

at the table. Oct 12-68
Spent in London " 13 '97
men on earth before A " 13 '33

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The Investigator.

"All things, put to the test; the good retain."—I Thess. v. 21.

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THE SPIRIT IN MAN.

[The four paragraphs which follow appeared on cover of last issue, and are reproduced here to preserve the continuity, in the body of the magazine, of the Editor's contribution.]

BUT perhaps these spirits have power to change at will from sour to sweet, in which case their "plan," which "they have before them," must undergo some modification, seeing they produce something else than themselves. The whole facts of grafting are worth bro. Weir's consideration. But it must all be as bro. Weir maintains, since matter, even living matter, continues, he says, "as inert as when it was inorganic." The graft from an apple tree, removed from the jurisdiction of its own "Potter-Spirit"—which presumably must have been left in the original stock from whence the graft was taken—produces not sour apples but sweet. Evidently the "Sour-Potter-Spirit" has not the power to mould the fruit of that graft in accordance with its "plan." So the mountain ash will produce, not rowan berries but, sweet apples on the engrafted twig. The "living matter," in the shape of a twig or bud even, *minus* its own "Potter-Spirit," counts for something here. Perhaps its "inertia" is too much for the "Potter-Spirit" of the ash to overcome, and so we have apples instead of rowan berries!

In connection with the presumed "inertia" of living matter, I would recommend bro. Weir and others to read Huxley's description (*Lay Sermons*, p. 155) of what goes on in the protoplasm which lines the interior of the slender hair forming the nettle's sting—observations I should reproduce here but for the lack of space. Living protoplasm appears to have some characteristics which do not accord with this notion of "inertia."

Bro. Weir is not satisfied with me for saying to Mr. J. J. Brown "I am a materialist if I am anything." He would prefer to think me "not anything" rather than I should claim to be a materialist, which latter he does not think I am "in any reasonable sense." Well, perhaps not, as he would define the term. I am no materialist in the sense of holding that there is nothing in this world but "matter, force, and necessity." That I repudiate as heartily as Huxley does in his *Lay Sermons* (p. 160), where he says, "the materialistic position" involves "grave philosophical error," and "is as utterly devoid of justification as the most baseless theological dogmas;" adding, "the fundamental doctrines of materialism, like those of spiritualism, and most other 'isms,' lie outside the limits of philosophical enquiry." I am, however, a materialist, in that I believe and maintain that I must have an individual existence before I can have any powers of thought; while I am no materialist in that I believe in and maintain the priority of "mind" to "matter." This is a seeming paradox, but the solution is to be found in the fact, that while

admitting the priority of "mind" to "matter," the priority I admit is not, and cannot be, that of your individual thought or mine. In the case of the individual thinker, "that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural" (1 Cor. xv. 46). Thought is prior to nature, for nature is just the thought of God materialised—departures from the established order of nature being departures from God; but we are parts of nature, and there was a time when we had each an individual existence but no actual powers of thought; that, as I have shown, is not inherent in us, but is an evolution which, in its realisation, implies a thinker and the thing thought—subject and object.

Bro. Weir must not think I am "sneering" at his imagination; sneering doesn't become a lover of truth, and I hope I have not been guilty of this; all the same, I think bro. Weir has given us fresh evidence of his imaginative faculty; e.g., as I have demonstrated, he imagines two or more points of exclamation where I write only one. This is a small matter, but, like a straw, it serves to show how the wind blows. Such imaginativeness does not add to "effective treatment." My phrase "formless form of spirit" I knew could not escape. Literally construed, it is ridiculous enough, yet it served in a way to convey my not-otherswise-to-be-expressed thought, and I plead that it may be "overlooked" on that ground. But my notion was not that "matter becomes spirit," but that spirit ceases to be "matter" as we cognise it. My words were: "By the absolute 'withdrawal' of IT [*ruach*] the organic world would itself dissolve, and even the matter of which it consists no longer be. So spirit holds all things together, even the ultimate atom. Let that spirit be wholly 'withdrawn,' and atoms assume once more their original and only essential formless form of spirit. What we call matter would have ceased to be, for the monad or ultimate atom is, as I take it, but a mode of spirit, the mode being dependent upon him who sent forth his spirit; and matter, with its shapes, personal and impersonal was" (January issue, 1898, p. 9). If there has been "creation" of matter, there can be "annihilation" of matter; and if that creation was *out of spirit* and not "out of nothing," then will not its annihilation be a simple resolution into the formative *ruach*? What else does bro. Weir himself believe?

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Jhos. Nisbet

IF the amount of space devoted by Bro. Nisbet in the *Investigator*, to criticism of my articles, be an index of his interest therein, this would seem to be on the increase. It is pleasing to see his interest grow, but disappointing to note the irrelevance of portions of his criticisms. His somewhat playful remarks about "grafting sour apples," &c., will be attractive reading to a certain class, but those who have the patience and ability to sift what has been written, as a whole, will readily see that such criticism presents no real difficulty. The instance is one of "division of labour," and the function of the respective "potters" is as clear-cut as could be looked for in a hybrid process. The temptation to get after Bro. Nisbet is great, but the desirability of having the *full statement* of my case appear as soon as possible—besides the fact that I have promised to attend to it before anything else—forbids that any part of this article be devoted to counter-criticism.

In my previous articles, chiefly the last, I have shown that, according to both scripture and science, man—"the natural man"—is more than "body"—more than "matter"—a "union of spirit and matter"—an organism invested by "a spirit"—in brief, "a soul." Attention has also been called to Nature's marvellous provision for *reproduction*, as recorded in Gen. i. 11, and corroborated by modern science—reproduction both *psychical* and *physical*. If the evidence which has been presented were all that is available my case might well be regarded as "*proven*," and, consequently, be dismissed, but the chief eschatological teaching concerning man is located in the New Testament, therefore *its* evidences must *also* be considered. If these be found to dovetail into, and amplify the foregoing, conviction ought to follow. That this is what they do I shall now proceed to show.

There are strong reasons for believing that, as in Nature the spirit (in the seed) has been shown to be the link joining parent with offspring: so, in the case of all who may be subjects of the resurrection, it will be the link joining the present with the future body. This will be more easily grasped if we specify here the sense in which the terms *life* and *death* are to be taken. "Life" is a quality of "spirit"—where "spirit" is life is, either *active* or *latent*. A human "body" invested by a human "spirit" is a human being—a living soul—say a man. To such a being, death is the condition produced by withdrawal of the "spirit:" the "body"—an integral part of himself, then goes to corruption—he is "dead." But his "spirit" is not, necessarily, destroyed. If he belong to the class who, in death, "sleep a perpetual sleep," his "spirit" and "body," probably, perish together when he expires, there being no further use for either. It is quite different, however, with the *responsible* dead. Their "spirits" are "received" and kept until "the day of the Lord Jesus." If worthy, they will then be "saved:" if *unworthy*, destroyed in Gehenna." The Saviour's words (Matt. x. 28) bear directly on this:—"Be not afraid of them which kill the body but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell (Gehenna)." To "kill the body" is to *liberate the "spirit"*—"Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return to God who gave it" (Ecc. xii. 7). But how can the Christadelphian theory that "the body is the man" be upheld in the face of these words? Had Jesus held such belief he, no doubt, would have said something like the following: "Be not afraid of them who would take away your life and after that have no more that they can do; but rather fear him who can *destroy you* in Gehenna." To specify "body" as being "killed" is to teach by a *very strong implication* that *man is more than "body."* When to this we add the fact that scripture abounds with passages in which (separately or combined) "spirit," "soul," "body" are set forth as *possessed by man*, we cannot but see that *no one of them singly is he*, but, on the contrary, they are all involved (in the way already abundantly described) in his make-up. For this reason it is quite appropriate to speak of each of them as "*his*," but on the Christadelphian basis—"that *he* is "body" only—this would be totally inadmissible. The possessive phrases "*your* spirit," "*your* soul," "*your* body," constitute an abuse of language leading to the intensest confusion if either "spirit," "soul," or "body" *singly* be the person.

But, further, the intimation in Matt. x. 28 that the "soul" can be "destroyed in Gehenna," as well as the body, suggests the idea of "*form*." True, life which, doubtless, is the meaning of *psyche* (soul) here, cannot be said to

have "form," but spirit can (Zec. xii. 1). Then, as "spirit" is the basis of "life," and both "body" and "spirit" have been "formed" (Gen. ii. 7; Zec. xii. 1) it is quite rational to believe that Jesus was stating a *literal fact* when he said that *both* could be "*destroyed in Gehenna*"—such, no doubt, will be the final end of the unaccepted. In neither "body" nor "spirit" can destruction go farther than "form:" to speak of *destroying* either *elementally* would be absurd.

Luke sheds an even stronger light on this than Matthew does: chap. xii. 4—"Be not afraid of them which kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do. But I will warn you whom ye shall fear: Fear him which after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell (Gehenna)." If "Gehenna" be that crematorium outside Jerusalem, so often described in Christadelphian literature, are we to understand that wicked men had not power to cast a dead body into it, after having "killed the body?" Of course they had power to do so: to deny this would be nonsense. But, while they had power to "kill the body," and to cast it into the aforesaid crematorium (Gehenna), they had *not power* to cast the *man* in there, which implies that the body is *not the entire man*.

Let us now see what part the "spirit of man" plays in connection with his resurrection. Paul (1 Cor. xv. 35-38) writes. "But some one will say, How are the dead raised and with what manner of body do they come? Thou foolish one, that which thou thyself sowest is not quickened except it die: and that which thou sowest, thou sowest not the body that shall be, but a bare grain, it may chance of wheat or of some other kind, but God giveth it a body as it pleased him, and to each seed a body of its own."

This "foolish one's" objection was based on the fact that the bodies of many of the righteous dead were then *non est*. The difficulty of believing in the resurrection of Christ, who "saw no corruption" (here made the basis of discourse by Paul), was small compared with that of those whose corruption was complete. In the former case the body simply had to be revived: in the latter there was *no body to vivify*—how, then, can *such* be raised? and "with what body do they come?" The apostle's answer is analogical, and quite convincing if understood. The farmer sows wheat, firmly believing that a crop will follow in due time, notwithstanding the fact (known to him) that the material part (the "body") of the *seed* must dissolve and disappear shortly after the sowing. Why, then, doubt that the Author of Nature can reproduce man after *his body* has dissolved and disappeared? His "spirit," which corresponds to the "spirit" (life) in the wheat berry (grain) has been preserved, and simply requires to be clothed with a body, and the *man* stands again. This, according to the analogy, is what takes place—"God giveth each seed (spirit) a body of its own"—"as it hath pleased him."

But some may not feel satisfied with this brief statement of the matter—the use made of the term "*die*" by Paul not being clear to them. To "*die*" means no more here (if anywhere) than for the body to part with or give off its life. Were it to mean the destruction of the life of the wheat berry, no crop could possibly follow, as has already been shown. What actually occurs after sowing is—the moistening of the berry or grain and the appearance of a "sprout," which gradually develops into a plant, taking the *life with it*, and feeding on the *material* part (the body) of the berry or "seed," for the first few weeks, till the roots are sufficiently established to extract its nourishment from the soil. By this means "*that which thou sowest*" "*dies*," *i.e.*, as a

"seed" or "berry." Its life ("spirit") is now in the offspring plant but *it* has gone—"Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die it abideth alone but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit"—Jesus.

From what we have now seen of the part played by the "spirit" in the "*germ*" and onward, it would seem to be a true inference that its presence is necessary to the continued vital existence of the organism (Jas. ii. 26). But it does more than *vitalise*—it is intimately associated with the *mind*; and as it contained the "plan" and "power" from which the man's likeness and other *native* characteristics were brought forth, so it may reasonably be expected to constitute the *register* (phonograph-like) of all that goes to make up his character during life. His memory, identity, &c., would be stored therein, and this is all belonging to him which it is important to have preserved. The components of all animal bodies are known to be in a state of constant *flux*, and all of the *same elementary* character. The "spirit," on the contrary, is *permanent while life lasts*, and surely it is more rational to ascribe memory, &c., to it, than to that which is *no two days the same*, and, elementally, is common to all organisms.

But I am disposed to press this argument farther and affirm that resurrection, on the *purely physical basis*, is an impossibility. If "the body" be the man, or if "spirit" be no part of the natural man (as Bro. Nisbet may prefer to put it), *re-creation* may obtain, but not *resurrection*, and the *one is not the other*. If two acorns, alike to an atom, lay side by side they would not be the same. No more so if put successively in the same places. Nor, again, if the first were destroyed and replaced by the second. But if that which had been destroyed were re-constructed of the *same constituents*, and made *precisely* as before, it *would* be the same—"resurrected." Now this, at least, is what has to be guaranteed by those who teach that "the body is the man." If *such a man* is to be "*resurrected*," *every particle of the matter belonging to him when he died must be restored to its place at the resurrection*. But we know that no mausoleum can long retain all the dust committed to it. In some cases, too, the perishing body may be unburied, and may fertilise the field and become the food of man, so that the same particles may belong to several of the dead; or some saints may have been eaten by wild beasts (as there is good reason to believe) and their dust incorporated in the body of their destroyer. A story is told of a husband and wife who, in the early days of New England, died there and were buried, and some time afterwards, when their friends wished to remove their bodies to the family burying-place, they found an apple tree growing near the grave, and, on digging down, they discovered that the roots of the tree had descended and clustered along the entire length of the coffins, absorbing all the contents. For years the owners of the ground and others had been eating the apples which had grown from these decomposing bodies. A pertinent question then was—"Who ate Mr. and Mrs. —?" But this notion of the resurrection has ever given occasion for sceptical cavil. The resurrection of the body, *per se*, is not anywhere taught in scripture—the resurrection of the *man* is, but *he* is "*Body*" and "*Spirit*." Resurrection of the "*man*" implies the standing again, or, at least, the "*upstanding*" of the *same man*—not the *same body*, atom for atom. The body which expires and is buried is "not that body which shall be." Paul has distinctly told us this: "God giveth it—the seed—the spirit—a body as it hath pleased him, and to each seed a body of its own." That is to say—the "unjust spirit" will be clothed with a "corruptible body:" the "just" with an "incorruptible." The

nonsense published concerning "Mortal emergence of the righteous"—causing disruption of the *Church*—would never have been invented had the constitution of man been understood. The desperate stratagem to which Dr. Thomas had to resort, to patch up this difficulty about "identity," is a proof of the absolute impracticability of his task. According to him, the histories of the dead shall, at the resurrection, "be flashed upon their brains, being transferred thither by Almighty power, from the divine and electrical page upon which they are all inscribed." "This scroll of record is the broad sheet of spirit, styled by philosophers ether and electricity, which, filling the universe, enwraps the world. All thoughts and actions are vibrations excited in this spirit of the Creator by corporeal agents. These subtle vibratory impressions are never obliterated unless He wills never to revive them. Many such He has willed to blot out: as in the case of those who are consigned to a 'perpetual sleep' and of sins that have been forgiven"—(*Anastasis*, pp. 23, 24).

It will not be denied that Dr. Thomas (for whom the writer has the greatest respect) is a representative Christadelphian. This, therefore, may be taken as genuine Christadelphian teaching. There can be no doubt that the Dr. regarded "the body as the man." His account of resurrection is: "First, re-organisation of dust as a basis for the restoration of personal identity; then, the breathing into the nostrils breath of the spirit of life, that the individual may awake, and stand upon his feet; after this, restoration of personal identity for appearance at the judgment seat of Christ" (p. 20). The Dr. does not believe that the *same dust* is to be used—"Other dust," says he, "may do as well, the power of identity not residing there, but in the character already formed being flashed by the Spirit upon the new creature" (p. 24). The Dr. properly calls this "a new creature," for such it doubtless is. Strange that he did not perceive the impropriety of creating "a new creature," and "flashing" thereon a *criminal's record or character*—for that is what is involved in the case of the "unjust." To "flash the intellectual and moral likeness of a pre-resurrectional man upon the post-resurrectional likeness of a woman" might be "confusion," as the Dr. suggests, but it would not be a whit more *confused* nor *unjust* and *cruel* than what he proposes. If nothing else makes identity, such a supposed restoration thereof would be a delusion. Omnipotence could, indeed, make us *think* and *feel* as if we had lived such and such former lives, but that would be an imposture if we were really other beings—"new creatures." When God shall restore the memory of things, the "accusing" or "excusing" conscience will be a part of our *unchanged selves, and not* a "new creation." This has been provided for by the Creator in a very purpose-like manner, through the survival of the individual "spirit"—the custodian of the person's past and present knowledge. Where else can the particulars of character be retained but in the "spirit"—that which alone "knoweth the things of a man?"

The Doctor's theory that "all thoughts and actions are vibrations in the ether and electricity which fill the universe and enwrap the world" will not account for our *memories during life*, if it ever was intended to do so. Seeing that we can, *at will*, recall to mind large portions of our past experience, there must either be something of a *permanent* character in our *constitution*, appointed to this function, or we must have ready access to some external source or agency. Which is the more reasonable? For the former we have the testimony of the Word, plus that of common sense (for who, in his senses, can believe that his memory is not a faculty of his mind?): for the latter we have nothing but gaunt speculation. It is evident, then, that *memory* must be a

feature of *self*—of our own constitution. But it cannot belong to “flesh” *per se*, because Dr. Thomas has proved (to his own satisfaction) that “flesh is a spirit that passeth away and *cometh not again*,” and although scientists do not confound “flesh” with “spirit,” yet they agree with the Doctor as to its fleeting nature—its constant *flux*. There is, however, “a spirit in man”—a part of himself—not flesh, but associated with flesh. When this spirit “passeth away” *life* “passeth away.” This, then, is the *only part of man* which answers to the requirements of memory: the *only factor of his constitution* which has been present from *beginning to end* of his existence. If Dr. Thomas considers that electricity is employed in keeping man’s record, I do not object, but instead of locating it *outside* the organism (as he does), I would place it *inside*—the garniture or enswathement of the “spirit,” by which all its behests are carried athwart the nerve system. Electricity is, thus, the *message-bearer* of the “spirit” during man’s life-time: and, as its nature exempts it from the “corruption” which immediately overtakes the body in death, it may reasonably be regarded as (along with the “spirit”) the *repository* of his *energy*, as well as of his *record*, during the interval between his *expiration* and *resuscitation*—an interval in which everything else, constituting the man, has been dissolved.

Many New Testament passages, otherwise puzzling, are simplified by this theory. I will notice two only—(Acts vii. 59, and 2nd Cor. v. 1-10).

Stephen, when dying, said, “Lord Jesus receive my ‘spirit’” (*pneuma*). What was this about which Stephen was solicitous? Not his *breath*, because *pneuma* is not so rendered in the New Testament, although it occurs over 300 times. It is almost invariably rendered “spirit” or “spiritual.” But even if it were rendered as often by the one term as the other, yet the question of *fitness* would overwhelmingly decide in favour of “spirit,” in this instance. What sense could there be in requesting that his *breath* be “received?” The proper place for breath, after passing through the lungs and nostrils, is the atmosphere. Here all Stephen’s previous expirations went, and there doesn’t seem to be any satisfactory reason why the last should not accompany them. It surely cannot be contended that the *retention* of this *terminal puff of impure air* is essential to Stephen’s future existence.

To say, on the other hand, that “*life*” was what he thus consigned to Christ, is to concede my contention, as “spirit” has already been proved to be the *basis* of life. This “spirit” belonged to Stephen as really as his “body” did, although we all agree that both belonged to God. When the Lord Jesus “received” Stephen’s “spirit” Stephen was out of harm’s way—

“Asleep in Jesus, blessed sleep,
From which none ever wakes to weep.”

Stephen was, thus, “absent from the body” and “at home with the Lord,” but “asleep.” He was, however, in the “naked” or “unclothed” state, and will so remain till “the trumpet shall sound and the dead shall be raised incorruptible”—then will he be “clothed with his house which is from heaven.” To interpret 2nd Cor. v. 1-10 as teaching that the “saints” go, at death, to be with their Lord in the “clothed” and *conscious* state, is, it seems to me, to create insuperable difficulties with a number of passages which point in the opposite direction.

The dying utterance of the Saviour—“Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit”—is parallel with, and corroborative of, that of Stephen, and fore-

closes any attempt at explaining the request of Stephen as one for assistance to die faithful.

Enough has now been written to enable the intelligent and careful reader to understand my theory, and to judge of its efficiency in furnishing a suitable place for all the different teachings of scripture. Had space permitted I might have dealt with Paul's "desire to depart;" "whether in the body," &c., and other bases of controversy, but probably they will come up in the discussion now to follow. My object, from the first, has been to exhibit a *system* of belief which, while conserving the great Bible truth that "Eternal life is the gift of God through Jesus Christ," does no violence to any of the many passages wherein the "spirit of man" is mentioned. As already intimated, I expected that Bro. Nisbet would do likewise, if not for the benefit of his readers, at least for his own satisfaction as a lover of truth—a *synthesis* of fragments of intelligence being the best means of testing their practical worth. Again I invite him to construct his several items of belief into *one whole*, and present it for comparison with mine—if such a task be practicable. If this is not done I may be compelled to gather his different statements together, in what I conceive to be their logical order, but if he elect to do so himself, I shall be better pleased.

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BRO. WEIR has now completed his argument in support of his theory of a personal spirit in man. I have, in the course of the discussion, advanced some objections to that theory, and in next issue bro. Weir proposes to consider these objections, or such of them as he may not have already attended to. But I have done more than merely objected to what Bro. Weir has advanced, for in the course of my objections—while in the nature of the case largely engaged in destructive criticism—I have advanced much of a constructive character in which, without regard to existing theories—"orthodox" or otherwise—I have set forth my own theory of the matter in question, viz., that the natural man is not possessed of such a spirit as bro. Weir contends for: that the only spirit native to the natural man is that one all-pervading spirit—spirit of God, not God—which brings into, and keeps in, being all subsisting things; that the natural man is thus merely "soulical" (*psuchikos*), "having no spirit"—(Greek: *pneuma*; Heb., *ruach*) in any personal sense, as Jude declares (ver. 6). As admitted, there is *ruach* in man (Job xxxii. 8) as there is *ruach* everywhere and in everything, but this *ruach* (or *pneuma*) is not to be confounded with the thinking faculty in man, although in itself essential to thought; in other words, the *ruach* (or *pneuma*) in man is not to be confounded with the living soul or true self. The *ruach* is essential to the living soul, but it is not it: the organism is essential to the living soul, but it is not it. The living soul is the organic personality, and this organic personality is a result of the interaction of the *nishmath chayyim*—which is never to be confounded with *ruach*—and the organism, *plus the capacity to receive, assimilate and reproduce impressions from without*. This is what Moses terms "man" in Gen. ii. 7—something more than a merely "vitalized body." The proof of this is to be found in the fact that Moses is there describing to us how man, the *genus homo*, came into being. Moses is writing long after the event, and consequently the terms he uses can only be properly understood when that fact is fully recognised and allowed for. But this is not always done.

We are all familiar with the common procedure in the public exposition of Gen. ii. 7: "The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground." The exposition proceeds somewhat in the following fashion:—"What have we here? A man, perfect in all his parts. We may suppose him—the man—lying at full length on the ground, perfectly organised and fitted to live, but as yet without life, for the *man* is not alive. What follows? God 'breathes into his'—the man's—'nostrils the breath of life,' and he, the dust formation, the lifeless but perfect organism, begins to respire the breath of heaven; and thus the 'man becomes a living soul.'"

But there is a fallacy here which consists in assuming that Moses uses "man" as a term properly applicable to the organism in itself, whether vitalized or not. Such a view takes no account of the fact that—apart from cumbrous circumlocution—the exigencies of language necessitate the use of the term "man" before it is scientifically applicable in the case. It is the becoming of man that Moses is detailing, and the man—the living soul—did not exist before the process was completed, although Moses' words when literally construed may prove to the satisfaction of some that *man* existed before he "became a living soul." But such a conclusion is based upon a mere fiction of speech, instead of resting upon a scientific basis of fact; as it should do.

Bro. Weir does not go so far as this, but he argues that a vitalized body is all that a living soul is. Now a merely "vitalized body" is still short of the living soul of Gen. ii. 7, which was a man in the full possession and exercise of his physical and mental powers. Livingness—physical and mental—is the foremost characteristic of a living soul, and vitalization is itself but a stage in the process; and hence it is that a merely "vitalized body" is something short of the "living soul" that man was when Moses wrote of his becoming.

Such a mere "vitalized body" answers to Bro. Weir's notion of a living soul—"a vitalized body *is*," he says, "a living soul—a living man" (Oct. 1897, p. 79), but "vitalized body" does not accord with my notion of a living soul—a man, which as I have shown goes beyond and embraces more than that. The way out of the imaginary "tangle" of thought, which bro. Weir, in the same issue, credited me with having got into over this matter (but which was due to his own misconception) is simple and obvious to those who have comprehended my position—a position I submitted in my first contribution to the discussion in the July issue for 1897 (page 55, pars. 2, 4, and 7). It is all a matter of distinguishing between what Moses appears to superficial thought to say, and what he means. What he means is only to be arrived at by a critical consideration of the circumstances. Now he wrote long years after man's becoming, and hence it was that all living soul, a man, was to him such as I have defined; and no less.

But bro. Weir does not quite know where I am, and he is not sure if I know either; but he may safely assume that I do know, and try to comprehend the theory I have put forth above; and show, if he can, the irrelevancy of the evidence I have adduced for everything I have advanced which is essential to my argument. That is the only way by which he may hope to answer me.

Having re-stated my theory of man I now deal with what bro. Weir says in his present contribution. I note that he makes statements which he will never prove—statements which he does not seem to realize call for any proof.

He affirms that "life is a quality of spirit" (page 3). Now this is no more evident than that death is a quality of spirit, for in its operations either life or

death may result, but neither becomes therefore a quality of spirit. And as no thing can exist apart from its qualities (to affirm that it could would be tantamount to saying that a thing can exist apart from itself) it is absolutely impossible that life and death—two things mutually destructive—can both be qualities of spirit. And yet it is just as evident that death is a quality of spirit as that life is. The truth is that both may be, and are, results of its operation, but neither can be said to be a quality of it.

Again, bro. Weir says, "where spirit is life is, either active or latent." The statement "where spirit is life is," is no more true than that "life is a quality of spirit." It is, indeed, demonstrably untrue; for if life is where spirit is, and spirit is everywhere (Ps. cxxxix. 7), then death were a recurrence: so long as spirit (*ruach*) remains spirit (*ruach*), death occurs. But so far is this from being the case that scripture ever opens the function of death, which is expressly affirmed to be a result of an operation at times. Examples are: Isa. xl. 7: "All the grass withereth, the flower fadeth: because *ruach* of the Lord bloweth upon them, and they shall wither" (see also ver. 20: "The flower of the field, so he flourisheth: for *ruach* of the Lord bloweth upon them, and they shall wither"). Ps. ciii. 15, 16: "The flower of the field, so he flourisheth: for *ruach* of the Lord bloweth upon them, and they shall wither."

