all be one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee; that they also may be one in us." God being the originator of this, and his spirit the instrumentality, "All are out of God" in the fullest spiritual sense; but (1 Cor. xi. 12) does not necessarily teach more. Let Bro. Nisbet show that it does before seizing it as a foundation for his philosophy.

Then as to Job xxxii. 8—"There is a spirit (*ruach*) in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding." The insertion of "a" before "spirit" by the translators is characterised by Bro. Nisbet as "a gloss upon the text." Desperate criticism this! But it won't get the Editor out of his difficulty. Let us again apply the common-sense test to it. Elihu the Buzite—a young man, like young Timothy, to whom Paul said, "Let no man despise thy youth"—had listened patiently to Job and his three friends. At length he ventured to speak, and said, "I am young and ye are old; wherefore I was afraid, and durst not shew you mine opinion. I said days should speak, and multitude of years should teach wisdom. But there is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding. Great men are not always wise, neither do the aged understand judgment." Elihu did not here refer to the physical act of inhaling air into the lungs by breathing, but to the inspiration of intelligence and wisdom by the Almighty. The leading thought of the text seems to be—"There is a spirit in man which is able to receive and appropriate the 'inspiration of the Almighty'." Elihu believed that he had been so inspired, and therefore he was willing, yea anxious, to speak, even in the presence of the "great" and "aged." Old age is not *always* associated with wisdom. The spirit here spoken of by Elihu could not be the "one spirit" which is *alike* in man and beast. This "one spirit" is used by Solomon (Ecc. iii. 19) simply with reference to physical life, and, being common to both man and beast, when it is withdrawn, the result is death—"As the one dieth so dieth the other." But Elihu's spirit is related to intellectuality and morality as well, and, as such, *could not belong to the beast*. There is therefore some clearing up to be done here by the Editor, to which I bespeak his most serious attention.

A strange thought in connection with this philosophy of his is that "matter," *i.e.*, "atoms," and their multitudinous "shapes," when released from the pressure, or grasp, of this cohesive force. *i.e.*, of *ruach* (spirit), "assume once more their original and only essential formless form of spirit." Thus, the *squeezing*, or *drawing* together, of this originally "formless spirit" (*ruach elohim*) results in its assuming *form*, being deprived of its previous *mobility* and so made *inert*, and therefore degraded; but let the *squeezing* or *drawing* cease, and it immediately reverts to its original formless, mobile, powerful, and exalted position. Is there any applicability of the following to

this?—"As the philosophers are seldom right, and are often ridiculous in the things they affirm or deny, we need not be too confiding in their statements."  
—*Investigator*, p. 9, par. 2.

(Par. 3 and 4.) "Christadelphians believe that every man has a spirit of his own, doubtless; but in this conception there is a departure from the notion of spirit as present in every man, which is one spirit and *alike* in all, to a use of the term spirit, which suggests character or disposition—what one mentally breathes out or exhales, so to speak—the which spirit being *different* in each cannot be that spirit which is *alike* in all. . . . Christadelphians hold that there is spirit in man, and that it is there wedded—so to speak—to an organism of the most perfect soulical kind, from which a high order of individuality is evolvable. In such an organism the *ruach* makes itself manifest in ways not possible in the brute with its lower organisation, and consequently more limited capacity."

Some of my foregoing remarks—those concerning the one spirit alike in all—bear directly on the first part of this quotation, and need not be repeated here. Suffice to say, they admit the *sameness* of the *life* source for man and beast, viz., the "*ruach elohim in the nostrils*," but this must not be confounded with "the spirit of man which is *in him*." The nose is—as it were—the *meeting-place* of the *ruach elohim*, atmospherically, and the "spirit of man." The latter is resident permanently *in the man*, and is *of man*—belongs to him: the former comes afresh with every inspiration; and when it is cut off, which it can be by enclosing the man in an air-tight box, he dies. "All the while, my breath (*neshamah*) is in me, and the spirit (*ruach*) of God is in my nostrils" (Job xxvii. 3).

Now Bro. Nisbet here speaks of "spirit in man"—there wedded, so to speak, to an organism, &c. This is perilously like what I have been saying. "Spirit *wedded* to an organism"—what can these words mean? "Wedded" is a rather inflexible term. If it have the same force here as when we speak of a woman being wedded to a man—which generally means *life-time*—all right, that is what I claim for man's spirit. If such be not its meaning, the term is misleading.

But let us pursue the examination. "In the human organism the *ruach* makes itself manifest in ways not possible in the brute with its lower organisation and, consequently, more limited capacity." Here the *ruach* (spirit) is the "manifest" and the organism the instrument. Let us suppose the manifest to be a musician, and the instrument a piano. The music produced will vary in quality according to the quality of the piano. On the same principle, the spirit of Sir Isaac Newton's dog, Diamond, would have played the part of astronomer as well as himself had it been "wedded" to Sir Isaac's body or organism. This seems to me the logical outflow of Bro. Nisbet's words; but, presumably, he will hesitate to stand by it. The error here arises from a failure on his part to distinguish the different uses of the term "spirit" in the Scriptures. If the *ruach*, which is *in man*, do anything more than cause him to *live*—as the electric current causes the electro-dynamo to *move*—if it play *any part in his thinking, feeling, &c.*, then, obviously, it must be a *part of himself*, else how can he be held accountable for his doings? But if it simply make him to live, then thought, feeling, &c., may be "secreted by the brain as the liver secretes bile;" and, after all, man may be simply "a creature of dust formation," as Christadelphians teach. There is good reason, however, to believe that in each creature the spirit and organism correspond. In a



germ they originate together; gradually they develop together; during life they operate together, and when they separate, that is the death of the creature; therefore, the spirit of the man, which is the same that is in him, is as much superior to the spirit of the brute as is his body to its body. Moreover, the fact that both spirit and body are, by a law of nature, subject to *reproduction*, is a strong presumptive evidence that they were both originally "*formed*," as it has been shown the Word teaches, and, consequently, that they both can be destroyed. It would be nonsense to speak of destroying "formless spirit," or, on the other hand, (abstract) *life* (soul) in Gehenna.\*

There are, then, but two moves left for Bro. Nisbet: either to admit such a spirit in man as I am contending for, or go back to the original Christadelphian belief that "the body is the man," *vide* "Christendom Astray," p. 32.

Turning now to the part which deals with my article, I find the first page devoted to a rearrangement of my remarks concerning Gen. ii. 7. This has been attended to in the first paragraph of the second article.

On p. 12, par. 1, Bro. Nisbet says:—"Moses never once mentions *ruach* as being in the nostrils of any creature" . . . "Of course, *ruach*, being everywhere, is also in our nostrils, but not specifically so." As Bro. Nisbet in this paragraph admits that *ruach chayyim* = "spirit of lives," is "in the creatures themselves," his remarks about it being "of course in the nostrils, though not specifically there," are to me exceedingly unimportant as well as misleading. My contention is that there is a spirit in man—the natural man—as well as "a body:" that it takes such a spirit and body to make a man; and at no time have I said that that spirit is located in his nose, nor have I ever said, or even implied, that it is "us," as the Editor *unaccountably* suggests. If the debate seems to be deteriorating, there can be no doubt in well-regulated minds that such criticism as this is, at least, a large part of the cause.

A very nice distinction of terms occurs here—"Not *ruach* but *neshamah*—the *neshamah* of *ruach chayyim*." "Respiration (*neshamah*)," says Bro. Nisbet, "is performed through the nostrils; hence its specified location: the *ruach*, on the other hand, permeates the creature, hence it is said to be in the creature." Had Bro. Nisbet been wearing the same eye-glasses here as when he perceived that "a" should not prefix "spirit" in Job xxxii. 8, perhaps he would have hesitated to insert "of" between *neshamah* and *ruach*. I do not

\* "If we analysed the material point at which all life starts, we shall find it to consist of a clear, structureless, jelly-like substance resembling albumen, or white of an egg. It is made of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. Its name is protoplasm. And it is not only the structural unit with which all living bodies start in life, but with which they are subsequently built up. 'Protoplasm,' says Huxley, 'simple or nucleated, is the formal basis of all life. It is the clay of the potter.' 'Beast and fowl, reptile and fish, mollusc, worm and polype, are all composed of structural units of the same character, namely, masses of protoplasm with a nucleus.' What then determines the difference between the different animals? What makes one little speck of protoplasm grow into Newton's dog, Diamond, and another, exactly the same, into Newton himself? It is a mysterious something which has entered into this protoplasm. No eye can see it. No science can define it. There is a different something for Newton's dog, and a different something for Newton; so that though both use the same matter, they build it up in these widely different ways. Protoplasm is the clay, this something is the Potter. And as there is only one clay, and yet all these curious forms are developed out of it, it follows, necessarily, that the differences lies in the Potters. There must, in short, be as many potters as there are forms. There is the potter who segments the worm, and the potter who builds up the form of the dog, and the potter who moulds the man."—"Natural Law in the Spiritual World" (Drummond). See also "Lay Sermons" (Huxley), 6th edition, p. 261.

say that it should not appear there, but will he kindly explain fully the principle on which he makes these "nice distinctions?" It seems to me that they are entirely neutralised by his *own admission* that Job xxvii. 3 teaches that the *ruach* of God was in Job's nostrils. Thus we have *both neshamah and ruach in the nostrils*, and the fact is sufficiently attested by both Moses and Job—not manufactured by Bro. Weir.

But the reason here given by Bro. Nisbet for locating *neshamah* in the nostrils, namely, that it is "from *nasham*, to pant, to blow, to breathe, and denotes the complex act of inspiration and expiration, in brief, respiration; and the nostrils, as both Moses and and the practice of the brute teach us, are the proper channels by means of which the lungs are enabled to perform their appropriate work,"—is very far fetched, and may well serve to show what a resourceful man Bro. Nisbet is and how desperate his cause; but his resourcefulness will not get him round the angle. If *nasham*, the root, mean "to breathe," why add the suffix "*ah*," thus making *neshamah*. *Nasham* would have served Bro. Nisbet's purpose perfectly, hence, the change is purposeless, if not wanton. Further, it would be a singular kind of *panting, blowing, or breathing* which could be done without both *inspiring* and *expiring*. But if we must have such hypercriticism as this, is there not good ground for saying that "*respire*" means to breathe *again*—from *re* again, and *spiro* I breathe? This, at least, is the meaning given in Webster's International Dictionary—a fairly good authority, viz:—"Respire," "to breathe;" "to take breath again." To *take breath again* implies, of course, *more than one* inspiration, and therefore must also include an *expiration*. But why all this straining by Bro. Nisbet, when it is evident that *neshamah* has been properly rendered "*breath*" by the translators? A theory which requires such extreme measures for its support should be quietly allowed to *expire* and then be buried.

(Par. 3). As to how Bro. Nisbet's theory "stood the test of the Socratic method in the debate with Dr. Jamieson," I may say that I read the "verbatim report" of that some years ago (and it is now lying on my table), and the impression I got was, that although Dr. Jamieson was pleading for the doctrine of the "immortality of the soul," and was therefore handicapped, he did not get the worst of it on the "spirit" aspect of the question. But whatever may be said of the Dr. Jamieson test, the "*theory*" is now undergoing an entirely different examination. It might easily have stood the test as against the manifestly unscriptural dogma of inherent immortality. Whether the theory of "A Spirit in Man," which has both revelation and science at its back, shall displace it remains to be seen.

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WHEREVER error is, it is dangerous. Nor is it less so, even when introduced blamelessly. Its presence, whencesoever and howsoever it may have arisen, is an evil, and is sure to work injuriously. Whether it has arisen wilfully, or unconsciously and honestly, it is equally noxious.—*Selected.*

In a qualified sense, every translation, however faithful, may be regarded as a paraphrase, since it is the transfusion of the words and sentiments of a writer into the words of another language; and such are the diversities of human speech and idiom, that no book in any language can be transfused, word for word, into the words of another language.—*Selected.*

It is inevitable, therefore, that a translation should be free, not in deviating from the genuine sense of the original, but in the choice and collocation of words which shall most correctly and fitly express it.—*Selected.*

# The Investigator.

APRIL, 1898.

Editorial Department: THOMAS NISBET, 62 Saint Vincent Street, Glasgow.

Publishing Department: JAS. PARIS, 24 South Albion Street, Glasgow.

A most interesting article on "Cosmic Ether" appears in the *Scientific American Supplement*, No. 1159 (March 19, 1898), in which a new working hypothesis is advanced, expressed in six propositions, which, if established, would bear out my notion—or what Bro. Weir is pleased to term "a philosophy seemingly all my own," but which I gather from Scripture—of the *ruach*, going directly in the teeth of Huxley's assertion that there can be "neither creation nor annihilation." The article is entitled "The Role of Cosmic Ether and Solar Heat in the Disintegration and Formation of Matter," and is by Charles E. de M. Sajous, M.D., Philadelphia, Pa. The first three propositions deal with the "Disintegration of Matter" into "its primary element, Ether;" the last three with the "Formation of Matter." Under the first division—disintegration—the writer argues that "heat is the predominant factor in kinetic energy. As the temperature is lowered the oscillations of the ether units are correspondingly reduced, and there comes a time when, all heat ceasing, vibration—shown by the spectroscope to represent the active manifestations of atomic life—also ceases, and the atom itself must succumb."  
 . . . . It is the atom, and not alone the molecule, that becomes dissociated. . . .  
 If the creation of matter has never been realised in laboratories, it is because homogeneous ether has never been submitted to the influence of a sufficiently high temperature . . . such as the sun supplies."

This is an endeavour in the way of ascertaining the HOW of Things, in which direction my curiosity does not strongly lead me. I am more concerned about the WHAT; and this reminds me that I am credited by Bro. Weir, in his latest contribution to "The Spirit in Man," with something in the direction of both the *How* and the *What* that I am not entitled to. On page 36 of the present issue, regarding the first, he attributes to me what Mr. J. J. Brown has taught about the "squeezing together of atoms," &c., into which region I have not ventured, and Bro. Weir must not drag into this discussion what I do not say and then credit me with saying

it, as he does several times in this issue. I am no more responsible for what the author of *Eternal News* says than I am for what Bro. Weir himself says, for I agree with neither of them. Then regarding the second—the *What*—he credits me with identifying electricity with *ruach*, which I have never hinted at, and which I do not even believe to be the fact.\* But even did I do so, his remarks would be irrelevant, for I do not believe *ruach* to be God, but spirit of God.

If any one ask me, "What is *ruach*?" I answer, I cannot pretend to say. Being an ultimate fact, it cannot be defined; it therefore cannot be known. But the fact can be accepted on the authority of Scripture, which affirms its universality. There we find it brought before us as God-in-outflow. It is all-pervading. We cannot get away from it and continue to be. It is the hypostasis of ALL. Nothing is without it. Where it is not, nothing is. "Even as the woman is out of (*ek*), the male (*aner*), so also the male is through (*dia*), the woman; and the all things (*ta panta*) out of (*ek*) the Deity" (1 Cor. xi. 12). But everything is not God, although *ruach* is out of God—and *ruach* in everything. Thus, even man in his natural state, while "but flesh," can be spoken of as a form of "*ruach* which passeth away and cometh not again" (Ps. lxxviii. 39). But, as I have said, *ruach* is not God: it is a spirit flowing out from God. All things are indeed but modes of that spirit. This seems to me to have been the direction which the matured thought of Dr. Thomas was taking when he penned the last article he ever wrote. It was entitled:—"What is Flesh? and was published in the *Christadelphian* for April, 1871, where he argues that man is a form (or mode) of *ruach*, but evanescent apart from the Memorial Name.

Bro. Diboll has withdrawn from the canvas of the subject. Bro. Weir continues in it along with the Editor; and I should very much like if any brother who can indorse *Christendom Astray* on this subject would enter the lists. Bro. Weir's present contribution came late, owing to the fact that he did not know what Bro. Diboll proposed to do until he heard from him; and the contribution coming so late, I have had to increase this issue by four pages, belating it at the same time to allow it to appear. It will be replied to in next issue.

\* Bro. Weir is not even correct in what he says about Brethren Dr. John Thomas and R. Roberts. Dr. Thomas incidentally connects the two in *Odology*. Bro. Roberts' position is best described in his own words, which are these:—"The electricity of their [the scientists'] discovery may not be the spirit of God in its simplest form, but it must needs contain it."—The *Christadelphian* for March, 1871, p. 92.

## NEW BOOKS.

**THE EMPHASISED NEW TESTAMENT:** *A New Translation, designed to set forth the Exact Meaning, the Proper Terminology, and the Graphic Style of the Sacred Original; arranged to show at a glance Narrative, Speech, Parallelism, and Logical Analysis; and Emphasised throughout after the Idioms of the Greek Tongue, with Select References and an Appendix of Notes. Adjusted to the Critical Text ("formed exclusively on documentary evidence") of Drs. Westcott and Hort.* By Joseph Bryant Rotherham. London: H. R. Allenson, 30 Paternoster Row, E.C. 1897.

The Translator has very kindly sent me a copy of the above work, accompanied by his "christian regards and best wishes"—for all of which he has my best thanks. It is designated in the prospectus of the work a "third edition of his *New Testament Critically Emphasised*;" but it might truly be termed an altogether new work, not merely on account of its marked difference in the arrangement and details of the letterpress, but also as a translation—intended, as I gather from an examination, to reach, and so be appreciated by, a wider circle of readers than the preceding editions. It appears to me, by comparison of this with the first and second editions (published respectively in 1872 and 1878\*), both of which lie before me as I write, that while there is a very considerable improvement in the latest edition, the changes, in several important particulars, do not always commend themselves to one who has got accustomed to the style of the former editions; since, while the changes may be in a direction qualified to render the work more generally acceptable and so more popular, yet, to the student of the Greek Testament, they do not increase but rather detract from the value of this translation. But this objection to some of the changes cannot perhaps be legitimately urged, as the Translation is primarily intended for the un instructed English reader. Still it seems to me that some of these changes are not made without some sacrifice of truth, as for instance, in the treatment of some of the tenses of the Greek verb, and particularly the *aorist*. In the previous editions, one who knew a little Greek, or who had mastered the preface in the first edition, could generally gather, from the English translation of a verbal form, what tense it was a rendering of. Where possible, the *aorist* was rendered by our simple past, or by aid of the auxiliary "did;" the *present* was more of a real present; the *imperfect* a real imperfect. It is otherwise now, the Translator having exercised a greater freedom, in an endeavour to convey the meaning in more idiomatic English than the more strict lines, pursued in former editions, permitted

him to do. This, as I have said, may be a gain in some desired directions, but it gives us a less literal work, and is therefore not now so useful to one who might, on account of its presumed literalness, wish to use it as an aid to his acquisition of Greek. It is, however, in any case, a matter of compromise, and perhaps the Translator has acted most wisely in the course he has now pursued. To such, however, as should wish to use Mr. Rotherham's more literal translation, there is still the former edition to fall back upon, an American reprint having been recently produced (whether with or without Mr. Rotherham's permission I am not in a position to say).

With regard to the Greek *subjunctive*, there is a clear gain to truth in the mode of rendering now adopted. Where, previously, Mr. Rotherham rendered the *subjunctive* by the usual sign of the English *subjunctive*, viz., by "may," he no longer does so, as, for example, Matt. x. 23, which in the previous editions he had rendered: "For verily! I say unto you, in nowise *may ye finish* the cities of Israel till whensoever the son of man *may come*," he now renders: "In no wise *shall ye finish* the cities of Israel till the son of man *come*" (or, as he might have said, "*be come*," as in the *Revised Version*). The rendering now adopted expresses in idiomatic English the thought of Jesus: the earlier rendering did not do so—this because the Greek *subjunctive* is not all fours with the English *subjunctive*—has, indeed, misled even an editor, as I see from the March number of the *Christadelphian*, where, on page III, "may come" (given as the rendering of the Greek *subjunctive* form *ellhē* in the above passage) is brought forward to justify the explanation given by him that we have here "not a prophecy, but the intimation of a possibility!" As a matter of fact, there is not the slightest dubiety implied in the Greek. Mr. Rotherham has accordingly increased the value of his translation as regards his treatment of the Greek *subjunctive*; and we have here, as I have said, a clear gain.

One feature I miss from the present translation with much regret, viz.: the indication of the presence or the absence from the original of the definite article. No doubt the course pursued has not been taken without what seemed good reasons to the Translator. In previous editions, a small circle—a degree sign—indicated its presence in the Greek when untranslated in the text, and brackets enclosed it in the English translation when it was not in the original. There is nothing of the kind in the present edition, and the definite article is inserted or omitted without scruple wherever, in the Translator's judgment, the meaning of the original would thus be best reproduced in English. While

\*A short notice of this earlier edition appeared in the *Investigator* for July, 1893.

in the previous editions it was possible that more might, by the uneducated, be taken out of the article than the genius of the Greek would justify, still, I think, that in the course now pursued Mr. Rotherham has given too much consideration to English idiom, at the same time depriving the book of a valuable characteristic.

These departures from his former procedure no doubt represent the Translator's matured judgment as to what is best in what must needs be more or less of a compromise. Perhaps the general introductory preface, which is to be published with his coming translation of the Old Testament, may serve to justify his course in relation to some things which I note as indicating a change of judgment from that of his previous editions.

The manner in which the emphasis, so all pervasive in the original, is shown in this edition, is entirely different from the former ones. And here we have an unquestionable improvement. Instead of indicating the emphasis by underscoring with one or two (and, in his first edition, three) lines, which was somewhat of a disfigurement to the page, we have the emphasis indicated within the line of the type itself, and without any variation in the letterpress in the shape of italics or capitals. This is done by unobtrusive upright lines—single or double as the case may be—enclosing, and so marking off, what in the judgment of the Translator are the more emphatic portions, while an acute accent serves to denote the least possible emphasis. The translator is also enabled, by the insertion of arrow heads (< >) enclosing clauses, to follow the original order somewhat more closely than would be otherwise possible, and so preserving to the reader the order of thought in the mind of the writer of the original. Other subordinate features serve a similar if less patent purpose. Of course, in a translation of such a graphic character as this, with such a complete, yet simple, system of notation to assist in conveying the meaning of the original, it necessarily follows that the result will embody the interpretation of some passages where the ambiguity of the original may allow of a variety of opinion as to its meaning, for with such a system of notation little can be left ambiguous in the translation. Jno. i. 9 may be cited as a case in point, where it becomes a question whether it is the "light" which is spoken of as "coming into the world" or the "every man." It is interesting to note in this connection that Mr. Rotherham in his third edition reverts to the view reflected in his first edition, in contradistinction to that expressed in his second edition, in which he connected "every man" with "coming into the world," a distinction with a difference. Now he reads—

It | was | —

The real light which enlighteneth every man—

| Coming into the world | .

A feature which in itself is very useful is the fact that "quotations from the Old Testament, including adapted language, as well as formal citation, have been rendered conspicuous by the use of italics." Select references, which are invariably pertinent, are given at the foot of the pages along with short notes, consisting of alternative readings or renderings and suggestive remarks or references to an Appendix of Notes, in which certain important terms are dealt with at some length. Among these we find the following:—"Age" (*aiōn*); "age-abiding" (*aiōnios*); "anointed" (*christos*); "assembly" (*ecclesia*); "covenant" (*diathēkē*); "demon" (*daimōn, daimonion*); "hell" (*gehenna, hades*); "gospel" or "glad-message" (*euangelion*); "immersion" (*baptisma*); "messenger" (*angelos*); "mystery" or "sacred secret" (*mysterion*); "presence" (*parousia*); "sabbath" (*sabbaton*); "soul" (*psuche*); "spirit" (*pneuma*), &c. One may not invariably agree with Mr. Rotherham in his conclusions, but his remarks on these terms are always interesting. "Age-pertaining" seems to me preferable to "age-abiding," although the latter is infinitely to be preferred to *everlasting* as a rendering of the original term *aiōnios*. *Aiōn* is a period with a definite character of its own, and does not signify *duration per se*, and therefore *aiōnios* is not fitly represented by "age-abiding." Thus the "age-pertaining correction" (*kolasin aiōnion*) of Matt. xxv. 46 is, I think, to be preferred to "age-abiding." I note that he prefers "life" as a rendering of the term *psuche* ("soul"), and "man of soul" for the adjective *psuchikos*. The Translator, while greatly regretting the "impossibility of making our English word 'soul' express just as much as is conveyed by the Greek word *psuche* and the Hebrew word *nephesh*," gives his reasons for rendering *psuche* by "life" in some such passages as Matt. xvi. 25, 26: it was only done after "a determined endeavour to render *nephesh* uniformly by 'soul' in the O.T." He quotes Esther viii. 11, where the Jews were "permitted to stand for their soul" (*nephesh*) as the passage which determined him to give up the attempt to uniformly render "*nephesh*" by "soul." In view of the Translator's convictions regarding the terms *nephesh* and *psuche*, it seems singular that Jno. x. 24 should be rendered by him thus—"How long holdest thou our *lives* in suspense?" where "*souls*" would have been less objectionable. The simple "us" of the Authorised and Revised Versions seems better than "*lives*." *Persons, i. e., souls*, may be "held in suspense," but not "*lives*." When he could render Acts ii. 43, "And there came on every *soul* fear,"

why not "souls" in Jno. x. 24? *Self* seems to be the fundamental thought in *psuche*, and so a "man of soul" (*psuchikos*) is a *man of self*, "without the spirit (*pneuma*) of Christ" (Rom. viii. 9). Of course, these facts are not concealed from the reader, so that he must think for himself: and this translation will *make* him think.

I am reading through the book, and noting the impressions I receive for use on a future occasion; but as yet I have not got through the "Gospels," although I have dipped into the book generally, and in some parts particularly. It is *the* translation for every one who cannot read the Greek New Testament, and will be found of great value to all who can consult the original. The work bears every evidence of having been most painstakingly done, and contains the Translator's reflex in English of the best Greek Text extant, viz., that of Westcott & Hort (a work of which I have had occasion to speak in past issues). I am sure no one can consult this translation without benefit; and thoughtful and discriminating readers will thereby be greatly assisted to an understanding of the apostolic teaching; and the investigator cannot fail to discover new thoughts, and have new aspects of truth revealed to him in his study of it. Such I know has been the experience of many with Mr. Rotherham's former editions; and my own examination of the present edition, so far as it has gone, leads me to believe that it will be so with the wider circle of readers for whom this translation is intended. The Translator has the whole of the Old Testament in manuscript, and only awaited the successful reception of the New Testament portion to justify its issue also in the same form. The success of the N.T. is already more than assured, as a reprint of it is being called for; and accordingly the printing of the first volume of the O.T. is to be begun this spring.

With the Emphasised Bible in our hands, we should then be in possession of something more than a mere revision of the Authorised

Version—we should have an entirely new and unique translation, with a Revised Original Text as its basis, viz., that of Dr. Ginsburg's Newly Revised Masoretico-Critical Edition of the Hebrew Bible, enriched by a selection of that scholar's Various Readings.

The volume before me is published at 10/6 in cloth, but may be had post free for cash, 8/6.

*A Brief Introduction to New Testament Greek.* London: The Religious Tract Society, 56 Paternoster Row.—The author of this little shilling primer of 128 pages is Dr. Samuel G. Green, who is also the author of a larger work, entitled, a *Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek Testament*, which I noticed in the *Investigator* for July, 1888, under "Some of the Best Books." The larger one is the best thing of the kind in existence at the money (7/6), both in method and thoroughness, and this smaller work is largely based on it, but merely giving an "outline of the Grammar both in Etymology and Syntax, with graduated Exercises from the beginning, and the needful, Vocabularies." The rules of syntax are given, for the most part, as they are wanted for the exercises, and the most important of them are summarised in order at the close of the book. The cost of this little work (1/) brings it well within the reach of all. With the aid of a *Key* to this little work, which has now been published, also at one shilling, students who have to work alone can have their exercises corrected; and the *Key* will also furnish them with a new set of exercises, to which those of the Primer will serve as key. I can recommend the investment to any one who has a notion to get a little nearer the fountain-head of truth than the Authorised or Revised Versions will enable one to get. There is not the difficulty about New Testament Greek that many suppose and some assert. If any one wishes to procure the book, and has any difficulty in doing so, I will send a copy, post free, at the published price, 1/; or with key, 1/9.

## THE ATONEMENT AS TAUGHT BY BRO. STAINFORTH.

### HIS CRITICISM OF W. D. J.'S REPLY TO A QUESTION CRITICISED.

(See page 79, No. 44, *Investigator*, for the Question; See page 81 for the Reply; and see page 86, No. 48, for the Criticism).

**B**ROTHER STAINFORTH begins his criticism thus:—"When we remember the statement that 'Your thoughts are not as my thoughts,' the statement that 'God's ways are adapted to man's native sense of justice' looks very unlikely to be correct;" and to make this remark of his more emphatic, he says positively, "IT IS

NOT CORRECT." Then he goes on to say, "That it is not possible to reconcile God's justice with his forgiveness of sins, apart from substitutionary sacrifice." He says more, but the clause quoted we will for a moment look at first, and come at that which precedes it and other points as well afterwards. The clause quoted is simply an assertion, and must remain so until he can prove it. It

requires proof to make it good, and failing this, its value is worthless. Doubtless, he has tried to make it good; but, having failed, and having also failed to shake the statements I have made in the reply he has attempted to overthrow, I beg of him to try again.

I quite endorse his statement, namely, "that God dispenses his justice righteously, that is, strictly; it would not otherwise be justice." I also quite endorse what follows it, namely, "that God's mercy is regulated according to circumstances;" and I further endorse this, namely, that the solution of what difficulty may appear in reconciling God's mercy with his justice "is found in God not ignoring justice, but by opening a door for mercy to operate *concurrently*." These are simply platitudes. They may to some appear very imposing; but, as they can equally suit either side, and are possible only on the side which can be proved as worthy of their attachment, they for the present go for nought. And so I halt here in so far as my agreement with him is concerned. I coincide with nothing further that he has advanced, save, it may be, with a slip in his logic I will immediately refer to.

I take exception, therefore, to that already quoted, which follows those platitudes, namely, "for it is not possible to reconcile God's justice with his forgiveness of sins, apart from substitutionary sacrifice." I contradict this; but I quite agree with what I call the adjective clause to it, inasmuch as it suggests the possibility of finding "some other satisfaction to the aggrieved law" than that which he names. These words, namely, "or if it can be found, by some other satisfaction to the aggrieved law," form the last clause of his sentence, and it so greatly modifies the clause preceding it as to nullify it. For if it is impossible to reconcile God's justice in the case, apart from substitutionary sacrifice, why does he, by the second clause, suggest an alternative? The one impossibility excludes all further possibilities. The possibility of "some other satisfaction" makes that which is asserted as "not possible" to be possible—a contradiction in terms. The two clauses are incompatible. It is like supposing that an irresistible force would move an immovable body. The combination of the two makes the matter absurd. He thus plays into my hands. I will not, however, take advantage of this slip in his logic. I will rather deal with what he means to say than what he does say. People sometimes fall into the error of saying what they don't mean, or of adding by way of emphasis one negative to another, which results in meaning the opposite of that which they intend, and those two clauses of Brother Stainforth's *most emphatic* sentence are an example of a like error. But should he think himself

aggrieved by my so handling his slip, and still obstinately adhere to it, as if it were no slip, then I have to say this, namely, if he believes it possible to find some other satisfaction than that of substitutionary sacrifice—and he admits the possibility by his very words—why in the name of common sense is he so dogmatic concerning this substitutionary theory of his? Common sense should dictate to him an amelioration of both his temper and language regarding those who, with their opposing statements, show that they think otherwise than he does and quite as well. He would have done better for himself had he had been purely tentative. It is just possible they may have found this other "satisfaction," though *he* may not see it; and it is just possible they may be wrong; but this possibility does not make him right. Both may be wrong. He may not think so, neither may I; still, this conclusion for the moment sets us both on equal terms, and so I begin as it were anew to discuss the question with him from the same level platform.

To begin, then, I will, as I have said, take his meaning, not his words, and his meaning is this, namely, "that it is impossible, apart from substitutionary sacrifice, to reconcile God's justice with his forgiveness of sins." This is all he means; and it is provable from the fact that it is all he is, and, for some time has been, contending for. Hence, for the sake of his own argument, why did he not stop there? Why did he add a redundancy, which, if not a redundancy, must imply that there lingers or lurks within him some shadow of suspicion that, after all he has said and done, he may be wrong.

However, to oppose his meaning as I have defined it, and meet the objections he has so confidently, dogmatically, and with no suaveness of speech advanced as against what I have stated, I will take up and reply to all of them *seriatim*: and

The first which presents itself is that already quoted at the commencement of this paper, namely, his objection to my statement "that God's ways are adapted to man's native sense of justice." This statement of mine, he says, is not correct: and for proof he refers to Isa. iv. 8—"Your thoughts are not as my thoughts"—a passage as foreign to the purpose he puts it to as any passage can well be. In that chapter the thoughts and ways of God have reference solely to what the chapter embraces. Had they reference to God as the creator and to man as the creature there might have been some sense in his quoting it, for God's thoughts and ways in creation are so infinitely and immeasurably above man's that there can exist no, not the shadow of a comparison between his thoughts and man's. But, in the chapter referred to, the comparison is between God's ways and

thoughts in the treatment of man—the Israelites in the case—and their treatment of him in return. It is like, as it were, a dispute between God and man. Man complains of God: God complains of man; as in Ezekiel xviii. 25, “Ye say,” says God to the Israelites, “Ye say the way of the Lord is not equal.” Here we may inquire, By what standard did they think so of God? Read the 19th verse, and there we find that the Israelites pointed to what they assumed to be unfair on the part of God. They said, “Why? Doth not the son bear the iniquity of the father?” And if this had been true, their accusation against God would have been just; for God does not affirm of himself an arbitrary power in the case. He is the Creator, and, as a despot might have done, he might have said, “Why, cannot I do what I like with my own? Has not the potter power over the clay to make one vessel this, another that? But he gave no such answer; he appealed to their own sense of justice, even to the very argument they themselves used as against himself. He, as it were, pleads his own innocence in the case, and to prove it, points to the evidence he furnished for their consideration in words supplied by their own mouths. See his reply, verse 19 and on to verse 25. Read these verses carefully, and note how he reasons with them from their own understanding of things. He says, “Yet ye say,” in the face of the evidence I set before you to the contrary, “Yet ye say the way of the Lord is not equal. Hear ye now, O house of Israel. Is not my way equal? Are not your ways unequal?” Indeed, read the whole chapter from beginning to end, and the whole may be summed up as an appeal based on convincing evidence to the men he was-pleading with, to show how, contrary to their own judgment, their accusation against him was false. He set before them his conduct towards them, as in harmony with their own ideas of right and wrong, with what they themselves set forth as equal and not equal.

Now, turning back to the chapter in Isaiah: look at verse 3, and see a covenant spoken of there—“an everlasting covenant, even the sure mercies of David”—then turn to verses 9, 10, 11, and there, in regard to the faithfulness with which God keeps his covenant, he sets forth that the word which cometh from his mouth shall not return to him void, for sure as the rain descendeth, &c., &c., so shall his word be. It shall accomplish and prosper whereto he sent it. But on what terms, pray? Man has got to do something. See verse 3, 1st clause, also verses 6 and 7, and there we have the human conditions required for the performance of God’s promise. And shall he promise and not perform? The Israelites had abundance

of evidence throughout their history to prove that God had all along kept his word or promise; and as in the past, so should he do, and that more abundantly, in the future. Now compare these ways and thoughts of God in relation to his promises with the thoughts and ways of the Israelites in relation to their promises. Go back to Exodus xix. 8 and xxiv. 3-8. There we find that they vowed to Moses that all the Lord said they would do; and their history tells us how unfaithfully they performed their promise. That they did it so far is true; but ultimately they wholly rebelled, and the prophet rebuked them, and exhorted them to return and He would have mercy upon them. See the contrast between their ways and thoughts in their treatment of God and his ways and thoughts in his treatment of them. They went from good to bad, and from bad to worse, while he all the while extended his mercy, increased their privileges, and promised greater. His thoughts and ways were clearly not like their thoughts and ways. And as they were in all their transactions among themselves exacting in the performance of what an oath, or vow, or promise required, and were as cognizant of the obligations of an oath or vow as they were of their lives (see Numbers, chap. xxx., also parallel passages; see the example of Jephthah), we have in God’s pointing them to his own covenants with them an appeal to their own sense and knowledge of a covenant, in which appears the adaptation on God’s part to man’s understanding and capacity of fulfilling an engagement—an agreement with God, as it were, on their own terms, seeing it was a stooping, a humility, if we may so speak, for God to make with man any agreement, bargain, or covenant whatever. Hence the force of what Jeremiah says—“Cursed be the man who obeyeth not the words of this covenant” (chap. xi. 1-10). “Obey my voice,” &c., &c., “that I may perform the oath which I have sworn.” But, alas! their ways and thoughts of performing the oath were not as God’s ways and thoughts in the same relationship.

Now take another example of God’s adapting his ways with man to man’s own sense and understanding. In Heb. ix. 16-17 we have reference to a will, or, it may be, to a covenant, of another sort to that already referred to—it matters little for the present purpose whether a will or a covenant. If a will, says the writer, there must of necessity be the death of him who made it; or if a covenant, there must of necessity be the seal which confirms the covenant. Here God has arranged with man an agreement, based on man’s understanding of what is required to legalise or make the covenant or testament sure to those concerned. Here was an



adaptation of God's plan to man's own knowledge and form of law.

Again, in Romans vii. 1, Paul says—"I speak to them who know the law." Here he appeals to a knowledge of law to justify his reasoning as to what God reveals through him in that chapter. Further, he says, "I speak (ch. vi. 19) after the manner of men because of the infirmity of your flesh": that is to say, he accommodates his reasoning to their capacity of understanding. Read also Heb. v. 12, 13, 14. Ponder what is there: and if we go back to the teachings of Moses, and consider the kind of knowledge the Israelites had acquired in Egypt, of the bull, the ram, the heifer, and goat, we have there a very circumstantial, justifiable reason for assuming that Moses adapted his animal sacrifices to their capacity of understanding, with the view of leading them the more easily from the worship of these animals to the sacrifice of them in the service of God. All this is evidence of God's accommodating his instruction to their crude notions of things. And so in the verse referred to in the Hebrews, we have the writer stating that solid food is for those who, by reason of use, have their senses exercised to discern good and evil: as for milk, it is for those without experience. This is just what the Scriptures do all through. They supply food adapted to the native sense of all, so that no one has any excuse, saying that all things they contain are above their capacity. But, lest Brother Stainforth should object that the knowledge required for the deeper things of Scripture is not native, inasmuch as it is acquired by a process of training, I have to say that the brawny arm of a blacksmith is as native to him as his infantile arm in childhood. The full-blown rose is as native to the tree as the bud which precedes it; and the full knowledge of anything which one may acquire is as adapted to the faculty he has exercised as the letters of the alphabet are adapted to the infant school, inasmuch as education is not so much an acquisition of knowledge, like as the mere recognition of a thing, but is the exercising, the drawing out of the native faculties of man to catch at knowledge and make proper use of it.

Now, turning once more to my sentence, viz., "God's ways are adapted to man's native sense of justice," which Brother Stainforth so positively says "is not correct," we turn to the arabs of our streets, and we hear from among them such remarks as these—"This is fair: this is not fair." They have an intuitive knowledge of justice, or what is meant by equality or the even balancing of things. Strike one of them by mistake for an assumed offence, and he will soon make it clear that he is not deserving of the stroke, and others will sympathise with him. Turn,

too, to the heathen. Read Jonah i. 14 with the preceding verses. There we find them fearing to have laid upon them "innocent blood." Whence had they this sense of justice—this fear of doing wrong? And next, ascending from this low degree in the scale of thought to the highest; to the law from God's own mouth—the Mosaic, we find these words (Exod. xxiii. 7), "Keep thee far from a false matter, and the innocent and the righteous slay thou not, for I will not justify the wicked." And turning back to what we have already said concerning Ezekiel's testimony (ch. xviii.), we have in Israel's false charge against God a reflection from their inner selves of these very words. And in God's reply to the said charge, we have, from the evidence he provides for them to look at and consider, an appeal to their own native sense in their own interpretation of those words. They interpret them rightly, but apply them wrongly. God does not accuse them of not knowing or of misunderstanding the law. He accuses them of charging him with a breach of the law; and he reasons with them, not as if he were offended with them in taking the step they did, but to show that he did not break the law, that he did not do as they said he did. Yes! what a reasoning is there here with man on the part of God! What a pleading! What a humility! What a stooping on the part of the Creator towards the creature! Why should God so demean himself to so reason with man? Why should he not rather dictate, and enforce silence as more becoming than accusing speech, or even speech at all? Why should he not rather impress on man the words of Job?—"Behold I am vile; what shall I answer thee? I will lay mine hand upon my mouth." This, however, is not God's way with man. He says, instead, "Come let us reason together," and we have many examples of his doing this. But could God reason with man, did he not stoop his conversation to man's capacity of understanding? This is the question, and on this foundation I place my statement that "God's ways are adapted to man's native sense of justice." It is a moving elemental force in the work of human salvation; an important factor in the understanding of Scripture. Hence, as regards the Atonement, nothing can be more repugnant to man's native sense of justice, and nothing can be more opposed to God's own written law as quoted, than the doctrine of substitutionary sacrifice—a doctrine, say what any one may, which involves the necessity of slaying, and thereby punishing, in place of the wicked, the One of whom it is said, "He knew no sin." And so here we may suitably transfer from the book of Job the words of Elihu the Buzite—"There-

fore hearken unto me, ye men of understanding: for be it from God that he should do wickedness, and from the Almighty that he should commit iniquity. For the work of a man shall he render unto him, and cause every man to find according to his ways. Yea, surely God will not do wickedly, neither will the Almighty pervert judgment." Brother Stainforth's theory perverts judgment, infringes justice, dishonours God, and deceives man. It is nought but a garble from the dunghap of Roman theology.

He, however, shies at the conclusion so come at. He endeavours to escape it, but flounders. He affects to coincide with the justice of abolishing from the death of Jesus all notion of punishment; but how can he, while he preaches a theory that necessarily involves it? He therefore storms, and for argument gives an expletive. We all know how some, when cornered, say things in spleen; and so, with an elegance known only amongst the vulgar, he says, "None but idiots can regard Christ as punished in our stead. How can an innocent man be punished? Suffering," says he, "can be inflicted on him, but punishment implies guilt." Quite so. But substitution implies punishment for guilt, otherwise it is not substitution. In this the sinner is assumed to be saved the punishment by what his substitute suffers for, or instead of, him. For if the law requires punishment as amends or compensation for a breach—and this is what all law does require—the substitute for the sinner must suffer the punishment in place of the sinner—the man who has made the breach. But it is unquestionable that no law can be just that can take a substitute for the man that makes the breach, and hence substitutionary sacrifice is neither legal nor just. It is the sinner who must suffer or be forgiven, and if there is no forgiveness with God apart from substitutionary sacrifice, wherein comes the hope of salvation? Alas! This is the logical conclusion of Brother Stainforth's theory, whatever he may say to the contrary. And he need not think of shirking it because his native sense of justice so revolts from punishing that he must have recourse to a stratagem to free his theory from that which he revolts from. Does he not see that the law that would inflict suffering upon an innocent man because of another's sin, would be quite as unjust as to inflict punishment? The distinction he makes between the two is in the relation he has placed them. I say, in the relation he has placed them, for there are other relationships besides this one in which suffering as a punishment for sin differs from suffering as an educating force. In the story of Job we have the two pretty well thrashed out and clearly defined; but, in the theory of substitutionary sacrifice, in

which relationship Bro. S. puts them, there is no distinction whatever. He confounds the two, or, as the phrase goes, the distinction he affects to make is "without a difference." I, however, quite sympathise with his question, namely, "How can an innocent man be punished?" I like this question very much. Yes; how? No one can tell; it is absurd. It cannot be in the absolute nature of law that a man can be punished for another's fault. He may, through another's fault, be made to suffer through sympathy, or he may be made to suffer from another's mischief, as by robbery; but nothing can alter the fact that what he suffers in this way can in no sense be called punishment for the sin of another. The murdered one cannot be said to be punished in place of the murderer. Sin and punishment are so linked together that punishment cannot be unlinked from sin and linked on to innocence. And as substitutionary sacrifice necessarily so links suffering and punishment together that each is the other—that is, it makes the suffering the punishment or the amends, for breach of law—the question Bro. S. puts, namely, "How can an innocent man be punished?" becomes for his own argument so lean and voracious, like Pharaoh's kine, that it swallows up with one gulp his whole theory. And much as he may try to wriggle out of this—much as he may recoil or revolt from the consequences of his own dogmatism—the premises he has laid down ties him logically to it. He may say, "No, no," if he pleases, and repeat his "No" *ad infinitum* if he likes, but there it is, clear as noonday. What therefore he calls idiotic is that very thing he himself is doing his best to establish. And hence, though I have not the remotest idea of calling him an idiot, nor have I any reason to call him one, and I question very much if I would call him one though I had reason, but there it is, and clearly too, he by his own logic classes himself among those he so expressively (and shall I say, "so gracefully?") calls idiots. By his logic there must be a good many idiots in the world—himself, by his own mouth, added to the number—all of them, however, much better than their creed, and far above the level of idiots. I dare say he would not like another to class him among the number, though he so unwittingly does this himself. Therefore, may I ask him to "do to others as he would have others do to him." It is not so much his entire creed that I object to, nor is it that I in any wise object to himself, but I certainly object to his manner of ramming his theory down one's throat, as if no one can think of the subject of it as well as he can; as if with an iron beak he would, without provocation, run down a vessel carrying a different flag.

(Completed in July number).

## ARE THERE "CONDITIONS" OF SALVATION?

[The following letters, between Bro. Parkes and Bro. Smith, are sent for publication by the former, who thinks the matters touched upon of sufficient importance to justify their appearance:]—

[Copy.]

DEAR BRO. SMITH,—I have obeyed the truth now for more than a quarter of a century, and though I have, more or less, from the commencement till now, tried to understand the Scriptures in their fullness, as God intended they should be understood, nevertheless, I am very far from attaining to an accurate knowledge of them, if the explanations of Scripture given by many of our lecturing brethren and teachers be correct.

I dare say that you have from time to time heard lecturing brethren, after expatiating upon the gospel of the kingdom of God to their audience, use expressions something like the following:—"Now, my friends, these are the conditions of our salvation, and it will be your own fault if you are not saved." Conditions indeed! Where such expressions have been imported from I am unable to say. I have never met with any such teachings in Scripture, and if one should call the attention of a brother to the fact, he immediately tries to get out of the difficulty by saying—"I grant you that the Scriptures do not give the phrase, word for word, in the same consecutive order, but the meaning is all the same. For instance, are we not plainly taught in Scripture that God has given us commands to be obeyed; these commands, therefore, are equivalent to the phrase, 'fulfil the conditions.'" Indeed, this would be news to me if I did not know better. Let us see what the dictionary says. "Conditions imply two contracting parties," but that commands to be obeyed are the emanations of a sovereign Ruler, who gives his commands that must be obeyed, whether the persons to whom they are given like them or not. There can be no contract-parleying in such cases. The word goes forth, and strict obedience must follow, or punishment be inflicted. Did God enter into a contract with Abraham when he told him to go and offer up his son Isaac? with Moses when he told him to strike the rock? Does an officer enter into a contract when he gives commands to a soldier under him, or even when a father tells his child to do anything which he requires to be done? Are they not rather the expressions

of a supreme ruler or head, who gives commands from his own inherent or acquired right, and which becomes law as soon as they are uttered? I think that the happiness which a right knowledge of the truth imparts has been greatly marred by a misconception of the phrase in question.

I take it for granted that as you are an elder brother and have given much attention to the study of Scripture you will see eye to eye with me in this matter; and I should be glad if you would take the initiative in laying this subject before the brethren through the medium of the *Visitor* or the *Investigator*. I shall be pleased to have a reply from you at your earliest convenience.—With love in the truth, I remain, yours in the one hope,

THOS. PARKES.

52 Wellington Road, Bilston,  
May 14, 1897.

[Copy.]

DEAR BRO. PARKES,—I received your very interesting and kind letter last night, it having been forwarded here from Edlinburgh.

I am very much at one with what you say, but how to act is a different matter. The truth, or the things of the kingdom of God, do not belong to any one community except that one composed of only a few, one here and one there, who have given up all will-worship and pride of life, which latter includes spiritual pride, and worship God in the sincerity of the truth. The Christadelphian sect, to which I belong, is no exception to the general state of ignorance, which, in a more gross state, fills the earth. The community called the Church in apostolic times has been darkened, the light-stand of the spirit being withdrawn, and it now exists only in the form of a harlot. But a few of the woman's seed have been in existence all through the ages, consisting of any one who hears the spirit's voice and opens unto him. Growth in knowledge is necessary, but it may be slow and small; but if there is growth there is life, and in the kingdom there will be small and great. Such is the state, as foretold that it would be so, by the spirit; so we need not be disheartened, but make up our minds to bear and forbear, trying as we have opportunity to show forth the glory of God, as we may have the power. Many will not understand, but a few may be able to discern the spirit's voice. And now, dear brother, I must close this short note with much love in the truth to yourself and Sister Parkes, looking forward to the dawning of the day of light and life by the rising

of the sun of righteousness, who will dispel the gross darkness of Israel's night.—Your affectionate Brother,

CHARLES SMITH.

Streatham Hill, London,

May 25, 1897.

EDITORIAL NOTE.—Does not Bro. Parkes himself labour under “a misconception of the phrase in question?” For I should be disposed to take quite the opposite meaning from the lecturers' statement of the matter regarding “conditions.” “Conditions of salvation” means to me simply the terms laid down by God. And surely salvation is not unconditional. We are not consulted as to the conditions or terms upon which we may be saved; we have simply to conform to the conditions—if we can; but not all can. There is no suggestion on the part of the lecturers that any modification of the terms can be brought about by us. It is our privilege to conform to these. If, however, it be true that not everybody can conform to the conditions—which, not to speak of our own experience, seems to be plainly implied by Jesus in the parable of the sower, where the good soil, of different degrees of fruitfulness, alone brought forth: the wayside, the stoney ground, the thorny ground hearers being evidently incapable of responding to the divine call, that is, unable to conform to the conditions—if this be so, then, it can hardly be universally true to say that “it will be your own fault if you are not saved.” It is more often one's misfortune than one's fault that he cannot be saved. But I am disposed to think that a good deal of the confusion that exists with regard to salvation arises from the fact that God's primary purpose is misapprehended or not clearly grasped. That primary purpose is not to save people but to manifest himself. Individuals he will save

in the working out of his purpose, but only such as can and do—and all who can will—fall in with the “conditions,” by “working out their own salvation” (Phil. ii. 12). It thus becomes a survival of those who are fit; and this just means that only those who conform to the conditions are such as can survive the ordeal. Here I can, along with Bro. Smith, cordially agree with Bro. Parkes when he antagonises the suggestion that we may make terms with God; but I do not see that Bro. Parkes has legitimately fathered such a notion upon our lecturing brethren, who have, as I see at least, truly affirmed that there are conditions to which we must conform if we would be saved. Nor do I think that Bro. Smith in his letter can be read as endorsing Bro. Parkes here. Wherever there is an “if” there is a condition implied or expressed. And salvation is conditioned by an “if.” “If ye believe not that I am he ye shall die in your sins” (Jno. viii. 24); while “He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved” (Mark xvi. 16).

“If ye live after the flesh ye shall die” (Rom. viii. 13).

“If ye do these things” (2 Pet. i. 10).

“If we hold fast” (Heb. iii. 6).

“If any man have not the spirit of Christ” (Rom. viii. 9).

“If ye continue in the faith” (Col. i. 23).

“We are made partakers of Christ if” (Heb. iii. 14).

These are God's terms in Christ. Our wisdom and privilege lie in accepting these—if we are able to.

*Editor*

## APOCALYPTIC STUDIES.—No. XVIII.

### CHAPTER XXII.

“AND he shewed me a river of water of life, bright as crystal, proceeding out of the throne of God and the Lamb, in the midst of the street thereof.” The locality of “the throne” is not stated; but from the reading it would appear as if the phrase “the throne of God and the Lamb” was used as synonymous with “the holy city, New Jerusalem.” It is said to have one “street.” The throne is also stated to have “a street,” and that the river of the water of life flowed “in the midst of the street thereof.” On that understanding, the throne would be co-extensive with the city—the city being the bride, the

Lamb's wife, and as such co-ruler with the Lamb of all the kingdoms on the earth. The throne would thus have a world-wide signification and application. If the throne is a symbol of universal government, so in like manner the river of the water of life which is to proceed out of the throne would be the life-giving properties of the new order of government, and the administration of its laws, which shall be for the healing of the nations. It is said in Isaiah xii. 3, that in that day they will “with joy draw water out of the wells of salvation.” Access to the water of life will be free to all. “The Spirit and the bride say, Come. And he that heareth let him say, Come. And he

that is athirst, let him come: he that will, let him take the water of life freely." On either side of the river was a "tree of life bearing twelve manner of fruits, yielding its fruit every month; and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations." In keeping with the figurative character of the city, the river of life and the trees of life may also be a figurative representation of the spiritual blessings flowing from the Lord of life and glory, and the beneficial government of the coming age.

But as figurative language must of necessity have a literal basis, in order to be understood and rightly applied, so in this case there must needs be a literal throne or centre of government, and also a literal river of life and literal trees of life. The Apocalypse gives us the figurative; the prophets give us the literal. We have seen that Jerusalem the literal is to be rebuilt to the Lord on its own ancient site. We find likewise that a temple is to be built, which is to be a house of prayer for all nations. (See Isaiah lvi. 7; Zech. vi. 12, 13; xiv. 16, 17; Ezekiel xl. to xlv.) In that temple to be built, the size and arrangements of which are given in Ezekiel, there was a place pointed out to the Prophet as the place of the Lord's throne in these words: "Son of Man, this is the place of my throne, and the place of the soles of my feet, where I will dwell in the midst of the children of Israel for ever: and the house of Israel shall no more defile my holy name" (Ezek. xliii. 7).

We find that there will also be a literal river of life-giving waters issuing from that literal temple. In ch. xviii. the Prophet says—"And he brought me back unto the door of the house; and behold, waters issued out from under the threshold of the house eastward, for the forefront of the house was toward the east: and the water came down from under, from the right side of the house, on the south of the altar. Then brought he me out by the way of the gate northward, and led me round by the way of the gate that looketh toward the east; and behold, there ran out waters on the right side. When the man went forth eastward with the line in his hand, he measured a thousand cubits, and he caused me to pass through the waters, waters that were to the ankles. Again he measured a thousand, and caused me to pass through the waters, waters that were to the knees." Another thousand, and the waters were to the loins. Another thousand, and they were waters to swim in, "a river that I could not pass through." The Prophet also saw on both sides of the river "very many trees." "These waters issued forth toward the eastern region, and shall go down into the Arabah: and they shall go toward the sea; into the sea shall the waters go which

were made to issue forth; and the waters shall be healed. And it shall come to pass, that every living creature which swarmeth, in every place whither the rivers shall come, shall live; and there shall be a very great multitude of fish, . . . and everything shall live whithersoever the river cometh." Here we are taught to look for a literal river of life, with trees of life on its banks: trees for food, yielding fruit every month, and the leaf shall not wither, nor the fruit ever fail; the leaf shall be for healing. All of which will be "because the waters thereof issue out of the sanctuary." The waters are miraculously produced, and seemingly miraculously increased in volume as they flow along towards the dead sea, whose waters shall be healed, and filled with life. In verse 9, two rivers are mentioned (see margin), but no account is given regarding their division into two. In Zech. xiv. 8, the two are mentioned thus:—"It shall come to pass in that day, that living waters shall go out from Jerusalem; half of them toward the eastern sea, and half of them toward the western sea; in summer and winter shall it be." In Joel iii. 18 we read:—"And a fountain shall come forth of the house of the Lord, and shall water the valley of the Shittim." In Isaiah xxxiii. 21 we read of "broad rivers and streams" in connection with Zion and Jerusalem. These testimonies clearly teach that the house of the Lord in that coming age will be the source of a large supply of life-giving water, and on its banks trees of life. Other places will be similarly supplied—"I will open rivers on the bare heights, and fountains in the valleys; I will make the wilderness a pool of water, and the dry land springs of water" (Isa. xli. 18, and xliii. 19-20). The use of the water of life and the fruit and leaves of the trees of life will have the effect of checking the tendency of mankind to disease, decay, and death, and be productive of that longevity which is to be a characteristic of the age to come, as taught in the prophets. The cure of the blind, the deaf, the dumb, and the lame will be brought about by the use of those God-given waters, as we read in Isaiah xxxv. 5-6—"For in the wilderness shall waters break out, and streams in the desert."