But it is easy to show that, constructively, there is no room in the fact of death at all: neither of "body" or "spirit," at least, no room for it in his theory.

As to *body*: according to him "organic matter is as inert as when it was inorganic . . . a power outside itself must be credited with its operations" (Oct., 1898, p. 81). A living organism, then, we are to believe, cannot move itself, because it is not alive; it moves, but not of itself; the power to originate movement is one of the many fanciful functions with which bro. Weir endows his "potter-spirit." If, then, this "potter-spirit" is the only thing which lives, it follows that death can never be predicated of the body; for no thing can ever die which is not previously alive; and since, according to this theory of life, the body does not live, neither can it die; nor be "killed."

As to *spirit*: What happens to it according to bro. Weir's theory when what he calls "death" takes place? He answers, "to 'kill the body' is to liberate the spirit"—this at least as regards what he calls the "responsible dead!" Liberation, however, is not death to the "spirit," for when "liberated" it returns to God who gave it. And since we are told "where spirit is life is, either active or latent," it is difficult to see how, apart from annihilation of the "spirit," death of this "spirit" could obtain. And since bro. Weir tells us that "in neither body nor spirit can destruction go further than form," and "to speak of destroying either elementally is absurd" (page 4), it follows there is no room at all in his theory for death either to the "spirit" or the "body."

But let us follow for a moment the fortunes of the "liberated spirits." "These are received," we are told, "and kept until 'the day of the Lord Jesus.' If worthy, they will then be 'saved:' if unworthy, they will be destroyed in Gehenna." Saved! What is this? One can only make an inference, as bro. Weir has not revealed it. I infer, then, that if "death" means liberation to the "spirits," the "salvation" in the case can only mean a return to detention in a body: once more "spirits in prison." For separation from a body, with its consequent unconsciousness, seems to be all that this disembodied

* In both these cases the definite article is absent from before *ruach*.—T.N.

"spirit" needs to be "saved" from. Form, indeed, seems to be all that the "spirit" retains of its former self. But in the circumstances it is not easy to see how it could appreciate "salvation" of any sort, seeing it is quite unconscious of its unconsciousness in the separate or "liberated" state. For it should not be forgotten that "consciousness," says bro. Weir, or it may be, *said bro. Weir, "is entirely dependent on the union of spirit with body"*—Oct., 1897, page 97, par. 1 (the italics are his). What, therefore, is there for it to be saved from "then" if not its unconsciousness, and how is this to be accomplished?

But "if unworthy they will be destroyed in Gehenna," we are told. How there can be any remaining element of unworthiness in a disembodied unconsciousness is equally difficult to see. Nor is it easy to see any other reason for putting this "unworthy spirit" into a body than that it may become aware of what is taking place when it is being snuffed out or de-"formed." But on what ground of justice or common sense is this new body (which the "unworthy spirit" is to tenant at the "resurrection") to be punished along with the old "spirit"—which "spirit" is the only sinner which bro. Weir's theory allows of being got hold of in the case?

It may be said that in dealing with the statement "where spirit is life is" I have ignored the qualifying clause regarding life, viz., that it is "either active or latent." I am ignoring it in a sense, since the term "latent" means nothing to me beyond what my definition of it contains; and in view of that definition which I gave in my previous contribution bro. Weir was precluded from using the term unless he defined the sense in which he used it. As the case stands he contents himself with the re-iteration and re-assertion of a term which I have characterised as importing no real existence—as a term without anything corresponding thereto. Bro. Weir cannot, of course, have accepted my definition of the term, viz., a mere "capacity for becoming," since, to admit that, is to say that where life is latent life is not—as yet. There will be a capacity for becoming alive, but no life. "Latent life" is non-existent life—a contradiction in terms, but it is one forced upon me—while in the substance of the thing of which "latent life" is predicated there is a capacity for becoming alive. If bro. Weir has any other meaning for "latent," will he tell us what that meaning is? If he has no essentially different meaning, then his fine-spun theory of "potter-spirits" as the life, active or latent, in everything, requires revision and reconstruction. There is evidently no need to go beyond the present life in order to test this theory: and if it fails to stand present tests it will matter nothing even if it should be found to fall in with bro. Weir's notion of the "resurrection."

This capacity for becoming inheres in the organised matter,* not in a "potter-spirit," as we have already seen in the process of growing apples on a mountain ash stock, and as we shall further see when we come to consider the much misunderstood and therefore much abused illustration of "the resurrection" (*anastasis*) of the dead, in 1 Cor. xv., and which bro. Weir has claimed as bearing out his theory.

Before dealing with this matter I have something further to say with reference to the subject of grafting a twig from an apple tree upon a mountain ash with the result that we have sweet apples produced on that twig instead of rowan berries—and that under the manipulation of the "mountain-ash-potter-

* The reader is referred to a short but suggestive contribution on this aspect of the subject from bro. Paris on cover of the present issue.

spirit." Bro. Weir says—"Such criticism presents no real difficulty. The instance is one of 'division of labour,' and the function of the respective 'potters' is as clear-cut as could be looked for in a hybrid process." He adds, "the temptation to get after bro. Nisbet is great." I therefore trust he will not fail to grapple with this obstacle to his theory in his reply in the April issue. But let me say here that he is quite mistaken in terming grafting "a hybrid process." It is just because it is what it is, and not a hybrid process, that it tells so powerfully against his theory. In a hybrid you have a mixture of two species of a genus; in grafting you have no mixture of species. The fruit on the engrafted twig is not half rowan half apple, but pure unadulterated, unmixed apple. What, then, is the "Potter-Spirit" of the rowan tree about that it should permit the little twig (or a simple little bud even, as it may be) to resist and overcome its influence while supported and developed by the sap which the supposed "potter-spirit" of the ash conveys to it? Where is its "plan;" or of what account is its plan if it cannot carry it out? Why have we not rowan berries on this little twig? The true answer to this question will satisfactorily dispose of the more recondite, indeed, impossible theory of a "potter-spirit."

But supposing it were a hybrid process, is the difficulty removed? Not at all; it is not even lessened. It can be shown to embody a different, but a none the less telling, argument against his theory. Take the case of a hybrid animal—a mule. In it we have a mixing of two species, say, horse and ass. Do the respective "potters" in the case become one, or do they remain two, in the hybrid? If the former, we have two individual "spirits" becoming one "spirit"—which, however, may be no difficulty at all to bro. Weir; if the latter—which seems to be the view bro. Weir would take since he speaks of "division of labour" on the part of "the respective potters in a hybrid process"—we have two spirits in one hybrid animal, and each, I presume, modifying his plan to suit the requirements of the other, and both producing something different from either of them. How ever do they arrange the matter? seeing that "each has his plan somehow stamped upon himself, and *his work is rigidly to produce himself.*" (See *Drummond*; endorsed by bro. Weir, p. 78, Oct., 1898.)

But the matter is more serious than this. Let us leave the brute mule and take the case of a human mule, a mulatto (from the Latin: *mulus*, a mule). Here we have the offspring of a black and a white. Now, which of the "respective potters" in this "hybrid process" is the responsible one? or if neither is responsible to the exclusion of the other will there always be two—even when the time comes (as interpreted by bro. Weir) for "each seed to receive its own body?"—that is, assuming that this mulatto is to be punished with a "resurrection" of the kind believed in by bro. Weir—a "resurrection" which is certainly not the *Anastasis* of scripture. If each receives his own body there should be two bodies. Or if not two bodies, why not? But, to avoid confusion, perhaps one of the "potters" may subside and leave the other—whether the white one or the black one it matters not—to "reproduce *itself.*" The principal difficulty in this case would be that the mulatto could not be reproduced by either the "white-potter-spirit" or the "black-potter-spirit," for neither of these can help itself—it must perforce reproduce itself: "To every seed its own body" says bro. Weir's interpretation. So that either a white or a black *might* be reproduced but not a mulatto—unless, of course, there is the survival of both the "respective

pottery," which arrangement cannot be said to lessen the difficulties in the way of accepting bro. Weir's theory. I have other difficulties to present which are inherent in bro. Weir's theory, but I must refrain for the present as space does not permit me to say more.

THOS. NISBET.

The Investigator.

JANUARY, 1899.

I begin another volume with this issue. This being so, it becomes necessary to remind readers that this is also the time to renew subscriptions if they have not already done so.

This number is somewhat late owing to printer being "unable to do what he would," but possibly I may have made up somewhat for the delay by the addition of 8 extra pages in this issue—4 of extra reading matter and 4 of a somewhat exhaustive index, for the compilation of which I am greatly indebted to bro. Paris. "Topics touched upon" is a new department in index, which will be a considerable assistance to any who may wish to turn up a subject to which the heading of an article would be no sufficient guide.

The publication of the pamphlet on "The Devil," although nearer realisation, still hangs fire. The publisher awaits the responses of a few more to the Guarantee Fund—see as to this, *Publisher's Notes*, on cover of October issue, 1898. If these are immediately forthcoming, the "copy" will be at once put into the printer's hands, and the pamphlet may thus be out before next issue of *Investigator*. Other five guarantors of 20s. each will enable this to be done.

A new New Testament has just been produced—at least the big half of it, viz., the Historical Books—*Matthew to Acts*. It is a rendering into the English of to-day of Westcott and Hort's Text—the same which formed the basis of the Revisers' Version. There is no good and sufficient reason for rendering the original into the English of 300 years ago: on the contrary, there are

excellent reasons why a translation of the Scriptures should be put into colloquial English instead of antiquated English, however classical it may be. One reason is found in the fact that the Greek of the New Testament was the vernacular of its day—it was colloquial, not classical; and a similar reason is because the people of to-day are better able to understand the dialect they themselves use. This has been the aim of the intelligent body of scholars who undertook this labour of love, and who have here accomplished about three-fifths of the task they set themselves to do. A few examples of their renderings are here given: for "everlasting" or "eternal" we read "enduring" wherever the Greek term *aiwnios* occurs, so far as I have yet seen; for "to-day," in Luke xxiii. 43, we read "this very day"; for "Hades" "the Place of Death"; for "Hell" (*Gehenna*) "the Pit"; for "end of the world," "close of the age." The book, of which a second edition is already in the press, costs 1s. 6d. in limp cloth. If any one, not convenient to a bookseller, desires the book, I shall post a copy to his or her address at the published price, viz., 1s. 6d. It is published at the office of *The Review of Reviews*, London.

A new pamphlet (28 pages) entitled *Baptism Essential to Salvation* has just been published by bro. Paris. The cost is 2d. (2½d. post free). Those who had his former pamphlet on *Eternal Life and the Spirit of Life* (price 3d. post free) will know to expect a well reasoned out paper. The pamphlet should fill usefully a gap in our literature, which, singularly enough, does not include much in the above direction.

Two more pages of my *Interlinear Translation of 1 Cor. xv.* appear in this issue. When completed it will be published separately, with *Brief Introduction* explanatory of the text and translations, interlinear and marginal, which I furnish.

SELF EXAMINATION.

THE apostle Paul instructs those to whom he was writing to examine themselves. He says, "Examine yourselves, whether ye be in the faith: prove your own selves." It was to a church he was speaking, and it shows that while self-

examination is necessary for the individual, it is also necessary for the community. If we examine ourselves as a community, how shall we best carry it out? The community calling themselves brethren of Christ is divided into two or three sections. At the very outset of our examination, we find that as a community we stand condemned by the same apostle, as being carnal, walking as natural men. When we carry our examination a little closer, we find that human sentiment is a strong power in the community, while the child-like spirit of babes and sucklings, in whom the Lord is to perfect strength, is lacking. The true babes and sucklings are characterised by an eager desire after the Word, drinking it in to their spiritual growth, and by that means becoming able to "rightly divide the word of truth," and so being made meet for strength to be perfected in them.

The spirit of the community is manifested by its out-breathings. Take our various magazines as an example. Lately, a brother who has been prominent as an editor of one of the magazines, died, his death being announced in all the magazines within black borders, while the death of other brethren is recorded without the black lines! Is there not in this respect of persons? The apostle James says, "My brethren, have not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ . . . with respect of persons." If ye do so, "Are ye not then partial in yourselves, and are become judges of evil thoughts?" As Christadelphians we have been pluming ourselves as being the one community having the truth; and in many cases being boastful of our knowledge, while at the same time we were so very ignorant, that we were not able to see our own ignorance.

The community requires the evil spirit of self-satisfaction to be expelled with the worship of man, and to be renewed in the spirit of its mind—renewed by the understanding of what the will of the Lord is. Such only are Christ's bond-servants; but also freemen. Is it not true that many are afraid to investigate for themselves? As an example of this slavery to man through gross ignorance, we have known brethren of another section, when present at the meeting for the breaking of bread, rise to their feet when prayer was being offered, but sitting at the thanksgiving for the bread and the cup. Others would break bread, but they were afraid to do so, lest it should make trouble when they returned to their own section in the towns to which they belonged.

It makes one inwardly blush to think of the miserable manifestation the so-called brethren of Christ make. Truly, it is few who walk in the steps of the Master. When he comes, think you, will he judge men according to Christadelphian formulae of

doctrine? He says, "Then he shall reward every man according to his works;" and again, his last words by John, "Behold I come quickly, and my reward is with me, to give every man, according as his work shall be."

Chas Smith.

7 Blackwood Crescent,
Edinburgh, Jan. 22, 1899.

Editorial Note.—I could not wish bro. Smith to modify his remarks one iota regarding the flesh-worshipping state of the community. His remarks are not a bit too strong. The charge is only too well founded, even although I feel impelled to say that it is not the fact that all the magazines announced bro. Roberts' death within black borders. The *Fraternal Visitor* did not sin in this respect, however much it may have erred in what it printed at the time. Neither did the *Sanctuary Keeper* (bro. J. J. Andrew) display the conventional weeds. The *Investigator* (along with *Glad Tidings*) must plead guilty to a modification of the charge, having inserted a double-thickness rule at top and bottom of the paragraph announcing the death. I did the same when announcing bro. M'Glashan's death, with perhaps greater consistency than in the case of bro. Roberts; for my remarks about the latter barely consoorted with the symbol of mourning which accompanied the paragraph. I daresay the concession to conventionality was a mistake on my part, for I cannot honestly say that I regarded the death of the late editor of the *Christadelphian* as a loss to the community. He had, humanly speaking, become much more of a hindrance than a help to the truth, and his removal will be as likely to benefit those members of the community of which he was the recognised head, as the division on the subject of Inspiration-fellowship did those others who, fifteen years ago, were providentially delivered from his truth-antagonizing headship, being "withdrawn" from because they could not concede the demand made by their fellow-worm that they should determine—or declare even if they were unable to determine—the nature and extent of the inspiration: God had vouchsafed to his servants through whom he spoke. It is doubtful if he had lived the allotted span that he would have found a place of repentance. He seemed "joined to his idols."

Editor

CHAP. XV. 20.

I CORINTHIANS.

CHAP. XV. 20-28

anthrōpōn esmen. men we-arc.	Nuni de christos Now but anointed	egēgertai ek 20 has-been-aroused out	(20) But now Anointed
nekrōn, of-dead-ones,	aparchē tōn first-fruit of-the-(ones)	kekoimēmenōn. having-been-put-to-sleep.	has-been-aroused out-of dead-surroundings, a first- fruit-of-those having-been- put-to-sleep. (21) For
epēidē gar di' anthrōpou seeing-that for through man	thanatos, kai di' anthrōpou death, also through man	21	after-that, through man (is) death, also through man
anastasis nekrōn; upstanding of-dead-ones;	hōsper gar en tō adam pantes even-as for in the adam all	22	(15) an-upstanding of-dead- ones (22) for even-as in the Adam all are-dying-off, thus also in the Anointed
apothnēskousin, are-dying-off-from,	houtōs kai en tō christō pantes thus also in the anointed all	zōpoiē- all shall-be-	all shall-be-made-living.
thēsontai. made-living.	Ekastos de en tō idiō tagmati; Each-one too in the own band;	aparchē 23 first-fruit	(23) Each-one too in the appropriate band: an an- ointed first-fruit, after- wards those of-the anoint- ed in the presence of-him
christos, epēita hoi anointed, afterwards the-(ones)	tou christou en tē parousia of-the anointed in the presence	23	
autou; of-him;	eita to telos, hotan then the end, whenever he-may-be-giving-over	paradidō tēn 24 the	(24) then the end whenever he-may-be-handing-over
basileian tō theō kai patri, rule to-the deity and father,	hotan katar- whenever he-may-(have)-rendered-	24	the rule to-the deity and father, whenever he-may- render-of-no-effect every
gēsē pasan archēn kai pasan useless every beginning and every	exousian kai dunamin, authority and power,	25	headship and all authority and power, (25) for it-be- comes him to-be-ruling
dei gar auton basileuein it-behoves for him to-be-ruling	achri hou thē 25 (have)-placed during what he-may-(have)-placed	25	during what (time) he- may-place all the enemies under the feet of-him. (26)
pantas tous echthrous hupo all the enemies under the feet	tous podas autou. eschatos 26 of-him. last	26	Last enemy (of-all), the death, is-being-rendered-
echthros katargeitai enemy is-being-rendered-useless	ho thanatos, panta gar 27 the death, all for	27	placed-beneath under the feet of-him. Whenever, too, he-may-(have)-said
hupetaxen hupo tous podas he-placed-beneath under the feet	autou. hotan de 27 of-him. whenever too,	27	too, he-may-(have)-said
eipē hoti panta hupotektai, he-may-(have)-said that all he-has-placed-beneath,	dēlon hoti 28 clearly that	28	that all he-has-placed-be- neath, clearly that (means) outside of the (one) that- placed-beneath him the whole. (28) Whenever, too, he-may-(have)- placed-beneath him the
ektos tou hupotaxantos outside of the one-that-placed-beneath	autō ta panta. him the all.	28	
hotan de hupotagē autō ta panta, whenever too he-may-(have)-placed-beneath him the	pote 28 all, then	28	placed-beneath him the

v. 22: The difficulties of this passage raise the question as to who those are who "die-off" in Adam. If the Adam typifies the transgressor (Rom. v. 14; Hosea vi. 7), then those "in Adam" are a stage beyond the "natural" (*psuchikos*): they are "carnal" (*sarkikos*)—actual sinners, i. e., transgressors of law.—*apothnēskousin*: see Notes v. 4 on *apothnēskō*.

v. 23: *parousia*, "presence," is a stage beyond "coming," literally it signifies *being-beside*—from *para* = beside and *ōn (ousa)* = being.

v. 24: "end": *telos*, not the last of anything but the consummation, the end in view.—"handing-over," lit. *giving-beside*.—"rule," *basileia* = kingship; but I render "rule" as corresponding with the verb *basileuein* in v. 25. The rule does not end: there is transition, not cessation.—"rendered-useless," *katargēsō* (*katargōō*), or quite inoperative, paralysed, made-of-no-effect; rendered "destroy," in Heb. ii. 14; "abolish," 2 Tim. 1-10; "become of no effect," Gal. v. 4.—"beginning," *archē*, the *beginning* of a thing or the underlying *principle* from which action may proceed.—*exousia* and *dunamis*—one may have power (*dunamis*) but lack authority (*exousia*). The distinction is an important one to note in other connections—see "power (*exousia*) to cast into *Gehenna*" (Luke xii. 4) which sin alone has; hence, beyond putting a believer to death, our fellowmen "have no more that they can do."—v. 4.

v. 25: *achri* is not merely "until," it is also *during*, *all the while* up to a certain point, without suggesting a cessation then.

CHAP. XV. 29.

I CORINTHIANS.

CHAP. XV. 29-37.

[kai] autos ho whios hupotagēsetai tō hupo-
 [also] himself the son he-shall-be-placed-beneath-the one-that-placed-
 taxanti autō ta panta, hina ē ho theos panta en
 beneath him the all, in-order-that may-be the deity all in
 pasin. Epei ti poiēsousin hoi baptiz- 29
 all. Otherwise what shall-they-make-(of it) those immersing-
 omenoī huper tōn nekron? ei holōs nekroi ouk
 themselves on-behalf-of the dead-ones? if at-all dead-ones not
 egeirontai? ti kai baptizontai huper
 are-being-aroused? why also are-they-immersing-themselves on-behalf-of
 autōn? ti kai hēmeis kinduneuomen pasan 30
 them? why also we are-we-running-into-danger every
 hōran? kath'hēmeran apothnēskō, nē tēn humeteran 31
 hour? daily I-am-dying-off, yea the your
 kauchēsīn, adelphoi, hēn echō en christō Iēsou tō
 glorying, brethren, which I-am-having in anointed Jesus the
 kuriō hēmōn. ei kata anthrōpon ethērio- 32
 master of-us. if in-accordance-with man I-battled-with
 machēsa en Ephesō ti moi to ophelos? ei nekroi
 wild-beasts in Ephesus what to-me the benefit? if dead-ones
 ouk egeirontai, phagōmen kai piōmen, aurion
 not are-being-aroused let-us-be-eating and drinking, to-morrow
 gar apothnēskomen. mē planasthe; pththeirusin 33
 for we-are-dying-off. not be-ye-deceiving-yourself: are-spoiling
 ethē chrēsta homiliai kakai; eknēpsate dikaiōs 34
 habits useful associations bad; be-ye-wakened-up-sober justly
 kai mē hamartanete, agnōsian gar theou tines
 and not be-ye-missing-the-mark, no-knowledge for of-deity some
 echousin; pros entropēn humin lalō.
 are-having; tending-towards shame to-you I-am-talking.
 Alla erei tis, Pōs egeirontai hoi nekroi, 35
 But will-say some-one, How are-being-aroused the dead-ones,
 poiō de sōmati erchontai? aphrōn, su ho 36
 to-what-sort too to-body are-they-coming? unwise-one, thou what
 speireis ou' zōopoieitai ean mē apoth-
 thou-art-sowing not is-being-made-alive if not it-may-(have)-
 anē; kai ho speireis, ou to soma to genēso- 37
 died-off; and what thou-art-sowing, not the body the shall-come-
 menon speireis alla gumnon kokkon ei tu-
 about-for-itself thou-art-sowing but a-naked grain if it-might-

v. 28: "all in all"—the realization of the Memorial Name, "I will become who I will become" = *ehyeh asher ehyeh* (Exodus iii 14), when "the mystery of God is consummated" (Rev. x. 7).

v. 29: "What shall they make (of it)," *poiōs*, to make, do (derivative. "poet"); rendered "make," Matt. iii. 3; iv. 19; Heb. i. 7; Rev. xxi. 5; xxii. 15; "wrought," Matt. xx. 12; also rendered "execute," "gain" (Luke xix. 18), "yield," "bring forth."—"those immersing-themselves" in a sea of trouble on behalf of others; see vv. 30-32 where similar thoughts are expressed: nothing is effected, if there be no "upstanding of dead ones."

v. 35: "Some-one"—not necessarily a believer—wants to know the *How* and the *What* with regard to the *egesis* (rousing—see *Notes*, vv. 4, 13) of those termed *nekroi* or dead ones. This "foolish one" is answered in vv. 36-58.

PETER'S ANSWER: "THE CHRIST OF GOD."

A SUGGESTION.

THESE are the words of Peter, as recorded by Luke (ix. 20), in answer to Jesus' enquiry of the disciples: "But whom say ye that I am?" Peter, always ready to answer for himself and others, said: "The Christ of God." Matthew and John give Peter's confession in a somewhat more amplified form, viz.: "Thou art the Christ, the son of the living God" (Matt. xvi. 16; Jno. vi. 69). Mark, whose characteristic is brevity, simply records the words, "Thou art the Christ" (Mark viii. 29). We have thus an absence of mechanical or verbal uniformity with identity of substance; both of which are characteristic of the testimony of Jesus' disciples. Unity without uniformity; as was to be expected, which indeed was as inevitable as it was desirable in a Book coming to us through man, although not originating from man. For such a characteristic affords strong evidential testimony to the genuine character of the writings composing the book—that is, they were written by those whose experiences are therein related, and who thus testified to the things which they had seen and heard.

If the dictum be true that "Beauty consists in variety," then the "Gospels" (so-called) may lay claim to such a quality, for such a variety here obtains as has even led some to speak of the "contradictions" to be found there. But

VARIETY OF STATEMENT

is one thing, contradictory statement is quite another. But that the variation is so great as to have led many to conclude that we have not in these testimonies a genuine narrative of events which happened is, looked at from another standpoint, one of the most powerful proofs of the authenticity of these records. For had they been concocted by interested parties with a sinister end in view, all those so-called "glaring contradictions" would have been carefully avoided. The seeming contradictions are thus seen to be factors which go far to prove the genuineness of those records we have left to us of the ministry of "the Christ of God."

Looking for a short time at the variations in question—I mean in the records we have of the confession of Peter: it is interesting to note how suggestive of thought variations may become, and how, from different forms of expression, we may receive diverse impressions, giving us a broader, and therefore truer, view of a matter than we would be likely to get from a single statement, however complete. It may be taken that Peter said no less than what Matthew and John record, viz., "Thou art the Christ, the son of the living God." Yet we would possibly not have got all out of that statement which it contains had Luke not given us his understanding of it in the somewhat unique and striking expression "The Christ of God."

If all scripture, God-inspired, is profitable, then this God-breathing statement will supply its quota of "instruction in that which is right"—that is, it will do so to those who fondly consider and weigh, by means of their intellectual apparatus, every variation of expression to be found therein.

"THE CHRIST OF GOD."

Such an expression suggests, by contrast, a Christ or Christs not "of God." Luke's words may fairly be taken as including the conception of a Christ God-approved and God-sent, and while the expression "Thou art the Christ, the son of the living God" fairly implies all this, it does not so directly suggest it as does the phrase "The Christ of God."

Then "The Christ of God" is even more exclusive in its conception. There is here the suggestion that there is only one such, the one promised, the one sent, and that one Jesus of Nazareth. "The Christ of God" tells us that here we have God's ideal realized—as God himself testified by a Voice, when he said on the occasion when Jesus was about to begin his ministry—"This is my son, the beloved, in whom my soul delighted," and later when, in addition to the law and the prophets as represented by Moses and Elijah, he said to Peter, James and John on the mount, "Here ye him."

We have also suggested to us by contrast—

THE CHRIST OF MAN,

man's ideal—what man thinks a Christ should be—what indeed men think he is—ideals which are just as different from God's conception and from each other as the idiosyncracies of man permit and engender. Here, then, we have the true Christ in opposition to all other Christs, be they either merely ignorant of Christ or actually opposed to the true Christ.