In the age to come the law of sin and death will undergo a change. The present rule that "in Adam all die" will cease. Life and death will be in relation to the second Adam, the Lord from heaven. "In those days they shall say no more 'the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge.' But every one shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eateth the sour grapes his teeth shall be set on edge" (Jer. xxxi. 29-30; Ezek. xviii. 2, 5, 20-26). The sou. that sinneth, it shall die;

the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son; the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him. But if the wicked turn from all his sins which he hath committed, and keep all my statutes, and do that which is lawful and right, he shall surely live, *he shall not die.*" "If the righteous man turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, and dieth therein, in his iniquity that he hath done shall he die." Thus the law of heredity shall cease. Obedience to the law which shall proceed from Zion will secure continued life. Persistent disobedience will result in death to every individual transgressor.

Further, we read—"And there shall be no curse any more." The ground was cursed on account of Adam's sin, thereby labour and sorrow was caused to the sinner. The ground on that account would bring forth thorns and thistles. There are some people who contend that the curse on the ground was only for Adam's sake personally. However, the facts are against that contention. The thorns and thistles are still with us, so also is the labour, sorrow, and anxiety, the experience of the cultivators of the soil. And disease and death is still the portion of all classes under the sun. When God said to Noah after the flood that he would no more curse the ground for man's sake, I suppose that had reference to such a calamity as the flood, and not to the removal of that which was inflicted after Adam sinned. Noah was assured by the rainbow sign that summer and winter, seed-time and harvest should not cease while the earth remaineth. The flood had the effect of suspending the operations pertaining to these seasons, but that would not happen again. However, we find that since that was spoken famines and crop failures have often happened in various places. The seasons have recurred in regular order, but the productiveness of the ground has varied. The law of Moses threatened various curses on the people and on their land if they disobeyed its precepts. The present dispersion of Israel is the result of disobedience. Solomon said, "The curse causeless shall not come." So we need not blame Adam's sin for all the trouble and sorrow that is to be found in the world. We should look for the cause nearer home. It is written, "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us, . . . that upon the nations might come the blessing of Abraham in Christ Jesus; that we might receive the promise of the spirit through faith" (Gal. iii. 13-14). That blessing will come in its fulness, when "there shall be no curse any more." "Then

shall the earth yield her increase. God shall bless us, and all the ends of the earth shall fear him" (Ps. lxxvii. 6-7). The people shall not "labour in vain, nor bring forth for trouble" (Is. lxxv. 23).

"And there shall be night no more; and they need no light of lamp, neither light of sun; for the Lord God shall give them light." We have no reason to suppose that night and day will cease. On the contrary, we have positive testimony that they will not cease. (See Jer. xxxi. 35-36; xxxiii. 19-26). The natural darkness of the night will be dispelled by the glory of the Lord, which shall lighten it. "The glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together; for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it" (Isa. xl. 5). The glory bearers will be the saints, for "then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father" (Matth. xiii. 42). When all flesh shall see so many suns shining all over the earth, the darkness of "night shall be no more." Not only so, but the sun's light shall be shamed thereby. "Then the moon shall be confounded, and the sun ashamed; for the Lord of hosts shall reign in Mount Zion, and in Jerusalem, and before his ancients gloriously" (Is. xxiv. 23). Under such circumstances, no artificial light will be necessary.

"These words are faithful and true, and the Lord, the God of the spirits of the prophets, sent his angel to show unto his servants the things which must shortly come to pass. Behold I come quickly. Blessed is he that keepeth the words of the prophecy of this book." Although there are symbols and figurative language in this book, they represent things that are to occur as matters of fact. Some have been fulfilled, others are still in the future. I have endeavoured in these "Studies" to show that the symbols and figures are in harmony with those used by the older prophets, and also in harmony with the teaching of Christ and his apostles. Wherein I have differed from the generally-received interpretation, I have advanced proofs and argument in support of my contentions. If we have to keep the words of the prophecy of this book, it is necessary that we should understand them for ourselves. It wont do for us to accept at the hand of others without personal investigation.

The remaining verses of this chapter do not require any special comment. They consist of exhortations and warnings to those who are looking for the Lord's appearing. May we all be found unto praise and honour and glory at the revelation of Jesus Christ.

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*W. Hill*

# The Investigator.

"All things, put to the test; the good retain."—1 Thess. v. 21. 

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## "THE SPIRIT IN MAN."

THE April number of the *Investigator* was duly received, and as usual, full of interesting matter. The discussion of "The Spirit in Man" cannot fail to add much to the knowledge of all who read it carefully; and while I have not yet given the subject that close and critical study necessary to form an opinion of any value, I believe I am adding to my little stock of knowledge, by means of this discussion, much material that may be utilized as a foundation on which to base an opinion satisfactory, at least, to myself. So at present you need not anticipate or court any criticism by me on The Human Spirit question.

It might not have been the same thirty years ago. I am now 55 years old, and do not *know* as much as I did at the age of 25. It is quite common to humanity to *know* very much in early life, so much so, that they do not hesitate to settle the most profound matters by copious quotations and a few dashes of the pen. I presume the printer, though, frequently finds the pen-dashes more numerous than few.

But when Time's dial begins to point to the half-century mark, there are some who begin to realize that there are still some things left for us to find out, and the more we find, the clearer we perceive that instead of our having the entire tree of knowledge, we have only broken off one of the smaller branches; and many times this proves to be one of evil instead of good.

When you touch on the question of God, then, you get into a subject with which I feel more familiar and better prepared to offer a little friendly criticism.

I am writing to you personally; yet, if you see proper to give it to the public with your reply I shall not object.

You have in years past said so many *good* things concerning God and Christ and Holy Spirit, coinciding at times so perfectly with my own understanding of these terms, that I am surprised at several remarks found in your Editorial on p. 38 of last issue. It reads to me as though the printer had made you say what you did not intend to say. The objectionable and contradictory statements are as follow:—

"I do not believe *ruach* to be God, but spirit of God." In the next paragraph you teach that *ruach* is universal, and say:—"There we find it as God in-outflow." Is it God *only* when flowing out, and *not* God when it has flown into, filled, and become fixed in, a man styled Christ Jesus? If you say God was *not* in Christ, then you are against both Paul and Jesus. If you admit that God *was* in Christ, but that the Holy Spirit is *not* God, you *must* admit that the Holy Spirit was also in Christ, and in that case your Christ would not be very objectionable to any Trinitarian. If, on the other hand, you admit that God was in Christ as Paul and Jesus both affirm (which I

know you do), and admit further that the indwelling of Holy Spirit in this case, at least, is declared to be God *in Christ*, then you and I are at one, and it only remains for you to put *Editor Nisbet* right on this matter, for he does *not* believe that spirit is God. You must now see *why* I feel that the printer has made you say something that you will not stand by.

Again you say, "If any one ask me what is *ruach*? I answer, I cannot pretend to say. Being an ultimate fact, it cannot be defined." I presume you use the word *fact* in the sense of reality. To *this* all can agree, but when you class this spirit reality as an ultimate, just after saying it was *of* God, is where I think some explanation is called for.

An ultimate is the last, the end. The chemist will divide and sub-divide matter, going backward and separating element from element until he comes to a unit; he can go back no further; he has come to the end; he calls it an ultimate.

How a thing can be called an ultimate and yet there be something back of it from whence it came I do not understand. I fully agree with you that *ruach* or spirit is an ultimate fact, and when I arrive at the ultimate I stop; I know of nothing from whence the ultimate came when I am reasoning on Divine matters.

I recognize *ruach* or spirit of *ruach* as a *name of God* when he is working in an invisible manner, chiefly by slow process, developing something high from that which is low—for instance, sons of God from children of men, which I recognize as being done by *ruach*—the Divine Spirit, in which work the spirit of the flesh can have no part or lot.

Paul reminded the Corinthians that the spirit of God dwelt in them. Unto the Philippians he wrote, "For it is God which worketh in you." Is it unreasonable to think that the Spirit of God in the Corinthians is identical with God in the Philippians? I think the Editor *must* believe that the Spirit of God *is* God, or he must feel that Paul was somewhat careless in the use of terms.

I look at God as spirit, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent. Here is my ultimate. I do not know whence the Divine Spirit is. I cannot define it in any other terms. In chemistry, carbon is simply carbon, oxygen is nothing but oxygen. The Divine Spirit is simply spirit—nothing before it—nothing after it—the Ultimate—Jehovah, God. I am charged with teaching a "bodiless" God. Those who do so do not know my God. His body is the universe, and the Divine Spirit is His mind.

Man having been made in the likeness of God, and being both mental and physical, God must also be mental and physical. We must reason from what we know to what we do not know. I see men moving like flowing rivers and turbulent waters, and I know it is mind that moves them. I see also a universe in motion, and I enquire what is the moving force. My own motor affords the answer. No mind, no motion. The Infinite mind—the Divine Spirit is the power of the universe.

When spirit is changed into flesh, or as Mr. J. J. Brown would say, "holds itself rigidly together," thus becoming flesh, or wood, or stone, in these aspects it becomes localized, fixed, finite, thus losing the Divine characteristics, and we do not call these shapes God.

These created things are not ultimates, for by revelation we trace them all back to spirit. There we come to the ultimate—to *ruach*—to God.

These created shapes, the Psalmist says (Ps. lxxviii. 39) are "*ruach* that



passeth away" (*ruach*, holding itself together in shapes). But these created shapes are certainly included in Paul's "all things," which he says "are of God" (2 Cor. v. 18). These two statements of the psalmist and the apostle, to my mind, identify God and the Spirit of God as one and the same.

God is the only Divine Ultimate, and He revealed this fact by saying, "I am the last" (Isa. xlvi. 12).

The human form is the ultimate of *physical* creation, but when we trace the form backwards we come to spirit, and here we both agree to write "ultimate." But if spirit is *not* God as you say, but *of* God, meaning thereby that it is as distinct from God as steam is distinct from the engine, then spirit is *not* the ultimate, though next to it.

You seem to have two Divine ultimates, though God said, "I am the last, and beside me there is none else."

I realize that there are some forms of expression which indicate spirit as going forth, flowing out, &c, but I think we should read such expressions as the flowing of the ocean, the Gulf stream, the Arctic current, &c. We do not mean by these that any part of the ocean gets away from itself, neither do the words Spirit of God imply that the Divine Spirit can be where God is not.

Anthropomorphism, like bloody sacrifices and offerings of grain and oil and wine, may have served a purpose when the human family were in a state of infancy, and mankind "thought as children," but none of these things will do for men who have become strong in Christ Jesus.

Where the Spirit is, *there* is God, "for He is not far from every one of us, and in Him we live and move and have our being."

When Paul wrote to the Ephesians (iv. 23), "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind," did he mean anything more than a renewing of their mind? Did he mean that their *mind* was one thing and the *spirit* of their mind was another thing distinct from their mind?

Is the Spirit of God, then, one thing, and God another thing? I trow not.

If a God of such vast, such universal proportions, whose body is the universe, and whose mind is the Divine Spirit, be too immense for us to "feel after," or to attempt to "find out" and recognize as our Father, He has provided a means, if we will believe the testimony, whereby we may come unto Him in Christ Jesus His son.

There he appears to us in a form like our own, in which the infinite spirit is combined with all the feelings of our infirmities, thus coming very near to his people, in which condition he invites them, saying:—"Come unto me all ye that labour and are heavy laden and I will give you rest."

If the foregoing criticism proves to be unfit, I stand ready to retract and make all possible amends. With much respect, I am, your brother,

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#### REMARKS.

I am afraid I cannot take refuge in the direction suggested by brother Jacobs, by blaming the printer for making me say what I did not intend, for I meant all I said—although I do not say but what it is possible I might have expressed myself otherwise and perhaps more clearly than I have done; and yet I do not very well see how I am to accomplish this. To so express myself on a subject like this that I shall not fail to convey to the minds of all,

or even of many, just what I think, is, perhaps, more than I can hope to do. And the matter does not become more, but less, easy where those to whom I am endeavouring to convey my thoughts have themselves definite and opposing ideas on the subject. The terms I use may not mean quite the same to such. We may not be at one in our apprehension of all the terms used, and therefore may not understand each other. The first thing necessary would be to agree as to our terms.

The Scriptures do not teach that absolute God is everywhere; these teach that spirit of (*ek*, "from," "out of," or "originating from") God is all-pervading. The spirit is instrumental—God Himself is the operator. When therefore I say "God in outflow," I do not literally mean "God flowing out," for that would be tantamount to saying "God flowing out of Himself." That which flows out, *so to speak*—for the expression must not be too literally construed—is His spirit, not Himself. It is in its genesis, but not in person, God, after the analogy of the Logos in Jno. i. 1, which was characteristically God (*theos*) but not absolutely God (*ho theos*).

In harmony with this we find a use of the term "God" (*theos*) in Scripture where absolute Deity is not intended. In this sense God was in Christ (1 Cor. v. 19). But how? By His spirit. So that practically brother Jacobs and I are agreed in our conclusion that God was in Christ *by his spirit*, and still I do not believe that spirit is absolute Deity. It never is under any circumstances. The very fact that it is spirit of God precludes this. It is not God, but spirit of God. And yet the term "God" is, as I have said, used in Scripture in connections which can only be understood as importing "*spirit of God*"—divine, as contradistinguished from human, or the spiritual from the soulical.

No, I do not use "fact" in the sense of "reality." God Himself is a reality, but I should not describe him as a "fact" (*factum*, done). If brother Jacobs will consider that I would say the same of life as I say of *ruach*—viz., "Life, being an ultimate fact, cannot be defined"—he will see better what I mean when I speak of *ruach* as an ultimate fact. I presume he will agree with me that life is an ultimate fact—we cannot get behind it—and yet it is not God, although of God. So with *ruach*—neither is it God, although an ultimate fact: a reality, certainly, but I should not say "an ultimate reality," as that does not express my thought. Thus *ruach* is a fact: life is a fact: both are ultimate facts, and both alike undefinable. Life is of God, but it is not God. So spirit is of God, but it is not God. God is more than life. God is more than spirit. He is both, and being both, neither regarded separately can be held to embody all that the Deity is.

The chemist wisely refrains from saying or thinking that he has arrived at the ultimate when he finds he can go no further in the resolution of a substance. It is only ultimate in the sense that he can go no further at present. But he does not imagine he has reached absolute finality. He knows he has not from the fact of the existence of a plurality of elements or "ultimates" (so called). To-morrow, perhaps, he may succeed in decomposing one or other of them.

Then I do not mean to suggest that "spirit" is as distinct from "God" as "steam is distinct from the engine." A better analogy would be found in the engine and its power, although as a matter of fact no true and sufficient analogy exists.

Nor have I "two divine ultimates," only one—the Deity Himself. Spirit

is an ultimate fact, but it "is not the ultimate." There we have God, whom no man by searching can find out (Job xi, 7), but a God everywhere present *by his spirit*.

To brother Jacobs' question regarding the phrase "spirit of the mind:" it appears to me that "mind" here is the understanding with its powers, and "spirit" is a new cast given to it by enlightenment proceeding from God in Christ. In this way the two are distinct—"renewed in the spirit of your mind."

*Editor*

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### ON J. J. BROWN'S CONTRIBUTION TO "THE SPIRIT IN MAN."

MR. J. J. BROWN'S contribution to "The Spirit in Man" three-cornered debate is hard to digest. As a reasonable solution of the primary condition of substance it is probably the best. But it goes hard to call this substance "Spirit." We are called upon to imagine, before any beginning of creation, a simple sole-substance-fluid-essence as existing from all eternity alone in space. No other being or existence but one. "There is only space and this simple substance in it," an omnipresent something existing in unlimited nothingness. And if that is unconceivable, then exit space and say the substance only existed. 'Twas truly the most wonderful mixture, conscious being, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, wisdom, and all the attributes that constitute the Infinite mind so perfectly mixed up as to be one with all kinds of chemicals in a fluid state; in fine, with every constituent of stars or suns or planets, with whatever atmospheres they may have, all existing as just one fluid-essence.

From this substance evolve atoms at the infinitesimal stage of creation, so minute as to be only imagined as existing. One might object to the mode suggested: "He can easily create atoms by a simple pressing or holding together minute portions of the substance of Himself." Fancy the Infinite source of life squeezing to death portions, however small, of Himself; not squeezed to death, but into passive unconsciousness; so, in that case, they still live, and only need liberty from pressure. In that case, if one could only grind solids into atoms fine enough, the result would be life and liberty. Does that account for microscopic life? The germinal cause of life is just what evolutionists want. Granted the germ and time for evolution, and all animated nature results. But the germ! Next to Mr. Brown's solution—we forget what scientist it was—but he said:—"In the vicissitudes of a cooling planet, by a fortuitous combination of atoms, one spark (of life) may have been evolved." If one could imagine an outside edge to omnipresence—space outside of the simple-fluid-substance,—then we could suggest zero as the cause of the shrinking and hardening of the fluid into chemical atoms. Or, if we could regard God as nature, self-renewing by necessity—imagine Him as casting off from His body infinitesimal portions of rejected substance in the continual process of self-renewal—well, if we must be anthropological, let us be so. There must be some way of accounting for death, unless we deny its existence. Spirit gives life; if all creation is derived from spirit, how can death be possible?

Evolution or involution should be gradual in development or in decadence. Solids and atoms are passive, yes, dead. What a relief it is from death to infinite life and conscious being, or downward from God to death !

Then there is the law of expansion and contraction of substance. The condensation of fluid into atoms and the massing together of atoms into solids must have caused great shrinkage. This would reasonably account for what we call space; but would it not mean the dividing up of the substance-god into a countless number of passive-gods with millions of miles of zero between them; just as we see the stars in space, like little brilliant points of something set into an unlimited nothingness? But to a believer in an Omnipresent Spirit there is no such zero. Space is a very important part of the being of God; it gives us a good idea of the purity of spirit and of the immensity of the spirit of God: pure to absolute invisibility, though we can see through billions of miles of it. And God is there.

The idea of omnipresence itself forbids the idea of the divisibility of spirit. And that which cannot be divided must remain one.

The Holy Scriptures reveal to our minds a personal God. The spirit is described as His breath, and His utterances and commands His word. In Genesis there is God, His spirit, and His word. The spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters, and God commanded. So, "by the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of His mouth." "He spake and it was done; He commanded and it stood fast." "By His spirit He garnished the heavens."

Evolution is not creation. We may as well say that a man evolves to walk or do any other act. The body moves in instant obedience to the will, and without the spirit it is dead; it belongs. The mind conceives, the will determines, and the body performs. Has God no organism when all the forces of nature obey Him?

Man was created in the image, after the likeness of Deity; in what respect does the image resemble the Divine person? Man must breathe to live. His existence depends on the life-giving power of the spirit. But the same power that built and supports his life may hasten his decay after death. He lives by the will of God—"Cease ye from man whose breath is in his nostrils." This indicates the frail hold he has upon life, and it ought to settle his claim to spirit ownership. He might file a claim on sunshine, or on a portion of a flowing river that speeds on its way to the ocean. Death stops all claim to spirit ownership. "In that very day his thoughts perish."

Human spirit? Yes, in a sense, by its defilement. The atmosphere and the earth is tainted with the curse of sin, and needs a new influx of the spirit of God.

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### THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

**T**HE popular idea is that the immortal soul is the organ of thought, and that the mind of man is located in the soul, and that it survives the death of the body. In our opposition to that view, it is customary to contend that the brain is the sole organ of thought. While that is true to a certain extent, I am inclined to contend that it is not all the truth; that the

Scriptures and our experience teach us that there are other centres of thought and action besides the brain, although they may be acting in harmony therewith. The writers of the books of the Bible may have had more knowledge of the constitution of man than we may give them credit for. Be that as it may, if we believe that all Scripture is given by inspiration of God—the God who made man and endowed him with all the functions that he is possessed of—we must come to the conclusion that all references to man's functions in the Scriptures must be scientifically accurate. So when we read that “with the *heart* man believeth unto righteousness,” should we not locate the function of belief in the region of the heart, and not in the head? When we are told to “love the Lord our God with all the heart, with all the soul, with all our strength, and with all our mind,” does it not indicate separate centres of action? We do not clasp a loved one to our brains, rather to our bosoms, as the heart is regarded as the seat of affection. Our experience teaches us that the feelings spring from thence. In the Bible, compassion, mercy, kindness, longsuffering, and kindred affections are associated with the bowels as their centre. “If there be, therefore, any consolation in Christ, if any fellowship of spirit, if any comfort of love, if any bowels and mercies, fulfil ye my joy”—Phil. ii. 1. “Put on, therefore, as the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, longsuffering; forbearing one another, and forgiving one another.—Col. iii. 12-13.—“Whoso hath this world's goods and seeth his brother in need, and shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him, how dwelleth the love of God in him?—1 John iii. 17. Is it not in accordance with our experience that our hearts and our bowels are stirred by pity, by compassion, and their counter parts grief and sorrow? The *bosom* is a word also used in Scripture, associated with the expression of love and confidence. Such expressions are commonly regarded as figures of speech, but a study of what is really known of the nervous system will prove that there is a foundation of literal truth in the functions thus located.

In order to deal fully with the subject from a scientific point of view, it would be necessary to have a diagram of the nervous system for reference. However, it is not my intention to deal fully with that aspect of the subject. If any of my readers have such a diagram, they will be able to follow my remarks, and study the subject for themselves.

I think we may all agree that the brain is the grand centre of thought and action for the whole body. Mind has been defined as “the faculty by which we think.” The result of thought is action. Different actions are performed by those members of the body which are functionally adapted for doing the things required as the result of any particular thought. For this purpose there are connected with the brain a series of motors called nerves, which ramify the whole body. They are composed of two distinct portions or systems, namely:—the *cerebro-spinal* and the *sympathetic or ganglionic*. It is with the latter that we have to deal in this enquiry. The *sympathetic system* consists of a chain of ganglia (that is nerve knots or masses), along each side of the vertebral column. There is one in particular which bears on the point in hand. It is called the *great splanchnic*, a Greek word, which means the bowels. This nerve arises by five separate roots. The cords from these five roots unite to form a large round cord, and after entering the abdomen through the diaphragm, ends in a large and complex ganglion, and which, from the mass of nervous matter which it contains, has been termed the *abdominal brain*. A blow on this spot often causes unconsciousness, and sometimes death.

What is called "the cardiac plexus" is a nerve centre in the region of the heart, which forms a centre of action in connection with that organ, which will therefore be what in Scripture is called "the heart with which man believeth unto righteousness," and the seat of affection. If that be so, it proves that these Scriptural expressions have a foundation in these *ganglia* as centres of faith, love, compassion, mercy, kindness, and kindred function; all the members of the body being necessary.

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### THE "SPIRIT IN MAN" DISCUSSION.

THE April *Investigator*, for reasons stated by the Editor, does not contain his reply to my last contribution, that being promised in "next issue." About a page and a half, however, appears from his pen, which seems to have been written before he received my last MS. Moreover, his editorial is devoted entirely to my article, in a way not much to my liking. Editors, of course, are privileged, and oftentimes they may, by an "editorial" or a "foot-note," take a seeming advantage of an opponent, he being unable to defend himself.

In a case like the present, where two men are professedly engaged in a friendly discussion, for the elucidation of an important Scripture doctrine, there should be no "*guerilla*" practice. Each should state his theory of the question; then should follow a mutual pointing out of defects, and suggestions of improvement. If there were more than two theorists, as was the case here, the principle would simply be extended, and readers would choose for themselves, at the finish, as to which was most reasonable. But it appears to me that bro. Nisbet has never had this conception of his duty. He has pursued an almost entirely negative course. He set out by denying that "man is a creature of dust formation, whose individuality and faculties are attributes of his bodily organisation" (*Declaration*, p. 26); or that "the body is the man" (*Christendom Astray*, p. 32-34); or that even the "vitalised body is the man;"—"the vitalised body," says he, "*became a living soul*" (*Investigator*, '97, p. 55, par. 6). This was pointed out in October number, but he has ignored the observations I then made. Until he pays due attention to them, "it cannot be said that any satisfactory canvass of the subject has begun." The theory of the constitution of man advocated in *Christendom Astray* is clear and quite decided. For many years I held it, in the absence of a better; but the only commendable thing I see about bro. Nisbet's is that it furnishes an evidence that he "*do move*."

I trust that he will get down to business now, and show how *his* theory of a "*living soul*" works out in practice. In order to be of any service, it must be symmetrical, and workable in the light of Scripture and sound reason. Meantime I shall make a few comments on his present article and editorial. But before doing so, let me say the proof-reading of last issue is not up to his usual standard. In my article two misprints occur, which considerably mar the sense. On p. 35*a*, par. 3, "value of mind" should read *realm* of mind; and on p. 37, par. 3, "second article" should read *present* article. The other defects are typographical and unimportant.

(1). Bro. Nisbet begins by saying that bro. Weir has neither disposed of

nor accounted for the fact that *ruach* is not mentioned in Gen. ii. 7. Bro. Nisbet seems to have taken a death-grip here, very strongly illustrating the old adage of the "drowning man" and the "straw." Surely a sufficient explanation of this has been already given in January *Investigator*, p. 6-8. I should be delighted if bro. Nisbet dealt with all *my arguments* as fully as I have dealt there with this. But if he will reflect upon the fact that in the description given by Moses of man's "*creation*," in Gen. i. 27, *ruach* is not mentioned, he will, if consistent, abate his surprise at its non-mention in Gen. ii. 7, where "*formation*" is the leading feature. Gen. i. 27 reads, "God created man in his own image." Does this embrace nothing more than body or bodily form? It does embrace more, bro. Nisbet being witness. "I do not think," says he, "that the view held by the brethren is as expressed by bro. Diboll in his concluding paragraph, that man is simply a 'vitalised body.' They go a step further, at least I do, and claim with Moses that the vitalised body became a 'living soul.'"—*Investigator*, July '97, p. 55, par. 5.

Man's form, according to Gen. ii. 7, appertains to his body—"the dust formation." But this is not "*man*" according to bro. Nisbet; therefore *more is involved* in the above extract from Gen. i. 27 than "body or bodily form." The "*vitalising*" does not even produce "*man*," according to him. What, then, does?