"The "natural" man is not without his Christ, or ideal of what is best and truest. Humanity is glorified by him, and humanity perfected by "natural" process is his ideal. But the "natural" is not actively and personally opposed to "the Christ of God:" it is merely ignorant of him, and if he should happen to hear anything about him it appears to him mere foolishness; as Paul says—"Neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned, but he that is spiritual discerneth all things" (1 Cor. ii. 13).

In the *man* Christ Jesus we have the type of the spiritual (*pneumatikos*): in Adam, prior to transgression, we have the type of the *natural* (*psuchikos*). But there is another type, that of the "carnal" (*sarkikos*), which is not to be confounded with either the one or the other. Adam, after transgression, is the type or "figure" (Rom. v. 14) of that which was about to become prevalent, viz.,

THE "CARNAL."

The "carnal" is only made possible under law; for law it is which gives the conditions which put the "natural" to the test so that it may be determined whether the "natural" will pass into the "spiritual" or remain unimproved by the spiritualizing influences of truth and so justify the application of the term "carnal." But while the existence of the "carnal" is clearly recognised in scripture, the "carnal" is a mere incident in God's purpose: it is not essential to flesh but becomes possible under law, and actual in transgression. The two broad and essential basic conditions are

THE "NATURAL" AND THE "SPIRITUAL"

These are recognised by Paul in 1 Cor. xv.—"First the natural afterwards the

spiritual"—which he establishes by referring to the fact that "the first man Adam was *made a living soul*, the second Adam *a life-effecting spirit*." As I have said the "carnal" is a mere incident in the carrying out of God's purpose in Christ. While it is not without its use in the development of character yet it ought not to be at all, which cannot be said of either the "natural" or the "spiritual," for these are equally of God, the natural being the basis provided of God upon which to raise the spiritual. If we realize this clearly—that the natural is of God—we shall be the better able to understand all that is involved in Peter's words, whether we take the phrase "the Christ of God" or the more amplified form, "Thou art the Christ, the son of the living God."

The Natural is nothing but natural, while it is the God-arranged basis for something better—the spiritual or the divine. And since the better can only come through the knowledge of God, by which knowledge one may rise to the higher or spiritual plane, it follows that sonship to God cannot obtain in the natural apart from this knowledge of God.

When we realize this fundamental law we can see how to be son of the living God involves knowledge of God and

CONFORMITY TO A TYPE

in harmony with the intelligence which characterises a son of God.

We shall be thus better fitted to understand in what this sonship of Christ's consisted.

There are those who see no more in this confession of Peter's than an admission that Jesus is called the son of the living God *because he had no human father*.

If, however, this fact fills the mind it is evident that the divine doctrine of sonship is not understood, and that consequently Peter's words are not comprehended, nor can the position of saints in Christ Jesus—in relation to sonship—be understood either. In the estimation of such the sonship which is possible to the believing must be not only different in degree from the sonship of Christ, but also different in kind; for it must be evident that if the sonship of Jesus is the direct and inevitable result of his conception by Mary, it necessarily follows that the sonship, of which we can be the subjects, must be altogether different in kind from that one aspect, at least, which such recognise as constituting the sonship of Jesus.

Such a view, indeed, may preclude one from ever seeing more in

THE SONSHIP OF JESUS

than what the narrative of his conception by Mary conveys to them, and so the sonship of Jesus will not be seen in the light that Peter saw it, as is reflected in other words of Peter on this occasion, as recorded by John (vi. 68): "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life, and we believe and are sure that thou art that Christ the son of the living God."

By this suggestion regarding "sonship" I do not, as some will naturally think, seek to belittle anything which God has seen fit to do in the working out of his purpose as involved in the creation of his Christ, but merely wish to assist to a more proportionate view of God's purpose in Christ.

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Thos. Nicke

THE EDITOR *VERSUS* VICARIOUS SACRIFICE.

IN the January, 1898, No., p. 18, I said, "Jesus died that we might escape the second death." Bro. Nisbet, in a footnote, objected—"Personally I should deny this. The death of Jesus does not preclude our dying either a first death or a second death. He died that we might live, not that we might not die. Our not dying the second death will depend upon our own actions." And on July, 1898, cover, p. xii., he makes a fair offer. "My objection to vicarious death is that it does not prevent me dying. If Christ's death had obviated the necessity of my dying I could see that his death might have been vicarious, but inasmuch as it has not so operated I repudiate the vicarious idea."

(2) I am glad that a plausible objection has now been produced; and that a logical mind has narrowed the question to a point that can be argued.

(3) I take it that Bro. Nisbet does not require to be reminded that "Our Saviour Jesus Christ has abolished death, and brought life and incorruption to light through the gospel;" thus reducing the first death to a mere "sleep in Jesus." Nor that "the second death hath no power over the partakers of the first, best, or chief resurrection." I think that what he wants shown is how all this results from Jesus' death? This, if true, ought to be demonstrable.

(4) I say then, first, that facts prove that there never could have been any intention to abolish that mere physical (meaningless) death of which we partake in common with all other animals. To do that we must, I suppose, have been made immortal, which must have included bad and good. But the adopted plan of "abolishing" the first death for the responsible reduces it to a mere laying aside of saints as their probations are finished, until "that day." What is promised is resurrection from the first death—"he that believeth *though* he die yet shall he live." Bro. Nisbet should not stand out for what was never covenanted. Since, then, death is unconsciousness, it will apparently be instantly followed by "being caught away to meet the Lord."

(5) To proceed to the required "proof." Jesus said that "As Moses lifted up the serpent so must the Son of Man be lifted up, so that whosoever believeth may in him have eternal life."

(6) The Jews understood him as indicating by this "lifting up," Crucifixion (John xii. 34). Here we see that eternal life (which I think implies an escape from the first death by resurrection, and immunity from the second death) depends upon belief in a Crucified Saviour. It is quite true that Jesus' death does not "preclude" the second death (nor

the first, except as "abolished" by him), the benefit is receivable by the faithful and obedient *only*; it is all strictly conditional.

(7) John vi. 47-58 negatives the second clause in the statement—"He died that we might live, not that we might *not die*;" thus, "He that believeth hath eternal life. I am the bread of life. Your fathers ate the manna and they died: this is the bread from heaven that a man may eat thereof and *not die*. I am the living bread from heaven; if any man eat of this bread he shall live for ever; yea, and the bread I will give is *my flesh for the life of the world*." That I regard as a distinct reference to his death, as Paul says, "He loved me and gave *himself* for me." It is true he afterwards spoke of our "eating his flesh," but that was in reference to its symbolization as "the bread of life;" which means that the principle upon which such life depends—its food—is our continual fellowship with Christ. He made this plain when he said "As the living Father sent me, and I live because of the Father; so he that eateth me he also shall live because of me" (John vi. 57). Jesus did not "eat" the Father, but he recognised his entire dependence upon him and the perfect happiness of such trust and confidence; so we are exhorted to maintain our higher existence by the vital principle contained in the fact of the lifting up of his flesh for the life of the world. (*Mem.* Flesh means body).

(8) Accordingly, Paul says that the gospel as revealed to him individually by Jesus, consisted "first of all in the fact that Christ died for our sins according to the Writings." Can anyone deny that in consequence of that death a believer's sins are forgiven? Or that such removal of sin entails conditional salvation? Or that, if Christ had not so died, our sins must have caused us to perish? Or that this death (other things being in order) thus obviates our death? Don't call that "vicarious" death and make yourselves sick; leave it nameless, but accept it since you cannot get away from the facts that when he died for our sins the benefit extends to us, "we are freed from sin and have become servants to God, have fruit unto sanctification (becoming holy), and the end eternal life." Jesus' dying for our sins liberates us conditionally from their consequences, thus entailing eternal life on enduring to the end.

(9) But if Jesus' death was merely an example for our imitation, then even a perfect following would have no effect on sins done aforesaid, besides such following to produce salvation must not be imperfect. John says—"Unto him that loveth us and loosed us from

our sins in his own blood loveth us; and he made us to be a kingdom," &c. John evidently thought that Christ's death and our salvation were cause and effect. Of certain martyrs in Rev. xii. 11 it is stated that they "overcame because of the blood of the Lamb." In Acts xx. 28, that "bishops" were directed to feed the church of God which he had purchased with the blood of his own (Son or Lamb).

(10) Paul, when he preached the gospel, was careful "that the cross of the Christ was not made of none effect by wisdom of discourse" (see 1 Cor. i. 17). "He knew nothing but Jesus Christ, and him crucified" (ch. ii. 2). Can he have regarded him as a mere example of what the Christian life should be?

(11) "Our not dying the second death will depend on our own actions." That is true only in the sense that a drowning man *saves himself* by clinging to a rope that another throws to him. I say, on the other hand, that our not dying the second death will be due to

Christ having already died it, as described by Paul in Rom. v. 8, 9; *for our sins* according to Moses and the prophets; while our dying that death will be entailed on us by our unforgiven sin, from which we have *not* been loosed in the blood of the Lamb. We have seen that resurrection is promised to those who believe in the gospel, which consists in the preaching of the Cross; we are informed "that over those thus partaking of the best resurrection the second death hath no authority." They "walked in the light . . . and the blood of Jesus Christ has cleansed them from all sin." No Jew would in those days have required such an explanation. "The Lamb of God that takes away sin" would be a nutshell big enough to hold the whole of the above.

London.

R. R. Stainforth

REJOINDER BY THE EDITOR.

(1.) **A**S being more convenient and enabling me at the same time to economise space by rendering it less necessary to reproduce—but often merely to refer to—bro. Stainforth's remarks, I have taken the liberty of numbering his paragraphs and have made my Rejoinder correspond thereto. Before dealing with what bro. Stainforth has to say in reply to my objections as reproduced above in his first paragraph, let me go over the ground of my objections anew, amplifying the same somewhat.

I objected to the statement that "Jesus died that we might escape the second death," and my reason for doing so is because the natural man is not amenable to a second death—taking the term "second" as referring to number and not to intensity—because not related by nature to a second life. It follows that only such as become related to a second life could ever experience a second death. And as only those in Christ are related to a second life, only such as they could suffer a second death. How? By being overcome of sin. Those who are not "hurt of the second death" are those who "overcome." Jesus does not overcome instead of us: "He that overcometh shall not be hurt of the second death" (Rev. ii. 11). Thus Jesus saves no one from the second death. Salvation from it is impossible by any action outside the subject, and as the faithful believer is not under the power of the second death he does not need to be saved from it. If, then, the physical death of Jesus does not prevent me dying

physically, it follows that in the matter of physical death he was no substitute for me. And as he cannot be the substitute of any in experiencing the second death in their stead—for it is only for such as do not overcome—his death on the cross does not affect the matter either way. He died that we might live—live unto God now, live unto God always. "He died unto sin" that he might be justified from sin—and we can never be justified on any other grounds than by "conforming ourselves unto his death" (Phil. iii. 10).

(2.) The objection I advance is more than plausible; it is based on eternal justice; but the admission that it is plausible is an admission that the objection has some apparent force. I trust bro. Stainforth will yet see that it is not merely plausible but that it is substantial and real as well.

(3.) No, I do not forget what Paul had to say about Jesus Christ having "abolished death when he brought into light life and incorruption *through the good news*" in relation to it (2 Tim. i. 10) nor that "the second death has no jurisdiction (*exousia* = authority, not power = *dynamis*) over such as have a part in the first resurrection" (Rev. xx. 6), although I evidently understand these passages of scripture in a totally different way from bro. Stainforth. I certainly do not see how the results to which he refers spring immediately from Jesus' death on the cross; since they were operative prior to that occurrence as is proved, to my satisfaction at least, by the words of John the Baptist—"He that believeth into the son hath *eternal* life"

(John iii. 36); or by the words of Jesus himself—"He that heareth my word and believeth him that sent me hath *aionian* life and into judgment cometh not but is passed over out of the death into the life" (John v. 24).

(4.) But the death from which he delivered them was not "unconsciousness"; it was because physiologically alive while spiritually dead that they needed salvation—if not "saved" then, they never could be—while unconsciousness is a mere outcome of death (physiological)—a death which was written in the very nature of all flesh and blood creatures as they came from the hand of Elohim.

(5.) Here we are furnished with some of "the required 'proof.'" To the statement quoted I can take no possible exception; but it does not lend support to bro. Stainforth's contention, for was not this in operation prior to Calvary, and *aionian* ("eternal") life an actual possession in the case of those who did not need to wait until "the Son of Man had been lifted up" that they might believe into him? Such had already believed into him and therefore had become possessed of eternal life.

(6.) A consideration of the foregoing will show that "eternal" life did not depend upon belief in a crucified Saviour, although—now that he has suffered "death on a cross"—we, who live after the event, cannot have "life" without such belief. Believers then, and now, are saved from the death which came by sin when they "rise to a newness of life," but death (physiological) comes all the same to them as to others. Our future life rests upon the fact that Jesus lives, not that he was put to death by wicked men—"Because I live ye shall live also" (John xiv. 19).

(7.) John vi. 47-50 bears me out instead of negating my statement. It all depends upon what Jesus meant by "eating and not

dying." The eating was not literal but spiritual in its nature, so therefore was the "not dying." I understand "live for ever" to mean live age-ward—live so as to enter therein. This aspect seems to be recognised by bro. Stainforth in the same paragraph where he speaks of "maintaining our higher existence"; but this fact is the first thing to me: it is subsidiary in bro. Stainforth's estimate.

(8.) "Christ dying for our sins" and "Christ dying on the cross" are not equivalent phrases to me. It follows that bro. Stainforth's questions which follow cannot be answered categorically by me. I can, however, answer the last by saying: Certainly no death of Jesus "obviates our death." The scriptural benefits which accrue to us from his (scripturally understood) death are admitted. Jesus' "dying for our sins" does not liberate us from sin, except on such conditions as God lays down, viz., by forsaking it.

(9.) Paragraph 9 does not afford any support to bro. Stainforth's position as regards my attitude on the subject.

(10.) Neither does paragraph 10.

(11.) Christ never died the second death else he had died a sinner. What is the second death? Death which overtakes those who sin unto death, and forsake it not. Bro. Stainforth does not show that "the Gospel consists in preaching the Cross." How does the Lamb "bear away" the sin of the world? Not as a substitute; but in himself as our example, and through us as his imitators. His death is, however, a fact first, and then an example. "We shall be saved in (*en*) his life" (Rom. v. 10).

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Edifort

THE ATONEMENT AS TAUGHT BY BRO. STAINFORTH.

REPLY BY W. D. J. TO R. R. S.'S ARTICLE IN LAST ISSUE.

See page 93, No. 52.

THE following paper I deem more urgent for the present than the one "crushed out" from last issue: and as there is no room for both, the one crushed out must stand over a second time. A three months' more delay will neither mould nor rust it, and the following paper may intensify its force.

Turning therefore to Bro. S.'s last article I will follow it, paragraph after paragraph, in keeping with the order of his own arrangement.

Paragraph 1, marked (a): In this he says, "that the key to what he calls my 'error' is the well-known fact that justice, being a divine attribute, the 'natural man' is as totally devoid of 'native justice' as a crocodile."

This, so far from being a "well-known fact," is not a fact at all. He, however, refers for proof to 1 Cor. ii. 14—a passage as remote for his purpose as black is removed from white. He in all scripture could not have found for me a better passage with which to refute his own contention. He in that quotation confounds the moral with the spiritual, and hence concludes there is not a just man upon the face of the earth save the spiritually-minded man. In favour of this, however, he may refer me to Rom. iii. 10 to 19, but those verses must be taken in connection with Paul's argument in the same chapter, separated from which they convey a meaning inconsistent with other portions of scripture. In their

context they refer to the perfect obedience of man under the standard measure of moral obedience—the Mosaic law: and to the obedience of others in relation to that law. And so Paul brings this to enforce his argument on justification before God by the works of the said law, in contradistinction to justification before God by the works of faith, or the Faith. Hence the passage, “there is none that doeth good, no, not so much as one”—the sum and substance—the “multum in parvo” of the verses associated with it, has reference specially to the perfection God requires from man as obedient to the Mosaic law, to justify man’s justification by the deeds of it; hence, in relation to this, there is none that doeth good and sinneth not—there is not so much as one who by the law can do any good towards securing justification. For, according to James, “Whosoever shall keep the whole law and yet offend in one point he is guilty of all:” in other words, the man able to keep nine-tenths of the law, and fails in keeping the other tenth, is as much guilty of breaking the whole law as the one able to keep one point only and failing in keeping the remaining nine. Now, how is this? Why, the law is one standard measure—a chain of ten links, from which the taking away of one link as clearly breaks the chain as the taking away of more. The one point broken, or the one link taken away, invalidates or makes useless the other nine for the purpose required, viz., the perfection of duty under the law to secure justification by the deeds of the law. Hence, in relation to this, there is none righteous, no, not so much as one. But all the same, in relation to the world, as between man and man, there are upon the face of the earth many good men and righteous men, apart from the spiritually minded. Paul, Rom. v. 7, speaks of both, and therein makes a distinction: and the distinction he makes is not as between a spiritually good man and a spiritually righteous man, but between a good man morally so and a righteous man morally so. And he could not, nor would have, so spoken of either in the use to which he there puts them, had it been true in fact that there is none righteous, none that doeth good upon the face of the earth; though this is thoroughly true in man’s relation to God as set forth in the chapter to which the verse belongs.

Alas! it would be a sad state of affairs if there were not so much as one righteous man on the face of the earth. God would have saved Sodom had there been five only; but there was only one found, and he, righteous though he was, does not appear to have been a spiritually-minded man. The world is bad enough certainly; but were Bro. S.’s contention a just one, it would be worse and worse—a very haunt of demons. I am sorry, from

one point of view, that I have to say I have met with men far from spiritual, more honourable and just in their transactions than many whose spiritual knowledge and profession should have shown more transcendent results. And it is much to mourn over, that one of late years so exalted in the spiritual aspect of things should have fallen into so opposite a scale. But, apart from this, taking history as our testimony, I should think that Plato and Socrates before him were as just men as ever lived within a civilized community, and they certainly were not moved by Holy Spirit, or touched thereby. I should think, too, judging from the results of his government, that Marcus Aurelius was as just a ruler in the kingdoms of men as ever ruled over nations, persecutor though he was of many Christians. I should think, also, that the civil laws of Rome were in principle as just and equitable, before certain nations were called “Christian,” as any that ever since have been the laws of a people (Acts xxii. 25). And coming to closer quarters, in which we can, in one individual, discern the distinction between what are moral qualities and what spiritual, we cannot have a better example than that of the Centurion (Acts x. 2). Before he ever heard the gospel he was as eminent for all that is good in the moral world as a man could be, and more than this he was not endowed with Holy Spirit until after he believed the gospel preached to him: and this shows that even the belief of the gospel is not a spiritual effort, but a moral one. It is based on the use of the senses: it is not based on a preceding operation of the spirit *within* the man. Faith cometh by hearing, and to the Centurion the Word preached to him was adapted to his ears, to his wise longings, and high aspirations. There was for him a just balancing of revelation to the capacity and measure of the understanding, native to his previous knowledge and experience. As for justice being “a divine attribute” as Bro. S. affirms, is there anything native in the nature of man, as regards mental and moral qualities, which in their origin and perpetuation is not a gift from God? He formed the eye, he planted the ear, he gave speech to the tongue, and though man as a whole has misapplied the three: and though man at the first was made upright, and since then has sought out many inventions subversive of his uprightness, marring his likeness to God, yet there still remains in him much that makes him susceptible of receiving from nature, apart from God’s spiritual teaching, elements of elevation in which justice shines and wisdom shows forth its power. For example, “the literary gem,” which Bro. S. refers to (page 94), and which he calls the “good old Homer,” contains much that is elevating. If there is no “native sense of justice” revealed in Homer’s

writings, nor any in those of the other "Greek sages" he refers to, why does he call the one "good" and acknowledge "there was some common sense in those old heathen after all?" Are not "goodness" and "common sense" attributes from the Deity? (Jas. i. 17) Are they not a fraction infinitesimal of his own essence? And yet Bro. S. dares to affirm that there is no native sense of justice in man save that first he is endowed with Holy Spirit. Alas! how he contradicts himself. What would Paul have said to this? Why did Paul reprove as *without excuse* those who would not, did not, exercise their faculties to understand the invisible things of God by the things visible in the creation around them? And why did he dare say that "the Gentiles which have not the law *do by nature* the things contained in the law," &c., &c. (Rom. i. 20; ii. 14, 15)? Bro. S. should compare these passages with his I Cor. ii. 14, and see the contrast and also see the analogy. In the latter we have the natural man unable without the gift of the spirit, as derived from the Written Word—unable to discern the things of the spirit: in the other, man's ability to discern the things in nature by the native faculties with which he is endowed. If man were without the natural faculties of discernment in both the moral and physical of the world around him—the natural world—why should Paul reprove as "without excuse?" But Paul did not preach to crocodiles. Justice is not restricted to the spiritual state of things. In this it is rather superseded than sustained, and that by a principle—a divine attribute—which far transcends it: and that principle is Love—a principle which seeketh not her own even in justice. Justice is an even balancing of things: like as against false balances, false measures, false handling of any thing. And as regards punishment under the Mosaic law, it was "an eye for an eye," "a tooth for a tooth:" and so, life for life: but under Christ's teaching there was, and is, the higher principle already spoken of—a principle purely spiritual, in contradistinction to the "native sense of justice" in the man that is not unnatural, but natural: and there are both natural men and unnatural men in the world. Let Bro. S. consider these things, if he is so disposed. As for his allusion to my reference to "street arabs," he confounds reason and justice with lust and self-will. These predominate doubtless; but if reason and justice did not simultaneously exist with lust and self-will in the one individual natural being, whence would virtue appear, or vice be made manifest. Virtue and vice are normal results resulting from the contention between.

Paragraph 2, marked (b). Here Bro. S. deals with the word "platitudes;" and being in want of a dictionary to further explain the word to him, he perverts the use to which I

have put it. He insinuates that I call his doctrine of Substitution a platitude. I do no such thing. What I do is to show that he arrogates to himself for his doctrine the words, "God dispenses his justice righteously, that is, strictly, otherwise it would not be justice," as applicable to the character of substitution: that is to say, that substitution is, in his view, an excellent example of God's dispensing his justice "strictly," whereas I reckon up his doctrine of substitution as an example rather, and a good example, too, of injustice. Therefore, before he can use those words as applicable to his doctrine, he must prove one wrong, and himself right. Hence, the words being applicable to one side only, and only to that side which merits the description, therefore they are a platitude—a proof of nothing; or, as the dictionary by me gives it, "a big phrase with nothing it."

Paragraph 3, marked (c, e). Here he affects surprise, and even disappointment, that I have not entered upon something affirmative as regards "some other satisfaction to the aggrieved law than that of substitution." Why should he so speak? Surely it is better to show the necessity first for a contrary affirmative by destroying that which is so persistently and dogmatically affirmed; and if this cannot be done, why trouble about another? But the fact is, it is not that he is surprised, or disappointed at my reserve; but he would, if he could, draw me off from my criticism into something in which his paragraphs or arguments would be less referred to and much less criticised. I now even beg of him to remember, that what I took upon myself to do, and am doing, is to "criticise his criticism;" and as I am taking up his paragraphs seriatim, I have no need to branch out into something the paragraphs criticised do not require. He need not therefore think that any effort on his part, either by attempted taunt or aim at ridicule, will cause me to treat my subject in a way that would better please him. My formal statement of views will follow in due course and in good enough time. He is very fond of criticising others, but he is not fond of being criticised himself; therefore I am the more determined to fulfil my engagement to the letter. Going on he further aims to pass a verdict on two columns of mine he otherwise cannot answer. He says they are there to prove "it" a platitude. Prove what a platitude? See preceding paragraph. I have said nothing about his doctrine or any other doctrine being a platitude, and this disposes of his ability to form on the matter a judgment at all.

Paragraph 4. This I have in substance already referred to. See remarks on paragraph 1. It has proved useful to me in showing how Bro. S. contradicts himself.

Paragraph 5, marked (f). In this he says,

"that the son should bear the iniquity of the father, is a Divine principle—a principle that we know is still universally in force in Nature." Monstrous! What does he mean? Does he mean that God visits the iniquity of the father, by way of punishment, upon the children in an arbitrary sense: that is, in a sense dependent on no moral rule—that God only wills it so, without any relationship to merit or demerit? If he means this—and he must mean it, otherwise he would reason differently—then I say what he calls a "Divine principle" I call a *diabolical* one. And he astounds me by penning the sentence in the face of God's contention to the contrary. See Ezek. xviii. Bro. S., by the statement given above, perverts the whole of that chapter, and as he has affirmed that *I* represent the Israelites as objecting to that "Divine principle" of his, I have to say that it is not *I* who do so; it is the prophet Ezekiel who does it; and *he* even does not do it; it is God who does so, through him. What do the Israelites complain of, pray? They complain of God doing what God himself disclaims doing; and he aims to put them right by showing what he does do, in contradistinction to what they affirm he does. And what, in relation to this, does he do? He visits the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the second and following generations on a principle of equity. He passes the iniquity of the fathers from generation to generation on those *only who hate him*; and for the many thousands *who love him*—for these he keeps his mercy and forgiveness. See Ezek. xviii. 20, 25, 26; Exod. xx. 5; xxxiv. 7. God's ways, by this principle, are thereby proved equal, but on Bro. Stainforth's principle God's ways would be very unequal, because unjust. Still, here Bro. S will say, perversely, as it were, to excuse God, in the case, "God's ways are not as man's ways." But here the evidence is conclusive in the case before us, that in the matter of justice in the case, "God's thoughts are as man's thoughts" in this particular example of justice; for what God says to the Israelites who complain of him acting unjustly is this, viz., that he does not do what they say he does, and does do the very thing that they complain he does not do. The question here is not how these Israelites act themselves, but what it is they complain of as against God's acts. And these acts are not as their acts, but, all the same, they are in keeping with the principle of justice by which they judge those acts, as much as God's judgment is in keeping with the same principle. For what leads them to complain? Why, what else but their sense of justice under misconception and misunderstanding of God's application of the principle which they, in common with God, consider just. They charge God falsely; not here in-

tionally, but mistakenly so. Here it is not a perverted idea of justice they are guilty of, it is rather the inversion in their perception of God's actions in the case that they are guilty of.

Next, in the same paragraph, he goes on to say, that though the Israelites, from their own notions, raised objections to themselves bearing the iniquity of their fathers' faults, they did not object to Sihon's family being destroyed for their fathers' faults: nor did they object to Saul's sons for his treachery to the Gibeonites. Here he falls into the same objectionable reasoning, and in effect charges God with doing injustice to both Sihon's family and Sihon's sons: whereas, according to the principle set forth in the verses quoted from Exodus and Ezekiel, God destroyed that family and those sons not because their parents did wrong, but because those children followed in the footsteps of their parents: they were in sympathy with their fathers' deeds, and guilty, or would be, if permitted to live, of deeds corresponding thereto. This is not said in the immediate context; but it is clearly involved in the principle revealed to us, and in history demonstrated to us, concerning God's ways with the children of men. I am therefore surprised at Bro. S.'s shortsightedness in the matter. I am amazed at his narrow comprehension of it. Were he even talking of man in relation to the lower animals, his argument, in like relationship, would fall helplessly to the ground. Take, for example, one determined to clear his warehouse of rats. He finds a female with many young. He kills the mother, knowing full well the mischief she has done, and the more she would do, if permitted to live. He next looks at the young ones thus bereaved. Interesting in themselves as living creatures: poor little things! What have they done? Why, therefore, should he kill them? Sentiment whispers—No, don't touch them; rather feed them; they have done no mischief. This corresponds with Bro. S.'s argument. But it is against the wisdom which foreknowledge teaches. This steps in and says another thing quite opposed to that of sentiment. It says:—"You must judge of those harmless looking things, not by what they are, but by what they will be, if permitted to live. So he kills them too. His wisdom dictates this. So of God with the nations he commanded the Israelites to utterly destroy; and because they did not carry out God's commands to the very letter, the nations which in consequence were left became, as they grew stronger and again multiplied, thorns in the side of Israel, snares to entrap them, and enemies to destroy them (Deut. vii. 2-16 and on; Joshua xxiii. 12, 13; Judges chaps. ii. iii.) Yes; there we see how God's foreknowledge steps in to justify his ways and

commands towards man. He sees the end from the beginning: and shall not the Judge of all the earth do right? (Gen xviii. 23 and on.) Yes; God's foreknowledge explains many things *seemingly* inconsistent on the part of God. But Bro. Stainforth's "Divine principle," if permitted or fostered, would turn the world upside down.

Paragraph 6, marked (f, g, h, i). This paragraph so misinterprets what I have advanced, and is so incoherent, that I can best reply to it by referring the reader to the paragraphs to which it is a reply, if it may be called one. "The adapting, accommodating, and levelling up and down" he sees no need for! Indeed! If God had not accommodated his teaching to man's native comprehension and understanding man would have had good excuse for rejecting it all. Again. What "native sense of justice," says he, "could possibly dwell in men who were capable of slaying the notoriously innocent and righteous expecting that God could afterwards be induced to justify them?" Why, the "native sense" would appear, after the deed was done, by the working of their consciences. They would *accuse* or *excuse* themselves. When Paul stood by, guaranteeing the clothes of those who were stoning Stephen, are we to suppose that he, a trained lawyer, &c., had no native sense of justice? Did he not approve of the deed in the first instance from a sense of justice towards God? It certainly was a mistaken application of it; but, all the same, it was in him, then and there. Much injustice is done on the plea of justice: much evil on the plea of good. The counterfeit is the proof of the genuine. If there were no fact there could be no fiction.

Paragraph 7, marked (h). "The Hebrews never made wills," says he. What does this

prove? It does not contradict the fact that a will is of no force until the testator dies. Though the Jews never made wills while under the immediate control of their own civil laws, it does not follow they made no wills when scattered abroad. But a will may be made in a testamentary form, and if duly attested it becomes a testament. The testament referred to in Hebrews was the Will of God, covenanted with man, and ratified by the death of Christ. It is a will as much as a testament, and a testament as much as a covenant, and according to the Revised Version, *diathikē*, "signifies both covenant and testament."

Paragraph 8, marked (i). "The simile of the blacksmith's arm," says he, "is bad." Yes; this is true. It is very bad for his side of the argument: for work is adapted to the strength of the arm of the one who has to do it. So is knowledge to the mind, and revelation to the capacity or power of the understanding (Heb. v. 14).

Paragraph 9, marked (j). "Jonah's sailors," says he, "were actuated by a form of selfishness!" I differ much from this. They feared to do an act of injustice. Jonah ch. i. verse 14 clearly shows this. I therefore prefer the words of scripture to Bro. Stainforth's *ipse dixit*—a kind of conceit he more relies on than on reason, argument, or scripture. If he says it, his *ipse dixit* should be the proof, *he thinks*. But all justice may be said to be selfish. If we believe the scriptures, that evil only can come to the man that is unjust, it is his own special interest to be just. "That man hath perfect blessedness who walketh not astray." Why, therefore, for his own selfish interest does he not take heed to the counsel?

(To be continued in next number.)

IDEALS AND IDEALITY.

(Concluded from page 93 of October issue.)

What, then, are those ideals, which, projected on the retina of our mental visual organ, lead us ever onwards and upwards? What facts are there in connexion with our holy calling in Christ Jesus, which sink into our hearts and become part and parcel of our very being? What great truths are there, which we have received, and, though the words which first conveyed them to our mentality have faded away, yet live in our souls as the predominating factor impelling us to follow the creation of our imaginative faculty?

When we review our relationship with the Creator of heaven and earth, we are conscious

of the fact that the privilege to address him as our heavenly Father is a manifestation of divine love. "Behold," says John (1 Ep. iii. 1), "what manner of love the Father hath bestowed on us, that we should be called the sons of God." How do we realise this love? Does the mere statement of John convey to our minds the fact of this love in any tangible form? No, it does not. It must be manifested to our perceptive faculty by some active work. Something must be done which will operate on our emotions before we can receive the statement as a truth. Mere prostration of love will never affect us. Christ told Nicodemus that "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son,

that whosoever believeth on him might not perish but have everlasting life" (John iii. 16). This is something that the mind can grasp as tangible. Something is given, and ever afterwards when contemplating our position in relation to God our minds instinctively revert to the gift which our heavenly Father has given us. So inseparable are these facts—the love of God and his divine gift—that the thought of the one implies the other. We cannot think of our altered circumstances without picturing to ourselves the giver and his gift—the Lord Jesus Christ. We, not having seen, have yet learned to love our Saviour, and through the medium of the spirit we are able to project the image of the Son of God on our hearts, and he lives there as an ideal purifying our lives here on earth. When tempted to do evil, or to stray from the narrow path, the image of our ideal rises before our eyes: and we cannot wilfully offend our heavenly Father who has manifested his love for us and has done such great things for us, whereof we are glad.

We are commanded to love our enemies, to do good to them that persecute us; and, above all, we are enjoined to love the brethren. It is by no means an easy task; the first clauses of it are exceptionally hard. In fact it can only be accomplished by a real crucifixion of the flesh with its prejudices. It requires more than human power to enable us to comply with the demands of this obligation. Yet we all try to obey the command. Why do we thus struggle? How is it that repeated failures daunt us not? Why is it that again and again with strong crying and tears we pray for strength that we may be able to fulfil this law of love? Is it because we are afraid of meeting the displeasure of an angry God? No, a thousand times no; it is because of an ideal which lives within the soul. We think of the love God has manifested to us. We remember that there was "a time when we were alienated and enemies in our mind in our evil works" (Col. i. 21), "that at that time we were separate from Christ, having no hope, and without God in the world" (Eph. ii. 12). While we were in this truly lamentable condition "God commended his own love toward us in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us" (Romans v. 8). "Herein is love," says the apostle John (1 Ep. iv. 10), "not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his son to be the propitiation for our sins." It is the realisation of these facts that enables us to project before our mental vision an ideal of the love of God. The more we realize these truths the more intense and real becomes our ideal. When we contrast our present position in the Lord Jesus with what we formerly occupied, we cannot help but be stirred to the very depth of our souls with

gratitude to our heavenly Father for this manifestation of his love to usward.

If our spiritual experiences are feeble and fitful our ideal becomes dim and obscure. The more intermittent these experiences become, the more indistinct will the creation of our ideality appear, till it fades entirely from view; and with its disappearance the strength and impulse to battle with this sordid world will vanish also. When our spiritual experiences are strong and vigorous, and their intensity steadily maintained, the ideal of our creative faculty stands out with wonderful clearness and precision. It assumes a tangible reality and becomes a potent factor in stimulating to renewed exertions our drooping spirits. "If God so loved us," continues John (1 Ep. iv. 11), "we ought also to love the brethren." Where the ideal is strongly developed this will follow as a natural sequence. When the ingratitude of our fellows sinks into our hearts with its bitter disappointments, and we feel ready to relinquish the struggle; when we have given the best of our labours for the benefit of our brethren and have been misunderstood and our actions misconstrued; when we are sick at heart because of the indifference of our neighbours; and all these troubles have combined to produce a mental depression which re-acts upon our physical frame in a manner no pen can describe, it is the image of our ideal which lifts us out of "the slough of despond." It is the love of God which has been shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit which quickens us anew. It is the picture portrayed before our mental vision which stands out illumined with the halo of divine truth; and like a beacon guides us safely through "the valley of the shadow of death."

Not only have we the love of God manifested to us as an ideal and which of itself exercises such a powerful influence for good upon our lives; but we have also the personal love of the Lord Jesus manifested to us. Can we think of the glorious truths associated with our Redeemer, and the important part he himself has played in the accomplishment of our salvation, and not be moved to devote our lives to his service in return for his love? Think of the declaration concerning him, "It became him for whom are all things, and through whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the author of their salvation perfect through suffering" (Heb. ii. 10). Consider that noble life of him "whose meat and drink was to do the will of his Father," and realize that when tempted to use his divine gifts for purely personal gratification, it was that "he might be tempted in all points like unto his brethren;" and that he might set them a glorious example of consecration for purpose. Listen to his declaration, "The foxes have holes, and the

birds of the heaven have nests, but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head" (Matt. viii. 20); and compare it with the depth of meaning underlying the apostle Paul's statement, "Ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, how that though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye through his poverty might become rich" (2 Cor. viii. 9). Bring to mind the closing scenes of that glorious life and understand and know that "He was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities, the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed, and the Lord hath laid upon him the iniquity of us all" (Jer. liii. 3-4). We shall never realize the intensity of the love of Christ until we can receive these truths in full assurance of faith in their deep personal application. When, however, we have so received them, we have an ideal which transforms our whole life by reason of its exquisite loveliness and the firm hold it has upon our affections.

"Faith," says the apostle, "is the giving of substance to of things hoped for, the proving of things not seen" (Heb. xi. 1). It is only as we absorb these truths through the perceptive faculty, and make them tangible by the power of ideality, that we can hope to give substance to the things hoped for. It is only as we set these ideas before our mental vision as living realities, and interpret them in those daily sacrifices that proceed from the heart, that we shall prove to our satisfaction and eternal salvation the things not seen by our physical eyesight. To this end we would echo the prayer of our beloved Paul, "That God would grant us according to the riches of his glory, that we may be strengthened with power through his Spirit in the inward man; that Christ may dwell in our hearts through faith; to the end that we, being rooted and grounded in love, may be strong to apprehend with all the saints what is the length and breadth, and depth and height, and to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, that we may be filled unto all the fulness of God" (Eph. iii. 14-19). If we have Christ dwelling in our hearts through faith, then indeed we have an ideal whose presence will purify our lives here on earth.

It is an inspiring thought that our heavenly Father "has given us of this Spirit that we might know the things which have been freely given us of God" (1 Cor. ii. 12). As we come therefore in prayer to meditate upon these holy oracles, and catch the beams of heavenly light as they stream upon the page of holy writ, enabling us to drink in the truths there revealed for our guidance and spiritual upbuilding, we begin to understand somewhat of the love of God and of Christ. The life-giving beams dissipate the lethargy which overhangs our activities, our pulse

quickens, and we go forth to do the will of God from the heart. Our faculty of ideality seizes upon these grand and noble truths and reveals to our wondering and adoring eyes the image of the Son of God. In our imagination we live over again that self-sacrificing life, we walk with him during his ministry and listen to that enchanting voice as he proclaims the "glad tidings of peace which shall be to all peoples." Our hearts throb with reciprocal love as we behold him pouring his rich blessings upon his afflicted countrymen. We follow in his steps as he pays that last visit to the garden of Gethsemane, and sigh in sympathy as we perceive the bloody sweat which reveals the intensity of his prayers. We are borne along by the irresistible rush of that frenzied mob who are clamouring for his death, and behold him on the cross and see the cruel nails and the crown of thorns; and our tears fall fast as we catch that last despairing cry of a broken heart. With joy we see him make himself known to his heart-broken and disappointed disciples, and realize that in that death lies the basis of our reconciliation to God. Again, with that little band of chosen followers we watch him go up to the Father's right hand in the clouds of heaven, and our hearts bound with exultation, for we know that our resurrection is sure, for death hath no more dominion over him. "Now are we the sons of God," as we realize that relationship and that love which has wrought such a wonderful transformation for us. We consecrate afresh our life to him "who loved the Church and gave himself up for it" (Eph. v. 25) We who have died to sin will not henceforth live any longer therein, but, turning our eyes to behold the ideal which lives in our hearts by faith, we determine to "forget those things which are behind" and "press forward toward the prize of our high calling in Christ Jesus." We see him in the majesty of our immortal body, and as we contemplate the glories of spirit nature our hearts throb with love and admiration, and with patience born of conviction we wait the day when we shall be like him, for we shall see him with our physical eyes as he is.

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Religion does not consist in pious feeling but in the sacrifice of self. There are some very pious pagans.

Piety is no antidote to the worship of self: the two are often wedded.

The genuine lover of truth is no self-worshipper: as Self comes into sight Truth hides herself.

The Investigator.

"All things, put to the test; the good retain."—1 Thess. v. 21.

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THE BIBLE.

HINDRANCES AND AIDS—TEACHERS AND TRUTH.

THE Bible is not a formal treatise. It is not built along scientific lines. It does not speak right on, but gives "here a little and there a little;" "line upon line and precept upon precept."

Perhaps it is not just so easy to understand on this account. And if it be the case that it is less easy to understand than it would be were it constructed on different lines—say like any Text Book of Science—then the fact that it is not so constructed cannot be a matter of accident, but must be one of design. That is to say, God never intended it to be a book easy of comprehension or readily fathomed.

There is something educative in the search after truth, and the benefit got in the search is not to be measured by the mere amount of truth acquired. There is an education in it. But not everybody is inclined for such an education, and accordingly not everybody understands the Book. Nay, we who, I trust, have begun such an education, do not. There is much that we do not comprehend fully; there is much that we cannot at all understand. But this lack of knowledge on our part cannot be wholly charged against the Book; much of it will be found to be due to the fault or the misfortune of the reader. Many things have conspired to prevent the ready apprehension of what has been written. And for some of these we are not ourselves responsible; for others we are.

One fact I have already drawn attention to, viz., the very structure of the Book is against a ready understanding of it. But that is a blessing in disguise, being distinctly educative.

Some of the particular causes which lie more or less beyond our control may be considered before looking at others which are, to a greater or less degree, within our power to control or modify.

We find there are certain things which affect the perspicuity or clearness of the best copies of the originals we have. Those copies which are extant at the present day were made 300 or 400 years after the death of most of the apostles: they are not copies of the autographs themselves, but are copies of copies of copies made during all these years, and so reach back to the autographs or actual original epistles of the writers themselves. For all the copies extant of any age differ from each other more or less, while substantially they agree; and their very number and diversity is one of the many evidences of the genuine and authentic character of the autographs.

From a comparison of those many copies, and from other sources, a more or less pure Text (or reproduction of the originals) has been made; and I may say that we have these originals almost as they left the writers' hands. I say almost, because, as a matter of fact, there are still a few places—some 60

altogether—of doubtful authority; not doubtful as to *whether* the writers wrote certain portions, but rather as to *what* they wrote, or, perhaps, merely the order of the words in those portions where an error seems to have crept into the earliest copies, as, for instance—and as indeed exemplifying the relatively small importance of the variations—in verse 6 of the 5th chapter of Romans we are left in doubt as to what Paul really wrote as regards the first two words of the sentence beginning with “For when we were yet without strength.”

We have here what is called a primitive error, at present incapable of solution.

Next to primitive errors, which need only be mentioned here, there are .he more important, because more widespread and misleading, faults of translation. This is a fault which is beyond the power of many of us to remedy. Not that this need be so to the astonishing extent which obtains among a people who may fairly be assumed to value the words of God above rubies; and so it is a question if we are not ourselves to blame regarding this matter, for there is really no reason why one should remain unable to refer to what Paul himself wrote in Greek, rather than blindly accept as his what translators represent him as having written.

We do not take our doctrines at second-hand, at least we do not mean to do so; and why should we be content to accept the words of the translators as if they were the words of God, when we may, especially the younger men and women among us, with a very little expenditure of time and labour, fit ourselves to read the very words of Jesus and his apostles? Still everyone must be fully persuaded in his own mind; but, personally, I should not care to have to say to Jesus, “I might have known just what you said, but I couldn’t give the time from other things;” or, “I couldn’t be bothered, being quite content with what I read in the English Bible as by law appointed to be read, although I did know it was far from being a true reflexion of your words, and was capable of being brought much more into harmony with your mind as contained in the Greek original.” Of course there is middle ground between the two extremes, middle ground which many of us occupy. That is got by consulting aids to the better understanding of what Jesus and others say, in the shape of diverse renderings by different translators, which, as Luther said, are a greater aid to the understanding of the meaning of the Scriptures than the most exact of the many translations extant would be in itself. And this is perhaps the best course to be pursued by the many, since there is after all some truth in the saying which indeed specially applies to the acquisition of a language, “A little learning is a dangerous thing;” for unless one knows enough for every occasion, he is perhaps better not to know anything on some occasion.

As to what these aids consist in, any one desirous of knowing can readily ascertain from those who know. But what is called the *Englishman’s Bible*, along with the *Emphatic Diaglott* and *Rotherham’s Translation*, may be instanced as very great helps to a more intelligent understanding of the Scriptures, since they take you behind the ordinary English translation, and give you glimpses of the inner shrine of the Testimony, so to speak, with less of the veil which obstructs the view of him who would get to know God and Jesus Christ whom He has sent.

Given, then, all possible helps to the better study of what Paul and others wrote, if we do not get to know God more intimately than we have done hitherto the fault must lie with us. What more is necessary? We have to make constant use of all the aids we possess. If we have no other translation

of Scripture than that which the Authorised Version affords us, let us then use it. It is perfectly able to make us wise unto salvation, including within that salvation deliverance from many, if not all, of the doctrines and commandments of men; but with much more trouble and research and comparison of texts than is necessary when we call in some of the simpler aids to study. Study circumscribed by the Authorised Version will assuredly leave us far short of what we can easily acquire by having recourse to these other aids.

There is just one other thing to which I would refer, which more than anything else interferes with our increase of knowledge, or rather which nip any such desire in the bud. It is the absurd, nay evil, sinful notion which has been sedulously and, I fear, only too successfully taught by a few of our would-be teachers, viz., that we have already got the truth, and all we have to do is to cultivate what are called the graces of faith, hope, and love, as if that would be possible when the mind is closed against the entrance of any new truth—that is, to develop the moral qualities and tendencies, and not to trouble ourselves with any desire or attempt to increase our knowledge of truth. This, it must be admitted, is the line of safety from the standpoint of the conservation of sectdom, but when followed it leads one quite off the lines of truth, and makes us mere sectaries. It is also the most comfortable, the most selfish, the most flesh-pleasing, and perhaps the farthest removed from the spirit of the truth which is possible to one who professes to be obedient to the truth. "My little children," says John (1 Epistle iii. 18), "let us not love in word, neither in tongue, but in deed and in truth." We have seen the fruits of this sect-loving characteristic in the past; we see it still going on in those more recent divisions over the doctrine of the amenability of outsiders—divisions which are inevitable so long as the principle of division acted on fourteen years ago, on the subject of fellowship in relation to the original character of the autographs, is maintained or is unrepudiated.

Nothing will so much deliver a man from captivity to the law of sin among our members than the study of what was written for our learning. It is even desirable if one would be a follower of truth, that he should cease to saturate his mind by the reading of works which profess to set forth the first principles of the Truth as having reached finality in their delimitation. And yet, while it is said by some that Dr. Thomas reached finality in his investigations, these same have not been content to abide by these supposed delimitations; for, since his death, they have, from time to time, been extending their doctrinal borders so as to include fresh dogmas among the so-called "first principles." The tendency is thus to create mere sectaries—not lovers of truth, but just of so much of it as can be found in those works which profess to demonstrate this truth, but which at the most give but their author's views of truth. I don't object here to one making known his views of truth—that is a duty one owes to truth—but what I do object to is that these views should be adopted and professed by me on pain of being cut off from the fellowship—save the mark!—of the writer or propounder of those views. We cannot be saved along these lines. There is only one way of salvation, and that is to follow Jesus, and to call no man master.

There are those at whose feet we may sit and learn, but they do not belong to this generation. They lived long ago, and they live still in their works which we possess, and which we value more or less—less, the less we know them, and more, the more we know them. Let us cultivate, not quench, the spirit. Let us break away from men of this generation, and cleave to those

who spoke by royal commission, and whose credentials are unquestionable, who never helped to split up the body, but whose work was to instruct, upbuild, and comfort in truth as in Jesus—to develop sons and daughters of the Lord God Almighty—those in whom His image would be reflected, and who would therefore be fit media of manifestation of the Most High Himself in that coming age—and in this present, so far as possible—when the knowledge of Yahweh will cover the earth as the waters cover the depths of the sea.

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Editor

ON THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF LIFE.

YOU are doubtless aware that the common nettle owes its stinging property to the innumerable stiff and needle-like, though exquisitely delicate, hairs which cover its surface. Each stinging-needle tapers from a broad base to a slender summit, which, though rounded at the end, is of such microscopic fineness that it readily penetrates, and breaks off in, the skin. The whole hair consists of a very delicate outer case of wood, closely applied to the inner surface of which is a layer of semi-fluid matter, full of innumerable granules of extreme minuteness. This semi-fluid lining is protoplasm, which thus constitutes a kind of bag full of limpid liquid, and roughly corresponding in form with the interior of the hair which it fills. When viewed with a sufficiently high magnifying power, the protoplasmic layer of the nettle is seen to be in a condition of unceasing activity. Local contractions of the whole thickness of its substance pass slowly and gradually from point to point, and give rise to the appearance of progressive waves, just as the bending of successive stalks of corn by a breeze produces the apparent billows of a cornfield. But, in addition to these movements, and independently of them, the granules are driven, in relatively rapid streams, through channels in the protoplasm which seem to have a considerable amount of persistence. Most commonly, the currents in adjacent parts of the protoplasm take similar directions; and thus there is a general stream up one side and down the other. But this does not prevent the existence of partial currents which take different routes; and sometimes, trains of granules may be seen coursing swiftly in opposite directions, within a 20,000th of an inch of one another; while occasionally, opposite streams come into direct collision, and, after a longer or shorter struggle, one predominates. . . . The spectacle afforded by the wonderful energies prisoned within the compass of the microscopic hair of a plant, which we commonly regard as a merely passive organism, is not easily forgotten by one who has watched its display, continued hour after hour without pause or sign of weakening. The possible complexity of many other organic forms, seemingly as simple as the protoplasm of the nettle, dawns upon one, and the comparison of such a protoplasm to a body with an internal circulation, which has been put forward by an eminent physiologist, loses much of its startling character.—*From Huxley's "Lay Sermons," page 123, et seq., VI. Edition.*

The further we stray from truth, the more perplexing the maze.
More would rather live long than live well; and so it happens that most people live too long; the few who live well die too soon.

THE SPIRIT IN MAN.

ATTENTION must now be given to bro. Nisbet's criticisms, which have been accumulating while I was engaged with the statement of my theory. Evidently my arguments have "stirred up his spirit," judging from the free use he makes of such phrases as "mere juggling," "confusion of thought," "greater confusion," &c. If confusion of thought be characteristic of my argument, so much the worse for the argument. Later on I shall show that such is not the case. Meantime, I would observe that, on his side the phrases "living soul" and "mode of spirit" have done such duty (I wont say "juggling") that I must now insist on a clear understanding of their meaning.

If I have "grossly misapprehended and misrepresented" him, as he alleges, by saying that, in this discussion, he set out by denying that "man is a creature of dust formation, whose individuality and faculties are attributes of his bodily organisation," it seems to me I am not to blame, seeing that he has said—"Faculties are attributes of the living soul or self, not of the body, which is merely an organism more or less adapted to the manifestation of those powers which properly belong to the living soul" (*Investigator*, July, p. 55, par. 6).

The author of the *Declaration* says the "faculties are attributes of the bodily organisation;" bro. Nisbet here says, "Faculties are attributes of the living soul or self, not of the body." NOT OF THE BODY, be it observed. This amounts to a flat contradiction of the *Declaration* theory, as "the body" and "the bodily organisation" are but different names for the same thing. Bro. Nisbet, however, seems not to have a clear understanding of the *Christadelphian* or *Declaration* theory. He reasons as if Christadelphians had been ascribing those faculties to the body, *per se*—the inanimate organism. "If," says he, "the body were the man, that would be equal to saying that the man's individuality and faculties were qualities (and not mere attributes) of his bodily organisation; which again would imply that wherever you have an organism you have mental powers or faculties; and, if so, death would make no difference to the continued exercise of those faculties, so long as there remained an organism or bodily organisation or structure" (*Investigator*, 47, p. 55, par. 3). This is neither fair treatment nor good philosophy. Christadelphians have never ascribed those "faculties" to the *inanimate* body. They do teach that "the body is the man," and that it is the basis of all his powers, but those "powers" are "exercised" *only while he lives*. Between their position and mine—that man is a *unit* composed of a "body" and a "spirit" in union—there is no logical halting-ground. While professing to differ from them, bro. Nisbet has, all along, been fighting under cover of their guns, relying on his own ability to arrange words and phrases so as to hide his weakness. When taken to task on one occasion about his use of the phrases, "Spirit wedded to an organism," and "Spirit combined with an organism," he claimed to have used them "catachrestically—*catachresis* being the abuse or necessary use of one word for lack of another more proper" (*Investigator*, 51, p. 57, foot-note). On another occasion (*Investigator*, 53, p. 2,) he says, "My phrase, 'formless form of spirit,' I knew could not escape. Literally construed, it is ridiculous enough, yet it served in a way to convey my not-otherwise-to-be-expressed thought, and I plead that it may be overlooked on that ground."