Bro. Nisbet has cited Psalm civ. 30 as an illustration of "*ruach* combined with an organism." If this be not a meaningless form of words, it would seem to be an admission of my contention, that the *creation of man* was effected by the Creator "*combining a spirit with an organism*," said "organism" becoming, in this way, a "*living soul*." If this be not his meaning, he has no warrant for such a distinction as he draws between the two passages he cites (Psalm cxxxix. 7 and civ. 30). The "spirit" is the same in both passages. In the former, its universality is affirmed; in the latter, its *creative function and power*. All the creatures mentioned were "*created*," by God sending forth His spirit, which may very reasonably be understood to mean simply an act of the *Almighty will*—the spirit already being present everywhere, as affirmed by the Psalmist (cxxxix. 7). Bro. Nisbet, in January issue, p. 10, par. 3, speaks of "spirit in man wedded to an organism;" and in April issue, p. 34, par. 1, of "*ruach* combined with an organism."\* He cannot get away from the fact that such is the *build* of a "*living soul*." Well, then, the question between us is narrowed to this:—Is such spirit a *part of such creature*, or is it, on the contrary, a *part of the Creator—God*? In either case, it must be admitted to be *active*, not *passive*, and, as such, inseparably connected with the "*will*," and, consequently, with responsibility. If it be a part of the creature, responsibility would, of course, attach to the creature; but if it be a part of God, what then? Let bro. Nisbet answer, seeing that this latter is *his* view—not mine.

Further, the spirit of man is credited in Scripture with the ability to *know*, as well as with being the seat of the emotions.—"I Daniel was *grieved in my spirit* in the midst of my body" (Dan. vii. 15). "Nebuchadnezzar dreamed dreams wherewith *his spirit was troubled*" (Dan. ii. 1). "What man *knoweth* the things of a man save *the spirit of man which is in him*" (1 Cor. ii. 11); therefore the spirit is a *part of his mental machinery*, and as such must have

\* Neither of these are my phrases. As the reader may see, I inserted the phrase "so to speak" after "combined" and "wedded," thus indicating to the intelligent reader that the terms used were catachrestical—*catachresis* being "the abuse or necessary use of one word for lack of another more proper." If bro. Weir had paid attention to *my* phrases—if indeed he had reproduced them here—his argument would have been without point.—EDITOR.

been involved, although not "*mentioned*," in Gen. ii. 7, else neither thought nor emotion could have obtained.

(2). I am quoted, on p. 8, January issue, as saying, "We are not discussing about the spirit of God at present, but "the spirit in man." Then bro. Nisbet says, "That is so, but from my standpoint we are discussing both—the one being the other as I see it in this connection. I have denied that man, whose formation is described by Moses in Gen. ii. 7, had such a spirit as bro. Weir contends for." . . . "We are both agreed that there is *ruach* in man; will bro. Weir tell us what else this *ruach* is, if it be not *ruach elohim*—spirit of God—not God, but spirit of God?"

Bro. Nisbet is taking great liberties here with *ruach elohim*—"spirit of God." He practically affirms that it is identical with "the spirit in man"—"*man's spirit*." True, he does not quote these italics (whatever his reason for omitting them be); but on p. 8, from which the quotation is taken, they are attached by me to the phrase "spirit in man," and so constitute an explanation of the sense in which I there employed it. I, therefore, shall construe him here as affirming that the "spirit of God" is identical with "man's spirit"—"the one being the other," says he, "as I see it in this connection." If this be not what he means, he is *evading* the issue. I would, in any case, beseech him to give par. 3, page 8, a categorical examination, taking it in its "*connection*."

But I have not attempted to define what man's spirit is *essentially*. I have said, and *proved*, that it was formed by God within man (Zech. xii. 1)—see *Investigator*, July '97, p. 49; also Oct., p. 78-81—and inasmuch as *ruach elohim*—"spirit of God"—is the means by which all things have been "*created*," it (*ruach elohim*, "spirit of God") is the *CAUSE*—they the *EFFECTS*. Now man, body and *spirit*, being a "creature," an "effect," it is evident that neither in whole nor part can he be *ruach elohim*, "spirit of God," else the "*effect*" is its own "*cause*," which is, of course, absurd.

(3). "Hypostatic *ruach*" and "free *ruach*"—"nice distinctions," whatever they may mean. "Granted," says bro. Nisbet, "there is the hypostatic *ruach* and the 'free' or all-pervading *ruach*, but the *ruach* is neither man nor man's, except in the Scripture sense that flesh is *ruach* that passeth away and cometh not again (Psalm lxxviii. 39)."

Bro. Nisbet cites Psalm cxxxix. 7 to show what he means by "free or all-pervading spirit." The "spirit of God" is what is mentioned there by the Psalmist, who makes it identical with God Himself. "Spirit of God" in the form of "*flesh*," then, is the *only sense* in which man *is* or *has* "spirit;" therefore, *man's body* being "*flesh*," the totality of man is *flesh*, and "*flesh*" being "spirit of God," man is "spirit of God," and "spirit of God" being God, man is God! This is very Theosophic, but it seems to me the fair and logical sequence of Bro. Nisbet's words.

Bro. Nisbet, editorially, says (p. 38):—"Ruach we find brought before us in Scripture as God-in-outflow." . . . "But *ruach* is not God: it is a spirit flowing out from God. All things are indeed but modes of that spirit."

Flesh, then, is a "mode or form of God-in-outflow." But what can "God-in-outflow" be but God? Is His nature changed by this "outflow?" Is He *less real* or *powerful* in *Sheol*, where the Psalmist says HE IS, than in Heaven? Is he not omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and unchangeable? Whence,

\* A foot-note belonging to this will be found on page x. of Cover.



then, the "inertia," and similar ungodlike attributes of "matter"—"flesh"—if "all things are indeed but modes of that spirit?" The fact is, this *Evolutionary* philosophy of bro. Nisbet cannot account for them at all. A clear distinction must be made between the idea of "things created by the spirit of God" and that of "things evolved out of that spirit." Bro. Nisbet seems to have adopted the latter idea, and so made common cause with Pantheists.

But why not adhere to the rendering of Psalm lxxviii. 39, given in the "Authorised," the "Revised," and the "Douay" versions? They all three give "wind" as the idea; and seeing that *ruach* is rendered "wind" over 90 times in other passages of the O.T., there would require to be some very powerful reason for disputing the judgment of these translators here. Does such reason exist? No. Let any thoughtful person read the psalm from the beginning, noting v. 2—"I will open my mouth in a parable; I will utter dark sayings as of old"—and the conviction will be irresistible that the Psalmist desired to set forth the very fleeting nature of those disobedient Israelites, whom he characterises as "flesh," &c. A better metaphor than "wind" could not be chosen. The thought is akin to that in Job xiv. 1, 2—"Man that is born of a woman is of few days and full of trouble; he cometh forth a flower and is cut down, he fleeth as a shadow and continueth not:" or to that in Jas. iv. 14—"Ye are a vapour that appeareth for a little time, and then vanisheth away." This will be abundantly manifest if, with Psalm lxxviii. 39, we compare Isa. xxxi. 3—"The Egyptians are men and not God, and their horses flesh and not spirit—*ruach*." Isaiah comes to the rescue very nicely here, telling us in a way not to be misunderstood that "men" are "not God," and "flesh" is "not spirit." The context here plainly shows that "spirit of God" is the sense attached to *ruach* by Isaiah. The same test applied to Psalm lxxviii. as plainly shows that the Psalmist used *ruach* in the sense of "wind." Admit this, and the Scriptures harmonise; deny it, and you cause collision and consequent confusion.

(4). I cannot understand why bro. Nisbet objects to my substituting "spirit" for "life" in the extract from Dr. Cook (Oct. issue, p. 78, foot-note), seeing that he himself says "*Ruach* is the cause of life." If it be the "cause of life" (as bro. Nisbet and I agree), and "life" be the cause of "organism," scientifically speaking, then it seems sound enough for me to regard its use by Dr. Cook (who was speaking as a scientist at the time) as "synecdochical." Be it remembered that "spirit" is a Scripture, not a *scientific*, term, hence Dr. Cook's choice of "*life*" instead.

Then bro. Nisbet is filled with astonishment—judging from his use of exclamation signs—that "bro. Weir actually calls this the teaching of science!" Bro. Nisbet's astonishment, probably, is due to inattention to science. I have given him a *second* instalment in my last article—this time from Huxley, "the monarch of science," quoted from Prof. Drummond's book—himself an intelligent exponent of science; when bro. Nisbet attends thereto I shall probably have something further to say hereon.

(5). ATOMS.—After what bro. Nisbet has written in January *Investigator*, p. 9. par. 3, about "*ruach*," "atoms," "monads," "matter," "shapes," "organisms," "formless form of spirit," &c, it is strange that he should now *disown* and endeavour to "father" it on the "author of *Eternal News*." I suggested that it "bore resemblance to the philosophy of Mr. J. J. Brown, appearing in the same issue," but in no way whatever did bro. Nisbet recognise Mr. Brown's authorship; therefore, I characterised it "a philosophy seemingly all his own."

But, still more strangely, bro. Nisbet says (editorial, p. 38, par. 1), that he has "gathered it from Scripture." Well, how he could "gather it from Scripture," and yet not only refuse to own, but try to saddle it on Mr. Brown, is for him to explain. As to my dragging into this discussion what bro. Nisbet does not say, and then crediting him with saying it, I plead "*Not Guilty*." He says I have done so "several times in this issue." I presume this is one of the times just replied to,—if he will specify the others, I shall understand what my crime is, and be willing to expiate it.

(6). COSMIC ETHER.—I happen to have read in the *Scientific American* supplement the article on this subject alluded to by Bro. Nisbet, but I fail to see how it can be made to support his philosophy. "Cosmic ether" and "solar heat," according to Dr. Sajous, are the two factors participant in the "formation of matter." "If," says he, "the creation of matter has never been realised in laboratories, it is because homogeneous ether has never been submitted to a sufficiently high temperature . . . such as the sun supplies" (*Investigator*, p. 38). "Homogeneous ether," then, according to this, is the basis of "matter" (is "elementary matter"); "solar heat" the *concretizing* or materialising force. But where does *ruach elohim* come in here? I shall await bro. Nisbet's reply in next issue before saying more.

(7). ELECTRICITY.—What I have said about brethren Dr. John Thomas and R. Roberts is *correct*. In "*Eureka*," vol. 1, p. 96, Dr. Thomas writes:—"If I might venture a conjecture on so profound a subject, I would suggest that the Divine nature is that wonderful and extraordinary essence observed in that terrible and destructive agent the Scriptures term "spirit," and the philosophers *electricity*." Then, again, on p. 97, par. 3, "The all-pervading *electricity* is the simple and undecomposable radiation "*out of*" the Divine Substance, which, under the fiat of His will, constitutes the atomic nucleus of all bodies, solid, fluid, or aëriiform." Now for bro. Roberts, see *Christadelphian*, November, 1895, p. 484:—"Deity is spirit, and to convey our conception to the reader of this substance, we would style it *corporeal electricity*" . . . "*Electricity* or *lightning* is a Bible symbol for spirit." Let our readers judge between us.

In conclusion I would say, that as this subject required more space than could be given to it, I dropped the discussion of the "Nature of Jesus," &c., in which bro. Nisbet and I were engaged. When this subject ("Spirit in Man") is finished, if he be not tired of me, I should like to resume the other. I hope, in next issue, to advance to the New Testament aspect of the "spirit" question.

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*R. Stewart.*

Bro. Weir begins his sixth contribution to this subject with a few observations upon the proper course to pursue in carrying on this discussion, observations which, in the circumstances, I cannot be expected wholly to endorse. He objects, and somewhat unreasonably, to my "guerilla practice," for he gave me no chance to do anything else in last issue than this which he characterises as "guerilla practice:" he was both late and lengthy—occupying close on six pages—with his contribution, and a formal reply to him was out of the question, and if any correction of the errors in fact of which he was guilty was to be made in that issue, it must needs be in the Editorial, since all the rest of the space was already fully set, and the most

of it printed off. But my Editorial was, he says, "devoted entirely to his article, and in a way not much to his liking." The latter statement I must needs accept as true, but the former is not in accordance with the facts. My Editorial was devoted to something else altogether: the purpose I had in view was to draw attention to the remarkable article on "Cosmic Ether" appearing in the *Scientific American Supplement* for March 19, an article which seemed to me to show that the trend of scientific thought was in the direction of the "philosophic" conclusions at which I had myself arrived by the aid of Scripture *plus* common sense, and in direct antagonism to the assertion of Huxley, that there can be "neither creation nor annihilation." Any reference I made to bro. Weir was merely incidental, and I think wholly justified by the facts of the case. He must have read very carelessly what I wrote as to my belief about Things when he could see therein the "strange thought" with which he credits me on page 36 of April issue. What I did write was (page 9, January, 1898):—

"Spirit (*ruach*) is absolutely essential to the life of all animals and to the very existence of shapes, animate and inanimate, to the integration even of that of which these shapes are made—of 'matter' itself; that the partial 'withdrawal' of this spirit results in death of all organisms so deprived, and in the resolution into elemental forms of those organisms and of all other shapes; indeed, by the absolute 'withdrawal' of *IT* the organic world would itself dissolve, and even the matter of which it consists no longer be. So spirit holds all things together, even the ultimate atom. Let that spirit be wholly 'withdrawn' and atoms assume once more their original and only essential formless form of spirit! What we call matter would have ceased to be, for the monad or ultimate atoms is, as I take it, but a mode of spirit, *the mode being dependent upon the will of Him who sent forth his spirit (Ps. civ. 30), and matter with its shapes, personal and impersonal, was. Ruach was therefore antecedent to matter. So 'all things are out of God'—cē tou theou (1 Cor. xi. 12).*"

I had not said nor suggested that the "squeezing or drawing together of this originally 'formless form of spirit' results in its assuming form," with which bro. Weir credits me. I had no call to enter that region, being content with the statement found in Ps. civ. 30, as reflected in the italicised portion of the above extract. The "strange thought" exists only in bro. Weir's imagination—a faculty with which he seems specially endowed.

Then bro. Weir had gone out of his way to suggest that I believed electricity and *ruach* to be identical. This suggestion I contradicted, indicating, at the same time, the irrelevancy of his objection about "chaining the Most High to the chariot wheels of Mammon, &c.," since, even if I had believed electricity to be *ruach*, as he had charged me with doing, yet, as I did not believe *ruach* to be very God, "harnessing" *ruach* would not be "harnessing" God. But I had given him not the slightest grounds for believing that I sought to identify electricity with *ruach*. Perhaps the wish that I might do so was father to the thought, he having, what he thought, an effective answer in store for any one who might so affirm. But if bro. Weir will confine himself to what I say, without drawing upon his imagination for material, he will have enough to reply to. But he pleads "Not Guilty" to "dragging into the discussion what bro. Nisbet does not say, and then crediting him with saying it," and is only anxious to be told his fault that he may "expiate it." He has been already informed in the Editorial in question of several cases. But his "expiation" is somewhat peculiar. He had credited me, as I said in my Editorial, with identifying electricity with *ruach*. His "expiation" consists in saying "Not Guilty" of anything. But "guilty" he was, and "guilty" he remains, just as in the case of Genesis ii. 7, of which he said on p. 49 of July issue for 1897, "In . . . Gen. ii. 7 it says, "The Lord God formed

man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils, *nishmath ruach chayyim* (literally, breath of the spirit of lives), and man became a living soul;" and on page 78 of the issue following he said, "This is what was done—the Lord God breathed into man's nostrils *nishmath ruach chayyim*, not simply *neshamah* (breath) but *ruach* (spirit) as well." When I point out that *ruach* is not mentioned in the passages, as both quoted and affirmed by him, his "expiation" takes the form of admitting "lack of clearness at that point but not of *error*." Bro. Weir is always anxious to expiate his errors; but as he never makes any, he never gets an opportunity of expiation.

Then what he has been pleased to term "a philosophy seemingly all my own," I have neither repudiated nor "tried to saddle on J. J. Brown." What I did say was that he had attributed to me what J. J. Brown had said about "squeezing together of atoms." Anything that I have said about "'*ruach*,' 'atoms,' 'monads,' 'matter,' 'shapes,' 'organisms,' 'formless form of spirit,' &c.," I neither "disown nor endeavour to father on the author of *Eternal News*," as bro. Weir now says I do. But I have no relish for occupying space only to repudiate charges which, with ordinary care in the reading of what I say, need never be made.

These are all the references I made to bro. Weir's article in my Editorial. I afterwards remarked upon *ruach* in answer to a possible question from some one—"What is *ruach*?" describing it in a way, but confessing my inability to define it, as being one of those ultimate facts which elude definition. I concluded my remarks by a reference to the conclusion to which the matured thought of Dr. Thomas had brought him regarding the natural man, his conclusion being that he is a form (or mode) of *ruach*, which, being outside the Name, is evanescent in type, and when it passeth away cometh not again.

As regards the charge of confounding electricity and *ruach*, which bro. Weir brought against bro. Dr. Thomas and Robert Roberts, bro. Weir would almost seem to have made it good in the case of Dr. Thomas; although, having just read, in their connections, the portions in *Eureka* adduced as proof by bro. Weir, I am not without my doubts as to his understanding of the Doctor being correct. There Dr. Thomas makes a distinction between *ruach* and what he terms the "Divine Substance"—the former, in his view, being a mere radiation from the latter. But the charge clearly fails as against bro. Roberts, for, in the extract given from the *Christadelphian*, bro. Roberts calls electricity "a Bible *symbol*" for spirit. The symbolical is not the actual. A symbol is an emblem or representation of something else; *ergo* electricity, according to the extract, is not *ruach*, but symbolises it.

It seems that bro. Weir does not as yet understand what my theory about man is. He says, I "set out by denying that man is 'a creature of dust formation, whose individuality and faculties are attributes of his bodily organisation.'" Now I did no such thing. On page 55 of the July issue for 1897, in my first contribution, I suggested an emendation, by which I said, "the statement in the *Declaration* becomes *demonstrably true*." I have in the past been challenged to affirm in public debate the proposition as it stands in the *Declaration*, but have declined, as a smart man might press it into service against the truth; hence I admitted, in replying to bro. Diboll, that it was "open to exception, but not so much as is the contention in *Christendom*

\* What J. J. Brown really says is about "spirit," not "atoms" (see page 64 of this issue), viz., "not by the sustained effort of 'squeezing,' but by simply holding minute portions of itself together."

*Astray* that the body is the man"—although I do not believe that the writer of *Christendom Astray* seeks to maintain that the body is all that man is. I know no Christadelphian who does this, and if bro. Weir held for "many years" this theory of the constitution of man, which he says is "advocated in *Christendom Astray*," I congratulate him on having given it up.

Dealing with bro. Weir's theory as at present held by him, will he tell me where and how consciousness comes in? On page 79 of October issue he says, "at present his belief is that consciousness is entirely dependent on the union of spirit with body." Well, does consciousness come to the spirit as a necessary result of its union with the body, or subsequently; and if subsequently, is it dependent upon other factors, of which the outside world is one? If the spirit is not conscious *as* spirit, but becomes so in virtue of its union with the body, what practical difference is there between the theory of the writer of *Christendom Astray*, that "mind is a product of the living brain and personal identity the sum of its impressions," and bro. Weir's theory regarding the "spirit," which, he says, has no consciousness before its union with "body," but only after such union has taken place? For, apart from each other, "body" seems to have as much to do with the faculty of thinking as the "spirit" has, and it would seem to follow that it is neither of the body as such nor of the spirit as such that thinking can be affirmed, but of the man or "living soul." Indeed, as I see it, thinking necessitates the presence of another factor, being a result of the interaction of the "breath of life" and the organised body *plus* impressions from the outside world. But if the spirit can think in the body without the body taking any active part in the process, why cannot the spirit think independently of the body before birth or after death? But if it be neither the "body" nor the "spirit" but the living soul which thinks, and which thinking can only obtain during the interaction of "breath of life" and "body," then it is easy to understand why thinking cannot be predicated of the man when death puts an end to this interaction, for the "living soul" which depends for its being on such interaction will have ceased to be.

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*Editor*

(For continuation, see page xi. of Cover.)

## The Investigator.

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change of address—No. 151 Stirling Road,  
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THE present issue is largely occupied with contributions directly suggested by the discussion on "The Spirit in Man." I have several short papers on the subject, but none of them in support of the contention of bro.

Diboll and Weir, otherwise I should have been pleased to give such a place along with the others. The subject thus seems to be of some interest, if I may judge from the number of those who have been moved to put their pens to paper. I am still without any contribution in support of the usually accepted—what I have called the "orthodox Christadelphian"—views on the subject of spirit in relation to man, as prevalent amongst us as a body and reflected in our literature. It is possible that many may think—as some do—that the space might be more profitably occupied with other subjects. I have a half notion of this myself, and in future issues I shall endeavour to prevent an undue amount of space being occupied by contributions on the subject, outside those of bro. Weir and myself.

I have more interest personally in the subject to which bro. Weir refers at the close of his present contribution on spirit—viz., the "Sonship of Jesus," &c., and shall welcome his renewal of that subject after he has disposed of "the New Testament aspect of the spirit question," which he purposes advancing in the October issue.

The subject of the nature of Jesus and his relation to the Father has practical bearings of consuming interest to us all. When, therefore, bro. Weir and I have said as much as is desirable on the (shall I say "natural?") spirit in man, we may turn with interest—and, perhaps, something of relief—to the discussion of the divine spirit in the man Christ Jesus, with all that it imports and implies for us who seek to follow Christ.

## A COMMUNICATION.

### THE GREAT SPIRIT, GOD.

DEAR BRO. NISBET,—(1) Relying for the acceptance of this on the generosity of your sentiment which you once expressed to me, that "we can do nothing against the truth," it being eternal, I therefore venture to send you my rejoicing and congratulations on your belief of the "*formless form of spirit*."

(2) I have read Dr. Sajous' article you refer to, but it does not just touch the point. True, it suggests the destruction of the chemic atom by means of extreme cold—as Lockyer's researches on the sun suggests the same by means of extreme heat—but it builds on the basis of Kelvin's vortex theory that millions of vortex rings go to make one chemic atom, so that this atom's destruction is but a separation of vortex rings from one another, but not their destruction. These vortex rings, these ultimate units, these are the atoms, or, as I should say, the points Dr. Sajous doesn't touch. He leaves it to Lord Kelvin, who says, that to generate or to destroy these can only be an act of creative power.

(3) Now, if we consider the nature of a vortex ring, we will at once see how brittle and easily broken and destroyed it must be. A whirling, straight column of fluid we can easily understand; but in one bent round into ring form, we ask: how can the incompressible fluid in the outer and wider rim of the ring compress round in its vortex motion into the inner and narrower rim of the ring? Then we see that the outer rim cannot be continuous like the inner rim. The whirling portions which meet together at the inner

rim of the ring must separate or radiate out from each other towards the outer rim of the ring. Thus we have the outer rim rugged with gaps. Such is the brittle structure of the vortex ring. If to generate such requires an act of creative power, I should say that to uphold such in existence would require continuous effort of creative power. I like Lord Kelvin's theory, however, for it starts with finding in space the one sole simple substance perfectly infinitely fluid (your "*formless form of spirit*"), and tries to give a reason how form or solidity begins to be.

(4) "*Formless form of spirit*."—To me it is the great spirit, God. Here is the foundation fact of all religion and science. Here, the greatest fact in the universe, before which every "ism" stands in awe. Modern materialism arriving here halts, astonished, as if afraid to look on God. For from the standpoint of the materialist, the consciousness or sensitiveness must inhere in the substance itself, or how could shape or form bring it? And seeing that substance itself is the conscious or sensitive thing, in the name of being or existence I ask:—Does the substance never act? Do you think it never acts? Of course, if it generates millions of vortex rings for the purpose of making a single chemic atom, I should say that a much easier and better way for that purpose would be, not by sustained effort of "squeezing," but by simply holding minute portions of itself together.

(5) "*Formless form of spirit*."—All sufficient, omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, Infinite One. Our spirits, offspring of this great father spirit, live, move, and have their being in Him. Great heaven-ocean of Spirit. "God is everywhere or nowhere," Prof. Blackie wrote me once. And you give this great spirit great manipulative power in the building up of our bodies for the resurrection. But bear with me, the idea of limiting the Father to a central nucleus in space, however immense that central nucleus may be, if short of infinity, makes him but a *mite*, which the infinite spirit by its infinity could swamp. Great omnipresent spirit, God. The place whereon we tread is holy ground. In Him we have our immortality, our all. Our spirits which are off His, may safely commend themselves into His hands. He will clothe them throughout eternity as required. Our Father knoweth what things we have need of. Let us but submit ourselves unto the Father of spirits and live. Let us learn from Christ the eternal principles of the eternal government of God and, love, obey, and trust.

300 Cathcart Road,  
Glasgow.

J. J. Brown

## REMARKS ON THE FOREGOING PARAGRAPHS AS NUMBERED.

(1). My phrase, "formless form of spirit," is, after all, only a phrase to describe something of which I *know* nothing beyond what the Scriptures convey to me.

(2). I read Dr. Sajous' article somewhat differently; its suggestions go somewhat deeper than "vortex rings."

(3). I don't know anything about "vortex rings." I have read about them, but they are outwith science, having their origin in the scientific imagination. They don't seem to me a necessity.

(4). I am a materialist if I am anything, but with me neither shape nor form bring consciousness, as is abundantly evident when we realise that in death, shape or form remain, *minus* consciousness. Life does not even bring consciousness. Consciousness requires both the knower and the known—subject and object—to render it possible. Substance, then, is not the conscious or sensitive thing—it is the person, the living soul, who feels and knows, and that is a form of "*ruach* which passes." But I may not proceed further in this line of things in answer to the foregoing remarks, or bro. Weir will say I am replying to him.

(5). The Father is not *limited* to a central nucleus in space. By his *ruach* he is everywhere; he is therefore not limited, and never can be opposed by his *ruach*, which is but a mode of himself. The *ruach* is not infinite *because* omnipresent. Omnipresence is not infinity. "Infinity" is a term, and to me it is nothing else, for I can never know "infinity." It is the easiest of things to juggle with terms and deceive ourselves.

EDITOR.

DR. THOMAS' RENDERING OF *DI'HOU*: RIGHT OR WRONG?

DEAR BRO. NISBET,—The brethren, when explaining Heb. i. 2 "by whom," also Col. i. 16 "by him" (last clause), and 1 Cor. viii. 6 "by whom," always follow the rendering given in *Phanerosis*, page 13, where the Doctor translates *di'hou* as meaning "on account of whom."

I wish to ask you, and it is an important point, do you know of any authority other than the Doctor's for this alteration?

The word *hou* is in the Genitive case, as is *autou* in 1 Cor. viii. 6. Can you bring forward any authority for translating either of these expressions into "on account of him" or "on account of whom?" It seems to me that in doing so, as the brethren generally do, they are perpetuating a very great blunder. Liddell & Scott's Lexicon gives the meaning of *dia* as "coming through and out of, arising from," and (1) with the Genitive, of the agent or instrument, through, by

means of, by;" but with the Accusative case—" (2) with Accusative strictly according to the signification of the Accusative case, through and towards, aiming at, with a view to, *on account of*, for the sake of, by reason of."

Young's "Analytical Concordance" shows that the writers of the N.T. observed the distinction—without any exception if you take the R.V., with one exception if you use the A.V. Seeing the importance of this point, I lately sent to the Professor of Greek at the University here the following question:—"Would a correct Greek writer use *dia* with the Genitive to express any of the following meanings:—On behalf of whom, in relation to whom, or with a view to whom?" (which you will see express the idea of "on account of whom.")

His answer—besides referring me to Scripture—was as follows:—"I am not aware that *dia* with the Genitive is ever used in any of the senses you mention—though *dia*, with the Accusative, in the sense of "owing to his action," differs but slightly in meaning from *dia* with the Genitive in the sense of "by means of him."

So, though *dia* with Accusative comes in meaning near to *dia* with Genitive, it does not appear from grammar or N.T. use that *dia* with Genitive has the meaning given to it by the brethren, *i.e.*, the meaning of *dia* when used with Accusative case. Have not the brethren made a blunder? Hoping, for the good of all, you will look into this matter, I remain, faithfully your brother,

R. G. BURTON.

95 Buckingham Street,  
Sydney.

ANSWER.