It is easy to see the uselessness of discussing this subject if liberties like these are to be taken with language. Suppose a scientist were to resort to "catachresis" when his "working hypothesis" leads him into otherwise insurmountable difficulty, what kind of science would he evolve? A truth-seeker could not have a better evidence of the unsoundness of his "working hypothesis" or theory than the fact that he had to resort to an "abuse of words to express it." Such practice might pass with *poets* or *mere rhetoricians*, but in serious matters, such as we are now discussing, nothing but plain language and severe logic is in order; bro. Nisbet should abandon these views which are not otherwise-to-be-expressed than by ridiculous phrases, and some satisfactory progress will be made.

Coming now to the January *Investigator*, p. 8, we have what I shall regard as bro. Nisbet's definition-in-full of the "living soul." In the previous issue we had a partial definition; but in this issue it is *amended* and *enlarged*. "The *ruach*," says he, "is essential to the living soul, but it is not it; the organism is essential to the living soul, but it is not it. The living soul is the organic personality, and this organic personality is a result of the *nishmath chayyim*—which is never to be confounded with *ruach*—and the organism, *plus the capacity to receive, assimilate, and reproduce impressions from without*." The italics are bro. Nisbet's, indicating that this is an important feature of his "living soul." Of what, then, does this "living soul" consist? It is a *result* of the interaction of the *nishmath chayyim* and the organism—*i.e.*, of the *body breathing* (for this is all that interaction of *nishmath chayyim* and organism can be shown to be) "*plus capacity*," &c. And this "*capacity*" is but the *aggregate of powers possessed by the "living soul"*, varying, of course, as such "living soul" is higher or lower in the scale of souls. By the "organic personality, then, is meant apparently the *living body and its powers*; and this is (after all that bro. Nisbet has had to say against the "*orthodox Christadelphian*" belief) but the same article clothed in most perplexing phraseology.

It is possible, however, that something else may be meant by "organic personality," because bro. Nisbet has said, "The *ruach* is essential to the living soul, but it is not it; the organism is essential to the living soul, but it is not it." The organism, then, is *only a part* of the "organic personality"—"it is not it;" and, from the particular association of the *ruach* with the organism in this parallel, the natural inference would be that the *ruach* is *also a part* of the "organic personality," in the *same sense* as the organism is a part. If this be not the case, if the term "essential" be employed here in two entirely different senses, it has the appearance of a mere literary shuffle, the effect of which can only be to confuse and mislead. But why is *ruach* (seeing that it is an essential) left out of the definition?—a defective definition is worthless. And, *ruach* and organism both being "essential," why (in qualifying personality) is *ruach* omitted? Why only say—"Organic personality," thus suppressing *ruach*—the other "essential"? But, while bro. Nisbet makes "*ruach* essential to the living soul," as "the organism is essential to the living soul," he has said, in the same paragraph, "The natural man is merely 'soulical' (*psuchikos*), 'having no spirit' (*Greek, pneuma; Hebrew, ruach*) in any personal sense, as Jude declares (v. 19)." This does not seem to me a right interpretation of Jude. He is not treating of *man's constitution*, but of the morals and standing (from the Gospel point of view) of two opposite classes—the *regenerate*, who had been "begotten by the Word," which is "spirit," and who, therefore had His spirit; and the *unregenerate*,

who are "mockers, walking after their own ungodly lusts, sensual (or natural, or animal—margin R.V.) having not the spirit"—i.e., "Spirit of the Word," or "of Christ." Verbal exactness is not everything in a good translation. The sense of the narrative must be kept in view. Supposing bro. Nisbet should literally apply his rendering, it would prove too much for him—it would not admit of the natural man having *any kind of spirit whatever*. He therefore qualifies it by the phrase, "any personal sense," but I submit to the consideration of critical readers that such is a perversion of Jude's teaching.

Having shown Jude's evidence to be "out of court," we return to the examination of bro. Nisbet's definition. And here let me ask concerning this "capacity to receive, assimilate, and reproduce impressions from without." Is it something added to the result of the interaction of the *nishmath chayyim* and organism? If not, why say *plus*? If so added, where does it come from, or what is its basis? Or, on the other hand, is it something inhering in the organism (a quality of the organism) waiting to be stirred into action when the breathing starts?

VITALIZED BODY.—To vitalize, according to Webster, is "to endow with life or vitality;" "to give life to;" "to make alive." Gen. ii. 7 reads: "The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul" (*nephesh chayyah*). Dr. Adam Clarke says *nephesh chayyah* is a general term to express all creatures endued with life in its infinitely varied gradations." The phrase is rendered "living creature" in Gen. i. 21, 24, and applied to all the lower animals. "A living soul," then, on the basis of this evidence, is simply a "living creature"—a living animal, or flesh and blood organism, or body. This definition embraces, of course, all the *native "capacity" or powers* which the animal, by nature, may possess. A vitalized body is, therefore, a "living soul," whether man or beast. This bro. Nisbet denies, apparently on the ground that the faculties, attributes, qualities, capacities, powers, or whatever they may be properly called, of the animal, owed their existence to the "becoming," as he puts it; which "becoming," as I view it, was *simultaneous with Adam's vitalization*, or being "made alive." His "becoming a living soul" or "living creature," according to Moses, immediately followed the inbreathing of the "breath of life;" and, inasmuch as bro. Nisbet does not believe in "latent life," Adam's "becoming a living soul," and his "vitalization," must be one and the same as he views it.

LATENT LIFE.—Bro. Nisbet says "latent life is non-existent life—a contradiction in terms:" "latent is a mere capacity for becoming, as a block of marble may become a statue."

This similitude chosen by bro. Nisbet is not apposite. "A block of marble" has *no inherent power*, the nature of which is to develop spontaneously when a suitable environment is furnished. If the block ever becomes a statue, it will not be because of any "capacity" it has, but because some artist who *does have the "capacity"* or ability expends upon it the mentality necessary to transform it into a statue. In the absence of this, true to its *inert* nature, it will never make the slightest progress, but will remain a "block." It matters not where you may place it—in heat, or in cold; on a dry site, or in moisture—it manifests no advance. On the contrary, if you take a ripe and well-preserved seed, no sooner have you planted or sown it in proper soil than the process of growth begins, true to the vitality which belongs to it. Here is "capacity for becoming" (if you may so name it); but what analogy is there between the

"block of marble" and the "seed?" None whatever in that wherein, for the purposes of bro. Nisbet's argument, they ought to correspond. They do correspond so far as the "matter" is concerned—that is to say, the "matter" is the same in both. But, in the case of the seed, a power is associated with the "matter" (though *not of it*), whereas, in the block there is *nothing* but "matter," hence the inertia or immobility which characterises the latter. In the "seed" the "matter" is the "physical basis of life," as Huxley terms it; in the block of marble "physical basis" is all there is.

The following definition of *life* from the "Student's Encyclopædia" may be of interest here:—"Life, the expression applied in Physiology to indicate the sum total of the functions which mark the active state of organic things. What Life in its essential principle is we do not know; and definitions of Life are useless from our utter ignorance of the nature of the condition we attempt to define. Recent biological speculations have tended to connect Life with protoplasm as a property of that substance. This idea is very far removed from demonstration; and so long as chemical and physical forces of themselves fail to produce life or vital action, so long must the biologist reasonably regard life as an independent force or principle which invests matter but is not of it." It being admitted here, then, that Science cannot, at present, tell us anything further as to the *nature of life*, we turn to the Scriptures, where we shall find that "Spirit" is the source and basis thereof.

"The body apart from the spirit is dead" (Jas. ii. 26); "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return to God who gave it" (Ec. xii. 7); "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit: and having said this, he gave up the spirit" (Luke xxiii. 46); "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit" (Acts vii. 59).

These passages bear directly on this enquiry. Jesus gave up his spirit and died; so did Stephen. This is in strict accord with the description by the author of Ecclesiastes as to *how* "man goeth to his long home;" and all these *prove* the statement of James, that "the body apart from the spirit"—the spirit *native* to it—"is dead." In common with all the Bible writers, James represents man as *having* both a *body* and a *spirit*. When it is understood that *this "spirit"* is as much a "*created thing*" as the *body* is—both having been "formed" in Adam's case—it will be recognised that this is a different use of the term spirit from its many other uses in Scripture. It is no more a part of God's spirit than the body is; both were originally *created by God's spirit*. When "man goeth to his long home," "the body (the dust) returneth to the earth, and the spirit returneth to God"—to be kept (in the case of the responsible dead) for resurrection purposes. These are the *constituents of the man*. The life lasts while the spirit and the body are united; when the spirit goes life goes. Revelation and our experience being in agreement here, proves that where the *human spirit is life is*: there can be no other reasonable conclusion. Bro. Nisbet must have failed to notice the *setting* on page 3 of my phrase—"Where spirit is life is," or surely his criticism would have been different. It would not trouble me much to *prove* the assertion in the *broad sense*, but that is neither my object nor my duty at present. My contention is that the "human spirit" is the basis of human life, and consequently human life is a "*quality*" or *property* of the human spirit.†

† A brother in Great Britain writes to me: "At foot of p. 9 bro. Nisbet plays tricks on your words. You, of course, meant—'Life is a quality of (the human) spirit.'" It is clear to any reader of any capacity that this is what you mean, but he goes on to argue as if you meant spirit *abstractly* considered."

It seems also to have escaped bro. Nisbet's notice that, although the English term "Spirit" may always be correctly *ruach* in Hebrew, yet *ruach* may *not* always be correctly rendered "spirit." There are many passages in O.T. where "*wind*" is the only word which will represent *ruach* without making nonsense. Hence the unsuitability of Isa. xl. 7, 24, and Psalm ciii. 15, 16, chosen by bro. Nisbet to destroy my argument about *spirit* and its powers. "Wind" is manifestly the meaning of *ruach* in those passages. Surely bro. Nisbet does not think me so foolish as affirm that "where wind is life is," or "that life is a quality of wind." That wind *blasts* and often ruins the "grass" every farmer knows to his cost.

BODY, SPIRIT.—On p. 10 a paragraph is given to each of these. I shall treat them together. Bro. Nisbet tries to show that my theory "has no room for death either to the 'spirit' or the 'body.'" His method is to make "organic matter" identical with "living organism," and then to argue that—"If the Potter Spirit" is the only thing which lives, death can never be predicated of the body. Now, in the first place, he should remember that he himself has drawn a very sharp distinction between "organic matter" and "living organism," *alias* "living soul," of Gen. ii. 7 (see p. 11, par. 1). If he will apply that distinction here, the supposed difficulty will disappear. In the case of Adam the body was first formed and afterwards made to live. After 930 years death took place, but for some time after that the organism would still exist. "Organic matter" **INERT**, then, obtained in Adam's case both before he became and after he ceased to be a "living organism." This proves that matter *per se*, whether organic or inorganic is *inert*. It also proves that the organism exchanges the condition of activity which is popularly called "life" for that of inactivity termed "death," hence "*dies*." This is effected by withdrawal of the "life-power"—the "spirit"—what I have termed "liberating the spirit." Whether said "spirit" be that which I am contending for, or that bro. Nisbet holds to, matters not. In either case death of the organism is caused by its withdrawal. The spirit, however, being of a more enduring nature than the body cannot be "killed" by man. But Jesus has said that "God can destroy it in Gehenna" (see p. 4, par. 1). If bro. Nisbet prefers "annihilation" to "destruction," he may enjoy his choice—it does not affect my argument.

FORTUNES OF THE LIBERATED SPIRIT.—Bro. Nisbet says, "Saved! What is this? One can only make an inference, as bro. Weir has not revealed it. I infer, then, that if 'death' means 'liberation to the spirit,' the salvation in the case can only mean a return to detention in a body." Strange inference this of bro. Nisbet, in view of the knowledge of my position which he otherwise exhibits in the two paragraphs now being examined. A "liberated spirit" such as I am writing about, stands related to the judgment day. Meantime, they are in *Sheol* or *Hades*, awaiting either the *enrobement* with the "house from heaven," or, on the other hand, the "everlasting destruction" which is to overtake the "unjust" at that day. Release, then, from the death-state, with the attendant glory of that event, is what I wish you to understand by my application of the term "saved," to the "spirits of just men made perfect."

DISEMBODIED UNCONSCIOUSITY.—This is bro. Nisbet's phrase. I prefer "disembodied spirit;" it is simpler and more Scriptural. The term spirit is so associated with *power* in Scripture, and yet is so *subtle*, that, *experimentally*, we may be said to know next to nothing about it. Who, then, dare affirm

that the human spirit, though impalpable to our senses, is not a very *substantial* something? I believe it to be very substantial, and so, instrumental in preserving man's "identity," &c., as described pp. 6 and 7. This is where the "element of worthiness" or "*unworthiness*" should remain." It is far more reasonable surely than that it should *remain nowhere*.

Then, as to the "ground of justice or common sense" on which a "*new body*" is to be punished with the *old spirit* at the resurrection," I would say that this "difficulty" of bro. Nisbet is "*simplicity itself*" compared with the Christadelphian one, that requires an *entirely new man*—"a new creation." Let bro. Nisbet tell us how he gets over the latter, and then I shall have something to say.

Before closing my article (which, I fear, is now too long), a word or two about "Grafting." This is a very interesting subject, and (if bro. Nisbet wishes) might be examined at length later on, but needs no more than a passing notice here. The difficulty of explaining its *modus operandi* cannot be greater for my theory than for bro. Nisbet's materialistic one. Then I am quite justified in my expression "hybrid *process*," notwithstanding bro. Nisbet's very learned strictures about the "human *mulus*."

As probably another article, or two at most, will bring this discussion for the present to a termination, I beg bro. Nisbet to give some attention to the question of the "Will," "Man's Accountability," the "Resurrection"—not *re-creation* of man, &c. "Grafting," &c., is only subsidiary to these *main questions*.

Bro. Paris has pointed out that *Drummond*, in a "foot-note," warns us that "Science may yet have to give up as a working hypothesis what the Germans call the 'ontigenetic directive force.'" I am quite aware that this is a working hypothesis, but so have all scientific truths been to start with, e.g., Newton's Theory of Gravitation or Dalton's Theory of Atoms.

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DR. YOUNG'S BIBLE—No. 1.

PS. cxli. 7: "Our bones lie scattered at the grave's mouth, as when one cutteth and cleaveth wood upon the earth." What an appropriate simile! "Bones—human bones—scattered around the open grave like refuse chips left after the felling of a tree." A picture of persecution truly which Dr. Young in his version localises, for he translates—"As one tilling and ripping up in the land have our bones been scattered—at the command of Saul." This "Psalm by David," then, evidently refers to the period when Saul was pursuing David, doubtless more or less successfully, as when Doeg, at his command, "putteth to death eighty and five men bearing a linen ephod," 1 Sam. xxii. 18. This was done at "the mouth of Saul"—by his orders. So we read in Job xxxix. 27: "Doth the eagle mount up at thy mouth?" (mar. A.V.); and in Ps. xlix. 13: "This their way is their folly, yet their posterity delight in their mouth" (mar. A.V.) See also Gen. xlv. 21: "The command of Pharaoh." Dr. Young's reading of "Saul" instead of "grave" is due to the fact that both Saul and Sheol in Hebrew (disregarding the vowel "points," which were not used till about A.D. 800) are each represented by the letters "SL.;" consequently, which reading—"Saul" or "grave"—is preferable rests with the translator's judgment. R.R.S.

CHAP. XV. 38. I CORINTHIANS.

CHAP. XV. 38-45.

choi sitou ē tinos tōn loipōn; ho de 38 ing, but a naked grain, (have)-chanced-of-wheat or of-some-of-the remaining; the too perhaps it might chance
 theos didōsin autō sōma kathōs ēthelēsen, kai hekastō of-wheat, or of some of the rest: (38) the Deity, deity is-giving to-it a-body just-as he-willed, and to-each too, is-giving it a-body
 tōn spermatōn idion sōma. ou' pasa sarx hē autē 39 just-as he-willed, and to-each of-the seeds its-own body. not all flesh the same body. (39) All flesh (is)
 sarx, alla allē men anthrōpōn, allē de sarx ktēnōn not the same flesh, but flesh, but another indeed of-men, another too flesh of-beasts, (there is) one, indeed. of
 allē de sarx ptēnōn, allē de ichthuōn. kai sōmata 40 men, another flesh, too, of beasts, another flesh, another too of-birds, another, too, of fishes; (40) and bodie
 epourania, kai sōmata epigeia; alla hetera of-fishes: (40) and bodie heaven-related, and bodie earth-related, and bodie earth-related; but differ-
 men hē tōn epouraniōn doxa, hetera de ent, indeed, the glory of: indeed the of-the heaven-related glory, differ-
 hē tōn epigeiōn. allē doxa heliou, kai 41 ent, too, that of-the earth-related. (41) One glory (there is) of-sun, and
 allē doxa selēnēs, kai allē doxa asterōn, astēr gar and another glory of-moon, and another glory of-stars, star for
 asteros diapherei en doxē. houtōs kai hē anastasis 42 asteros diapherei en doxē. (42) Thus also (is) the Upstanding of-the dead-ones. (43) It-is-
 tōn nekrōn. speiretai en pthora, egeiretai 43 being-sown in corruption, it-is-being-aroused en
 en aphtharsia; speiretai en atimia, egeiretai en in corruption; it-is-being-sown in dishonour, it-is-being-aroused in
 doxē; speiretai en astheneia, egeiretai en dunamei; in power; (44) it-is-
 speiretai soma psuchikon, egeiretai soma pneu- 44 being-sown a soulical body, it-is-being-aroused a spiritual body; if there-
 matikon. Ei estin soma psuchikon, estin kai 45 is-existing a-soulical body, there-is-existing also a-
 pneumatikon. Houtōs kai gegraptai: Egeneto ho 45 first man, Adam, into a-
 spiritual. Thus also it-has-been-written: Became the soul, living"; the last Adam into spirit. life-

v. 42: "the Upstanding of the dead"—the Thing of all Things revealed. It is as Paul here details it. He begins with its inception by means of the Seed-truth of the *Anastasis* which is being sown in the sphere corruptible and develops in the sphere incorruptible into "a Body as it hath pleased Him," since to every Seed there is its own Body; and so, to the Christ-Seed there is the Christ-Body. The *Anastasis* thus begins in the present though consummated in the Aion to Come. The illustration preceding shows that there are degrees of *anastasis*: which is not affirmable of "resurrection" if defined as a coming out of the grave, since all who participate therein are alike in respect of this fact. If, then, there are degrees in the *Anastasis* it follows that it cannot be defined as a coming out of the grave.

v. 43: "is being sown;" *speiretai* cannot fairly be rendered "springs" or "is born," as Dr. Thomas does in his pamphlet, *Anastasis*, p. 36; and *speirō*—the active form of *speiron* (*speiretai*)—is more than to scatter; it is to sow.

v. 44: "soulical," *psuchikon*—on the natural plane; *pneumatikon*—above the natural plane: if the former exists, so does the latter, says Paul; but we have to rise to the latter from our "dead surroundings;" and all do not attain the same level.

v. 45: "a soul—living," *psuchōn zōsan*; "a spirit—life-effecting," *pneuma zōpoioun*: the former lives, the latter communicates life—has "life in itself." The defining terms "living" and "life-effecting" are participles, not simple adjectives; hence their position in the translation.

effecting. (46) But not first the spiritual, but the soulical; after that the spiritual. (47) The first man (is) out of earth, dust-made; the second man (is) out of heaven. (48) Like-as the dust-made (man) such-like also the dust-made (men), and like-as the heaven-related (man) such-like also the heaven-related (men). (49) And even-as we-bore the image of the dust-made (man) let-us-bear also the image of the heaven-related (man). (50) This, too, am-I-saying, brethren, for flesh and blood is-not-(able to-(have)-become-heir-to kingship of Deity, neither the corruption is-becoming-heir-to the incorruption. (51) Behold a-secret to-you I-am-telling: we-shall-not all -(be put-to-sleep and we-) all -(shall-be made-other-(than-we-are) in) undivided-(state), in (the) wink of an-eye, in the last trumpet: for it shall sound, and the dead-ones shall-be-aroused incorruptible-ones and ourselves we-shall-be-made-other (than we are); (53) for it-behoves the—this—corruptible to-(have)-clothed-itself (with) incorruption, and the—this—mortal to-(have)-clothed-itself (with) **prōtos anthrōpos Adam eis psuchēn zōsan; ho eschatos Adam eis pneuma zōpoioun. All' ou' prōton 46**
pneumatikon alla to psuchikon, epeita to pneumatikon. Ho prōtos anthrōpos ek gēs choikos, ho deuterōs 47
anthrōpos ex ouranou: hoios ho choikos toioutoi 48
kai hoi choikoi, kai hoios ho epouranios, 49
toioutoi kai hoi epouranioi; kai kathōs 49
ephoresamen tēn eikona tou choikou, phoresōmen 50
kai tēn eikona tou epouranion. Touto de 50
phēmi, adelphoi, hoti sarx kai haima basileian theou 51
I-am-saying, brethren, that flesh and blood rule of-deity 51
klēronomēsai ou' dunatai, oude hē phthora tēn aphtharsian klēronomei. idou mustērion humin legō: 51
corruption is-becoming-heir-to. behold a-secret to-you I-am-telling: 51
pantes ou' koimēthēsometha pantes de allagēsometha, 52
all not we-shall-be-put-to-sleep all too we-shall-be-made-other, 52
en atomō, en rhipē ophthalmou, en tē eschatē sal- 52
pinggi; salpisei gar, kai hoi nekroi egerthēsontai 52
pet; it-shall-give-sound for, and the dead (ones) shall-be-aroused 52
apthartoi, kai hēmeis allagēsometha. dei 53
incorruptible (ones), and we we-shall-be-made-other. it-is-necessary 53
gar to ptharton touto endusasthai aptharsian kai 53
(have)-clothed-itself (with) for the corruptible this to-(have)-clothed-itself (with)-incorruption and 53

v. 46: the *psuchical* precedes the *pneumatical*, but, all the same, they can and do co-exist; for the *psuchical* does not cease that the *pneumatical* may begin; the latter is just the former plus "the secret of God."

v. 47: the *genesis* of both "men" is here set forth.

v. 49: "let us be bearing," *phoresōmen*, is the best supported reading. The reading of the *Received Text*, "we shall bear," *phoresomen*, is rejected by Lach. Tisch. Treg. and Westcott & Hort.

v. 50: "flesh and blood" does not give a title to anything higher than itself; birth, other than the new birth, does not give a title to the kingship (*basileia*); heredity is of value only when it gives "good soil."—"become heir to": the term *klēronomōō* is not limited to possession; it signifies to *become heir to*, as well—see Gal. iv. 30; Heb. i. 14; vi. 12.

v. 51: "a secret," *mustērion*: not a mysterious, incommunicable matter, but something Paul could make the subject of intelligible discourse.—"made other (than we are)" as "natural" persons: a curious alternative reading is found here, the negative being removed from before "sleep" and placed before "made other."

v. 52: *en atomō*, literally, *in uncut*—form, state, or some other term being implied, and to be supplied. I am not satisfied with "in undivided (state)," it might as well be "company" as "state." "Monient," which is only inferentially a translation of *atomos*, seems to be excluded by the obvious reference to time in the phrase "in a wink of an eye."—"The

CHAP. XV. 54.

I CORINTHIANS.

CHAP. XV. 54-58.

to thnēton touto endusasthai athanasian. deathlessness. (54) When-
 the mortal this to-(have)-clothed-itself (with)-deathlessness. ever, too, the—this—mortal
 hotan de to thnēton touto endusētai [tēn] 54 shall-clothe-itself (with)
 whenever too the mortal this may-(have)-clothed-itself (with)-[the] the deathlessness—then
 athanasian, tote genēsetai ho logos ho gegram- shall-come-about-for-itself
 deathlessness, then shall-be-made-to-happen the word the having-been- the written word, "Swal-
 menos: Katepothē ho thanatos eis nikos. Pou 55 lowed-up-was the Death
 written: Was-swallowed-quite the death into victory. Where into victory; (55) Where
 sou, thanate, to nikos? pou sou, thanate, to kentron? of thee O-Death, the
 of-thee, O-death, the victory? where of-thee, O-death, the sting? victory? where, of the-
 to de kentron tou thanatou hē hamartia, hē de dunamis 56 O-Death, the sting? (56) The: sting, too, of-
 the too sting-of-the death the error, the too power the Death (is) the error,
 tēs hamartias ho nomos; tō de theō charis to 57 and the power of-the
 of-the error the law; to-the too deity graciousness the error (is) the law (57) To
 didonti hēmin to nikos dia tou kuriou hēmōn Iēsou the Deity, too, thanks—
 giving to-us the victory through-means of-the master of-us Jesus the one giving to-us the
 Christou. Hōste, adelphoi, mou agēpetoi, hedraoi genes- 58 (58) So-then, brethren of
 anointed. So-then, brethren, of-me beloved, firm (ones) (have)- me, beloved-ones, firm
 the, ametakinētoi, perisseoantes en tō ergō tou kuriou become-ye, immovable, superabounding in
 become-ye, immovable (ones), abounding in the work of-the master work of-the Master, al-
 pantote, eidotes hoti ho kopos humōn ouk ways knowing that the
 always, having-seen-for-yourselves that the toil of-you not labour of you is not vain
 estin kenos en kuriō. in (such) a-Master.
 is-existing vain in master.

dead shall be aroused"; the grave—i.e., sepulchre, is not in view here. The "dead" and the "we ourselves" are not one class—"we ourselves" being referable to the Apostolate.

v. 55: note here that "grave" is not found in this verse, in the best texts: in both clauses it is Death that is apostrophised.

v. 58: the phrase *en kuriō*=in a lord is not the same as *en tō kuriō*=in the lord. *En kuriō* seems to carry something of the idea of "in (a manner pleasing to a) Master," whereas *en to kuriō*=in the Master, indicates inclusion.

The Investigator.

APRIL, 1899.