As a matter of grammar, there can be no doubt but Dr. Thomas and others following him are quite wrong in their construing of *dia* with a Genitive as if it were an Accusative. *Winer*, in his *Grammar of the New Testament Diction*, puts the matter thus:—"With the Genitive, *dia* denotes the instrument of an action; with the Accusative, its ground, *ratio*." Green, in his *Handbook*, says of *dia* with the cases it "governs:"

"A—*dia* with Genitive.

1. *In reference to place*: through, literally 'through and from'—see Jno. xiv. 6, 'No one cometh to the Father except *through* me;' Jno. iv. 4, 'He must needs pass *through* Samaria.'

2. *In reference to agency*: *through*, by means of—1 Cor. iii. 5, 'Ministers *through* whom ye believed;' Eph. i. 1, 'By the will of God.'

3. *In reference to time*: it marks the passage through an interval (*a*) during, or (*b*) after a lapse of time.

B—with the Accusative.

*On account of*, as *dia touto*=on this account; so, because of, for the sake of—Jno. vi. 57, 'I live *because of* the Father;' Rom. viii. 11, '*On account of* the indwelling spirit of him in you;' Matt. x. 22, 'Hated *all on account of* my name.'

All my reading of the Greek N.T. bears this out.

Now, in view of the facts of the case, what could have actuated the Doctor in his exegesis of passages such as bro. Burton refers to? Clearly he had some reason for going apparently in the teeth of facts. He had. He had doctrinal reasons. He knew that many of the "all things," materially considered, were "before" Jesus in point of time, and therefore Jesus could not have made them, nor could they have been made through him as an agent. He therefore read "on account of him" where he should have read "by means of him." There is only one legitimate exegesis of such passages, and that is, to limit the "all things" And as no one, not even the most "orthodox" of believers, will maintain that Christ created all things, absolutely (for example, sin), it becomes a question as to the extent of limitation. The context in various cases settles this, limiting the sphere while applying to "all things" absolutely, within the sphere indicated. That the "all things" relative to the sphere of the truth's operations, *i.e.*, apostolic, were created "by him" as well as "for him," is frequently affirmed (Heb. ii. 10; Col. i. 16; 1 Cor. viii. 6).

The fact that the Genitive is used with *dia* where the Accusative with *dia* would have exactly expressed the ground or *ratio* of an action, proves conclusively to me that if we read *di'hou* as "on account of," instead of "through means of," we are not reading Scripture, but reading something else into it.

EDITOR.

62 St. Vincent Street,  
Glasgow.

#### CONDITIONS *VERSUS* COMMANDS.

DEAR BRO. NISBET,—Referring to my letter which appeared in the last issue of the *Investigator*, I perceive that you have pre-faced the letters with an explanation of that which led to their publication. Your explanation is true as far as it goes; but you should have inserted "with Bro. Smith's consent." I am sure you must be aware that, in England, before a witness gives evidence in a court of justice, he is informed that his evidence must be truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. In the preface alluded to, you have not told all the truth which you were in possession of; and as the explanation now appears, it may read (and we cannot tell how

often), as though I had, sent Bro. Smith's letter for publication without his permission; such an act on my part, or on the part of any person towards another, would be, to say the least, an undignified and questionable liberty. I am therefore liable to be wrongfully blamed, and dubbed accordingly.

You ask:—"Does does not Bro. Parkes himself labour under a misconception of the phrase in question?" My reply is, that I believe I do not; for after a close and protracted study of the word, I have become convinced that, in reality, there are no conditions of salvation in the Scriptures at all, and the more I look into them, the more securely I become entrenched in my conviction.

I trust, dear brother, you will excuse me when I say that I am quite surprised at the manner in which you have considered the phrase, "are there conditions of salvation?" and of the question you ask, as to whether I am labouring under a misconception? and when you say that you would be inclined to believe, etc. These seem to be the expressions of one who is fearful, of one who is afraid to do or say right, lest he should do or say wrong; afraid to take either one side or the other, lest he should give offence. If I am wrong, I think you should give Scriptural proof of my error. Truly you have quoted several passages of Scripture, professedly in support of your contention, but though you have, as I presume, done your best, you have been very unfortunate in your choice, because they do not in the least help your case. Every quotation you have given is simply a passage of Scripture, uttered by Christ or his apostles to instruct others; simply cause and effect, one being the consequent of the other; as I would tell a child to be careful and not drop the glass, because, if you do, it will break. It seems to me, that you uphold conditions which you cannot prove to exist, at the expense of the instructions and commands which are so plainly and abundantly taught and enforced throughout the whole of Scripture. There are commands to be obeyed, but no conditions to which we must conform. It is always better to adhere to Scripture words and phrases, lest we should unwittingly introduce new words and phrases of a divergent or doubtful meaning. You say that "wherever there is an if there is a condition, either implied or expressed." Now, if you are able to find any condition, compact, stipulation, or bargain, implied or expressed in the following passages, your ability will very much outstrip mine:—John xi. 10, vi. 51; Matt. xii. 27; John iii. 12; 1 Cor. x. 30, xii. 17; Rom. viii. 25; 1 Cor. vi. 4, xv. 13-16; 1 Peter iv. v8.

The purport of my letter was to make manifest that conditions, so frequently be-



lieved and laught amongst us, are unscriptural, and like a worm at the root is eating out the life and force of the *use* of commands, which God has given to be obeyed by all who lay claim to the benefits and glorious prospects which the word of God sets forth.

Obedience to God's commands is the only proof which mortal man can give that he loves God. "If ye love me, keep my commandments; by this shall all men know that ye are my disciples." Degeneracy in the past has always been brought about by the introduction of words or phrases which have seemed little and insignificant to begin with, but which have nevertheless been fraught with disastrous consequences.

I think you should not believe and accept conditions at the expense of commands and instructions, as conditions cannot be used interchangeably with either, because of the reason already assigned, that the definition of each word differs from that of the other; therefore, the word should never be used or associated with either commands or instructions.

You also quote Phil. ii. 12. This passage, to a person with an unreflective mind, would (at first sight), seem to be a passage in your favour, but really it is not. What is the teaching which Paul wished to impart? Evidently that a person who lays a right claim for salvation will manifest it by his outward walk and conduct, as the only means by which he can prove to others his possession. It is simply obedience to God's commands, by which we manifest that we are children of God, and if children, then heirs—heirs of God, and joint heirs with Christ. In the verse you have quoted, Paul commends the Philippians for their consistent walk and conduct, which made manifest that they possessed salvation prospectively, and as a further exhortation, told them to work it out, make manifest the fact, though it may have to be with fear and trembling as to what the trials and troubles would be through which they might be called to pass, as a consequence of their strict consistency, and as followers of Christ. The passages quoted, contain instructions imparted, as though I did not believe that such passages of instructions could not be found; therefore, the quotations you have given, and that in every case, have no force. All the teachings of God's word have their basis in the commands given from time to time by God to the Israelites, to Christ, to the Apostles. Those who will use the word *conditions*, must expect to be confronted with such passages as the following:—"If any man speak, let him speak as the oracles of God" (1 Peter iv. 11). "Hearken, O Israel, unto the statutes which I teach you for to do them; ye shall not add unto the word which I shall command you,"

(Deut. iv. 1-2). Christ was commanded by his Father what he should say and what he should speak (John xii. 48-50). It is (the obeying of) his commandments (which is) life eternal. "Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but the keeping of the commandments of God" (1 Cor. vii. 19). "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, reproof, correction, and *instruction*," etc. (2 Tim. iii. 16).

You also say that "surely salvation is not unconditional;" however, if you will refer to the following passages, you will, I think, find this the case, at least, so far as my judgment goes:—Eph. i. 4, 5, 11; ii. 8; iv. 7; Rom. v. 15; vi. 23; ix. 15-16; 2 Tim. i. 9; Titus ii. 11.

Our plain duty is to proclaim the gospel of the kingdom of God wherever we can, and by every lawful means within our reach. The more we do this, the greater is the prospect that some of the good seed of the kingdom will find a lodgment on some good ground, in some honest heart, and bring forth, in some thirty, in some sixty, and in some an hundred fold, to the praise and glory of God.—With love in the truth, I remain, your faithful brother,

TITOS. PARKES.

52 Wellington Road,  
Bilston, England,  
3rd May, 1898.

#### REMARKS.

I have been put on my oath both in England and Scotland, and am therefore well aware of the fact that in England as well as in Scotland—let us say Britain at once—"the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" is required of one in such circumstances. But I also know that if I am prepared to take the consequences, I may decline to tell anything at all, and this I might do without any injury to truth and righteousness. Then, as Editor, I claim a little more liberty than this reference of bro. Parkes' would seem to imply is my right. I do not, of course, mean to suggest that I intentionally suppressed the fact of bro. Smith's consent having been obtained. I simply did not think it necessary to formally state a fact which might be safely left to intelligent inference on the part of readers. If, however, anyone should think of acting as bro. Parkes fears some may think he has done, the Editor will be able to "put a spoke in his wheel" by withholding the desired publicity.

The beginning of bro. Parkes' third paragraph hardly seems called for by his attitude towards the subject. I certainly do not agree with him in his notions about unconditional salvation, which belief of his (see his pamphlet on the subject) constitutes the real

*raison d'être* of his letter to bro. Smith. And I thought I had expressed my views with some clearness. But bro. Parkes evidently misinterprets my hypothetical manner of arguing out the matter; the little word "if," which I make use of in my remarks, having acted upon him like the proverbial "red rag." I certainly have no sort of doubt on the subject, and no disinclination to express my views on it, and think I have expressed them dogmatically enough, and if bro. Parkes will read again my remarks, he should be quite able to ascertain my whereabouts on the subject.

The most palpable difference between us is to be seen in our apprehension of the term "conditions." He says, "there are commands to be obeyed, but no conditions to which we must conform." As bro. Paris' notes on the margin of the printer's proof of bro. Parkes' remarks, given him for the purpose of revision: "If salvation is to be obtained only by obeying God's commands, then salvation is conditional on obedience to them. The conditions, however, are imposed from one side only—by God, to be accepted unconditionally by the other side—man; but bro. Parkes seems to restrict his definition of 'conditions' to terms which may be modified by mutual arrangement or concession." (This: with apologies to bro. Paris for making his marginal remarks part of the text.)

Regarding the quotations with which bro. Parkes closes this paragraph (the third), I can find no "compact, stipulation, or bargain," but I see a "condition" is implied or expressed in every one of the passages adduced.

Bro. J. J. Andrew has some excellent remarks upon the term "condition" in the current number of *The Sanctuary Keeper* (p. 22), which I transcribe below. "Y" appears to occupy the same ground as bro. Parkes, if indeed the one be not the other.

The passages enumerated in bro. Parkes' last paragraph but one are interesting ones, but they do not prove that we do not require to conform to conditions, while they show that salvation originates with God, who worketh in us, both in our willing to do, and in the performing of, his good pleasure. The last of the passages (Titus ii. 11), in which Paul refers to "the grace of God which bringeth salvation," reveals conditions of salvation, viz.: that "denying ourselves ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present evil world."

EDITOR.

62 St. Vincent Street,  
Glasgow.

BRO. J. J. ANDREW ON THE TERM  
"CONDITION."

Y. objects to our answer on the above

subject in No. 16 (p. 91). His reason is that "condition" is defined by the dictionary to be "a stipulation, or terms of compact." This he considers to imply a "bargain," whereas man is not in a position to discuss terms; all he can do is to obey commands from God.

The above definition is but one aspect of "condition;" it is not a complete view of the word. The word is also used "to impose or invest with conditions" (*Encyclopedic Dictionary*). Thus, many a servant enters on a situation without any opportunity of discussing its terms; he simply has to comply with the terms imposed by his employer. A tenant likewise is sometimes precluded from discussing the terms of occupation; he may enter on the premises if he is prepared to submit to the landlord's conditions, but not otherwise. In warfare a victorious nation has often claimed, and put in force, the right to dictate the conditions of peace. Colleges and universities grant degrees on certain conditions, but they do not allow candidates to discuss with the authorities any modification thereof. In law, "there may be conditional legacies, conditional pardons, &c." (*Encyclopedic Dictionary*); what opportunity is afforded to a legatee to "bargain" with the testator concerning a conditional legacy? None whatever; if he wants the legacy he must comply with the conditions in the will; if he demurs he loses the legacy. In law "a conditional limitation allows a stranger to come into possession of an estate on fulfilment of certain conditions" (*Encyclopedic Dictionary*).

It is in the above sense that we (and others also) speak of salvation being dependent on conditions. We know of no one using the word in the sense of man having a right to bargain with God. As Y. rightly contends, God has given certain commands, and all that is left for man is to implicitly obey them.

Although the word "conditions" is not used in the Bible in connection with the way of salvation, there are other words of equivalent meaning. Thus:—"If ye continue in the faith" (Col. i. 23); "Except thou repent" (Rev. ii. 5); "Unless ye have believed in vain" (1 Cor. xv. 2); "Hear, and your soul shall live" (Isa. lv. 3); "I keep under my body . . . lest . . . I myself should be a castaway" (1 Cor. ix. 27). Indeed every statement in the Bible which promises reward, or threatens punishment, for doing or not doing certain things, is *conditional*. The antithesis of the word is *unconditional* or *absolute*, and it would obviously be impossible to describe the way of salvation as *unconditional*.—From *The Sanctuary Keeper* for June, 1898.

## THE ATONEMENT AS TAUGHT BY BRO. STAINFORTH.

## HIS CRITICISM OF W. D. J.'S. REPLY TO A QUESTION CRITICISED.

The next objection he sets forth is to the statement I have made, viz:—"God will admit no proxy: He accepts no one's obedience for another's obedience," and he asks me to harmonize 1 Cor. i. 20, 2 Cor. v. 21, with the said statement. This, I think, is easily done.

In these verses we have a righteousness spoken of not our own—that is to say, a righteousness not of our own conception, or as one originating from our own inner selves—still, a righteousness we, nevertheless, individually and severally have to put on. Hence, to put it on is what we have to do. No one else can put it on for us, and no one else's having it on can take the place of our own putting it on. For, if it is not possible, or not to our mind, to do this for ourselves individually, it is not possible for another to clothe us with it. No proxy, no agency, apart from our own taking heed to God's written word, is acceptable with God. We cannot, for example, say that our father or mother, sister or brother, husband or wife, however excellent they may be as followers of Christ, and so full of prayer for us, can avail us anything, if we, severally and individually, do not follow their example. Jesus Christ, much as he loved his disciples, did not permit them to think that they would or could be saved by his own personal righteousness, apart from their keeping his commandments. "If ye love me," said he to them, "keep my commandments." He looked to them that they would be of the same mind with him and do his will as he did his Father's. His prayer for them was based on their participation in the work they themselves, for themselves, in union with God, were required to do. All are required to work out their own salvation by a process in which God worketh in them by his written word, both to will and to do of his own good pleasure. Read John xvii. 6, 14, 17, 19, 20. Read these carefully, and then read the whole chapter, and see if any proxy or the shadow of one can be there traced. The written word, or call it the revealed word, is the only means; taking heed thereto, is the only way by which individual satisfaction can be acquired. He himself, Jesus, did not at any time acquire it. He all along was holy from the womb upwards. Compare Luke i. 35 with John xvii. 8, and this again with verse 19. So once we are begotten by the word—the written word, which is spirit as well as word; this begetteth, which, from a subordinate point of view, is as marvellous as the miraculous conception:—we have, as he did, to sustain our holiness by the same word. For much as he

had the Holy Spirit, with a fullness without measure, this did not aid him in the slightest as towards holiness. He was but the holy vessel: the vessel made holy, and kept holy by his attention to the written word—the vessel made fit for the reception, possession, and retention of the greatest of God's gifts—2 Tim. iii. 16-17—a gift, not given to him for his own personal advantage, but for the powers of the world to come; and as with him, so with us. Hence it was Jesus said to his disciples, pray ye "lead us not into temptation"—a petition, the reflex of which is, take heed to the written word: and hence, as contrary to this, Jesus was led of the spirit, after he received it in a special sense, "into the wilderness to be tempted by the adversary." And was it by the aid of the Holy Spirit that he resisted the temptation? Certainly not. This would have been incompatible with the object of the Holy Spirit's leading. He consequently appealed "to the written word; at every turn he said, "It is written." And so far from assisting him, it formed a prominent factor in the temptation. For the greater the gifts we possess, mentally or physically, materially or spiritually, the greater is the temptation to use them for our own praise and gratification: and this at the cost of the honour due to the giver. Hence the need of the wisdom, the greater wisdom, which can alone come by giving heed, in a practical form, to the written word. In the affairs of life, therefore, and in the midst of temptation, we have the example of Christ before us. And what we do, like as he did, in taking heed to the word—keeping his commandments, as he did his Father's—so do we clothe ourselves with a raiment of needlework in keeping with the pattern he has placed before us to copy: hence clothe ourselves with his wisdom, his righteousness, his sanctification and redemption—a garment beautifully inwrought, embroidered, and adorned—all handiwork, needlework, such as one skilful in the work can do for himself only, not another for him. This is the garment with which each must appear in the palace of the King. It will not be Jesus' own garment that will avail, as if borrowed for the occasion. Each must have his own after Jesus' pattern; not machine made, not bought, but inwrought by our own hands, with threads of gold from the store of God's written word. No angel, no man, no proxy, can do our own adornment; and yet, seeing it must be to the pattern given by the designer, boasting is excluded: it is not ours but God's after all.

Turning to 2 Cor. v. 21, the other passage

bro. Stainforth refers to, we find it says that "Jesus was made sin for us, who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God through him." Here are two clauses, the first giving effect to the second. The second we will deal with first. The other we will have occasion to deal with further on. A paragraph we will come to in due course will better include it. Enough for the present purpose to see that by Jesus being "made sin" he accomplished for us a righteousness, which otherwise we could not have had. His death on the cross was occasioned by his obedience. It was not the cause of it. His death was rather a something he took upon himself to be obedient to, in conformity with the honour due to law; and having accomplished it, he achieved a victory over its powers, which resulted in its abolition as regards its ordinances and sacrifices. He having by his death fulfilled its requirements, and also its purpose, for the purpose of the law was to bring all to himself, he substituted for the righteousness of the law his own righteousness. Born under the law, he continued under it, until the cross of his death removed him from under it. In death he became dead to the law; the law dead to him, and after being raised and exalted to the right hand of God, above all principalities and powers, he, as the prophet like unto Moses, became the new law-giver. Under this new arrangement, his death became the passover and passport to all participating in it. Like as the blood of the paschal lamb was made the mark for separation of the Israelites from the bondage of the Egyptians, so was his blood in figure made the badge of separation of his followers from the bondage of the law, and that of sin. There was no substitutionary lesson in the sacrifice of the paschal lamb, for all partook of it, and so participated in the death of it, and all in a manner were sprinkled with its blood. It formed an object lesson of faith in God. The people were obedient in all that was required of them by God in regard to it; and it was a type of death as a divider from one kind of life, and as a means to another—a death by violence too, not a natural death, in which was prefigured a course of suffering or sacrifice in the service of God, culminating through death in a new life—the spiritual aspect of which prospectively was that now professed—a dying unto sin and a living unto God. Hence, under the Mosaic economy, the blood sprinkled from the paschal lamb, associated with all the circumstances prescribed, of the attitude in which the Israelites had to partake of it in the crisis of their separation from bondage, was continued after different aspects through all the ritual services of the law. Everything was made holy or separated by the blood of the sacrifices, and

these, that of the bull, the ram, the heifer, and goat, all in the service of man, all representative of the wealth, strength, force, and sustenance of the nation, and the individuals composing it—these were not, as is usually and generally accepted, prospective, or types of a future blood-sacrifice as that of Christ's. They were rather the types prospective of the spiritual sacrifices of Christ's followers; and retrospective, reflective, and commemorative of that of the paschal lamb—the only type of Christ in the Mosaic ritual which Scripture appears to sanction. Jesus was the lamb slain from the foundation of the world; that is to say, the lamb slain at the foundation of the Mosaic age was the true figure of him who was slain at the foundation of Christ's economy. Hence from this we have a parallel in the separation of the Israelites from the bondage of the Egyptians, typical with the separation of Christ's followers from that of the world—the blood of the lamb in both cases; and after the separation from Egypt came the baptism of the nation into Moses, in the cloud and the sea, prefiguring that of baptism into Christ; and after this came the law and its ordinances, answering in type to the teaching of Christ and the epistles of the apostles. And as the law was special for the nation of Israel, so are the epistles generally addressed to the church. And like as the ordinances of the law were to the paschal lamb, so are all the ordinances of Christ—retrospective, reflective, and commemorative of his death, and what he accomplished by it.

Now, what makes up righteousness, pray? Take what the Scriptures say concerning it. There are two righteousnesses spoken of by Paul, namely:—the righteousness of the law, and the righteousness of Christ. Look at examples of each. Of Zacharias and his wife (Luke i. 6), it is said, "that they were both righteous, walking in all the commandments and ordinances of the law, blameless." Here it might have been said that the blameless character of the husband might have covered or stood in place of his wife's; but no. They were both righteous. Paul also speaks of himself when under the law, that as touching the righteousness written in the law, he was blameless, Phil. iii. 6; that is, he did all that was required of him to do while under the law. Summed up, it was simply:—"Except ye be circumcised, and keep the law of Moses, ye cannot be saved." This was what obtained before Christ came; but, after he came, it became a spurious righteousness, a thing of the past and done with. Now, what is the righteousness of Christ? It is simply keeping the commandments of Christ, as was the righteousness of the law the doing all that the law required. There is no substitution in either case. No proxy was admitted

under the law; each individual under it was responsible for his own deeds; no one was permitted to plead the deeds of another as satisfaction for his own; and the same has to be said of the law under Christ. The substitution which appears, is the substitution of Jesus' commandments for those of Moses. "If ye love me," says Christ, "keep my commandments." This is the axiom, and we begin our obedience to Christ by baptism.

In this rite, we put him on; but following this, there is the keeping him on. If one does not abide in him, he is cast forth as a branch and is withered. If one cannot continue in his word, he cannot remain his disciple. Thus we have conditions as obligatory under Christ as those under the law; conditions given which no proxy can supply. All this is simple enough, but bro. Stainforth renders it unintelligible by associating the righteousness of Christ with the idea of proxy or substitution, as if it were a thing which can be had without appropriation on the part of man; as if it were a robe cast on man, and pinned there apart from man's own will. If he does not mean this, what does he mean? Did he never read the parable of the talents? Did he never read the parable of the ten virgins? Did he never read "I know thy works," seven times repeated to the seven churches? Yet, it does seem in the face of these that man, by his theory, can be saved without an effort on man's part, all by the aid of substitution. He certainly is not clear as to what he means, but inasmuch as he adds thereto his objection to my statement, that God accepts no man's obedience for another's obedience, the two together makes the following clear, namely:—that my interpretation of his meaning, as associated with the quotations he has given me to harmonize, is a right one. Still, it may be that he may mean this:—he may mean that the righteousness of God without the law—the Mosaic—is manifest, inasmuch as by the deeds of the law—the Mosaic—no flesh can be justified; but surely he does not interpret this to mean that any man can be justified without the works prescribed by the commandments of Christ. He surely does not mean that he can possess a righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ without works. "Show me thy faith," says James, "without thy works; and I will show thee my faith by my works. Faith without works is dead, being alone." Can, therefore, faith without the works of faith save a man? Bro. Stainforth's logic clearly says so. It seems to say, that the obedience of Christ, and this simply as a proxy, is all that is required for man's salvation. I am, however, persuaded that bro. Stainforth is very much better than his logic.

The next objection he makes is in these words, namely:—"I gather," says he, "I

gather, as looking through a glass darkly (W. D. J. is nowhere very lucid—he evidently feels he is skating on thin ice)." This from a writer so sure about all he advances—the meaning of whose sentences I, in the preceding pages, have had to guess at or suggest before remarking on them, so devoid are they of both force and light—is to say the least extremely out of place; but, nevertheless, it is very suggestive of his own blindness, and therefore from this point of view, ignorant of his own defect, it is natural for him to set it down to that of another. It is not likely that a man so infatuated with a theory as he is of substitution, and so dogmatic—it is not likely that such an one can see anything clear, even in that which merely approaches to a contradiction of him. The prejudices he has created in his mind, by his dogmatism and incoherent positive declarations, as if he were of all men, on the subject, clearly infallible, is quite enough to veil his eyes from seeing anything clear beyond his own fancy; ay! and more than this, it is quite enough to induce him, yes, compel him, to construe wrongly what he dislikes, and, with a false vision, see that distorted which otherwise is straight. Hence, too, like the poor wretches who, in times of persecution, are compelled, by torture on the rack or otherwise, to confess to crimes they never committed, and profess doctrines they don't believe—so does he rack my sentences from their simple meaning, separate them from their context, or mutilate them, to make them mean what, in their simple language and appropriate relationship, they do not.


For example, he imputes to me the following sentence, viz:—"That when Jesus is said to have suffered for sins, all that is meant is that his sufferings were caused by the special sinful actions of those who caused his death." This appears with features so contorted with torture that I do not perceive it to be my sentence at all. Then further on, referring to the same idea which, by distortion, he has extorted from the sentence, he sets forth another sentence as also mine, viz:—"He died because his obedience to God offended his murderers." I say that "he was killed." The two phrases may to some appear the same, but the distinction lies in Jesus' death, as being different from Adam's, and therefore a thing evidently separated from the condemnation passed on Adam. He thus not only alters the words of the sentence, but cuts it out from its connection—away from the reason assigned for my use of it. His charity school-boy with which he aims to ridicule my statement I will bring to witness against him. He next endeavours to fix on my statements that I have in my "eagerness to set forth the comparatively insignificant missionary aspect of Christ's death, quite

ignored the vital relationship of that death to the new covenant." This also is part and parcel with his torture and mutilation of what I have set forth. He seems to make it his business to apply what may be said in relation to one feature of a matter, to what should be said on the whole subject. Hence, though the death of Jesus may have a missionary aspect, for it has many aspects, it does not follow that what may be said of one aspect can be said of all, and what I may have said which could apply to the one, cannot apply to all, or have such a meaning, or even an approach to such a meaning as would justify the accusation that I ignore the vital relation of Christ's death to the New Covenant. I *never* entertained the view that Jesus simply died as a missionary. So far from entertaining such a view, I as utterly repudiate the death of Jesus as a missionary one, as I repudiate his death as a substitutionary one. Neither have any foundation in Scripture, though there may appear certain semblances to both. Semblances, however, do no more constitute identity, than do bro. Stainforth's imputations, insinuations, and accusations constitute facts. Further, he attempts to ridicule what I have said as to Isa. liii., but this will recoil upon himself when I come to show how he himself not only gives a meaning out of the usual, or rather, in place of giving a meaning, he verily destroys its meaning as applicable to Christ at all. He, I dare say, does this unwittingly, but nevertheless he does it.

Lastly, he quotes another sentence of mine, which he forces to mean what I don't say; and this he does again by the torturing process of mutilation. Referring to mortal and eternal life in Christ, I say "That eternal life, which while on earth Jesus possessed, simply dwelt in him by the word his flesh manifested, and the Holy Spirit by which he was endowed." Bro. Stainforth in quoting this *leaves one-half out*. He leaves out these words, viz:—"by the word his flesh manifested." Why did he leave out these words, pray? They form one of the factors by which Jesus while on earth became possessed of eternal life. But left out, bro. S. suits the words to his own purpose, and so constructs his reply, not to my sentence, but to one he has himself constructed and affirmed as mine. All this recoils upon himself. It is a poor theory which requires such artifices as this one and those preceding it I have pointed out to prop it up with. It uncovers rottenness at the core of it—or it may be his pugnacity far exceeds his ability to sustain or defend it.

Here, however, I must now close. I have already occupied too much space. I have not, however, finished with the subject. I will return to it next issue (all things favourable), and once more deal with the

points indicated by the things referred to in a preceding paragraph, and such other points as I have omitted to touch, or touching, have not fully enough made plain.



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### A QUESTION.

*Re* Bro. Nisbet's article, "The Truth: What is it?" appearing in January issue: Would he or any one else say *from what* the truth referred to by Jesus was to set the disciples free? Paul writes of being set free "from the law of sin and death." Was it from this law Jesus promised his learners freedom? If so, what law was it to which they were bound?

WM. SAUNDERS.

### ANSWER.

1. An affirmative answer might be given to brother Saunders' first query, without determining what "the law of the sin and the death" was, to which Paul refers in Rom. viii. 2. Whatever it was, deliverance from it was effected by another law—"the law of the spirit of the life in Christ Jesus."

2. To the second query it may be said that the Jew "knew sin" only by the law of Moses, but sin covered a wider field than that occupied by Moses, for "until the law sin was in the world" (Rom. v. 13); consequently, this new "law of the spirit" would necessarily operate towards deliverance from more than that which the Jew was "sold under" (Rom. iii. 9). In other words, "the law of sin and death" operates in a wider field than that in which the law of Moses held sway. I do not then think that "the law of sin and death" is to be confounded with the law of Moses, which latter was not in itself sin.—EDITOR.

# The Investigator.

*"All things, put to the test; the good retain."*—1 Thess. v. 21.

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## ESSENTIAL TRUTH.

THERE is truth and truth—some truth, and more of it; that is, truth, or items of truth, reaching up to a given limit, and which truth, by the fiat of God in spiritual matters, is essential to the attainment of whatever He may be pleased to offer as the reward or result of its attainment. Also, there is a limited knowledge, which, by the recognised authority of man in secular matters, is essential to the enjoyment of the good and desirable things which man offers to men as the reward of attainment. But, beyond these limits of truth and knowledge, there is more of both to which we may aspire, though it may not be imperative in order to obtain what is offered to those who attain to the limit specified. In both cases we have truth and knowledge formulated in details, but limited in quantity and direction, so to speak, which is essential for a given purpose—a purpose or award defined in its nature or scope. In this sense, then, there is truth which is essential to be known in order to attain to the salvation offered to us in the Scriptures, which, while absolutely essential to the attainment of salvation, does not exhaust *all* truth. And, similarly, there is technical and practical knowledge, which, also, is to be regarded as essential to the attainment of a man's object or desire in secular matters; but a knowledge defined within specified limits, and which, therefore, does not exhaust, and may not even touch upon, the knowledge which extends beyond that limit. Keeping in view this definition of what I mean by Essential Truth, it may be useful to observe that among the brethren themselves, even the best of them, there is a tendency to clog the simple truth, the really essential truth, which may be formulated in Scriptural terms, with a burden of unessential matter, which, however true and beautiful and desirable, is yet not truth which can be formulated as an obligatory code, and matters which may even include some things which are really true and some which are not.

As one advances in spiritual understanding and familiarity with the essential foundation elements of the truth and the persistent exercise of them, the deeper truths and things of God lying beyond the elements begin to come into view. They form delightful and profitable themes for meditation and enquiry and even speculation to the man who can bear them; but as weaker brethren, less instructed and less advanced in spiritual exercise, cannot bear them without very possible injury, great caution and discrimination ought to be used in presenting them to the general reader or hearer.

It may, I believe, be regarded as certain that the measure of knowledge necessary to save a man—that is, just barely to save him, if one may speak of salvation in such a way—is limited to what we might call a minimum standard; for if it were indefinite or unlimited, who, or how many, could be saved?

There are fundamental elements of chemical truth, for instance, which a

man must know and be prepared to subscribe to before he can *be* a chemist, and be officially recognised *as* a chemist. But beyond these elements there are a thousand chemical truths which, however true, are not essential to his becoming a chemist, in the sense of just qualifying himself for official recognition and no more. If, having attained his object, he is either defective in chemical mentality, so to speak, or too indolent to pursue his studies, it is clear he will not be able to perceive or, perhaps, even to be conscious of the higher truths which extend infinitely beyond the formulated elements. Another man, more favourably endowed with the necessary mentality—more in love with the science, and more aspiring and energetic—will advance on and on, perceiving more and more of the inner things of chemical truth, which the other may possibly not see at all, and might not understand if they were presented to him.

So it is with spiritual truth. There are fundamental elements constituting in their totality a measure of truth which must be known and understood—not necessarily, however, the same measure for every man—before he can be qualified for divine recognition, and attain unto that resurrection from the dead to which Paul refers in Phil. iii. 11, and which seems to read as if he meant only just or even to attain to it, and implying that there is something more than just barely attaining to the resurrection from the dead—to life—and obtaining an entrance through it to a place in the kingdom of God; as, when illustrating the fruits of faith, he speaks (Heb. xi. 35) of some who were “tortured, not accepting deliverance, that they might obtain a *better* resurrection.” Beyond, then, these fundamental elements of saving truth, which, as I have said, may be formulated, there is an infinite extension of truth not formulizable, in precise Scriptural terms, and in the sense of being obligatory. Not that it is not possible to give verbal expression to every known form of truth to the extent to which it is known, but because they are not, in the first place, directly formulated in the Scriptures, but are intuitive perceptions coming from active knowledge of the elements; and secondly, because, being infinite, they cannot, all of them, be formulated. The man who is satisfied with the bare attainment, and whose spiritual mentality is therefore, presumably, not of a high order, or whose love of the truth is not very keen, and whose aspirations are relatively low—such a man is not likely to set himself resolutely to “instruct himself in righteousness and exercise himself in godliness” to such an extent as to carry him beyond the elements, and penetrate the vast region beyond. These truths are therefore hidden to him; and his senses not being exercised, he cannot perceive them though they were shown to him—he is not in a condition to bear them. On the contrary, another man, with more vigorous spiritual mentality—a keener love of the truth for itself, higher aspiration, and more determined and persistent in his efforts to advance, his senses being more fully and healthfully exercised—he leaves the elements behind, and advances further and further into the illimitable region beyond. In this region he spiritually perceives things which, to a certain extent, are, as Paul said in another connection (2 Cor. xii. 4), “not lawful to utter,” which, I apprehend, may mean difficult to utter, in the sense of want of suitable power of expression to give utterance to things and experiences which the ordinary mind cannot easily, if at all, comprehend when formulated in every-day speech. The elements, being left behind, are yet included in the wider circle of his spiritual horizon, though he no longer needs to refer specifically to them. They may be said to be absorbed into his new



experiences, like the two numerical factors which, when multiplied together, disappear in the result. He is calmly assured and self-contained, and rejoices to find himself competent to detect the fallacies of error, however plausibly stated, and to set against them the knowledge of unassailable truth.

While it is an unspeakable privilege to be able to enter this region of the deeper things of truth—to revel in and meditate upon them—it must not be forgotten that however beautiful and desirable and true, they are, nevertheless, not essentials—they are over and above the essential; for if not, there is too much reason to fear that few indeed could be saved.

The indiscriminate presentation of these higher aspects of truth\* for discussion is, I am inclined to think, carried too far in our printed literature—at least, in such literature as is intended for general distribution—and is a source of danger to some and, perhaps, to many. “They that feared the Lord spake often one to another” (Mal. iii. 16). This points to one possible solution of the difficulty. It is a matter for speech or for an inner circle of literature—for mutual, helpful, and loving conversation among those whose spiritual minds vibrate to the same key-note or one harmonising with it. Where this harmonic relation is not established, there is, of necessity, discord, notwithstanding that the discordant notes are true notes in themselves; but intelligent harmony demands the selection of particular notes before the harmonic chord can be produced. These spiritual harmonies are therefore more likely to be produced by the mutual speech of kindred minds than by general printed literature.

But admitting the propriety of special literature for this class of thought, it is soon realised that there is a difficulty in giving shape to it. Of course, verbal expression of some sort can be given to any known truth† or thought, and particular passages of Scripture adduced in support of the view sought to be presented. But as the outer range of truth I am speaking of is, from its very nature, difficult to deal with in conventional language, and is, besides of infinite extension, it cannot in its totality be formulated because we do not know them all; and if we did, a special language of terms and symbols would be needed—as indeed is felt in regard to such of them as we do know—in order to give them adequate expression, and give some assurance that the thoughts expressed will reach the minds of such as are prepared, and may be helpful to those who are only in the preparation stage. Besides, many of the truths with which the advanced spiritual student has become acquainted is the result of a keener perception of, and deeper insight into, the spirit and meaning of Scripture writings, by which he enters more and more into the mind of the writers themselves, and by which an intuitive sense has become or is becoming developed. The things revealed in this manner are so subtle and spiritual that in many cases it may be very difficult to clothe the ideas in language which would be comprehensible to those who are still in the elementary stage, and who, on reading the passages upon which they are founded, might, and probably would, not see the relevancy of them.

On the contrary, the fundamental elements of the Gospel—summarised by Paul as “the things concerning the kingdom of God and the name of Jesus Christ”—are by their nature relatively simple and limited in number, and can be referred either to direct and specific Scripture authority in the nature of a

\* By which I mean those finer and more subtle spiritual things lying outside the simple facts constituting the gospel which Christ and the apostles preached.

† But are there not some truths which may be said to be *felt* rather than *known*, and elude definition or verbal expression? From what bro. Paris goes on to say, it appears that this is also his view of the matter.—EDITOR.

direct proposition—as, for instance, “He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved”—or otherwise by passages not so direct, but from which the teaching is so obvious as to present no difficulty in accepting it as equal to a proposition; as, for instance, that man is mortal. There is no passage in any part of the Scriptures which directly affirms this fundamental truth in so many words, but there are many which so obviously teach it more or less directly that we are safe to put it as a positive proposition—“man is mortal.”

The fundamental truths, therefore, being limited in number and simplicity, and referable to direct or practically direct Scripture authority, can be formulated as a fairly complete set of propositions; while the outer range of less obvious and, what we may call, more complicated truths, being also, from their nature, difficult to express, as well as—to us—infinite, cannot be formulated as a complete set of propositions, since we do not know them all, and cannot compass the infinite.

This being so, it follows that those who are conscious of having only a very limited knowledge of truth should not be too hasty in condemning as visionary the statements of others who are much further advanced. And, equally, these latter should be cautious how and to whom they give expression to their advanced views.

Essential Truth—the gospel which, by a kind of analogy, I may define as that which is necessary to bring us into the focus of Christ—may be compared to the rays of light which converge from an object, of definite size to the focus of the lens; and unessential truth—by which I mean, not that it is not to be earnestly desired and sought for and entered into, for, in the abstract, all truth is essential in its nature—but that which is over and above what is absolutely essential to bring us to Christ. This kind of unessential truth, then, may be compared to the same rays which *diverge* from the other side of the lens into infinite space. Within these diverging rays all the converging ones are included, on the principle that the greater includes the less; and note, they cannot *begin* to converge until the essential converging ones have come to the optical focus typical of Christ.

From what has been said, it will be seen why a certain amount of reticence and caution should be exercised in indiscriminate discussion concerning the higher and more inward conceptions of truth which come within the experiences of more advanced students of Scripture; for, though the greater may comprehend the less, the less cannot, except in measure, comprehend the greater. One may as well expect that the presentation of the higher mathematical truths of the fifth book of Euclid should be intelligently received by a student who has not yet mastered the first, as that the presentation of the higher and deeper things of God can be received by those who are yet groping among the elements. In both cases the effect is more likely to discourage further effort, on the ground that there seems so much to know which has not even begun to find entrance to the mind. In every branch of enquiry, the order is practically the same—first, the milk-like elements; afterwards, the solid food, which the matured or maturing mind alone can digest.

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*Januskeris*

## THE SPIRIT IN MAN.

[The four paragraphs which follow appeared on cover of last issue, and are reproduced here to preserve the continuity, in the body of the magazine, of the Editor's contribution.]

I AM asked to consider Gen. i. 27—"God created man in his own image"—as affording a sufficient justification for bro. Weir's citation of Gen. ii. 7 as evidence that man has a *ruach* (spirit) of the sort contended for by him. But as what I took exception to was that Gen. ii. 7 was quoted as expressly asserting that man has not only *nishmath chayyim* but *ruach* as well, reference to no other passage will justify the assertion that *ruach* is mentioned where it is not. That he should infer its presence in the man is a totally different matter, and has nothing to do with his assertion as to what Moses said.

For the reason that *ruach* is absent from Gen. i. 27 I am expected to "abate my surprise" at its non-mention in Gen. ii. 7; but as I was not surprised at its absence from Gen. ii. 7, but at bro. Weir's assertion that it was to be found there, my surprise continues, and is even increased by his denial of any "error" having been made by citing it as he has done.

He thinks my phrase, "*ruach* combined—so to speak—with an organism," a meaningless one, if it be not "an admission of his contention that the creation of man was effected by the Creator 'combining a spirit with an organism,' said 'organism' becoming in this way 'a living soul.'"\* The footnote I have made to page 57, on which he makes the remark, sufficiently disposes of his impression, since it points out that my phrase, when left as I gave it, shows that I cannot mean "combined" (nor "wedded" in that analogous phrase of mine in which it occurs) to be taken in the strict sense of the term as misconstrued by him, but is to be understood in the sense of my contention that man is a form of *ruach*, not a combination, not a duality, but a unit, a living soul.

Bro Weir thinks I should have quoted his phrase "man's spirit" as being a true equivalent of "the spirit in man," but that is a begging of the question which I decline to allow. If he admits that there is "spirit" in man which is not "man's spirit" in the personal sense, I ask again what else is that "spirit" if it be not "spirit of God" (*ruach elohim*), and what other "spirit" than this is necessary to keep the man in life? This "Spirit of God"—which, as I have said, is not God—is the only "spirit" which man, as a mere body of life, can be shown to be possessed of; any other "spirit" he has is "formed" within him. But what is "formed?" In Zech. xii. 1, as in Gen. ii. 7, the original term is *yatsar*, to shape, to mould, to fashion, as a potter does his clay—which bears out my view that any "spirit" which a man may have other than the *ruach elohim* is only possible to the living soul *plus* knowledge of things outside itself.—EDITOR.

\* Query: What becomes of the "spirit?" does it share the change with the "organism," or is it something distinct and apart from the living soul? Bro. Weir's theory requires a little explication here.

MY intention was to advance this time to New Testament evidences, but, judging by the contents of July *Investigator*, which has just arrived, it will be necessary to devote a portion of this article still to the Old Testament.

(1). Gen. i. 11 reads, "And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the tree yielding fruit after his kind, whose seed is in itself upon the earth, and it was so."

Here we have the origin of the "vegetable kingdom." All below this belongs to the realm of the inanimate—the inorganic. The gates thereof are barred on the upper side, so that nothing can force its way upwards. The roots of *living* vegetation are the only means by which the process of uplifting is carried on between the two planes. Life is therefore a *sine qua non*: apart from its influence *inertia* reigns. Such was the situation prior to the creative event here quoted. Matter, then, *per se*, is inert. Vegetation is simply an aggregation of elements collected from "the heavens above and the earth beneath." It has taken a variety of form, according to the nature of the plant to which it belongs, but *essentially* it has not changed. Severed from the *life*, which was instrumental in lifting it from the *inorganic* to the organic, it rapidly relapses into its original condition. Now, it is interesting to observe the means employed by the Creator whereby each plant is enabled to reproduce its kind. "Seed"—a mysterious union of "life" and "matter"—is given off by the plant, and is the link joining the parent to the offspring. Take, for example, wheat. In vain will the farmer sow it if the *life* in the berry has been destroyed, which can easily be done by putting it into a hot kiln for a short time. As *food* it might be unimpaired, but as *seed* it would be valueless. Now the point I wish to make here is, that this *life* is the *essence* of the "seed," and "*spirit*" is the basis of life; this is equivalent to saying that "spirit" and "matter" in union constitute the "seed" in question.

Now these remarks apply also to the animal kingdom—the next above the vegetable.\* In both, the individual is a formation of "spirit" and "matter"—a spirit and a body in union, whether vegetable or animal, plant or man. And as both were, at first, produced from the *inorganic* and *inert*, life was, necessarily, directly communicated by the Creator; but we have no reason to think that such has ever been repeated: on the contrary, as Science has demonstrated, "all life is *now* from antecedent life." This clearly implies, in the light of the teaching of Science quoted in foot-note on p. 37, April *Investigator*, that not only is the spirit an integral part of the animal, but that *in the spirit* resides the potency of the animal's being. For if, as Science shows, the *same matter* ("protoplasm"—"clay of the potter") is used in *all* cases, it points strongly to the idea that the particular potency of each lies in the "potter"—"spirit"—which is known to Science *only by its doings*, and not in the "protoplasm," the chemical properties of which are well known.†

\* "If the first young germs of an oak, a palm tree, and a lichen be placed before a botanist, and he is called upon to define the difference, he finds it impossible. He cannot say which is which. Examined under the highest powers of the microscope, they yield no clue. Analysed by the chemist with all the appliances of his laboratory, they keep their secret.

† "The same experiment can be tried with the embryo of an animal. Take the ovule of the worm, the eagle, the elephant, and of man himself. Let the skilled observer apply the most searching tests to distinguish one from the other, and he will fail. But there is something more surprising still. Compare next the two sets of germs, the vegetable and the animal. And there is still no shade of difference. Oak and palm, worm and man, all start life together. No matter into what strangely different forms they may afterwards develop; no matter whether they are to live on sea or land, creep or fly, swim or walk, think or vegetate; in the embryo, as it first meets the eye of Science, they are indistinguishable. The apple which fell in Newton's garden, Newton's dog Diamond, and Newton himself, began life at the same point."—*Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, p. 288.

† "To understand unmistakably that it is really the "Potter" that does the work, let us follow for a moment the description of a trained eye-witness. The observer is Mr. Huxley. Through the tube of his microscope he is watching the development out of a speck of protoplasm of one of the commonest animals. 'Strange possibilities,' he says, 'lie dormant in

(2). Space does not permit more than a brief allusion to the physiological fact, that the human system is operated by *voluntary* and *involuntary* action. The heart, the lungs, the stomach, &c., perform their functions whether we wake or sleep—without any effort of the will. These are operated by means of the *involuntary* nerves, through which the *involuntary* powers of the spirit ever act.

In this sense, at least, "man is an epitome of the universe." Nature's laws correspond to the *involuntary* processes of man's constitution. At the beginning, these laws were appointed to their respective spheres, the force necessary being duly provided, and they have continued with unflinching regularity to perform their duties ever since. Man—the natural man—being a part of Nature, is included in this arrangement, and the force necessary for his movements is thus furnished by God on the *involuntary* principle. This force is *received* by the "*spirit of man*," and *distributed* by both *voluntary* and *involuntary* action, according to his requirements. This may be illustrated electrically. The industries of a town are operated by electric power. The *entire* power is generated at the "*power-house*," each industry having its own *local* "*motor*" to receive the electric current from the *central source*, and distribute it as needed. The *spirit* of each man corresponds to the "*motor*" of each industry, the "*power-house*" to God himself, the source of *all* power. Hence when, in the Old Testament, *ruach elohim*—"spirit of God"—is said to be in man's nostrils, it is simply as *furnishing force* in this *involuntary* or "natural" sense. On no account should it (the spirit of God) be confounded with the "*spirit of man*," which has been shown to be *in the* "*seed*" from which he sprang, and the *local* force as well in his body during the whole course of his life—when man's spirit leaves his body *he* dies (Jas. ii. 26). But if, on the contrary, all nature be managed by the *voluntary* method—if the Divine will be exerted afresh to cause every movement—then *all thinking and acting* is the result of *Divine volition*, and it devolves on bro. Nisset, who practically takes this position, to show how it can be harmonised with the idea of "*man's moral agency*."

(3). SPIRIT, SOUL, MIND, MATTER.—These are terms which must be

that semi-fluid globule. Let a moderate supply of warmth reach its watery cradle, and the plastic matter undergoes changes so rapid and yet so steady and purpose-like in their succession, that one can only compare them to those operated by a skilled modeller upon a formless lump of clay. As with an invisible trowel, the mass is divided and sub-divided into smaller and smaller portions, until it is reduced to an aggregation of granules, not too large to build withal the finest fabrics of the nascent organism. And, then, it is as if a delicate finger traced out the line to be occupied by the spinal column, and moulded the contour of the body; pinching up the head at one end, the tail at the other, and fashioning flank and limb into due proportions in so artistic a way that, after watching the process hour by hour, one is almost involuntarily possessed by the notion, that some more subtle aid to vision than an achromatic would show the hidden artist with his plan before him, striving with skillful manipulation to perfect his work. (*Lay Sermons* XII.: The Origin of Species, p. 261, Sixth Edition.)

"Besides the fact, so luminously brought out here, that the artist is distinct from the semi-fluid globule of protoplasm in which he works, there is the other essential point to notice, that in all his skilful manipulation the artist is not working at random, but according to law. He has his plan before him. In the zoological laboratory of Nature it is not as in a workshop, where a skilled mechanic can turn his hand to anything, where the same potter one day moulds a dog, the next a bird, and the next a man. In Nature one potter is set apart to each. It is a more complete system of division of labour. One artist makes all the dogs, another makes all the birds, and a third makes all the men. Moreover, each artist confines himself to working out his own plan. He appears to have his own plan somehow stamped upon himself, and his work is rigidly to produce himself."—*Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, p. 291.

defined, to some extent, ere we can deal satisfactorily with this subject. In philosophy "spirit," "soul," "mind" are generally used interchangeably, the antithesis of "matter."

(a). "Spirit"—Heb., *ruach*; Gr., *pneuma*—is used in a variety of ways in Scripture. "God is spirit," and angels are spirits; there are good spirits and wicked spirits; men have spirits and beasts have spirits; in short, the term "spirit" is employed in many senses. It is therefore incumbent on us to carefully distinguish its uses.

In its chief use it is associated with supreme intelligence—"God is spirit." In man, who is "created in the image of God," it holds the same place. "There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding" (Job xxxii. 8); "Blessed is the man in whose spirit there is no guile (Ps. xxxii. 2); "My spirit made diligent search" (Ps. lxxvii. 6); "My spirit was troubled to know the dream" (Dan. ii. 3); I Daniel was grieved in my spirit in the midst of my body" (Dan. vii. 15); "What man knoweth the things of a man save the spirit of man which is in him" (1 Cor. ii. 11). These passages—but a fragment of what might be quoted—show that the "spirit of man" is the centre of his intelligence, his morals, his emotions, &c. Bro. Nisbet makes strenuous efforts to distinguish betwixt God and "spirit of God;" why should he refuse to apply the same rule to man? The language of Scripture is clearly against him. Paul draws a parallel which makes this undeniable: as the spirit of man only can know the things of a man, so the spirit of God only can know the things of God. The spirit of man, therefore, is a knowing power in the light of Scripture, and, as has been shown, Science teaches the same lesson. But, it may be asked, "What is this spirit?" About this opinions differ. It is not a "spark of God," because, being a *part of man*, God *created* it; and having been "*formed*" by God (Zec. xii. 1), He can and will destroy it if necessary.

(b). "Soul." Bro. Nisbet has been repeatedly asked to define this, but either cannot or will not do so. In its primary and simple form it is the synonym of life, but is prominently used in Scripture to signify a "flesh-and-blood" organism, invested by a *spirit*. Thus the organism described in Gen. ii. 7 as "formed of the dust" *became a soul* by the inbreathing mentioned. Prior to that it was *not* a "soul," not having been connected with *life*. "Dead souls" can only be such because of having *lived*. Further, as "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God," it follows that the *spirit* is the *only part of such a soul* which can be utilised ultimately. Hence the significance of the apostle's injunction, to "deliver such a one unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus" (1 Cor. v. 5). When, at that day, "the spirits of just men made perfect" emerge from *Sheol*, they will be clothed with a "glorious, incorruptible, spiritual body," in keeping with their own purified, spiritual condition. They will then have ceased to be "*souls*," having been "*made spirits*," like unto their Lord. "That is not first which is spiritual (*pneumatikos*), but that which is soulical (*psuchikos*)" (1 Cor. xv. 46). If this be correct, an "immortal soul" is an impossibility.

(c). "Mind" may be viewed in two aspects—*active* and *latent*. When we say, "The brain is the organ of the mind," we may mean either that thought is evolved *directly* by brain, or that it is simply the material organ through which the spirit acts. "Mind-active" embraces all the wonderful mental phenomena which are manifested through consciousness; "mind-latent" that

potentiality resident in *spirit*, which alone can *originate* these. In this sense, "mind" is treated by scientists and philosophers as the antithesis of "matter."

(d). "Matter" is, according to one of the astutest philosophers (Berkeley) "a congeries or group of sensible qualities." A shape, and a colour, and a taste, and a smell, and a feel, &c., go, in union, to make an orange, for instance. But these qualities are all known to us through our *senses*. No one of them can produce *any* or *all* of its associates: they have no "*mind*" in them, either single or combined. The shape, and the colour, the taste, and the fragrance, as well as all the other qualities which make the orange so delightful, are due to a power *outside* and *superior* to themselves. Yet this orange is *organic* "matter," and is as *inert* as when it was *inorganic*. Organisation, therefore, does not change the *essential* character of "matter." All "matter," then, being *essentially* the same, if it appear in the form of a *brain*, the same observations will apply to it as to the orange—a *power outside itself* must be credited with its operations. Further, as water—a compound of hydrogen and oxygen, a form of "matter"—becomes invisible to the naked eye when these gases are separated, so *all* "matter" can be rarefied to invisibility and *still be unchanged essentially*. No rarefaction will *create* "mind." It therefore follows that, even if "matter" in the ethereal form were eternal, it would still be the same *inert* mass.

But Bro. Nisbet says, "What we call 'matter' is but a mode of spirit;" and he further says, "I am a materialist if I am anything" (p. 65). Judging from his collective utterances, I would say he is *not* "anything"—certainly not a "materialist" in any reasonable sense. He thinks bro. Weir is "specially endowed with the faculty of imagination" (p. 61). A healthy endowment in this respect is needed for the effective treatment of some subjects, and is therefore not to be sneered at; but the man who could conceive, as bro. Nisbet has, that "matter," in the "ultimate form of the atom," becomes a "formless form of spirit"—in short, that *matter* becomes *spirit*, if "*spirit be wholly withdrawn!*"—should be the last to indulge in such complaint. If such a one has not been *over-endowed*, he certainly has not been *overlooked* by nature anent "imagination."

It will be seen that this article is devoted almost entirely to the statement of my theory. In the next I hope to finish this, showing its important bearing on the resurrection doctrine, &c. Thereafter, I shall reply to bro. Nisbet's criticisms which appear in the present and future issues. From this our readers may form an approximate forecast of the end.

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In this issue we are entertained to bro. Weir's Theory of the Universe: God made "matter" with its "inertia" *per se*, while myriads of "Potter-Spirits" are immediately responsible for the organised forms of animate nature. This fancy of a "Potter-Spirit" is one of Henry Drummond's, which he, however, seeks to father upon science through Huxley, who is credited by Drummond with believing in the existence of a Resident "Potter-Spirit," who manipulates the "protoplasmic" speck or "seed," and shapes it, as he may have the mind, into tree, or dog, or bird, or man. All this bro. Weir believes, but in accepting it, he forgets or disregards his own earlier admissions, and involves himself in a contradiction of thought which eats into the very vitals of this hypothetical "Potter." He has said (*Investigator* for

October, 1897, page 79) that "at present his belief is that consciousness is entirely dependent on the union of *spirit with body*" (the italics are his own). That is equal to saying that the spirit by itself ("*per se*") has no mind, no powers of thought; or, to put it otherwise: Organisation is necessary to thought. So that, where there is no organisation there can be no thought. No doubt, he warned us, at the same time as he made this admission, that he "might be compelled at a later stage of the discussion to take the position" that "the spirit is self-conscious." And while we do not seem to have arrived at this "later stage of the discussion" yet—for his present contribution seems like a re-commencement of it—it is possible that Drummond may have already led him to this conclusion with his fancy of an intelligent "Potter-Spirit," who "has his plan before him," and "working not at random, but according to law"—each "Potter" with a different plan, and each "confining himself to working out his own plan"—and "his work is rigidly to produce himself."\*

Now, without pausing at present to contemplate the absurdity of one "producing himself," I submit that if bro. Weir has arrived at the conclusion that "the spirit is self-conscious," he should have informed us of the fact—in which case there will not be the same contradiction of thought for him to explain; but if he has not arrived at this conclusion as yet, the contradiction in question remains. What is this contradiction? Assuming that he still believes that organisation is necessary to thought, it lies here: the "Potter-Spirit" is at one and the same time a Thinker and a Non-Thinker: it can think independent of an organism, while, at the same time, an organism is, as bro. Weir admits, necessary to thought. How, then, can his Thinker think? But it may be said, Have we not an organism in a speck of "protoplasm?" Not if protoplasm be structureless (which is another factor in bro. Weir's argument), for we can have no organism without structure: that is the very essence of an organism. Hence no structure; no organisation. No organisation; no thought. No thought; no thinker. No thinker; no "Potter-Spirit," but simply the genesis of a living soul, in accordance with laws of which as yet God keeps the inner secret.