Bro. Weir's contribution to *The Spirit in Man* is distinctly disappointing. He is not always careful to note what I say, otherwise he might be saved much writing. Then readers will have to "chew the cud" on it till next issue, as I must perforce do myself, having neither space, nor time if I had space, to answer him. His contribution was delayed in transmission, having been posted on the 10th of March, and arriving here on the 26th—just three days ago. I have not added any foot-notes, although I was strongly tempted to do so before putting the MS. into my printer's hands—I mean in some cases where "misapprehension, and consequent misrepresentation," of my position and argument are apparent to me. But I remembered my former experience, when in similar circumstances, I inserted a few notes pending

my reply, then three months off—these brought me a fresh contribution of three more pages before I got replying to the previous five. As it stands at present, it seems as if it would very easily degenerate into a discussion of the English language, which bro. Weir evidently thinks I do not understand as well as he does. In this I naturally think him mistaken, as, for instance, where he takes me to task on the term "capacity." He thinks "capacity" is necessarily active, not being aware that it is primarily passive in character (although also used with reference to *mental ability to receive*). So a vessel has a certain *capacity*—that is, it can take in, or hold—the word is derived from *capio*, to take, to hold—a certain quantity, and this is the primary meaning of the word. So Shakespeare—"Had our palace the *capacity* to camp this host, we would all sup together." And although no block of marble has the inherent power of becoming a statue of itself, as bro. Weir complains, still it has the "capacity for becoming

a statue." Of course with all its "capacity for becoming," it cannot become a statue except under the influence of some power outside of itself, but neither can bro. Weir's wonderful "seed" turn into, or become, a plant: it has no such power in itself and of itself. In short, it hasn't the "capacity" to do so, in bro. Weir's sense of "capacity." But bro. Weir here begs the very question he has to prove. He wrongly postulates an inherent power in the seed to become a plant (just as he does about his "spirit in man") which he rightly denies to the block of marble. He is mistaken, both as to the term and the fact; and the analogy, which, he says, does not obtain, is as complete as need be. The seed will remain but a seed, just as the block of marble will remain but a block, until acted upon from without. The action is of course different, both in source and kind: in the one case, nature; in the other, art—the "capacity for becoming" obtains in both; the difference is one of organisation, not of capacity. While bro. Weir discourses about "capacity" he does not touch the argument of the paragraphs he is supposed to be replying to on "Life Latent" (see *Investigator* for October, p. 86, par. 3, and January, p. 11, par. 3). He would have shown more capacity if he had resisted the temptation to hypercriticism which he occasionally affects, and confined himself to my argument. I see he also confuses the *facts* of grafting with the *modus operandi*—where, of course, we are both at sea. But the facts remain, and he has to face these, and harmonise them with his impossible hypothesis.

MISCELLANEA.

Some say that in making public proclamation of the truth we are doing so without any authority from Scripture, but it seems to me that nothing could well be plainer than that Rev. xxii. justifies, if it does not indeed demand, our drawing attention to the things contained in the Revelations at least; and if to those things, then also to the things which supply the key to those apocalyptic utterances set forth so plainly in the other writings. It seems quite obvious that the 17th and following verses of Rev. xxii. show that the statements there made refer to the time during which "the words of the book" exist, and apply to "any man" who may read. The fact that we are not justified in "taking from" or "adding unto" surely assumes that we are expected to call attention to the things that are written there: otherwise there is no point in forbidding addition or subtraction. The mode we may adopt in

doing this—whether publicly or privately—is an immaterial detail.

Then it has always seemed to me that if a man says he has no authority to preach—that is, that he has no right, and therefore ought not to proclaim—the gospel, he might well be asked for his

authority to believe. If he has no right to do the one he has no right to do the other. Who authorised him to believe? It seems to me there is no logical standing ground between repudiating one's right to preach and repudiating one's right to believe, for certainly we have no more authority for the one than we have for the other, so far as we are individually concerned. But common-sense comes to the rescue, and teaches us that if we may benefit by belief ourselves, so may others; and it would require something more than a recognition of the absence of "authority" to prevent me from "sowing beside all waters," and thus "teaching others also," and so doing to others as I should wish to be done by. It is no answer to say that we read "God *commandeth* all men everywhere to repent," a sufficient answer to such as could so object—proceeding too upon their own lines—is to point out that that command was given in the apostolic age, and to ask them—Where is the authority that commandeth *me* to repent (*i.e.*, to think with God) in this age? And "everywhere" is not the equivalent of "all time coming." Besides, repentance is impossible apart from God "granting" it, as we know he did in the Apostolic Age. Reasoning, therefore, on their own lines, it would follow that in this age *we* have no authority for anything we do, if we have no authority to tell others what we know. The logical end before those who repudiate the right we exercise in publicly proclaiming truth is repudiation of the Scriptures as having any sort of claim upon us in the 19th century; and in the past some have so concluded.

I sometimes wonder what our knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ would amount to if we lost Paul out of the Bible. The Truth without Paul's weighty contributions would be not quite the same as we find it by the aid of his practice as recorded in Acts, and his exposition of it as contained in his letters. Ah, but what is "the Truth." The Truth is still the Truth, whether unfolded after Paul's fashion, or as we have it in the testimony of the Evangelists, or as we have it in Moses and the Prophets. Doubtless there is a difference, and what may even be called a material difference, between what we find in these various presentments of truth. But the difference is more of form than substance.

NO
AUTHORITY
TO
PREACH?

THE TRUTH:
PROPHETICAL
AND
HISTORICAL.

In Moses and the Prophets we have the Truth prophetically announced: in the Gospels and Acts it is historically set forth, in so far as it is there realized; and in the Epistles of Paul and the others we have it practically expounded to such as have become historically connected with it. This way of looking at the Truth as having distinct and definite stages of development, of prophecy, history, and exposition is only so far true; for of course the Truth is still a prophecy, while at the same time it is also a matter of realization inasmuch as it is now no longer merely a prophecy; and of course even when but a prophecy it had its expository aspects and possibilities, and indeed we find in Malachi's time, and before the One who was the Truth had appeared, that those whose hope was in Jehovah spake often one to another about Him who-would-be, and thought upon His Name. These, doubtless, had the Truth, but inasmuch as they lived before Aionian Times they could not be acquainted with its unfolding historically, much less with the expositions which followed its historical realization in him who was the Way, the Truth, and the Life. But the Truth was as much existent as a doctrine before the Aionian Times in which Jesus lived as during these Aionian Times, but its form was not so fully developed for its vesture so ample and complete. Not that it is yet complete. It has not yet been fully realized. Even Paul did not unfold all. The mystery of God is not yet finished, hence the Truth is not yet realized. The womb of the future still retains much for the future to bring forth.

Now, all this just shows that the Essential

**ESSENTIAL
TRUTH A
SIMPLE IDEA.**

Truth must be a simple idea however complex it may appear from our present stand point of historical and expository realization. The Truth necessary to be known must be simplicity itself. I do not mean by the truth all that we must needs, at the present time and circumstances, find presented to us for belief, but by the Truth I mean that which, apart from our individual cases, is itself the truth.

Is this knowable in itself? Is it capable of being intelligently grasped in its abstract form? Not in its absolutely abstract form, for then it is God Himself. But it may be known as revealed. What is its simplest revealed form? I venture the suggestion that in its simplest intelligible form it is found in the formula—"God all in all."

The longer one lives he finds more and more reason, and increased occasion, to distrust his own judgment of things, for judgment to be worth the name requires to be the perception of facts in their true relation; and as no one knows everything,

and is not even possessed of what many of his fellows know, and therefore is not in a position to exercise his judgment with the best results at all times, it follows that each of us may learn something from his fellows. And we needn't be too particular as to the manner in which our fellows may give us the benefit of their knowledge; sometimes it may not be quite pleasant; we may feel it a little rough at times. But we need criticism, opposition, and even defeat if we are to learn wisdom. And the truer the criticism, the stronger the opposition, and the more crushing the defeat, the better for us. It does good—but it is after the fashion in which "iron sharpens iron"—by loss, so that we may benefit. Two knives will sharpen each other. The sharpening is brought about by the friction between the two surfaces, which causes loss in quantity, but a gain in quality of edge. So we too gain when we lose something—the disciple of truth gladly. For no true disciple of truth is so in love with himself as that he would rather escape the friction and keep what he has. This is all very well in theory, it may be said, but practice is another thing. Well, if it is true in theory, the closer we approximate to it in practice the better for us and others. If we are offended in practice, that can only be—if the theory here advanced be correct—because we are more in love with ourselves than with truth. That is the only explanation: there is no other. The offence may be only momentary, but while it lasts it is only possible where Self is paramount. And this is all we have to overcome—Self. But who overcomes? Self is so insidious: we often fail to get the better of ourselves because we do not see just what we are doing at the time; but given the time we recover—if the general bent of the mind is truthwards.

What, then, is the lesson?

Cultivate the love of truth. The sooner we begin the better. This is what all may cultivate, whether technically in the truth or not. The very youngest is not too young to learn, as the oldest is not too old.

If we love truth we shall practice truth, and that just to the extent of our love of it.

"It is never the fortune of a prophet to be universally accepted. He is always more or less in advance of the community to whom he prophesies, and in the olden times he was so much ahead that nothing short of beheading him would meet their sense of what was due to the outraged convention of conservatism which he affronted."

[It is not very much different at the present time.--Ed.]

"THOU ART PETER," &c.—*Matt. xvi. 18.*

I THINK all thoughtful readers must have felt that there was something unsatisfactory about this rejoinder of Jesus to Peter's confession of faith in him as the Son of the living God: "Thou art a pebble (or boulder), and upon this rock I will build my church," seems a play upon words so far-fetched and so ill constructed as to have been unworthy of a man of such marvellous ability as Jesus repeatedly demonstrated himself to be. Some forty-five years ago I read an explanation of the difficulty which, from its reasonable nature, fixed itself on my memory. In the year 1884 I wrote as follows to the author thereof, who, as a controversialist, has been a thorn in the side of Popery for very many years:—

[COPY.]

"To C. H. Collette, Esqre. Dear Sir,—I append a reproduction from memory of a letter of yours which I read very many years ago. I should feel very grateful if you would supply me with reference to the MS. referred to therein.—Yours, &c.,
R. R. STAINFORTH."

[REPRODUCTION FROM MEMORY.]

"To the Editor of *The Rock*. Sir,—With reference to Matt. xvi. 18, the more ancient MSS., as is generally known, have no punctuation, nor are the sentences divided into words; in addition to these peculiarities, the scribes of those days exercised their discretion as to the abbreviation of words of frequent occurrence, so that in such 'uncial' MSS. the clause rendered 'thou art Peter' would appear as ΣΤΕΙΠΣ = *sueips*. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the transcriber of a MS. finding elsewhere therein that ΠΕΤΡΟΣ = *petros* = Peter was frequently represented by ΗΨ = PS. (just as we write Wm. for William) may have jumped to the conclusion that here was a similar instance, and accordingly inserted in his reproduction the missing letters *etro* turning *sueips* into *sueipetros*, thus representing Christ's words as a mere play on the name. If, however, the transcriber had been content to insert merely the single letter *a* we should have had something conveying a more probable sentiment and an expression quite in harmony with ordinary Jewish forms of speech—thus, *sueipas*. The former reading separated into words *su ei petros* would indeed read—'Thou art Peter,' but the latter would read—'Thou hast said' In that latter case we should have something simple and intelligible—thus, 'Peter said, Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God; and Jesus answered, Thou hast said' (see Matt. xxvi. 64); and on this rock (the acknowledgment of the relationship between the Father and the Son, 'He that confesseth the Son had the Father, also,' 1 Jno. ii. 23)—on this rock I will build my church'.—Yours, &c.,
C. H. COLLETTE."

Mr. Collette was kind enough to reply as follows:—"The subject is still vividly in my mind. The MS. to which I referred is the *Codex Vaticanus*, noted 1209 in the *Vatican Catalogue*, and is supposed to be of the 4th century. The passage is thus written—ΣΤΕΙΠΣ. This compound can, as I said, be divided into two forms, ΣΤ-ΕΙΠΣ or ΣΤ-ΕΙ-ΨΣ, the former might be rendered *su ei pas* = thou hast said, the latter *su ei petros* = thou art Peter. I do not deny that in the same MS. ΗΨ stands for *petros*, but ΗΨ also stands for *pas*. The first rendering is more likely as carrying sense and meaning; the second does neither.

Augustine (*Sermon*, Tom V., p. 1097, Ed. Benedic fol.) uses both—'Et ego dico tibi tu dixisti, mihi dixisti, audi; dixisti confessionem.'* I hope I have made this clear."—Yours, &c., "C. H. COLLETTE."

It is further observable that the "Rock" on which the church is to be built, *πετρα* = *petra*, is a feminine noun; Jesus would never have perpetrated such an absurdity as that, if the rock was Peter himself. And his general straightforwardness of speech would incline us to think that if he intended such a promise he would in such a case have said plainly—"On *thee* I will build my church"—but he did not. The true Rock-foundation is specified in Matt. vii. 24 as being the things preached by Jesus, with which Peter had no connection except as a message-bearer. The word here is also *petra*, the same feminine noun as above.

R. R. S.

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London.

* "And I say to thee thou hast said—to me thou hast said, Hear thou; thou hast given a confession."

CHRIST AS PRIEST AND HIGH PRIEST.

QUERIES.—At what time of Christ's life did he become priest? or when did he take up his office as High Priest?—J. M.

ANSWERS.—As Jesus was a priest before he was High Priest, there are really two questions involved in your queries.

1. The first question involves another, viz.: At what time did Jesus' sacrifice of himself begin? Now, as only priests can offer acceptable sacrifice, if we ascertain when Christ began his sacrifice we shall, at the same time, determine when he became priest. His sacrifice consisted of himself—"Lo, I come to do thy will"; "Not my will but thine be done." Here he offers himself a living sacrifice, and such a state of mind as is here evidenced must have been his from his first intelligent act of obedience in fulfilment of his mission in "putting away sin by the sacrifice of himself." When he appeared on the banks of the Jordan he receives the testimony that his Father already delighted in him—he was already his "well-belove." And as God is no respecter of persons, but of character, Jesus must have been beloved of God on the score of the character he had already developed. Now, character is only developed under discipline, and discipline means self-sacrifice in those who are exercised thereby. Jesus, therefore, prior to this time was a priest, and his sacrifice was that of himself for himself. The particular point of time when he began this sacrifice has not been revealed, and therefore does not concern us. The things that are hid belong to God: the things that are revealed belong to us—if we know them.

Now, we are ourselves priests and our

sacrifice is a "living" one—that of ourselves on the Altar of Truth. We do this in the beginning of our obedience; and what is true of us must also have been true of Jesus, for in nothing do we surpass him, but, contrariwise, he us.

2. The question of High Priest is quite a different matter. You cannot have the idea of a high priest without subordinate priests being implied: accordingly, the saints are termed "a holy priesthood"; and Jesus is the "High Priest of our profession." When Jesus' work as priest was perfected he had reached the end of his probation, and enters upon his High Priesthood; which has a direct relation to others—to us. Hence, after the type of the High Priest under the law, he offered first for himself and then for us—for himself as priest, for us as High Priest.

I conclude, then, that his priesthood and his high-priesthood are not to be confounded; for as it appears to me he was always a priest—from his offering of himself in personal obedience to the will of God; and he became our High Priest when his personal sacrifice was complete or perfected, and "he appeared in the presence of God for us." EDITOR.

CORRESPONDENCE.

"LIKE FROGS."

Bro. J. T. Browning, of Kansas, U.S.A., writing with reference to bro. Hodgkinson's suggestions regarding "the three unclean spirits like frogs" which he made in the *Investigator* for Jan., 1897, p. , says—

"Bro. Hodgkinson's idea—that the three frogs are naval powers—has the element of water all right, but it is salt water, which would be fatal to the frogs, and I am afraid

fatal to his argument. I prefer Dr. Thomas's exposition regarding the three frogs, as representing French influence in the dragon, beast, and false prophet territories. (The ancient banner symbol of France is three frogs). France has had her finger in the pie stirring up confusion and causing conflict since 1821 among all the prominent nations, which has resulted in the drying-up of Turkish power; but probably 1900 will witness the complete evaporation as the end of the 1290 period. We are earnestly watching the signs. If the 1260 and the 1290 have the same commencement the case seems certain. And if the 1335 commences also the same it will end in 1945, as the establishment of Daniel's standing in his lot. At just what point Christ comes to resurrect the dead is another question altogether, although assumed to be contingent upon the fall of Turkey; and there is a margin of 5 years, reckoning 40 years preparation.

J. T. B.

NOTE ON *DIKAIOSUNĒ*.

COGNATION helps us in arriving at the exact sense of a Bible word. But the King James' Translators paid no attention to it, sometimes giving a variety of English words for the one Greek word, but *dikaïosunĕ* they always rendered "righteousness." It is hard to tell why. The English words—just, justify, justification—are cognate; and the corresponding Greek words—*dikaïos, dikaïos, dikaïosunĕ*—are cognate also, and from the same Greek root. A good deal of the force of Paul's argument on justification is lost by

their omission, as also the clear sense of his meaning—a sad defect. There is little room for mistaking the sense of a cognate sentence, although it is not considered euphonious. For instance—The Judge is just, and has justly appointed a means of justification, and a justifier, to make men just, and to execute justice and judgment upon all men. Scriptural Greek is faithful to this rule, but translators neglect it for a variety of what they esteem synonymous expressions. Some of their translations would be very ridiculous, for instance—"Jesus *turned* himself and said." They have translated the same Greek word "converted." Suppose we read—"Jesus *converted* himself and said." Much error has arisen from imperfect translation and pedantry.

J. T. B.

A LIAR TELLING THE TRUTH.—The Devil is credited with having said on one occasion, "All that a man hath will he give for his life." He is allowed to know a good deal about many things, and this is one of the things about which—if he knows anything—it may be admitted he speaks from experience, and therefore with the authority which comes from knowledge. And although it is also true that he is credited with having been "a liar from the beginning," and deservedly so, yet the foregoing statement shows that he can speak the truth on an occasion—when the truth best suits him. For, in the formula as expressed, he but enunciates the law of *self*, which governs the actions of the human animal.—EDITOR.

THE EDITOR *VERSUS* VICARIOUS SACRIFICE.

(1.) (See page 17). "The Second Death—second referring to intensity and not necessarily to number"—can, I think, come upon some who at the return of Christ will not have died the first death. I suppose—now that Jesus has appeared as the prophet like unto Moses, the rejection of those words—"God will require it"; and since God, in consequence of that appearing now, commands all men to repent—that the natural man who has the Gospel intelligibly set before him but rejects it, becomes then related to "the condemnation that light has come into the world, but he loved darkness rather than light." This wilful disobedience must I think entail the second death of more or less severity. "Those my enemies that would not that I should reign over them bring hither and slay them before me." I think also that while those truly in Christ are thereby conditionally exempt from that death

that such exemption ceases when their overcoming ceases.

Take the case of Peter; can we believe him to have remained in Christ when he was overcome in sin, having repudiated his Lord and Teacher with oaths and curses? Did he not then become related, no longer to Life, but to Second Death? "Yes," says bro. Nisbet, in effect. How then did he escape therefrom except on the principle mentioned by Paul in his own case—"I have been crucified with Christ [substitution, since it was merely a figurative death] yet I live in the faith of the Son of God who loved me and gave himself up for me." Paul set no value on his own overcomings—"If righteousness is through law then Christ died for nought." From that it appears that if Paul's works were indeed the meritorious overcomings of which bro. Nisbet writes, then the crucifixion need never have taken place,

since it simply gave us something additional to believe!

We see on the contrary that it was indispensable, since even Paul's righteousness was ineffective. He was saved not by works of righteousness which he did, but solely according to God's mercy, because Jesus loved him and gave himself up for him. In Rev. xix. 8 their white linen is said to be the righteous acts of the saints; but we find in vii. 14 that they had washed their robes, and made them white (or pure, Heb. x. 22.) by the Blood of the Lamb. So we see that apart from that washing, and the sprinkling of the sacrificial blood, the saints "righteous acts" would not have been presentable. So as I said (9) such characters "overcame" truly, but solely "because of the Blood of the Lamb," xii. 11.

I think it then plain that if Jesus had not interested himself specially in Peter's case (1 Cor. xv. 5, "He appeared to Peter, *then* to the twelve" (eleven?) he must have remained related to the second death. But Jesus loved him, and gave himself up for him, including him among those loosed from their sins in his blood (Rev. i. 5). After that could we imagine Peter basing his hope on his own overcoming?

We have seen that Paul says "that those disobedient to the Truth receive indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish." If, then, a substitute is accepted for them he must undergo their pains. But is not that exactly what occurred to Jesus when he experienced the extremity of mental suffering—the Divine indignation and wrath due to the "disobedient," so that his sweat fell in great drops to the ground; and in his agony an angel was sent to strengthen him? And might not his physical sufferings, superadded later on, be appropriately styled Tribulation and Anguish?

But upon what theory but that of substitution can we account for the fact that a perfectly righteous Jew, an Israelite, indeed, who had been publicly acknowledged by God as His be'oved Son in whom He was well pleased—upon what other principle can we understand his being subjected by God Himself to such "illegal" sufferings, so that He should even be "pleased" thus to bruise him, except in view of the blessed result that "with his stripes we are healed." Was he not "*legally*" entitled to length of days in the land, unless indeed some Roman Catholic should say that he had failed in due honour to his mother! But why, upon Bible principle, should a sinless Jew die at all, much less in anguish and forsaken by his God?

"He died that he might be justified from

sin." This I take to be a misprint,* for "*we* might." "In him is no sin." It was "our sin he bore on his body to the tree."

(3.) I believe that Aion'an life has always been attainable on the conditions peculiar to the current dispensations. For instance, under Moses a faithful Jew, in belief of the future Prophet and King like unto Moses, must have made his offering with a heart thankful that forgiveness of sin was offered to him on such intelligible and feasible terms namely, truly penitent acknowledgment of guilt and substitution. This arrangement was current in Jesus' days until he superseded it by his better, because voluntary sacrifice, both meanwhile being equally a divine appointment, and therefore equally efficacious for the time being. Whatever terms God offered were of course equally honourable to His justice and mercy.

Believers, then, in all Aions could become related to eternal life, but solely as a conditional promise; as bro. Nisbet truly says to a "second" life, (1) which of course begins when the first life ends, "Because I live ye *shall* live also." This arrangement must be so, for that life is endless, "they can die no more;" whereas Peter had a dear break in his connection with "the life of Jesus." "Having at that time Aion'an life [according to bro. Nisbet's view (1)] Peter died the second dead by being overcome of sin." But no one can have "the life which is life indeed" in the present life, except as a promised conditional reward. "The heir is Lord of all, though" (*at present*) "he is under tutors and governors." No one can have, I trust, eternal life as a possession without being able to make the fact manifest. Body and soul will be perfected together. This mortal (soul) will put on immortality, but not till this corruptible (body) puts on incorruption, thank God! Meantime, no Incorruptible Body—no Immortal Soul. The Life is the Life of Messiah's Aion, not of the Devil's. If we possess both lives simultaneously are we "neither mortal nor immortal" as Adam has been said, and is said, to have been?

But after all our best overcomings, "the life of the Aion," remains "the free gift of God through Jesus Christ our Lord," Rom. vi. 23. All our contributions thereto are utter nothingness, except as indicating an acceptable frame of mind. Since no one but Jesus has ever been justified by works of law, our faith must rest solely on him, and him *crucified*, however great such foolishness may seem to Gentiles.

(7.) Bro. Nisbet understands the promise, "Shall live for ever—shall never die," to

*No; it is not a misprint: I mean he died that he might be justified from sin.—Ed.

refer to the preparatory state of saints in this life. I do not regard that state as the matter of a promise, but rather of a command, conditional to the performance of which is promised Aionian life. The "higher existence" I contemplated was not some mysterious ineffable condition of myself, but the cultivation of my higher and spiritual capacities. But that includes overcoming, no doubt, of my lower self, but any such being entirely owing to "God who works in the sons of obedience to will and to work for his good pleasure" (gratification?) Phil. ii. 13; while I maintain that course I can rely on His so doing—"there being some good thing found in me towards the Lord," 1 Kings xiv. 13.

(11.) Christ, having occupied a place similar in signification to that of the goat which died for the faithful in the congregation, must have died the death that was justly the due of those of whom Paul says: "When we were yet without strength in due time Christ died for the ungodly." Such a death so far from entailing "that he died a sinner," because he died a sinner's death, would rather prove the opposite from the fact that God raised him again, and to glory, while the Atonement goat being devoid of righteousness was left in Sheol. "God made Christ sin for us, or sin offering, who knew no sin," by causing him to suffer a sinner's recompense.

(11b) The second death consists of undergoing the wrath of God, the wrath to come, from which we may escape on repentance, belief, and obedience of the good news. It

consists of "many or few stripes" ending in painful destruction in "a lake of fire." Mere forsaking of sin does not dispose of the past, which disposing is the first step in the new path that leads eventually to life. It has no effect on the irrevocable past. Our law says: "Once a murderer, always a murderer." A Jew transgressor was not so much as looked at without a sacrifice. Regrets were mere wind apart therefrom.

(11c) *Re* "Is the preaching of the Cross the Gospel?" Yes. Christ sent Paul to preach the Gospel; but not "with wisdom of words lest the Cross of Christ be made of none effect. For the word of the Cross to those perishing is foolishness, but to us—those being saved—it is a power of God." Christ crucified; who became to us from God wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. Therefore, he that gloryeth let him glory in the Lord Jesus (see 1 Cor. i. 17-31), and not in his own overcoming. "The Lamb (or kid, Ex. xii. 5) bearing away the sin of the world" doubtless refers to the scape goat (Lev. xvi. 22) who "bore away the iniquities of the congregation," and was complimentary in the type to the goat that was sacrificed.

(11d) In conclusion, I say the Lamb first looses us from our sins by his own blood (Rev. i. 6), a privilege his life and obedience have procured for him with reference to all his "friends." He then invites us to become his imitators, and a very poor job I—for one—make of it!

London.

R. R. STAINFORTH.

THE ATONEMENT AS TAUGHT BY BRO. STAINFORTH.

REPLY BY W. D. J. TO R. R. S.'S ARTICLE IN OCTOBER ISSUE, 1898.

See page 92, No. 52.

(Concluded from page 22 of January issue.)