Now Huxley did not believe a little bit in this "Potter." Here is a little of what he says about "Protoplasm" in his *Lay Sermons*: VII.; On the Physical Basis of Life:

"Matter and spirit are but names for the imaginary substrata of groups of natural phenomena"—p. 143.

"I have translated the term 'Protoplasm,' which is the scientific name of the substance of which I am about to speak, by the words 'the physical basis of life.' I suppose that, to many, the idea that there is such a thing as a physical basis, or matter, of life may be novel—so widely spread is the conception of life as a something which works through matter, but is independent of it"—p. 120.

"Protoplasm, simple or nucleated, is the formal basis of all life. It is the clay of the potter: which, bake it and paint it as he will, remains clay, separated by artifice, and not by nature, from the commonest brick or sun-dried clod"—p. 129.

"Notwithstanding all the fundamental resemblances which exist between the powers of the protoplasm in plants and in animals, they present a striking difference, in the fact that plants can manufacture fresh protoplasm out of mineral compounds; whereas, animals are obliged to procure it ready made, and hence, in the long run, depend upon plants"—p. 126.

"Plants are the accumulators of the power which animals distribute and disperse"—p. 135.

"If the phenomena exhibited by water are its properties, so are those presented by pro.

\* I should put a point of exclamation after this, but it might be misread as a note of admiration from Drummond.



toplasm, living or dead, its properties. . . . If the properties of water may properly be said to result from the nature and disposition of its component molecules, I can find no intelligible ground for refusing to say that the properties of protoplasm result from the nature and disposition of its molecules. . . . If, as I have endeavoured to prove to you, the protoplasm [in a fungus] is essentially identical with, and most readily converted into, that of any animal, I can discover no logical halting-place between the admission that such is the case and the further concession that all vital action may, with equal propriety, be said to be the result of the molecular forces of the protoplasm which displayed it. And, if so, it must be true, in the same sense and to the same extent, that the thoughts to which I am now giving utterance, and your thoughts regarding them, are the expression of molecular changes in the matter of life, which is the source of other vital phenomena"—pp. 137, 138.

In quoting Huxley I am not to be held as endorsing him, but adduce these extracts to show how very far he was from believing in a "Potter-Spirit." Reading what Huxley says on *The Physical Basis of Life* in the very work appealed to by Drummond, one is tempted to ask if bro. Weir's knowledge of Huxley's teaching has been had at second hand through Drummond: otherwise, if he knows better, why should he bring in a false witness as to "the teaching of science" at the hands of Huxley? He should have known that the contention of Huxley is that "as the phenomena of life may be ultimately resolvable into those of chemical affinity, and these again into molecular force; so, and to precisely the same extent, the phenomena of consciousness, sensation, feeling, intelligence, will, may be resolvable into the physical organisation of the thinking agent." Huxley's contention was that *organisation is prior to thought*. But if we are to accept Drummond's representation of his teaching intention (which representation bro. Weir apparently does—else why quote Drummond approvingly as "an intelligent exponent of science," and, at the same time, of "this monarch of science"), if we are to accept Drummond's representation, we must believe entirely otherwise about Huxley—we must believe in "the fact [of the "Potter's" existence] so luminously brought out here [in Huxley's *Lay Sermons*, p. 261] that the artist is distinct from the fluid globule of protoplasm in which he works." What Huxley did say was—after watching hour by hour, by aid of the microscope, the process of the development out of a speck of protoplasm of one of the commonest animals—that "one is almost involuntarily possessed by the notion that some more subtle aid to vision than an achromatic would show the hidden artist with his plan before him striving with skillful manipulation to perfect his work." Now, no fact is brought out here such as Drummond makes believe and bro. Weir endorses: the "Potter-Spirit" is indeed absolutely unknown to science, and exists only in Drummond's imagination.

But the presence of a "Potter" is inferred from the fact that the microscope discovers no structure in the protoplasm. and yet it possesses contractile power. Now it is argued that as this contractile power cannot exist in the structureless protoplasm *per se*, it must be due to something present in the protoplasm, but distinct from it—a "Potter-Spirit" in short. But I reply, protoplasm is only apparently structureless, it is not demonstrably so: all that can be said is that no microscope has as yet been produced sufficiently powerful to demonstrate the existence of structure. Structure is not thereby proved absent, and some day science may enable us to perceive it. Given this structure, and the occupation of Drummond's "Potter" would be gone. But whether protoplasm be structureless or otherwise, the existence of a "Potter-Spirit" has not been established by "the teaching of science." I think I do well to be as astonished as bro. Weir would seek to make me out to be at his misapprehension as to what is scientific. He thinks my astonishment—indicated, by the way, not by "exclamation signs," as he says, but by one solitary note of exclamation—he

thinks my "astonishment at his acceptance of Dr. Cook's statement as 'the teaching of science' is probably due to inattention to science." Well, not that so much as inability in the particular case in question to see that "speculations about life and its origination *in embryo* could ever be justly called 'the teaching of science!'"—much less when, to suit the exigencies of bro. Weir's case, the term "life" in Cook's remarks is made by him to give place to the term "spirit," and yet a claim to scientific treatment put forward by implication. Scientific treatment of a subject cannot exist where there is a confusion of terms, or inattention to details, or exaggeration of statement and thought. There is, no doubt, a great amount of science falsely so-called abroad, and bro. Weir has apparently been beguiled into accepting some of it as science truly so-called. Science is a search for unity, and bro. Weir is truly and commendably groping after that unity; but I venture to think that unity of thought on the subject of man's nature will not be brought any nearer by postulating the existence of a "Potter-Spirit" in each embryonic speck.

The same confusion of thought as I have before noticed is found in bro. Weir's reference to a germinable seed. He confounds the potentiality of life with the actuality of life. Such a seed is, he says, "a mysterious union of 'life' and 'matter'"—an assertion more easily made than proved. I shall not deny the fact of life after the seed has germinated, but I contend that it is a mere assumption to postulate life of the seed prior to the beginning of vegetation in the seed; since, up to the time when all the conditions favouring germination are present, no proof can be afforded of what he has asserted obtains, viz., a union of "life" and "matter." Bro. Weir speaks of "life" when he should think and speak of a germ with the potentiality of life in it, for that is all that science teaches is in a germinable seed.

The confusion of thought is extended when he speaks of this "life as the *essence* of the seed." He means to say, this potentiality of life is the essence of the germinable seed—at least, that is what he should say; but it would not suit his contention as to the entitative character of life. The "life" in question being a fiction, it cannot be an essence or anything else in relation to the seed in question. It is mere juggling with a term, which can only lead to greater confusion, for the term represents no thing, but a modification of matter merely, which may or may not exist in any given seed. To speak of life being in the germinable seed may be a common enough mode of speech, but it does not express a proved scientific fact, and is therefore outside argument.

But what does bro. Weir mean when he says "'spirit' is the basis of life" in the seed? I confess I am not clear as to what he can mean here, for he immediately adds, "this is equivalent to saying that 'spirit' and 'matter' in union constitute the 'seed' in question." But further on in his article he says, "on no account should the spirit of God (*ruach elohim*) be confounded with the 'spirit of man,' which has been shown to be in the seed from which he sprang;" I therefore conclude that he refers not to *ruach elohim* but to this "Potter-Spirit" as "the basis of life" in the seed. But *en passant* I must take exception to him saying that he has shown this "Potter-Spirit" to be in the seed from which a man springs: he has not shown this; he has contented himself with asserting it. If, however, this "Potter-Spirit" be "the *basis* of life," and not life itself, life, after all, would be a result, and not a cause as his prime contention requires?

I think I am correctly interpreting bro. Weir's contention when I say that, in his view, the only thing which really lives in man is this "Potter-Spirit,"

which manipulates the "matter" of which the organism is composed, said "matter" remaining, according to bro. Weir, "as inert as when it was inorganic." "Organisation, therefore," says bro. Weir, "does not change the essential character of 'matter,' . . . . a power outside of itself must be credited with its operations" (the italics are bro. Weir's). Hence Gen. ii. 7 should now be read: "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man received within himself an entity of life." "Received an entity of life," not, "became alive," expresses the fact from bro. Weir's standpoint—a power not itself (for that is what bro. Weir means by the phrase "outside of itself") must, according to his contention, be credited with the operations proceeding in any creature. One of the singular things in connection with this "Potter-Spirit" is, that many of its most wonderful operations are conducted involuntarily and therefore unconsciously, and indeed all its operations prior to its invasion of an organism must, as I have before shown, be of an unconscious, and therefore involuntary, character, since it is only in "union with a body" that the "Potter-Spirit" becomes conscious of self.

Bro. Weir has not attempted to show how the problem of the beginning of the process of thinking involved in his position is solved by crediting a "Potter-Spirit" with the acquirement of the faculty when brought into "union with a body." The difficulty is not lessened but increased by the notion that while this "spirit" is the thinker—"spirit" being "a knowing power," as he defines it later on—it cannot think without the aid of something "outside of itself," which something is a body. And when it is further considered that these unconscious, involuntary operations are directed upon something "outside of itself," it would appear as if this theory of involuntary action on the part of the "Potter," with all that it involves, makes too great demands upon our powers of belief. Evidently, too, the "Potter-Spirit" is not a "something which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do" (Harris' definition of "mind"). More often than not it has no mind: it can indeed act without "perception, feeling, thought, or will" (from Taylor's definition), and that on something "outside of itself."

But it seems, if I do not accept this theory, then I must maintain, says bro. Weir, that "all thinking and acting is the result of Divine volition." I fail to see any appositeness in the remark: there is no such necessity upon me. And there is not the slightest justification for the remark that I practically take the position that "the Divine will is exerted afresh at every movement" of the organism. All through I have contended that it is the living soul which possesses and exercises these powers, whether voluntary or involuntary. Surely, then, it amounts to a gross misapprehension and misrepresentation of my position to think and write as bro. Weir does.

Bro. Weir then proceeds (under his Third Section) to define the terms "Spirit," "Soul," "Mind," and "Matter." "Spirit," "soul," and "mind" are, he says, "generally used interchangeably in philosophy." It depends, I presume, upon the "philosophy." The remark is not accurate, however. They are distinguished in philosophy, although in common parlance they are used interchangeably. But I cannot imagine why bro. Weir has left "Life" out of the list of terms which, he says, "must be defined to some extent." This term seems to me most intimately involved in the discussion, from bro. Weir's standpoint. He is contending for a Life-Entity, which he labels "spirit," and yet in defining "spirit" he does not mention "life," but defines "spirit" as "a knowing power." Is this his definition of "spirit?" It seems so, although he proceeds to say: "But it may be asked, 'What is this

spirit?" answering: "About this opinions differ." There is no doubt about this. Opinions do differ. And all he then vouchsafes as an answer is a negative statement: "It is not a spark of God;" adding, having been "created," "formed," God "can and will destroy it, if necessary." Definitions generally tell us what a thing is; and if we know what it is, we also know what it is not. But perhaps bro. Weir, who has given us a definition which does not accord with his contention, as we shall see, may take refuge in the fact that he only spoke of defining terms "to some extent." But if the "Potter-Spirit" is "a knowing power" only when wedded to an organism, it must be "a not-knowing power" prior to junction with a body; hence, to include it within the category of "spirit" is an abuse of terms. Then, if it cannot think at all, nor be conscious of self, before it possesses a body, how is it going to think when dispossessed of a body? Evidently, then, bro. Weir's "Potter-Spirit" is not "a knowing power" always, and so is not "spirit," according to his own definition of "spirit;" for if it ceases to be "a knowing power," it ceases to be what he calls "spirit."

He is no more successful in defining "soul." He tells us that "soul," in its "primary and simple form, is the synonym of life." No one knows anything whatever about soul having any "primary and simple form." Soul has no abstract existence, such as is here assumed, and therefore it has no "primary and simple form," as imagined by bro. Weir. Soul is the organic personality resulting from the interaction of the *nishmath chayyim* and the organism *plus* impressions from without. The term "soul" is never once used in Scripture except in relation with a body of some sort. To tell us that "soul" is used in its "primary and simple form" as "the synonym of life" is merely to make certain ink marks on paper: we are told nothing, for "life" has no "primary and simple form." The only thing of which we might so speak is *ruach*, which in its "primary and simple form" is the efficient cause of all life: "Thou sendest forth thy *ruach*, they are created, and thou renewest the face of the earth" (Ps. civ. 30). Of "life" we know nothing apart from the individual soul in which it originates.

Bro. Weir's definition of "mind" is based upon, and grows naturally out of, his conception of "spirit." "Mind," we are told, is either "active" or "latent." Mind-latent, he tells us, is that "potentiality resident in spirit which alone can originate" the mental phenomena seen in mind-active. Mind-latent is therefore non-existent, and only amounts to a capacity for becoming, as a block of marble may become a statue. This is all that "latent" means: and in this sense potentiality is admitted, but not that it can be called mind in any real sense, or that this which does not actually exist resides in a "spirit." Mental phenomena have never been exhibited by a "spirit" *per se*: my contention is that these never can exist apart from the substance in which they appear, viz., in living matter. But such a "spirit" not having any existence, it cannot possess the powers, latent or active, claimed for it. Bro. Weir but uses terms without things corresponding thereto.

"Matter" next comes up for definition, but is not defined. He illustrates the matter with an orange—all its "qualities" are due "to a power outside of these and superior to them." Hence I ought, perhaps, to believe that these are qualities, not of the orange, but of the "spirit" of the orange! What a good "spirit" it must be to "produce itself" after such an attractive fashion! And what a contrast to the sour "spirit" of a crab apple! But mentioning crab apples reminds me that the facts of grafting do not seem to agree with this theory of "Potter-Spirits" But perhaps these "spirits" have power to

*For conclusion, see page xv. of Cover.*

## CHAP. XV. I.

## I CORINTHIANS.

## CHAP. XV. I-9.

Gnorizō de humin, adelphoi, to euaggelion ho I-am-fully-disclosing, too, to-you, brethren, the euēnggelisamēn humin, ho kai parelabete, en ho I-for-myself-evangelised to-you, which also ye-took-alongside, in which kai hestēkate, di' hou kai sōzesthe, also ye-have-come-to-stand, through which also ye-are-being-saved, —tini logō euēnggelisamēn humin ei katechete—2 to-a-certain word I-for-myself-evangelised to-you if ye-are-holding-on ektos ei mē eikē episteusate. paredōka gar humin 3 without if not to-no-purpose ye-believed. I-gave-alongside for to-you en prōtois, ho kai parelabon, hoti christos among first(s), which also I-took-alongside, that apethanen huper tōn hamartiōn hēmōn kata tas graphas, died-off over the errors of-us down-to the writings, kai hoti etaphē, kai hoti egēgertai tē 4 and that he-was-entombed, and that he-has-been-aroused the hēmera tē tritē, kata tas graphas, kai hoti 5 day the third, down-to the writings, and that ōphthē kēpha, eita tois dōdeka; epeita ōphthē he-was-shewn to-Cephas, then to-the twelve; after-that he-was-shewn epanō pentakosiois adelphois ephaphax, ex hōn 6 more-than to-five-hundred brethren once, out of-whom hoi pleiones menousin heōs arti, tines de ckoimēthesan; the more-part are-abiding until now, certain-ones but were-put-to-sleep; epeita ōphthē Iakōbō, eita tois apostolois pasin. 7 after-that he-was-shewn to-James, then to-the apostles all. eschaton de pantōn hōsperei tō ekrōmati ōphthē 8 last and of-all like-as-if to-the abortion he-was-shewn kamoi. Ego gar cimi ho elachistos tōn apostolōn, 9 also-to-me. I for I-am the least of-the apostles, hos ouk eimi hikanos kaleisthai apostolos, dioti ediōxa who not I-am fit to-be-called apostle, because I-went-after

(1) And I-am-making plain to-you, brethren, the euangel which I-for-my-part-evangelised to-you, which also ye-took-alongside, in which also ye-have-come-to-stand, through means of-which also ye-are-being-saved—(2) if to-a-certain word I-for-my-part-evangelised to-you ye-are-holding-on—unless to-no-purpose ye believed. (3) For I-gave-over to-you among first-matters what also I-took-to—that Anointed died-off over the errors of-us in-accord-with the writings, and that he-was-buried; (4) and that he-has-been-aroused the third day in-accord-with the writings; (5) and that he-was-shewn to-Cephas then to-the twelve (6) after-that he-was-shewn to more-than five-hundred brethren all-at-once—of whom the majority are-continuing until now, but some went-to-sleep. (7) After that he-was-shewn to James, then to-the Apostles all (8) and last of-all, as if the abortion, he was-shewn also to-me—(9) for I, I-am the least of-the apostles who am not fit to-be-called an apostle because I-pursued-

v. 1: *gnōrizō* is rendered "give-to-understand" in chap. xiii. 3, "certify" in Gal. i. 3, "do-to-wit" in 2 Cor. viii. 1. The euangel had been previously announced to them. Paul but assists their comprehension here; hence the term *gnōrizō*. *Euaggelion* is compounded of *eu* well, good, pleasing, and *angelia*, a message: to euangelise was to communicate the "euangel" or good news.

v. 2: "being saved"—a process as yet incomplete, and dependant on holding fast by a certain word evangelised to them, viz., "the word of the Christ."

v. 3: "among first matters" shows that there other "first things" which are as important in their own place as this to which Paul alludes.

v. 4: "died off:" I render *apethanen* "died off," since the preposition *apo*, which here enters into composition with *thnēskō*, to die, signifies *off* or *away-from*. It is possible, however, that the *apo* in *apothnēskō* has a merely intensive force, and is practically equivalent to *thnēskō*; but the use of these terms is worth investigation. *Apothnēskō* occurs 110 times and *thnēskō* only 13 times.—"Errors:" *hamartia* signifies a missing the mark, and was said of an archer when he failed to hit the mark; *hamartia* is therefore more a *failure* or *shortcoming* than a *transgression* (*parabasis*=a going aside).—"aroused:" *egēgertai* is the perfect passive of *egeirō*, to arouse, awaken, stir up, raise, and is always to be distinguished from the term *anistemi*, to stand (up), to rise (up), from which the term *anastasis*, a standing (up), is derived. This term, *anastasis*, occurs 4 times in this chapter, viz., in verses 12, 13, 21, and 42, rendered "resurrection," but more correctly signifies *upstanding*.

v. 5: "in accord with," which is not quite the same as "as the Scripture saith."

v. 6: "are abiding," possibly meaning "continuing to believe."

## CHAP. XV. 19. CHAP. XV. 9. I CORINTHIANS.

after the ecclesia of-the tēn ekklēsian tou theou; chariti de theou eimi ho 10  
Deity (10) By-favour, the called-out of-the deity; with-favour too of-deity I-am what  
too, of-Deity I-am what cimi, kai hē charis autou hē eis eme ou' kenē egenēthē,  
I-am, and the favour of-him the toward me not empty was-made,  
rather, more-than them I-am, and the favour of-him the toward me not empty was-made,  
all I-laboured-to-weari- alla perissoteron autōn pantōn ekopiasa, ouk ego de,  
ness, and not I but the rather more-aboundingly of-them all I-toiled, not I too,  
favour of the Deity along- alla hē charis tou theou sun emoi. eite oun ego 11  
with me. (11) Whether rather the favour of-the deity with me. whether then I  
then I, whether those, thus eite ekeinoi, houtōs kērussomen kai houtōs episteusate.  
we-are-proclaiming, and whether those, thus we-are-proclaiming and thus ye-believed.  
thus ye-believed.

Ei de christos kērusetai hoti ek nekron 12  
If but anointed is-being-proclaimed that out of-dead

egēgertai, pōs legousi tines en  
egēgertai, pōs legousi tines en  
(12) But if Anointed is- being-proclaimed, (that out of-dead [surroundings] he- has-been-aroused, how are-saying certain-ones among you: "Upstanding of-dead-ones there is not" (13) but if "upstanding of-dead-ones there is not" not-even anointed has-been-aroused, (14) if, too, anointed has-been-aroused not, empty then the proclamation from-us, empty also the faith from-you (15) we-are-finding-ourselves, too, false-witnesses of-the Deity—that we-bare-witness against the Deity that he-aroused the Anointed; whom he-aroused not, if, indeed, then, dead-ones are-not being-aroused; (16) for if dead ones are-not-being-aroused, not even Anointed has-been-aroused; (17) and if Anointed has-not-been-aroused, without result (18) the faith from you, still are-ye among the errors of-you, (18) and then, those put-to-sleep in Anointed lost themselves. (19) If in this zoe in Christ we-are [such as] have-hoped only, most pitiable of-all men are-we.

(surroundings) he-has-been-aroused, how are-saying certain-ones among you that upstanding of-dead-ones not is-existing? if but anastasis nekron ouk estin? ei de 13  
anastasis nekron ouk estin, oude christos egēgertai; ei de christos ouk egēgertai, kenon ara to 14  
aroused; if but anointed not has-been-aroused, empty then the kērugma hēmon, kenē kai hē pistis hēmōn heurisko- 15  
proclamation of-us, empty also the faith of-us, we-are-being-metha de kai pseudomartures tou theou, hoti emarturēsa-  
found too also false-witnesses of-the deity, that we-bare-wit-men kata tou theou hoti ēgeiren ton christon, hon  
ness down-from of-the deity that he-aroused the anointed, whom ouk ēgeiren eiper ara nekroi ouk egeirontai; 16  
not he-aroused if-indeed then dead-ones not are-being-aroused; ei gar nekroi ouk egeirontai, oude christos  
if for dead-ones not are-being-aroused, neither anointed egēgertai, ei de christos ouk egēgertai,  
has-been-aroused, if too anointed not has-been-aroused, mataia hē pistis humōn [estin], eti este en 17  
purposeless the faith of-you [is], still are-ye among tais hamartiais humōn ara kai hoi koimēthentes 18  
the errors of-you; then and the-ones put-to-sleep en christō apōlonto. ei en tē zōē taute en christō 19  
in anointed lost-themselves. if in the life this in anointed hēlpikotes esmen monon, elēinoteroi pantōn  
having-hoped-for-ourselves we-are only, most-pitiable of-all

v. 11: "proclaimed" rather than "preached," as in A.V.

v. 12: "dead surroundings" (or "conditions"): *nekros* is an adjective qualifying some substantive understood. I have inserted "surroundings," "persons" being more specific than is justified by the genitive plural *nekron*, which is alike masculine, feminine, and neuter in form.

v. 13: "upstanding," *anastasis*, not *egerxis* as in Matt. xxvii. 53, there rendered "resurrection." It is worth while asking the question—Why does not Paul use the term *egerxis* (from the root *egeiro*), rather than *anastasis*?

v. 14: (*alternative reading*) *humon*=of you, in the phrase "the faith of us." "Empty:" *kenon* (*kenē*), with reference to its contents; *mataia*, in verse 17, refers to the result, "purposeless."

## The Investigator.

OCTOBER, 1898.

Intelligence, apparently fairly well authenticated, has reached Britain intimating the sudden death of bro. Roberts shortly after his arrival at San Francisco from Melbourne on his way to Birmingham. The information obtainable at Birmingham is very meagre, and was sent by the Shipping Company's agent at San Francisco. He has since confirmed previous cablegram, and states that bro. Roberts dropped down dead in the street: cause of death not known. The *Glasgow Herald* attributed death to disease of the heart, and stated further that he was found dead in his room in the hotel.

He lies in the city morgue—"a stranger in a strange land," away from all those who could have cared for him: a lonely end, viewed from the human standpoint. But I do not know that the mere circumstances would have distressed him much, or that he would have even chosen it otherwise. But he is dead, and what he most feared has happened: "the Truth" is left to take care of itself. While he lived he could never trust it to do this: he must needs assist it. He seemed always to regard it as a babe in swaddling clothes, and withal a weakly infant, which he must continually nurse and carefully doctor, else it would surely die. Such an attitude on his part always seemed to me to indicate a want of intelligent faith in God and a distrust of truth; or, perhaps, on the other hand, of the brethren. But he meant well: of that I never have had any doubt. To me he seemed dominated by the idea that he was identified in person with the truth, and that he held a brief for it as against his brethren; and should he go to the wall, or be worsted in argument, or change one iota in his judgment of the items composing it, the

truth would suffer loss, or perhaps even die in the earth. Hence his insane cry on one occasion, "The Truth in Danger!" Hence also his consistent opposition to any magazine which he could not control. He was honestly afraid of them, and opposed them "for the Truth's sake." Thus, while he fought he thought he was fighting for the Truth; and this must be his excuse. It was the same idea which led him to force division among the brethren, or to break with his fellows who might be as ready as he to set forth truth as she interpreted herself to them. To many such he appeared to "do evil that good might come." "The end justified the means," he believed. The means were at times more than questionable. Now he is gone I have no reason to approve those things which, when done, I could only condemn; nor could I conscientiously draw my pen through any adverse criticisms I may have been led to make regarding him in his public capacity. They are true as ever; but let us hope, for his sake, that the Master may have been able to look more leniently on him in his public capacity than we in our infirmity may have been able always to do.

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### CORRESPONDENCE.

#### ARE THERE CONDITIONS OF SALVATION?

DEAR BROTHER,—*Investigator*, No. 50, at hand. The letters of bros. Parkes and Smith, with your comments on the question, "Are there Conditions of Salvation?" suggest some thoughts that may not meet with the approval of many of the brethren, particularly those in the habit of drawing severe lines in fellowship.