Paragraphs 10, 11. These paragraphs follow the above, marked (j), but have no letters attached to them. In paragraph 10 bro. S. seems to reckon justice under Bible conditions as something different from justice outside Bible conditions; and so he says "Jesus was not punished" when he died on the cross; and yet he affirms that Jesus died as a substitute for sinners. His statement is illogical. A substitutionary sacrifice of a sinless man for sinners cannot exclude punishment. Bro. S. must either admit the punishment or withdraw his doctrine of substitution. Both must stand or fall together. He reckons punishment is due to sin; therefore, if to save a sinner from punishment a sinless man is made to suffer for him—that is, instead of him—what the sinless man so suffered is the punishment due to the man

that sinned. And he could not have provided a better proof than the example he draws from Paul's statement, viz., "I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh" (Rom. ix. 3). This implies substitution pure and simple. "How could substitution be more strongly expressed?" says bro. S., and I quite agree with him. But what does it prove? It proves that Paul in the case would have suffered, if his wish had been accomplished, the exact punishment that was to come on his countrymen for their rejection of Christ. He, in their stead, would have been "accursed from Christ," and they would have been saved. "Accursed from Christ"—anathema—means entire separation from Christ; and from other evidence bearing on it, it means

"perished" (1 Cor. xv. 18)—annihilated. Now, as this was a very unlikely thing to take place with Paul, and also a thing that could not, nor would not, for justice sake, be permitted, it is clearly seen that the words used comprise a hyperbole simply, and were conceived by Paul to express with vividness the intensity of feeling he had towards his brethren as regards their salvation. Still, the sentence in its literal meaning, as apart from the object Paul had in expressing it, is an excellent example, or description rather, of what substitution really means; and in this respect it contrasts greatly with the sacrifice Christ made for sinners. In Paul's case it was not possible, in the arrangements and justice of God, that he, Paul, a just man and an ambassador for Christ, could be "accursed from Christ" instead of his brethren, whether friends or foes, just or unjust. And so it was just as impossible for Christ to have in like manner suffered for sinners. Had God so cursed Christ in the sense Paul expresses, how could Christ have lived again? There is no analogy between what Paul expresses of himself as a sacrifice for his brethren and the Sacrifice Christ made for the world. Christ was never cursed from God, as Paul, so sacrificed, would have been accursed from Christ. Christ never perished in any sense whatever. He was throughout all his physical life dead to sin, and alive to God, and even when he lay in the grave he was as alive to God as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are at the present day. As for his spiritual life, it never died; therefore, to all intents and purposes, and in every sense of the term, his sacrifice was altogether different from that which Paul's would have been had Paul's wish been carried into effect. Christ's sacrifice was a living sacrifice all through, whereas in Paul's case, had it been possible, his sacrifice would have been a dead one—a contradiction to the whole plan of salvation. It is satisfactory, therefore, to have such a definition of substitution as Paul gives; and very satisfactory too to know that bro. Stainforth has set it forth in so excellent a form as an example of his own doctrine. We the more clearly see what he means, and how to face it.

Paragraph 12. Bro. S. next refers to my quotation from Elihu the Buzite; and, drawing it from its connection, he refers to the killing of oxen, sheep, &c. These he calls "innocents"; and because we kill them for food, and thereby live, we have in this a reason for the death of an innocent one to save a guilty one. Well, there is something in this, in so far as Jesus, in a very highly figurative sense, gave his body or flesh to be eaten, and his blood to be partaken of, that we might live; but this in no sense shows, even in figure, that Jesus gave his body to be

crucified, that by his crucifixion he as an innocent man might be punished for the sins of the guilty. Bro. S. himself says "that no law can be just" that would punish an innocent one for the sin of a guilty one, and yet he sets forth a doctrine which necessarily involves it. And what the lower animals have to do with the subject is beyond comprehension. "Innocents" they cannot be called, neither can they be called "sinners" inasmuch as they are in no sense related to moral law, and it is God's appointment that we should kill and eat them (see Gen. ix. 2-4). As for the killing of man by murder, or for murder, the law is clearly set down in the same chapter (v. 5, 6). But we have no law in any part of Scripture to set forth substitution. On this Scripture is conspicuously silent. "How our own interests blind us," says he. How foolishly he talks! What have cattle to do with man in the case? They don't offer themselves to or for man; they are of our "goods and chattels," standing in the same relation. Then he goes on to say: "The sinner must suffer or be forgiven." But if forgiven what becomes of the law, namely, "The sinner shall die"? What becomes of this? Why, if the sinner is forgiven the law is, "He shall live," and he does live. But what becomes of it? Why the law requiring death is set aside, in the case of forgiveness; and Jesus did away with that law by his death. He nailed it to his cross; and the sinner is forgiven, not because Jesus' obedience unto death in itself saves the sinner, but because the sinner puts on the righteousness which Christ acquired by his obedience, and keeps it on. But, according to bro. Stainforth, Christ's own personal righteousness in itself saves man, and man need not trouble himself about putting it on, or keeping it on. This will be made obvious in an example he gives further on. Next he sets forth the statement that "no one has attempted to show how the law gets honoured in a case of forgiveness." Well I have not come to this point. I am stating my views as I am going on. Here he would once more "draw" me off from my criticism of him. I, however, once more beg to remind him that in these papers I am not giving a formal declaration of my views; I am simply doing what I took in hand to do at the commencement, namely, "criticising his criticism." And that which does not in my statements directly refer to the Atonement, or is away from it, is due entirely to the fact that his "criticism" deals with those points, and so I must deal with them too. However, if he is impatient about knowing "how the law gets honoured in a case of forgiveness," why does he himself not try to show this? He says: "No one has attempted to show it." This sentence includes

himself. Why, therefore, does he not set about doing it, if so impatient?

Paragraph 13, marked (k). Here he refers to my statement, viz., "All law requires punishment as compensation for the breach," and he says I "omit to say *how* the punishment gets inflicted if substitution is not employed to bear the infliction." The omission will be supplied when he tells me how an innocent man can be punished for another's guilt. He admits what I say of the law's requirement of punishment as compensation for its breach. In the same breath, in the case of forgiveness, he requires the substitute to suffer the punishment; and in another place he goes so far as to say that Jesus, his so-called "substitute," was not punished! Was there ever confusion worse confounded? Next he says: "In a lucid interval I ask, Is it the sinner who must suffer or be forgiven; and if there is no forgiveness with God, apart from substitutionary sacrifice, wherein comes the hope of salvation?" Here he affects to be gracious. He says I here ask a straightforward question; and so I do, but it is with a different meaning from that he appends to it. He here forgets what he himself says in the commencement of his argument. There he says "it is not possible to reconcile God's justice with the forgiveness of sins apart from substitutionary sacrifice." These are his own words, and if they speak true the hope of salvation is gone. For it is not possible for substitutionary sacrifice to provide us with the intercession required in the forgiveness of sins (see his example from Paul), and therefore it cannot be had at all if it is not possible to have it apart from substitution. It is he who uses this last clause, and therefore may I well ask, from his point of view, wherein comes the hope of salvation? For, taking the example of substitutionary sacrifice given us by Paul in the hyperbolic sentence quoted by bro. Stainforth to sustain his argument, Christ would have been accursed from God as Paul would have been accursed from Christ, and Christ's intercession as our High Priest would have been lost to us. There would then have been no hope of salvation whatever. This strikes at the root of his whole theory.

Paragraph 14. Here says he: "Who can doubt that the willingness of Christ was produced chiefly by the same benevolence which actuated Paul's expression of affectionate regard for his brethren, and in some smaller degree by the liberal promises of the glory that was to follow, &c., &c., Heb. xii. 2" (see page 95). Here, were I to interpret this last clause after the fashion bro. S. interprets the sailors' motives in Jonah's case, I would call the last clause expressive of selfishness, but I don't. Does he? See

under paragraph No. 9. But leaving this; what liberal promises were made to Paul that would have been fulfilled had he been "accursed from Christ" for his brethren's sake? Paul's substitutionary death in the case would have been his total extinction. And, alas! the liberal promises. So I affirm once more that if Jesus had died a substitutionary death, it would have been an act of wickedness on the part of God to have permitted it; and more, it would have upset the possibility of forgiveness as based on Christ's intercession. There would have been no High Priest—no living Christ—to intercede. Therefore I must once more quote the words of Elihu: "Far be it from God that he should do anything wicked." Just see; think a little; and consider what perversion of justice, what evils, what dishonour to God would have happened had the doctrine of substitution been adopted by him for a "Divine principle." Alas!

Paragraph 15, marked (l, m). This paragraph recoils upon himself, and that with a force so strong, to his own hurt and confusion, as to render the force with which it was projected a pitiable expenditure of speech and reason. "How melancholy," says he, "is the sight here exhibited of 25 years' obedience to the truth." This refers to me; but, referring to me, he should have said "over 35 years," and this would have added greater stress to his "melancholy." In a former paper he says: "It is incredible that such views should be seriously held by 25 years' students of the Bible." Here he uses the plural, and, judging from a paper preceding it, he evidently refers to bro. Smith, to bro. Horsman—men who are far before him in the knowledge and understanding of The Truth—and to others, as well as to myself. Again, in another portion of the paper he says: "Is that a satisfactory outcome of 25 years' study of Moses and the prophets." This refers to a sentence of mine which he first perverts by isolating it from its context, and then ridicules it; that is to say, he ridicules the perversion. But as the sentence will come up again in the course of my criticism I shall leave it for the present, as what I beg to draw attention to now is his object in so repeating himself as to the "25 years' study" referred to. He evidently by his repetition desires to create prejudice. He cannot answer the arguments given him to reply to, save in some crooked way; and so he has recourse to the creation of prejudice, besides the perversion of sentences, to bolster up his reasoning with. And doubtless, with a certain class of his followers who have never practised "thinking for themselves," he may succeed in creating prejudice against the views those "25 years' students" may advance, but certainly not otherwise. His

"melancholy," therefore, may go for nought. It is of a piece with the spirit of all his criticism, and is of shape with the insinuations he makes in matters he either himself does not understand or does not wish to. What means he, for example, by asking, "Why all this shuffling and verbiage about Christ's righteousness? Why not acknowledge candidly that it is none of ours, but another's?" Have I not done so? Certainly not in the way he would have me do, but done it I have all the same, and this according to the Scriptures. The story he gives, and the conclusion he comes to concerning it, show where he stands in his understanding of the matter. I remember the incident, and of it he says "that that woman who had attended the lectures in London for several years, was debarred through illness and the orders of her medical attendants from availing herself of the ordinance of baptism. And it was said by our people that if she could only have her desire she would be safe, even if she died immediately afterwards." Well, this is all true, as I remember it, but what is bro. S.'s conclusion in reciting it? He says: "No doubt, but upon what principle could she, being totally destitute of the 'works' that are so highly extolled by some of our number, be saved under such special circumstances, except the righteousness of Christ being reckoned to her through her faith." Here is a sentence based on an assumption which has no foundation in anything I have written, or any others of our number have written that I know of. What are the "works" bro S. in this sentence refers to? In what sense are they extolled beyond what the Scriptures teach? By whom are they so extolled in the manner he describes? What does bro. S. understand by works, pray? Is not Faith a work in itself? (John vi. 28, 29). Is not Baptism a work in itself? And are there no workings of faith between the first acceptance of the faith and baptism? And hence, had the woman referred to become baptised she would have been saved by the works of her faith though she in her circumstances had done nothing more. But on the principle bro. S. sets forth she would have been saved without having done any works at all; her faith and her baptism, and her progress towards the latter intervening, being in his estimation no works at all! And if other works in continuation of the faith are referred to by me they are in no sense more extolled than faith and baptism are extolled. "He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved, is quite true to a certain point; but in the continuation beyond baptism, if life is spared, there comes in these words: "If ye love me keep my commandments;" and the whole of John xiv., from the 12th to the end, besides many other

passages to the same effect throughout the New Testament—all pertaining to works of the faith, in contradistinction to the works of the law, with which bro. S. evidently confounds them. And these works—the works of faith in continuation of the faith—are no more extolled than Baptism is. "If that believeth and is baptised shall be saved. Both are equally required.

And now as for my "shuffling verbiage, and so forth, with which terms he is pleased to abuse my papers, because evidently he cannot otherwise more satisfactorily reply to them. It will be better for him to keep *his* "melancholy" to himself and *for* himself; and, in place of shedding it over others in words, he had better shed it over himself in floods of tears. For, judging from what he has written in those papers criticising others, it is lamentable to think that a man so writing of others should himself show so little as the result of his many years' reading of the Scriptures. Reading I say; I scarcely think he has ever studied them. Ever learning, and yet unable to see in the law of adaptation a principle of justice so evident in nature, and for man so reasonable, merciful, and gracious, in the providential arrangements of God: ever learning, and yet confounds the moral with the spiritual (see paragraph 1): ever learning, and yet cannot or will not distinguish a platitude from a dogma (see paragraph 2): ever learning, and yet so perverse as to set forth injustice as a "Divine principle" (see paragraph 5): ever learning, and yet unable to discern the principle of equity by which God guides himself in the punishment and reward of men: ever learning, and yet must say that punishment under Bible conditions has a sense different from punishment outside Bible conditions: ever learning, and yet commending the "would-be" sacrifice of Paul as a good example by way of interpreting that of Christ's: ever learning, and yet setting forth cattle as "innocents," and hence "sinners" as well, were they in any sense related to moral law. Yes, to what strange absurdities will the defence of a false dogma lead the mind! Yes, here is something for "Melancholy" to settle down on and brood over. Just think of one spending the best part of his life in reading the Scriptures, and ending with such results as these.

Paragraph 16, marked (r). "Re his 'dishonest quotations.'" What bro. S. says under this head does not account for his quoting a sentence of mine with half of its substance left out; neither does it account for his perversions, which I will have to refer to as I go on with my criticism. He says also that he had the *utmost*—he puts the word "utmost" in italics; he says he had the *utmost* difficulty in finding my mean-

ing in my writing, and when found it was not mine. Doubtless it was *his*—the meaning he attached to it. This I quite believe; and from it we derive the fact that he all along has been replying to *his* own meaning, not mine. I, however, do not here complain of this. It harmonises exactly with his perversion of the whole of chapter xviii. in Ezekiel. I daresay it was with the *utmost* difficulty he could find the prophet's meaning, and failing, therefore he gave it one of his own! Alas! Alas! As for his ignorance of what my views are, I beg once more to tell him that I am simply "criticising his criticism," and further than this I have not for the present taken in hand to go. Once more I beg to say it is his "criticism" I am criticising. It need not therefore concern him just now what my views are. He should at least know what they are not. As I have said before, he would very much like me to deviate from my criticism—he does not like it—into something that would carry readers off from his own serious defects.

W. A. Pauline

Birmingham.

"A KAB OF DOVES' DUNG."

(See 2 Kings vi. 25.)

As an illustration of the straits to which the Samaritans were reduced in the siege by the Syrians, we are told that the famine in the city became so severe "that an ass's head was sold for eighty shekels, and the fourth part of a kab (R.V.) of doves' dung (three-quarters of a pint) for five shekels." We can understand an ass's head being marketable as food in Samaria under the circumstances, but of what service could doves' dung be in a famine? (Read Phil. iii. 4-8) Here Paul, having recapitulated the items of his inherited Israelitish privileges, declares that in view of "the excellency (or superiority) of the knowledge of Christ," he reckons them as so much dung in comparison thereof. The Greek Testament shows that the word here translated "dung" is not *kopros* (that is, the excrements applied to the roots of "the barren fig-tree"), but *skubala*, the plural of *skubalon*, which is said to be derived from *es kunas balcin* (*Lexicon*), meaning "to throw to dogs." Now we all know that dogs are the only scavengers in Eastern towns, so when we read of anything being thrown out

to them into the streets, the idea of worthless animal refuse from the kitchen at once arises in our minds, and not that of farmyard manure—"dung." So that Paul's expression was not coarse by any means, as represented.

Similarly, then, when we read in Lev. iv. 11, "And the skin of the bullock, and all his head, with his legs and his inwards and his dung, shall be burnt," we observe the remarkable omission to mention the very bulky bowels, while we note the distinction made between "his inwards and his dung:" the inwards standing for all the parts that are enclosed in fat, as in Ex. xxix. 13, "Thou shalt take all the fat that covereth the inwards, and the caul (or midriff) that is above the liver, and the two kidneys and the fat that is upon them, and burn them." We perceive, then, that the "dung" evidently signifies here the remaining bowels, the guts, as containing the more or less digested food in great quantity, and which are not protected with fat, as the heart, liver, kidneys, &c., are.

Again, in Lev. i. 16, in the case of doves or pigeons, "The priest shall pluck away his crop with the filth (R.V.) thereof, and cast it beside the altar by the place of ashes." Here, then, we find the entrails of doves—their filth, as including their bowels, their "dung"—thrown into a special place as useless. How natural, then, it would be in such a siege as this for the starving poor to purchase such refuse, such *skubala*, at their rich neighbours' back doors or in the market-place? Those who could not pay eighty shekels for an ass's head might still be able and willing to muster up five shekels for three-quarters of a pint of doves'—*giblets*.

R. R. Stanforth
London.

The world knows but one God and worships him in sincerity and truth—the god Self.

When one gets wroth he is worshipping Self.

Indifference to truth is a token of spiritual poverty.

Admit your mistakes.

More brethren are found disputing about conditions of fellowship than will find their way into the kingdom.

Some blush to tell the truth who can lie unblushingly.

One may be too grave as well as too gay.

Moral courage is no more than the prosecution, according to our ability, of what our reason prescribes should be done in the circumstances. Physical courage stands on a much lower level.

The Investigator.

"All things, put to the test; the good retain."—1 Thess. v. 21.

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LET US GO ON UNTO PERFECTION.—*Heb. vi. 1.*

THERE has been, and is yet, a considerable amount of confusion in the minds of many as to the true meaning of this passage. But it appears to me that this arises from looking at the epistle very much in the light of a universal document equally applicable to all Christians. It is true that all Christians may learn from it, but they will only learn rightly by understanding its direct application. It is clear, as its title shows, that it was written to Hebrew believers in Christ to strengthen them against the tendency that prevailed so much of resting in the law as a finality, by setting forth the weak and temporary nature of the law as evidenced by all that belonged to it. Its priests could not abide by reason of death. Its tabernacle was made by hands. Altogether, it was "the law of a carnal commandment"—*i.e.*, it concerned flesh, or human nature in the flesh; and so we find Paul in his epistle to the Romans constantly using the term "flesh" in a limited manner, applying it to human nature under the Mosaic law. Let us keep before our mind the circumstances of the Hebrew believers, in coming to this passage under consideration. It begins—"Therefore, leaving the principles of the doctrine of Christ, let us go on unto perfection." One cannot help inquiring what kind of perfection is to be found, or formed, apart from "the principles of the doctrine of Christ?" Is it possible to conceive of perfection in any one apart from him who says, "I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last?" and who, in the days of his flesh, said to his disciples, "Without me ye can do nothing." In prayer to his Father he said, "Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word, that they all may be one; as thou Father in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us." Paul likewise exhorts the Philippians (ch. ii. 3), "Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus." And Christ himself says, "Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest; take my yoke upon you, and learn of me: for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls." Can we ever leave that doctrine or teaching, and cease to learn of him?

To the Corinthians Paul says, "Other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is *Jesus Christ*;" and, again, "The head of every man is Christ." Finding fault with some he says, "Not holding the head from which all the body by joints and bands having nourishment ministered and knit together, increaseth with the increase of God;" and, again, to the Ephesians (ch. iv. 15-16), "But speaking the truth in love ye may grow up towards him in all things, who is the head, Christ, from whom the whole body is (in the process of) being fitly joined together and compacted according to an inward working in measure of each single part, thus making increase of the body unto the building up of itself in love." From those passages it is clear that there can

be no perfection apart from Christ; and as he is both the foundation and the top stone, it follows that all the building on the foundation (and covered by the corner stone) must constantly be in direct connection with "the principles of the doctrine of Christ," and that Paul, whom we take to be the writer, did not mean any such thing as the words in our version imply. How, then, are we to understand those words? By "therefore" we are sent back to the previous statements, and forward to the conclusion deduced from them.

In going back we find Paul showing the exalted position of Christ as mediator and high priest of the new covenant: he quotes the words of the 110th Psalm, "Thou art a priest for the age after the order of Melchisedec;" then, speaking of Christ's humiliation, he says, "Who in the days of his flesh, when he had offered up prayers and supplications, with strong crying and tears, unto him that was able to save him *from death*, and was heard, in that he feared, though he were a son, yet learned he obedience by the things which he suffered; and being made perfect, he became the author of eternal salvation, unto all them that obey him; called of God an high priest after the order of Melchisedec, of whom (Christ) we have many things to say, and hard to be uttered, seeing ye are dull of hearing. For when for the time ye ought to be teachers, ye have need that one teach you again, which be *the first principles of the oracles of God*; and are become such as have need of milk, and not of strong meat; for every one that useth milk is unskilful in the word of righteousness, for *he is a babe*; but for those of full age there is solid food, for those who by habit have their perceptions exercised so that they are able to discriminate between good and evil. Therefore leaving the word concerning the rudiments of the Messiah, or the word of the beginning of Messiah, let us go on unto perfection." What, then, was this word they were to leave in order to reach perfection? It is what he, writing to the Galatians, styles "the weak and beggarly elements, whereunto ye desire again to be in bondage"—that is, the observances of the law, regarding which he says, "the law made nothing perfect," for the law, having a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things, can never, with those sacrifices which they offered year by year continually, make the comers thereunto perfect." Now, the Jews had come to consider this rudimentary state perfection, and such of the Jewish believers as had not clearly grasped the exalted relationship of Christ were naturally inclined to place trust in the law. Paul has been showing the superiority of Christ, and that the things of the law were but figures pointing to him; and so, to obtain perfection, they must leave those things (which were only figures, and could not take away sin), and seek for that purification and perfection which could only be found in the reality, which is Christ.

While Paul exhorts to the leaving that beginning, he says that they "had need that one teach them again which be the first principles of the oracles of God." The first principles of the oracles of God were in the new and better covenant, which Israel to a large extent had lost sight of. A proper understanding of it would have enabled them to see in Jesus the seed promised. The veil of the law, however, being on their minds, as Paul says, "their minds were blinded; for until this day remaineth the same veil untaken away in the reading of the old covenant; which veil is done away in Christ"; who is "the end of the law for righteousness to everyone that believeth."

We have already quoted from Paul in regard to the foundation—that no other foundation can be laid. But the Jews were resting on another foundation, namely, that of repentance derived from dead works. In regard to

reverting to those dead works, he writes to the Galatians, "Christ is become of no effect unto you; whosoever of you are justified by the law, ye are fallen from grace." Consequently, for those who were "once enlightened, having tasted of the heavenly gift, and having become partakers of a holy spirit, and having tasted the good utterance of God, and the powers of the age to come, if such shall fall away, it is impossible to renew them again unto repentance, seeing they are crucifying to themselves the Son of God afresh, and putting him to an open shame." It was no light matter going back to the law for justification, for it was a denying of Christ. But he goes on to say: "And of faith upon God." Can we think Paul would instruct men to leave off having faith upon God? Yes, in the Jewish aspect of it. While they were shut up unto the faith which should afterwards be revealed, and the great majority of them without faith in the higher covenant, they could have "faith upon God," that he was their king: that he had delivered, and would deliver them, from their enemies. The perfection Paul desired them to "go on unto" was a faith leading into God through Christ. This is something much higher than merely trusting upon God; it is being one in mind with God—that unity which Christ prayed that all his, all the Father hath given him, might attain unto. Paul says that the law was as one that leads the child up to the teacher, and that the teacher is Christ, and that his teaching is in order that we might be justified "out of faith," and after the faith has come we are no longer under the one leading us up. "For now we are all the children of God through the faith in Christ Jesus." Of the "teaching of washings" little need be said. All will recognise the reference to the law in the washing of cups, and pots, brazen vessels, etc. "And of the laying on of hands." This had a twofold aspect under the law; first, the offerer laying his hands on the head of the animal, and second, the offering being laid on the hands of the priest. An example may not be out of place. In Exodus xxix. 10: "Aaron and his sons shall put their hands upon the head of the bullock, and thou shalt kill the bullock before the Lord." Lev. viii. 14: "And he brought the bullock for the sin-offering: and Aaron and his sons laid their hands upon the head of the bullock for the sin-offering, and he slew it, and Moses took the blood, and put it upon the horns of the altar round about with his finger, and purified the altar." Lev. iv. 13, 14, 15: "And if the whole congregation of Israel sin through ignorance . . . when the sin is known, then the congregation shall offer a young bullock for the sin, and bring him before the tabernacle of the congregation, and the elders of the congregation shall lay their hands upon the head of the bullock before the Lord; and the bullock shall be killed before the Lord." In verses 22 to 26 we find similar instructions for a ruler having sinned, while verses 27 to 31 relate to the common people, the difference being that the offering is a female, but there is the same "laying on of hands." The second aspect is in relation to the wave-offering, Exodus xxix. 24: "And thou shalt put all in the hands of Aaron, and in the hands of his sons; and shalt wave them for a wave-offering before the Lord." "And of resurrection of the dead": that this also was a teaching under the law is clear from the words of Martha to Christ regarding her brother Lazarus, who was lying dead in the tomb. She says: "I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day"; but while she knew that there was to be rising again at the last day, she did not know what was immediately told her, "I am the resurrection and the life." "And of eternal judgment." This also was taught under the law, as evidenced by the words of the preacher: "For God shall

bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil."

While these things were taught and believed under the law, they were but dimly seen. It was not until the new covenant was confirmed in the blood of Christ, and he was exalted to the Father's right hand, that the full light was cast upon them, the example having been given in his own person; so that upon this basis faith was now offered to all men, both Jew and Gentile. The prejudices of the Jews were against admitting Gentiles to equal privileges with themselves. They had so long looked upon all other nations as unclean, that they considered them unfit to keep company with, in any religious aspect, unless that they conformed to circumcision and keeping the law. They could not conceive of the favour of God coming apart from his own law, not being aware that the law had condemned every one of them, but had been fulfilled even to its curse in Jesus of Nazareth, so that in him was a new and living way of access to God; all in him being redeemed from the curse of the law, yea, from it altogether, since in putting on Christ they died to it, and rose in a new life, and were married to another, even Jesus. Paul continues: "And this will we do if God permit." Leave those dim outlines of the past and advance in the full light of him who is the light of the world. Those things were good in the times of pupilage, but unbefitting the confidence and familiarity of sonship. To live in them was to restrict the mind. It was like preferring moonshine to the bright light of day. What we have set forth is in accordance with the teaching throughout this epistle, and indeed with what is set forth in all Paul's epistles. The difficulty with many is to see that the law, in all its rites and ceremonies, was a shadow cast beforehand of *Christ* and the new covenant, and therefore was but a dim outline or the beginning of the things of Christ. Now a shadow may show the reality but can never be equal to it—when the substance comes the shadow must depart: nevertheless, it is still of value to us in confirming our faith by comparing it with the substance, and so showing all to be the work of one who sees the end and the beginning at the same time.

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SPIRIT IN MAN.