God has a right to command and receive implicit obedience; yet he has always permitted man's free will. There is an inevitable "must" in all divine law, whether written or unwritten, revealed to us in the Word and in nature. It is a necessary condition of existence that the human will must be subordinated to the divine will. The surrender should be unconditional. But man is both

ignorant and stubborn. From birth to death, willingly or unwillingly, we are under or schooled by law. "A burnt child dreads the fire." So "fear is the beginning of wisdom." We learn to avoid infringing, and to conform to, nature's laws through suffering. The inevitable "Thou shalt" or "Thou shalt not," though not spoken, surrounds us at all times. And why should we not expect it to be so in the spiritual realm? Conditions there must be of necessity, just as we must eat and breathe to live. "Open thy mouth wide and I will fill it." So we must open the mind to receive divine instruction. We must hear, believe, and obey the truth, and be taught to observe all things whatsoever the Lord, through his apostles, has commanded. We cannot really give God anything, but rather surrender to him his own. He is the giver and we the recipients. Yet he condescends to make a covenant. The Gospel was before the law, just as love should be before chastisement—as a tender and loving nurse in infancy, and as a corrector of youth to ensure manhood. The law was added because of transgression. So its spirit was existing before it was orally given; or, as bro. W. D. Jardine would say, "it was adapted to man's native sense of justice." The ten commandments are sometimes called positive law, but they are not more so than the laws of nature. The farmer must be an intelligent co-worker with God or he will never be successful. And so with every department of work. Success must be in harmony with divine law. And there was no need for God to command—"Thou shalt not jump from the top of a high tower," for only an insane man would do so. The covenant with Abram was really a gracious gift, yet it was initiated with a condition, "Get thee out," &c. Without faith and obedience on Abram's part there would have been no covenant made with him. God could have commanded and enforced His commands, but no spiritual life would have germinated in Abram by such a procedure. Abram was willing. Human consent is a necessary feature in the beginning of spiritual life. No man can be saved unless he so desires. Mutual willingness for the attainment of a desired object is the spirit of covenant. By it a man enters upon the higher plane of spiritual life. There can be no such thing as unconditional salvation. Law fulfils its mission by punishing the guilty, and by instructing unto righteousness. It is holy, just, and good; and yet by the deeds of the law shall no living flesh be justified. One might say, it found a man already condemned to death, and needing to be purchased therefrom. But even granting that, it failed by reason of the weakness of the flesh. If it were not so, the Gospel would be a superfluity, instead of what it is,

a necessity. To be willingly saved, force must be superseded by love—the human will must be led and not driven. Law commands and love pleads; the one says, "Thou shalt" and the other says "Come." Now it really seems most unnecessary to point out the great difference between law and gospel. But every age has its troubles and troublers. Even in apostolic times, some believers persisted in mixing law and gospel together, forgetting that the positive law bound unto death, while the gospel was a law of freedom unto life. And in this age, after coming out of the bondage of creeds and the darkness of superstition, as if not appreciating the freedom of conscience that has cost so much righteous blood, brethren still persist in treating gospel as if it were law, and reading law into gospel. The apostles could tell the conditions of salvation in a very short time, and initiate believers into life; but how is it now? Indeed it seems to be harder to keep in fellowship with brethren than it is to obey Christ. Ought not the conditions of fellowship to be equivalent to the conditions of salvation? If not, why not? Is it not time for brethren to call a halt, and ask truly for the old paths and the good way? Or must we wait until our ecclesias are reduced severally to a corporal's guard by repeated segregation? In early times it could be said, "Behold how these Christians love one another!" but now we have to add, "and segregate." Behold how good and joyful a thing it is for brethren to dwell together in unity!

Why should we persist in making truth a positive satire upon our conduct? It does not take long to invent something that others will not admit and refuse to fellowship. Thus we have had free-life, substitution, immortal emergence, verbal inspiration, Adamic condemnation, marriage with the alien, enlightened-alien-responsibility-to-judgment-after-death; and what next? The Cave of Adullam must have held a motley band of discontented members, but they had David with them then. Freedom is a glorious thing when rightly used and appreciated, and the right of private judgment is sacred, and must not be violated nor infringed upon, and we dare not sell our birthright for any mess of pottage. But why, when we individually love freedom so much ourselves, should we seek to bind the consciences of others? We ought to be constrained to humility, at least once a week, when we partake of the bread and the wine. It should bring to our minds the oneness of the body of Christ. It should also recall the fact that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us, unless we deny that he died for sinners. And I have heard brethren, while riding a hobby, do that, but it looked like denying their own salvation. And truly God



must have infinite patience with us. And blessed are the poor in spirit; for there is no ground for religious conceit, unless it is a merit for a man starving to death to open his mouth to be fed. Truly the divine conditions are necessary to produce a proper condition of salvation within ourselves. It is consoling to remember that the apostles were few and well chosen, and that they positively had no successors. For no others can bind on earth and in heaven, or loose on earth and in heaven. Segregation has always been the result of creeds, and relates as an effect to its cause. The truth does not need any such props. It existed before we were born, and can stand on its own merits. The observance of apostolic instruction is sufficient as a basis of fellowship. A dogmatic statement of belief is the parent of schism. The natural stubbornness of the human will accomplishes the rest. What right have we to impose conditions of fellowship on others? So long as we do so, segregation must result.

We mistake privilege for proprietorship.

We are privileged servants of one common Master, and the table is the Lord's. It is ours to serve one another in meekness, and truly "Blessed are the meek." We are neither masters individually nor collectively, and have no right to treat the ecclesia of God as if it were a social club we could vote our own rules and regulations for. The rules and regulations are all provided by divine inspiration, and it looks like an insult to divine majesty to assume that they are insufficient, and that we must be making Statements of Belief to regulate our little clubs. It is a vestige left in us of the spirit of Babel, that tried to rear a means of salvation out of human conceit, and found confusion and scattering. Still, while separations must go on, we have this consolation left us, that they that love one another will have fellowship, creed or no creed.

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## IDEALS AND IDEALITY.

(An Essay read before the Birmingham Christadelphian Mutual Improvement Society  
by Bro. GEO. F. BERRY.)

IN every individual there is a faculty of the brain, more or less developed, which enables the possessor to project on the retina of his mental visual organ images of the good and true, the beautiful and divine, or images which are earthly, sensual, and devilish. It is by the exercise of this faculty that children build their aerial castles, peopling those imaginative realms with fairies and elves, giants and dwarfs, and animals of wondrous shape and size. In after years, when the youth has been introduced to the great external of Reality, and his infantile dreams have been dissolved, this faculty receives a new impetus. The processes of nature at work within his body, transforming him from boyhood to manhood, force his attention inwardly upon himself, and after a brief interval, his imaginative soul soars away into a world of romance. The fancies of his childhood are exchanged for personalities dressed in more natural shapes, and taking their form from that great world to which he has just been introduced. Great stirring events troop before his mental vision. Mighty revolutions are enacted before his wondering gaze; and amid all these ever-changing scenes he beholds himself as the great central figure—the dominant individual for whom, and through whom, all these wonderful events occur. Among all classes of men the greater portion of them have Ideals, which give colour and tone to their lives and characters. These Ideals may

be either physical, mental, moral, or spiritual. Does the exercise of this faculty serve any useful purpose in the development of individual character, or does it act as an impediment to all true growth? Is it good to be able to surround one's-self with the idealistic, or would it be better only to take cognisance of the stern facts of life in all their nakedness? To put the question in another form—Is the exercise of all our endowments, mental and physical, necessary to produce the most perfect results in our development? The answer must be, Yes. Both experience and science certify that the non-use of any of our organs is speedily followed by degeneration, and finally by loss of the organs also. "If a man neglect himself for a few years, he will change into a worse and lower man. If it is his body that he neglects, he will deteriorate into a wild and bestial savage, like the dehumanised men who are sometimes discovered on desert islands. If it is his mind, he will degenerate into imbecility and madness."—(Drummond's *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, page 99). Those individuals, therefore, whose faculty of ideality is so rudimentary that they are incapable of seeing more than the material forms which lie around on every side are really in a lamentable condition. To the Christian these facts are of great importance, accounting as they do for the advantages or disadvantages under which the individual labours in his endeavour to realise the "Christ life."

"The things which are seen are temporal; the things which are not seen are eternal," says the apostle Paul. The thing which is seen is but the medium through which the unseen and eternal is manifested. The Rev. Hugh Black says, "With our materialistic standards we judge things by their appearance, and the things which do not appear we assume not to exist. We call the material the real, and the ideal we call imagination, meaning that it is something unreal. But the material is, after all, the fleeting and transitory, while the unsubstantial is the truly permanent. The permanent thing in everything is the unseen part of it. The sound of the word dies upon the wind, and the thought of it lives. The outward form of music is momentary, and the beautiful conception remains. The canvas fades, and the stone crumbles, but the vision in the soul of the artist dies not. The world of sense and sight and sound is only appearance, but the thought of it is fact. The material changes ever, but the spiritual, the aspiration, the ideal, the imagination lives in endless life." It is by the exercise of this faculty of Ideality that we are enabled to sympathise with our fellow-creatures. Our imagination gives tangibility and substance to the cause of their emotions, and we are thereby enabled to manifest in a practical manner our interest in the affairs of our neighbours—to weep with those that weep, and to rejoice with those that rejoice. Our own experiences teach us that we are not what we would like to be. We recognise that "the law of sin in our own members" is constantly warring against the law of our minds, and bringing us into captivity. We realise the intensity of the continuous struggle to mortify the deeds of the flesh. We feel the agony of remorse and penitence when we have been overcome of evil. We know the bitterness of spirit that results from a weakened faith in God, and the absence of spiritual strength to enable us to overcome evil. We have received that peace which the world cannot take away, and realise the blessed calm that steals over our spirit when, in answer to our fervent prayers, our Heavenly Father sends those seasons of refreshing which come from His very presence, to give rest and peace to the wearied saint. These experiences enable us to sympathise with our brethren in their joys and sorrows. Our Ideality brings vividly before our mental vision their struggles, their hopes and fears, and their aspirations after God. When, in their dark moments, they cry out, "Who shall deliver me from this body of death?" our hearts go out to them in loving-kindness and compassion. Our experiences are identically theirs; thus we are bound together by ties of brotherhood. The strong feel impelled to aid the weak, and

the weak look and yearn for the strong protective hand of the more vigorous. The mutual relationship thus established begets reciprocal love, and the brethren are thereby united in the bonds of joy and peace. The outcome of such an union will be the establishment and perfecting of an Ideal Church, in which, as a temple of the living God, the Holy Spirit will be tabernacled, and the Christ life the dominating characteristic. It should be as much the privilege of the Church to say "It is Christ that liveth in me" as it is of the individual saints. Where there is a contemplation of the Ideal, and a strenuous effort, by the strength which comes from above, to put into practical effect the aspirations of the idealistic in matters of daily conduct, this much-to-be-desired end will be within measurable distance of accomplishment.

That individual, however, who is so unfortunate as to be incapacitated from contemplating the idealistic is existing in a living death. All that makes life real, all that makes life beautiful and divine, is lost to him. The Creator is lost in the presence of the created forms. As these transitory materials fade away one by one, the fountains of his life are slowly crumbling away also, leaving the soul empty and barren, without a single thought or ideal to live when the fleeting substance has sunk into oblivion. The Eternal and the Divine have no existence to him. Judging his fellows by what is outward only—their words, their deeds, their pleasures and promises—his conception of them is necessarily a false one. He cannot penetrate the struggles of the aspiring saint, and perceive that the sharp conflict which is being continually waged against the wiles of the Devil prevents him from reaching up to the standard of his ideal. He does not comprehend that this mortality imposes limitations in the ascending scale, and thus retards the progress of the man of God towards perfection. And when the saint, in a joyous burst of acclamation for the strength which has been vouchsafed to him in order to overcome some more than ordinary trial, exclaims, "I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord," this poor benighted soul scoffs. God! there is no God to such as he. Alas! it is only too true, the non-use of this faculty of the brain has resulted in mental blindness. No light, therefore, from the Eternal One can penetrate the almost Egyptian darkness in which such a soul is enveloped.

There is another class of individuals who are deserving of our pity, viz., those who, having given considerable thought to the ideally-perfect as depicted in the Epistles, are yet human enough to seize hold of the characters of some strong brethren, by whom they feel they have been influenced for

good, and set them up before their mind's eye as living embodiments of their Ideal. Sooner or later, these ideals will inevitably be shattered. There will come a time when, face to face with some great crisis, that brother will fall far short of what is expected of him. Some undreamed-of weakness will make itself apparent to the senses; some uncharitable speech, some unchristlike act will be perpetrated, disclosing to the startled and wondering gaze the frailty of the object which has stood so high in the estimation of those weaker ones. The conclusion slowly dawns upon the weakening consciousness that these imperfections have existed all along. Suspicion being aroused, a more careful scrutiny of the character of the Ideal follows. Instances which happened long ago will be recalled, and, viewed in the light of more recent events, they exhibit to the critic the fact that these same imperfections were even then manifest, being, perhaps, only less in degree. The now-fully-awakened soul perceives the ideal of his dreams trembling on its pedestal. It comes crashing to the ground, and, as he views the shivered fragments, he experiences a sense of irretrievable loss. This support has given way, and the strength in which he trusted has been dissipated. Happy is he if, in this truly deplorable condition, he is led to lay hold of the true Ideal. But, alas! for the ultimate fate of such an unfortunate, if he but exchange one ideal for another equally frail. They will all share the same fate: and

as one by one all his ideals lie in ruined heaps around him, the probability is that the disappointed one will give way to despair, and plunge headlong into a fate which is worse than death. "Put not your trust in princes, nor in the son of man, in whom there is no help," sings the Psalmist (Psa. clvi. 3). Let us then take warning; we are all human, and it will not avail us much to try to lay the blame of our failures upon the shoulders of those brethren who have been the unconscious means of shattering all our ideals. Possibly, they are very worthy individuals in spite of their weakness, and in their own sphere are honestly endeavouring to serve their Lord and Master, and in all probability have succeeded more than ourselves. Let us, therefore, ponder deeply the significant words of the Lord spoken through Jeremiah (xvii. 5-8)—"Cursed is the man that trusteth in man, and maketh flesh his arm, and whose heart departeth from the Lord. For he shall be like the heath in the desert, and shall not see when good cometh: but shall inhabit the parched places in the wilderness, a salt land and not inhabited. Blessed is the man that trusteth in the Lord, and whose hope the Lord is, for he shall be as a tree planted by the waters, and that spreadeth out her roots by the rivers, and shall not fear when the heat cometh; but his leaf shall be green, and he shall not be careful in the year of drought, neither shall cease from yielding fruit."

(Concluded in next issue.)

### THE ATONEMENT, AS TAUGHT BY BRO. STAINFORTH.

I HAVE numbered the paragraphs in Bro. Jardine's two bulky instalments as *a* to *k* and *l* to *s*. I think it will be acknowledged that these two bites hardly justify the loudness of his bark on p. 13.

(*a*). The key to his error, "that God's ways are adapted to man's native sense of justice," is the well-known fact that justice, being a Divine attribute, "the natural man" is as totally devoid of "native justice" as a crocodile (read 1 Cor. ii. 14); and his reference (*j*) to "the fair dealing of the street arab" evinces about as much acquaintance with the ways of that urchin as is possessed by the average bluebottle fly. He further mistakes for "native sense of justice" the artificial self-restraint which all animal communities find themselves compelled to practise to make neighbourhood endurable. "Native sense of justice" indeed! I hope neither he nor I shall ever be reduced to rely upon that!

(*b*). With regard to my "platitudes." The word is not in my dictionary; I can

then be guided to its meaning only by considering the specimens selected. It is then "a platitude" to call attention to the fact that "God dispenses His justice righteously—that is, strictly; it would not otherwise be justice." Well, really then I do think a platitude an excellent figure of speech, for it appears to mean simply "a clear and concise statement of valuable though neglected truth." In hopes of being able to say "*tu quoque*" (you're another!), I have carefully, but unsuccessfully, searched bro. J. for similar expressions.

(*c, c*). He then takes exception to my statement "that it is not possible to reconcile God's justice with His forgiveness of sins, apart from vicarious sacrifice, or, if it can be found, some other satisfaction to the aggrieved law." Ah! said I. Now we shall have it; he is going to show how it is possible, quite apart from substitution, to reconcile God's justice with His permitting a "soul that sinneth" to enjoy eternal life, after his having solemnly sworn that such souls shall die. "All things come to him

who waits." He is going to show how that law of sin and death is duly honoured when no death whatever takes place! He? Not a bit of it! He fills two columns of space, precious to readers (and writers), in proving it—"a platitude!"

I will not defend the loose construction he has spotted; I present him with it in all its vileness. Let it be ascribed (truly) to ignorance; still it is intelligible. Meanwhile, I have read that the Greek sages, when they came across a peculiar—perhaps, even an outlandish—expression in some eminent writer were not decomposed. "This," said they, "we will regard as a *hapax legomenon* (a unique phrase) of our excellent author, one indeed that has not hitherto occurred in our readings, yet one that is in no way displeasing; and being *where it is*, may even be regarded as a not uninteresting species of the Literary Gem; good old Homer!" There was some commonsense in these old heathen after all. Where, then, is this "other satisfaction which," he says (end of *c*) "it is just possible others may have found?" Why is it not produced to the perdition of my "rafters, &c.," in all these 15 columns of small print (and more to come; end of *r*)? How can I or others see it if he keeps it under his bushel?

(*f*). He here represents the Israelites as objecting to the Divine principle "that the son should bear the iniquity of the father"—a principle that we know is still universally in force in Nature. Yet we find no objection raised by them when Sihon's family were destroyed for their father's faults (Deut. ii. 34), or Saul's sons for his treachery to the Gibeonites (2 Sam. xxi. 8), both by Divine command; but when the principle affected themselves, then they cried out.

(*f, g, h, i*).—W. D. J. then devotes many columns to showing, in direct contradiction to his own contention, that, as Isa. lv. 8 says, there has always been "a contrast between God's ways and man's." "His thoughts and ways were clearly not like theirs;" "God adapted His ways to man's own sense"—"accommodates His reasonings to their capacity," &c., &c. But if "God's justice and righteousness appear adapted to man's native sense of what is just and right" (Oct. '96, p. 81), whence the need for all this "adapting and accommodating" and leveling up and down? His own quotation of Ex. xxiii. 7 knocks his whole idea on such head as it possesses—"The innocent and righteous slay thou not, for I will not justify the wicked." What native sense of justice could possibly dwell in men who were capable of slaying the notoriously innocent and righteous, expecting that God could afterwards be induced to justify them? Was that "an instance of God's adapting His ways

with man to man's own sense and understanding (*h*, line 2)?" or was it not an "infallible proof" of my view of Isa. lv. 8, "that God's thoughts are *not* men's thoughts?" For what must have been the condition of the ways and thoughts—"the native sense of justice" of men to whom it was needful to impart such information as to the ways and thoughts of the just and holy God?

(*h*). Since the Hebrews *never made* "wills," it matters *everything* whether *diathēkē* in Heb. ix. 16 means "covenant" or "will."

(*i*). The simile of "the blacksmith's arm" is bad. Knowledge of Scripture is not born with us; and some of us, when we have got a little, only turn it into "platitudes." Brains are born with us; and so is an arm, but its brawniness is a thing subsequently acquired; just as my tongue is "native to me," while my knowledge of the Chinese language—"Hoang-ho"—has been acquired later in life. But where would be the above brawniness if the arm had been used exclusively for fiddling?

(*j*). Jonah's sailors evidently hesitated to throw him overboard, lest they should bring themselves still worse luck, which is merely a form of selfishness. That was the source of their "sense of justice."

In a general way only I agree with the statement (foot of p. 43) "that nothing can be more wicked than killing the just for the unjust." But we are now discussing the matter under Bible conditions, and therefore the statement "that Jesus was punished" could not be repeated by a self-respecting man, to whom had been pointed out the evident impossibility of "punishing" the innocent.

We all suffer from the evil deeds of others; are we;"punished" by the pain when a man strikes us? "The sour grape may set our teeth on edge," and that, though not punishment, may perhaps be even more painful to bear as being undeserved. Still, vicarious sacrifice appears unjust, even when it is a case of one for 144,000. Yet Paul was "willing," if it had only been permissible, "to have been accursed from Christ for his brethren's sake." How could substitution be more strongly expressed? But how would they have benefited if, when called upon to make good his words, he had said, "Oh, I never intended dying instead of them, you know?" "Indeed, then, what on earth did you intend?" "Oh, I don't quite know!" Why, then, should we deny an equal self-abnegation to Jesus? Evidently substitution is a Bible principle, which God and Jesus jointly carried out, as foreshadowed by the sacrificial goat which "suffered" instead of the congregation—dying that they might not *die*. Apparently, then, W. D. J.'s native

sense of justice would have revolted horror-stricken from any such "unfairness." He, though conscious of guilt, would have indignantly repudiated all complicity in the murder of that innocent creature, and would faithfully have "smashed their rafters and foundation" by quoting for Moses and Aaron.

"Elihu the Buzite—Far be it from God that he should do wickedness," and crying, "Look, brethren, at the principle involved!" in both theory and practice it perverts judgment, infringes justice, dishonours God, and deceives man; it is nought but a garble (? platitude) from the "Egyptian dunghcap" (*j*, end), quite losing sight, meanwhile, of his own participation in the exactly similar enormity when *innocent* oxen, sheep, fowls, fish, or eggs are daily being painfully put to death in order that he, forsooth, may *not* die! (How our own interests can blind us!) "No such law can be just; the sinner must suffer or be forgiven." But if forgiven, what becomes of the law "The sinner shall die?" How that law gets honoured in such a case no one has yet attempted to show.

(*k*). Bro. Jardine rightly says, "All law requires punishment as compensation for its breach." He omits to say *how*, if substitution be repudiated, that "punishment which the law requires" gets inflicted if the sinner be forgiven. He immediately proceeds, in a lucid interval, to ask, "It is the sinner who must suffer or be forgiven; and if there is no forgiveness with God, apart from substitutionary sacrifice, wherein comes the hope of salvation?" Well, now that *is* a straightforward question; no beating about the bush there. I will in the like spirit answer. In that (true) case it must be evident to the meanest capacity that the hope of salvation must then be founded exclusively upon that same "vicarious sacrifice apart from which there is no forgiveness." This is, as he acknowledges, "the logical conclusion of the matter." Oh, why is he not always so sweetly reasonable!

For the fact remains, as I have pointed out (July '95, p. 65, and Jan. '97, p. 15) that while Jesus died the just for the unjust, the recorded facts (1) that he was a willing sacrifice—"The cup that my Father hath given me, shall I not drink it?" and (2) that he was promised the amplest conceivable compensation for all these afflictions—which, though anything but light, were but for a moment, with a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory—these two considerations, I say, remove all its repulsiveness from an *invitation* to the innocent to suffer for the guilty. Who can doubt that this willingness was produced chiefly by the same benevolence which actuated Paul's expressions of affectionate regret over his brethren, and, in

some smaller degree, by the liberal promises of the glory that was to follow—"who for the joy set before him endured the cross," &c. (Heb. xii. 2). When we properly appreciate this reasonable and honourable willingness to undergo all that was necessary for the salvation of his friends, the "cruelty" involved in the dying of the just man, so that the 144,000 unjust might *not* die, should rather appear as the most admirable self-sacrifice on the part of both Father and Son. Since, then, we hear no complaints, why need W. D. J. take up the cudgels for Christ? Does he *seriously* declare that if he were in Jesus' place he should regard his vicarious death as "an act of wickedness on the part of God," and the entire arrangement as one that "infringes justice, dishonours Him, and deceives men?" (See *j*, end, p. 44).

(*l, m*).—How melancholy the sight here exhibited of the result of a 25 years' "obedience of the truth," such pitiable incapacity to comprehend the simplest of statements! such as "Jesus was made unto us wisdom from God, even righteousness and sanctification and redemption" (1 Cor. i. 30); and "He was made sin for us, . . . that we might become a righteousness of God in him" (2 Cor. v. 21). Why all this shuffling and verbiage about this righteousness? Why not acknowledge candidly that it is none of our's but another's—Christ's. Some 15 years ago a woman, who had attended the lectures in London for some years, found herself in a hospital, mortally injured, but unimmersed. She desired to be immersed, but the doctors would not hear it. It was said by our people that if she could only have her desire she would be safe, even if she died immediately afterwards. No doubt; but upon what principle could she, being totally destitute of the "works" that are so extolled by some of our number, be saved under such special circumstances, except through the righteousness of Christ being reckoned to her through her faith? But how could that be, if W. D. J. knows what he is talking about, who says, "God will admit no proxy; he accepts no one's obedience for another's obedience" (*l*)?

(*m*). Do these two columns of small print do anything but smother the doctrine which we all (?) believe, that having been justified by faith in Christ, and preparatory obedience in immersion, his righteousness is reckoned as covering our past sins from God's sight? We have, then, only to avoid forfeiting this honourable position, proceeding by continued obedience to "work out" or retain the salvation thus conditionally bestowed upon us by producing APPROPRIATE WORKS, ENDURING THUS UNTO THE END.

(*p*, end). Yes, I do say "that the obedience of Christ is all that is required for

salvation." If a man dies immediately after immersion, would W. D. J. doubt his salvation because he had produced no works? I consider the truth to be that Christ offers the rope of his righteousness to the drowning man as a connecting link between them; by faith and immersion the man accepts it, and by his subsequent works he simply retains his hold. His eventual salvation, then, in a certain inferior sense, does depend on his own exertions in retaining his new position; but if a Saviour were not effectively at one end of the rope, he might cling as tightly as he liked, but would infallibly drown all the same. The "rope" derives its efficacy solely from its connection with the author of "Eternal Salvation." Our works represent nothing whatever more than the holding on, the mere maintenance of the position; for if the rope is not first firmly held for him, there can be nothing reliable for him to cling to. And the possibility of him holding on at all rests exclusively on the fact that a reliable rope has been provided. Could we imagine the man, when finally rescued, thanking his rescuer, but adding—"Yet, after all, you know it was really a *mutual* affair; if I had not held on like grim death, I should have

been by this time food for fishes, notwithstanding you and your rope."

(r). *Re* my "dishonest quotations." I introduced the first as—"I gather, as looking through a glass darkly." The explanation of any such misunderstandings is to be found solely in bro. Jardine's Gladstonian obscurity and verbosity. I had the *utmost* difficulty in finding any meaning in his writings, and when found, it is not his! I have utterly failed in discovering what he thinks was the good of Christ's death, and look forward with dismay to his threat of still further instalments; for if he "touches" all the points in my article, omitted so far, at similar length, I suppose that the world itself will not contain—well, certainly the *Investigator* will not contain—much else. I know I get *my* share, especially considering I am, perhaps, but one of 20,000. I likewise repudiate all *personal* feeling. As for W. D. J.'s views, I have no idea what they are, and I feel safe in adding—neither does any one else!

R. R. STAINFORTH.

NOTE.—Contribution from bro. Jardine crushed out; see cover.—ED.

## A QUESTION.

QUESTION.—"By what rule in the translation of Matt. x. 28 do you arrive at the conclusion that *sin* is the "him which is able to destroy both soul and body in Gehenna?"—N. C.

ANSWER.—My view that in Matt. x. 28 it is "sin" not "God" (although the latter is usually read into the text) which has "power to destroy" is not so much determined by the grammar of the passage as in spite of it, when literally construed. It is really a question of interpretation, only the interpretation I give is not opposed to the grammar. As a matter of fact, the article and participle (*ton dunamenon* ("him which is able"—*Authorised Version*) are in the masculine gender, not neuter, which would have required to *dunamēnon*. The presence of the masculine article is amply explained by the principle of personification so common in Scripture, e.g., "Sin" is said to "reign in death" and "Grace" to "reign through means of righteousness" (Rom. v. 21), without implying a real person, as those infer who supply the term "God," or, on the other hand, the "Devil," as the "one who," &c.

That it is not "God" but Sin that is here said to be "able to destroy both soul and body in Gehenna" appears from two considerations:

First. Let it be ascertained what it is which has "the power (*kratos* = strength) of death"

(Heb. ii. 14). Now what this is is quite evident from Scripture. "The sting of death," says Paul, in 1 Cor. xv. 56, "is sin." "Sin," says James (i. 15), "when it is finished bringeth forth death." In fact, Paul affirms that "the mind of the flesh is death" (Rom. viii. 6), which is just another way of saying that "sin reigns in death."

Second. The parallel passage in Luke xii. 4 speaks of "that which, after it has killed, has authority (for the word is *exousia* = authority; not *dunamis* = power, might) to cast into Gehenna." Now we cannot speak of "God" as having authority—*i.e.*, delegated power; neither could Jesus speak so of "God."

The "him," then, of the Authorised Version is something possessing only delegated power; and as sin is the only thing "which can destroy both soul and body in Gehenna," the "him" of Matt. x. 28 must be something else than "God." If, then, sin alone has such power, Jesus might well tell his disciples "not to fear those who aimed at putting the body to death, but after that had no more that they could do." It follows, also, from the foregoing, that it is not "God" but "sin" that destroys the sinner; and while another may "kill" me, he cannot "destroy" me: for that is dependent upon whether I overcome Sin, which otherwise would keep me in the dust of death.—EDITOR,