I OFFER the following remarks on the above subject, not so much as answers to the questions propounded in *Investigator* for Oct., 1896, but as my understanding of what the Scriptures teach regarding spirit in man. There is no such term in the Scriptures as "human spirit," any more than the other popular term "immortal spirit." As *pneuma* signifies breath, the meaning of the word in its various uses must bear some relation to its radical signification. Referring to the Spirit of God, the apostle says—"But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to everyone to profit withal" (1 Cor. xii 7). The Spirit of God is not God himself, but something belonging to and proceeding from God. In relation to truth, God's Spirit is therefore a manifestation of God given to every one in Christ for the benefit of such. Hence we have the spirit of the truth in contrast to the spirit of error, as manifested in two classes of mankind, in relation to divine teaching. In the same chapter (1 John iv.) we

have the spirit of antichrist contrasted with the spirits which are of God. In Eph. ii. 2 we have the erratic spirit styled "the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience." The spirit of the truth, and the spirit of error, are both to be found in man; yet it is evident that they express different manifestations, and therefore must be produced by different causes. Error, disobedience, and anti-Christian manifestations must have an operating cause other than that which manifests the spirit of the truth. All human action proceeds from the mind as "the faculty by which we think," either by impulse or by the exercise of thought and reasoning on knowledge or impressions received from without. Such human actions are manifestations of these impulses, thoughts or reasonings. These manifestations are the spirit of the mind. When the disciples of Jesus bade Jesus bring down fire from heaven on those who refused him admittance into their city, as Elijah did, Jesus answered, "Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of." If that be so, then it follows that the spirit in man is the outcome of the mind as "the faculty by which we think"; and therefore cannot be a function of the mind, nor can it have any existence in anyone until his thinking mind manifests itself in making known his thoughts, or in putting them into action. That is true in the natural man, or in unclean spirits, or demons, as well as in the spirit man in Christ Jesus.

Before a man can worship God, or obey his will, it is necessary that he should be instructed in some way in order to do so. They that worship God must worship in spirit and in truth. For this purpose God has revealed his will and purpose with mankind. "For no prophecy ever came by the will of man: but men spake from God, being moved by holy spirit"—holy spirit being also designated "Spirit of God" and "Spirit of Christ." Those who have received the knowledge so given, and who do those things which God requires, thereby manifest a character and a course of conduct different from that manifested by the natural man. In order to accomplish that, a power must be imparted to his mind to enable him to counteract his natural tendencies. So it is written that "the Gospel is the *power of God* unto salvation to every one that believeth." This power operates through "the truth"; hence it is called "the spirit of the truth," and "the law of the spirit of the life in Christ Jesus." The behaviour produced is called "the fruit of the spirit." "That which is born of the spirit is spirit" as surely as "that which is born of the flesh is flesh." The spirit in man does not exist as a part of that which is born of flesh. It is something produced by the mind from outside influences, either in the natural man or in the spiritual man. In regard to the spiritual man, it is said—"The Lord formeth the spirit of man within him" (Zech. xii. 1). That is different from the way God imparted life to Adam, which was by breathing into his nostrils the breath of life. Here it is a process—"formeth the spirit of man within him." It is life in a spiritual sense as distinguished from life in a natural sense. It is a new manner of living formed by the knowledge of the truth. Jesus says—"It is the spirit that gives life; the flesh profiteth nothing: the words that I speak unto you spirit is, and life is" (John vi. 63). That was equally true of the words spoken by Moses and the prophets. The apostle says—"We know that the law is spiritual" (Rom. vii. 12-14). It stood related to the Spirit of God, and obedience thereto produced spiritual effects. In Gal. v. 22-24 the fruit of the spirit is stated as "love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self-control." These are contrasted with the works of the natural man. The

power of God is necessary to produce these traits of character. As spiritual effects, or fruits, we meet with such phrases as "spirit of knowledge," "spirit of wisdom," "spirit of understanding," "spirit of meekness," "spirit of faith," "patient spirit"; and believers are said "to serve in newness of the spirit" and to "be renewed in the spirit of the mind" (Eph. iv. 23). Mind is the thinking faculty; spirit is the manifestation of thought through speech and behaviour. The manifestation of the spirit of the truth in a man forms what is otherwise called "putting off the old man" and putting on "the new man which after God hath been created in righteousness and holiness of truth" (Eph. iv. 22-24). "Seeing that ye have put off the old man with his doings, and have put on the new man, which is being renewed unto knowledge after the image of him that created him" (Col. iii. 9, 10). "If any man be in Christ he is a new creation: the old things have passed away; behold, they are made new." It was this new man that Stephen asked the Lord Jesus to receive as his spirit. It is the deeds of the new man in Christ, which is to form the basis of reward when the Lord comes to reward everyone according to his works.

The passage in James—"The body without the spirit is dead" is on a par with Job xxxiv. 14—"If he (God) set his heart upon man, if he gather unto himself his spirit and his breath, all flesh shall perish together, and man shall turn again to dust." And "the dust shall return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return to God who gave it." God is "the God of the spirits of all flesh," in the sense of being the giver and sustainer of life in all creation; "for in him we live and move and have our being." It is therefore his own spirit that is yielded up in death.

Regarding 2 Cor. xii. 2-5, it appears to me to be easily explained by comparing Ezekiel's experience in like circumstances with that of Paul. Ezekiel was twice brought from the place of his captivity by the river Chebar to the land of Israel. On the first occasion (see ch. viii.) he says—"The form of a hand took me by a lock of my head; and the spirit lifted me up between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the visions of God to Jerusalem." On the second occasion (ch. xl.) he says—"The hand of the Lord was upon me, . . . in the visions of God brought he me into the land of Israel, and set me on a very high mountain, whereon was, as it were, the frame of a city on the south." Here, then, we have Ezekiel brought bodily through the air, say about 500 miles, to the land of Israel, in order to see its future state, and therefore saw things there in vision which had no existence in fact. The paradise which Paul was caught away to see was presumably a state of things to be in that same land of Israel. But unlike Ezekiel he had not any knowledge of being carried bodily, and therefore could not tell whether he was taken away bodily, or that the vision was a panoramic view presented to his mind in the place where he was sojourning.

I think if those passages, which are quoted in the "Questions," are looked at from the foregoing point of view, the difficulties raised will disappear.

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OUR convictions must be the outcome of evidence, if these convictions are to stand the test of time and experience. Our wishes can have no justifiable share in bringing about conviction; for just in proportion as our wishes give direction to thought, and thus step on to conviction, are they worthless in any permanent sense.

THE SPIRIT IN MAN (*Discussion*).

THE *Investigator* for April is to hand, *minus* bro. Nisbet's contribution-in-ordinary; he having (as stated in his editorial, which he devotes entirely to my article) "neither space, nor time if he had space, to answer." "Readers," says he, "will have to chew the cud on it till next issue, as I must perforce do myself." This ought to have a salutary bearing on bro. Nisbet's next contribution.

If, as he intimates, "it would seem as if this would very easily degenerate into a discussion of the English language," the danger is due to his own fondness for verbal criticism, and not to the cause he assigns. It has never occurred to me to compare my knowledge of English with his or anyone's else. My English and my arguments will both be analysed by our readers: about this I have no anxiety. But, in view of the position he has occupied for many years, he naturally feels surprised when one grapples with him as I have been compelled to do.

His editorial is, virtually, a criticism of par. 4, p. 31, *Inv.* 54. The subject there treated is "latent life," which bro. Nisbet says is "non-existent life—contradiction in terms." "Latent," says he, "is a mere capacity for becoming, as a block of marble may become a statue."

Now, in what follows I did not discuss the term "capacity" (as he would have it appear), but disputed the appositeness of his similitude. There is nothing in my argument to justify his remark that I "think 'capacity' is necessarily active." The very opposite was my object, as he, with reasonable care, ought to have seen. "Latent"—*i.e.*, hidden, and, therefore, *non-active*—power is what I was contending for: a power which *inheres in* the "wonderful seed," as he calls it, and which, when a suitable environment is furnished, *becomes active*.

Latent—[*L. latens*, to lie hid or concealed]: not visible or apparent; hidden; concealed; secret; dormant; as *latent* motives, *latent* springs of action; *latent* causes.—*Webster* and *Worcester*.*

If "latent life" be "non-existent life—a contradiction in terms," as bro. Nisbet asserts, it follows that the terms "latent" and "non-existent" are synonymous; therefore, when Webster and Worcester speak, as they do here, of "*latent* motives," "*latent* springs of action," "*latent* causes," &c., we are, according to bro. Nisbet's rendering, to understand that they mean "non-existent motives," "non-existent springs of action," "non-existent causes," &c. But these eminent scholars have used these phrases to illustrate what they mean by "hidden," "concealed," "secret," "dormant," &c.; therefore "non-existent" was *not* equivalent to "latent" in their judgment; for, with what propriety can a thing be said to be "dormant," &c., if it *does not exist*? There is an evident conflict here between bro. Nisbet and the lexicographers;

* I do not here question what bro. Weir submits to readers as the meanings furnished by both *Webster* and *Worcester*, but I think it right to add that both give but one quotation each, showing the usage of the term *latent* by the best authors. *Webster* cites Burke: "The evils *latent* in the most promising contrivances are provided for as they arise"; *Worcester* quotes from Prior's *Solomon*:

"Memr'y confus'd, and interrupted thought,
Death's harbingers lie *latent* in the draught."

The use of the term exemplifies my understanding of it. The "evils" of *Burke* and the "death's harbingers" of *Prior* were actually non-existent until they afterwards became facts.

—EDITOR.

and as they are "foemen worthy of his steel," we will expect him to face the difficulty.

If "latent life" be "non-existent life," what about drowning? Instances have been known in which unmistakable symptoms of life were obtained only after hours had been spent in mechanical efforts to restore the normal process of breathing. If life was not there all the time, it was a case of actual *bringing back the dead*, and we still are in the age of miracles: if it *was there* all the time, "latent life" is the only explanation.

If bro. Nisbet will consent to be guided by the definitions of the recognised authorities in learning (where there is no occasion for religious prejudice), instead of substituting his own for theirs, this question should be easily settled between him and me. He does not seem disposed to do this, judging from his remarks in January *Investigator*, p. 11, par. 3, where he says, "The term latent means nothing to me beyond what my definition of it contains." I submit that it is impossible to have *discussion* subject to such a claim as this. Bro. Nisbet must accept the definitions of the best authorities (I use no other) or there is no common ground of action betwixt us. Were he allowed the privilege of manufacturing his own definitions, together with such other liberties as were pointed out recently, he would wear a panoply with which he might well bid defiance to any antagonist. [We must discuss *things* not *terms*.—ED.]

Capacity.—While agreeing with bro. Nisbet's definition of the term "capacity," as far as he goes, I would add, on the authority of Sir William Hamilton, that it has *active* as well as *passive* uses (vide *Webster's International Dictionary*). According to popular usage, therefore, it has a very wide *scope*—embracing, at the one extreme, those *active* uses referred to by Sir William Hamilton, and, at the other, the geometrical use made by bro. Nisbet himself, when he applies it to the "block of marble."† Consequently, although it is within its *scope* to apply it to the "seed" and the "block of marble," yet it does not follow that there is *no difference of capacity* between these, as bro. Nisbet tries to make out when he says, "the difference is one of organisation, not of capacity." Why, the one "capacity" is based upon a *living* but temporarily *inactive* power; the other is a mere inanimate adaptability. In the former case, results are obtained from *internal* action; in the latter, from *external* ornamentation. The living "seed" develops into a plant by the transforming energy *native* to itself; the marble is but the *inert* basis of the sculptor's art. The development of the seed is governed by the "law of heredity;" a seed of wheat does not become a *cabbage*, but, true to its nature (*alias* "capacity"), a wheat plant. On the contrary, the "block of marble" may be made to *represent* anything the artist's fancy may devise—a wheat plant, a cabbage, a man. The so-called "analogy," therefore, talked of by bro. Nisbet does not exist. [As to that, see under *Editorial*.—ED.]

Suppose we take two saucers, and put a small quantity of wheat or barley in each, set them in a warm place, then add a little water to one, and await results. That to which the water has been added will soon *germinate*, while

† I am forced to add here another foot-note, because of bro. Weir's attempt to range Sir William Hamilton on his side *re* the proper use of the term "capacity." The reader will require to draw his own inference as to the character and value of the appeal, for, what Sir Wm. Hamilton really said was—and I am quoting from the same book that bro. Weir had before him—"Capacity is now properly limited to these [the mere passive operations of the mind]; its primary signification, which is literally *room for*, as well as its employment, favours this; although it cannot be denied that there are examples of its usage in an active sense."—EDITOR.

the other will be unaffected. Will any one be so rash as assert that the water furnished the life manifested here? In every respect (excepting the water) the influences from without are the same. The conclusion is therefore unavoidable that, if not generated by the water, the life was "latent" in the wheat or barley, and so constituted a feature of their "capacity" for becoming plants.

Or, take a potato. In autumn, when the potatoes are dug up and stored away for the winter, they manifest no signs of inherent life. But, ere long—especially as spring approaches—indubitable evidences of life appear, very much to the annoyance and in spite of the efforts of the owners, whose desire is to prevent the growths. This is due to the natural, inherent "capacity" of the potato to become a plant, not to something put into it after being stowed away. [It is due to outside conditions co-operating with internal.—Ed.]

Bro. Nisbet's assertion, that "the difference is one of organisation," is quite unsound. Organisation cannot account for the phenomena under consideration. Organise the "marble" as you please and it will still be a mineral, having no "capacity" corresponding to that possessed by any seed, vegetable or animal. Nor will the chemical adjustment of atoms, suggested by bro. Paris, solve the difficulty, however ingenious it may appear to be. If he thinks that he can show good grounds for believing that it will, I for one would be pleased to see his effort. [Bro. Paris says something on cover, and will say more.—Ed.]

Biogenesis—i.e., "the doctrine that the genesis or production of living organisms can take place only through the agency of living germs or parents," or, in other words, no life but from antecedent life—is the *dictum* of science.

Huxley says: "The evidences, direct and indirect, in favour of *Biogenesis* for all known forms of life must, I think, be admitted to be of great weight." . . . "Redi's great doctrine of *Biogenesis* appears to me, with the limitations I have expressed, to be victorious along the whole line at the present day."—*Critiques and Addresses*, pp. 237-9.

Is science opposed to Scripture ancient *Biogenesis*? I think not. On p. 77, October *Investigator*, I dealt at length with Gen. i. 11: "God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the tree yielding fruit after his kind, whose seed is in itself upon the earth, and it was so." This important feature of my argument has been either overlooked or ignored by bro. Nisbet, or he could not have written as he has.

What is the function of "seed"? Its place and duty in Nature is to connect generation with generation; not merely body with body, but being with being—"living soul" with "living soul," man with man. To do this, then, it must be *alive*: that the connecting link between two "living souls" should be *dead* is to me *prima facie* absurd.

"Latent life," then, being an essential constituent of "seed," and "the spirit" being the basis of *the life* (Jas. ii. 26), my statement that "seed" is a union of *spirit* and *matter* is proved.

I now turn to consider a question put by bro. Nisbet on p. 63, *Investigator* 51: "If the spirit is not conscious *as* spirit, but becomes so in virtue of its union with the body, what practical difference is there between the theory of the writer of *Christendom Astray*, that 'mind is a product of the living brain, and personal identity the sum of its impressions,' and bro. Weir's theory regarding the spirit, which he says has no consciousness before its union with the body?"

The practical difference appears to me very great. (1) "Mind" is not a "product," but a *power* or *faculty* of the "living soul" or person. In Scripture

it is very often attributed to man's "*spirit*:" to his brain never. My theory, therefore, which makes the "mind" a *faculty* of the *man*, having for its basis *his spirit*, is both Scriptural and scientific—the other is neither.

"Mind," according to Webster, is "the intellect or rational faculty in man; the understanding; the intellect; the power that conceives, judges, reasons."

"By the *mind* of man we understand that in him which thinks, remembers, reasons, wills."—*Reid*.

"What we mean by *mind* is simply that which perceives, thinks, wills, desires."—*Sir William Hamilton*.

"Let every man be persuaded in his own mind."—*Paul*.

These authorities agree that *mind* is not a "product," but a "power"—a "faculty." True, Webster and Worcester give *thought* as a fourth-rate meaning of *mind*, but this is a derivative use—a putting of the product for the Producer.

(2). To say that "personal identity is the sum of the brain's impressions" is to affirm that a man's thoughts and sensations, as a whole, are identical with himself. But, seeing that bro. Roberts has said, "the body is the man," he may only mean that the sum of the brain's impressions is that by which a person can be identified, say, at the resurrection. His theory of resurrection is the same as that of Dr. Thomas, whose "mantle" was supposed to have fallen upon him. That theory provides for a *re-creation*—a "new creature:" not a resurrection, or *standing again* of the old "creature" who died. (See this argued, *Investigator* 53, pp. 4, 5). If "the body is the man"—so much "dust" organised, as is so confidently asserted by him and his followers—then "dust" is man's *sole* constituent; and, therefore, if *identity of person* is to obtain, identity of *dust* must obtain also—the *same* "dust." To suggest, as Dr. Thomas does, that "other dust may do as well," is extraordinary, in view of the emphasis put upon "dust" by Christadelphians. If the same dust be not necessary, the only other physical thing is the *form* or organisation: therefore the "resurrecting," according to the Doctor's theory, consists of reproducing the same physical form of a dead person, and the "flashing" of the dead person's character upon that "form." But how does this "flashing," &c., reproduce the *same* person? First let us ask, Where is the Will located?—in the "dust" or in the "form?" It cannot be in the "dust," because that, it seems, can be substituted by "other dust." Then, the "form" must be the Thinker, the Conscious Personality, the Possessor of the Will. But what evidence is there that "form" has any such attributes? or, even, that these are attributes of "dust" in *any* "form?" None whatever, that I am aware of. If the defenders of this theory have any, it is their duty to present it: the burden of proof lies now with them. In the past, Christadelphians have been conspicuous for rushing into discussion. Why have they held so severely aloof from this one, although invited several times by bro. Nisbet to take part? They cannot, without affectation, regard as unimportant a discussion in which their theory of the "Nature of Man" and the "resurrection of the dead" is assailed. Some other motive must be actuating them.

The following extract from the *Christadelphian* for December, 1898, p. 258, is an answer by the editor, bro. Roberts, to a correspondent (T. S.). The title is "Second Death Really." I reproduce it here to show that others besides myself were dissatisfied with bro. Roberts' teaching on this subject: also to expose the methods by which he defended it.

Q. "How can there be a 'second' death, seeing that dead men made over

again are new men, and to them death at the resurrection must be a first death?"

Answer. "The solution is found in the sense in which the term 'second' is used. The second death will be second *in the experience of those who undergo it*. It will be the second time they have died. Though the substance of which they are made may be new, old memories will be associated with it, rendering them the very persons that lived in a former state. This is illustrated to us every day in the new substance we take as food going to build up old memories."

This remarkable "answer" constitutes, probably, bro. Roberts' last defence of his resurrection theory. Doubtless it was the best he could furnish, and as such merits an examination. Of course, it goes without saying that, if it be "*the second time they have died*," "it will be the second death in their experience." But, do they die a *second* time? This is T. S.'s difficulty. It has been already pointed out that if, as bro. Roberts asserts, "the body is the man," then "dust" and "form" are man's sole constituents; consequently, the "substance" (*i.e.*, the "dust") "of which they are made may be new," it is clear that, unless "identity" can be established by means of the "*form*" it cannot be established physically at all. *Memory* he makes the crucial factor, evidently. The "substance" may be new: "form" is not mentioned. Whatever the "substance" and "form" may be, "old memories will be associated with it, rendering it the very person who lived in a former state." It is a "new creature" until these "old memories" are "associated with it," then it instantly becomes the *very old* "*person that lived in a former state*," and experienced the facts remembered! All this wondrous transition is due to Memory. What, then, is Memory? It is the re-presentative power or element of the *Mind*, by which past events are recalled. What is its basis? According to bro. Roberts, it is a "product of the living brain." What becomes of it when the "brain," on which it is now said to be dependent, is dissolved in death? To this bro. Roberts and his associate believers can give no sensible answer. Neither can they turn to Scripture for help, as it is straight against them. Its testimony is that *man's spirit* is the basis of his *mind*. Although it is testified that the "Book of Life" contains the record from which the "dead are to be judged," yet it does not say that Memory is stored there. A clear distinction must be made between Memory and Character. In normal cases, generally speaking, memory remains while life lasts. When the spirit leaves memory leaves, and there does not seem to me the shadow of a reason to doubt that the spirit is its resting-place until it is required afresh on the resurrection morn. Guarantee the continued existence of the "*human spirit*," between death and the resurrection, as the *basis of man's mental and moral powers*, and all those man-made difficulties vanish like mirage.

Bro. Nisbet objects to my bringing in the resurrection. He says, "there is no need to go beyond the present life in order to test this theory." Well, this is, I fear, an evidence that he has not yet grasped the full extent of the question under discussion. Short of its *eschatological* bearings, it would not be of more than secondary interest.

As another article will finish my contribution to this "canvass," I hope that in his next bro. Nisbet will give some attention to the Will.

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R. Nisbet.

The Investigator.

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My intended contribution to the discussion of "The Spirit in Man" is not now forthcoming, since I have found it desirable, if not necessary, to act upon the suggestion of my medical adviser who has told me that "if I mean to live all my days I will need to take a few of my irons out of the fire!" Accordingly, as I am not a little in love with existence and its possibilities,* I have thought it wise to carry out as far as practicable his suggestion. I have, therefore, cancelled all speaking appointments, and, while continuing the *Investigator*, intend to confine myself more strictly to purely editorial work in connection therewith, taking less part in the discussion of subjects which may crop up. I am therefore precluded from replying at length to bro. Weir, whether as regards his argument or his replies to my animadversions upon the same.

While penning these lines I am off upon an enforced holiday, whither a contribution from bro. Weir on "The Spirit in Man" has followed me. This I have sent to the printer, and it will appear in the present issue. Bro. Weir makes much of the lexicographers, but, as will appear from two foot-notes on pages 55 and 56 of this issue, his "authorities" are not so entirely with him as one might have imagined from his remarks. It will be understood that I do not deny their definitions of terms—although the form might be improved—and, as regards the term "capacity," so far as I can judge from the remarks of Sir William Hamilton which I have submitted to the reader, his view of the term is my view, and not bro. Weir's. It seems to me that the most charitable view to take of the matter would be to think that bro. Weir understands neither the lexicographers nor Sir William.

I do not therefore deny the lexicographers' definitions as being conventionally correct, but I by no means feel thereby under an obligation to admit the existence of that of which a given term is the correct conventional sign or symbol. I do not, for example, seek

* For I can by no means endorse the attitude of those who, upon a misinterpretation of Paul's words in 2 Cor. v. 4, think they should "groan, being burdened" with the present existence.

to find fault with their definition of the term "latent," nor do I for one moment suggest that the term is not used as they have defined it; but I find fault with bro. Weir for thinking that when he combines the term "latent" with the term "life" he thereby proves that a something—which something is *life*—actually exists while latent. I repeat it: "*latent life*" is *non-existent* life, and the appeal to lexicographers proves nothing to the contrary. Bro. Weir has not been sufficiently careful in handling this matter of "bro. Nisbet and the lexicographers," and consequently there is no real difficulty to face, such as he imagines. For I have not said that "latent" and "non-existent" are synonymous terms; they are not; but I have said that the "*latent life*" of which bro. Weir writes is *non-existent* life, since the combination of "latent" with "life" really means life which does not actually exist but may *become* so. "*Latent life*," in my view of the matter, is no more actually existent than were existent, while "latent," those sore evils which Solomon attributes to dram-drinking, and which Prior phrases as under:

"Who drinks, alas! but to forget; nor sees
That melancholy sloth, severe disease,
Mem'ry confus'd, and interrupted thought,
Death's harbingers, lie *latent* in the draught."

Will bro. Weir—on the authority of the lexicographer—who, as per foot-note, quotes the last couplet of the above to show the use of the term "latent"—accept this as affirming that the evils really existed because latent? No; they were non-existent though latent. It is in this sense that I have affirmed that "*latent life*" is *non-existent* life, while there is a capacity for becoming alive. And, as I have said, there is *equally* a "capacity for becoming" in a piece of marble as there is in a seed, and albeit the *becoming* is different, yet neither can become anything *per se*; and my analogy holds good. Bro. Weir would have been much better employed finishing his argument than in occupying three pages in attempting to show that my illustration was not an apposite one, which, according to what he now says is all that he sought to do.

Bro. Weir objects to my dictum—that the difference between the seed and the block of marble is one of organisation—as being "quite unsound," but as he does not show the unsoundness, and his objection appears to arise from his inability to grasp the true meaning and limit of the term "capacity," and my use of it, even when assisted by Sir William Hamilton's explanation, there is nothing further to be said beyond that, I am sure

the reflecting reader will bear me out in my statement that the difference between the seed and the block of marble is just one of organisation; which, of course, determines the capacity for becoming. Both are alike without any *ability* to become other than they are, but, given the operation of an outside power, both have a *capacity* for becoming—in the one case a plant, in the other a statue. A capacity for becoming alike obtains in both, but the particular becoming is to be accounted for without postulating the presence of a “potter-spirit.”

That certain “authorities” are agreed, that mind is not a product or result but a power or faculty, merely proves their agreement; and certainly Paul’s remark in Rom. xiv. 5, that every man is to be “fully persuaded in his own mind (*nous*)” does not belong to the same category as the “authorities” in question, although classed with them by bro. Weir. As a matter of fact, it is on all fours with his injunction (1 Cor. i. 10) to be “joined together in the same mind (*nous*),” neither of which asserts anything as to whether “mind” is a “product” or a “producer.” If “producer” be the true description of “mind” (*nous*) as used by Paul, what is to be understood by Rev. xiii. 18?—“Let him that hath *understanding*” (*nous*, mind). Does it not imply that some have no *nous* or “mind,” which, again, would imply that “mind” here is not the “rational faculty,” but may be a “product”?

Great names prove nothing. The great ones are not always wise, whether when they speak of *biogenesis* or even of much simpler matters. And what bro. Weir is pleased to call “the *dictum* of science”—i. e., “the doctrine that the genesis or production of living organisms can take place only through the agency of living germs or parents,” or, in other words, no life but from antecedent life,” by no means proves that union of “*spirit* and matter” which bro. Weir believes in. If it did, why is it that Huxley, whom he quotes as endorsing the doctrine of *Biogenesis*, did not believe in this metaphysical distinction of “*matter*” and “*spirit*”? And certainly Gen. i. 11 (while establishing what I have not opposed, viz., that “seed connects generation with generation, living soul with living soul, man with man”) does not look in the direction of establishing bro. Weir’s contention of a “*spirit-link*,” such as he postulates between soul and soul. Still the connecting link is not “dead.”

I did not object to bro. Weir “bringing in the resurrection,” but said that “if his theory fails to stand present tests it will matter nothing even if it should be found to fall in

with bro. Weir’s *notion* of the “resurrection” (Jan. *Investigator*, p. 11, par. 3). But “resurrection,” as believed in by bro. Weir, requires that “every seed should at that time get its own body”—by which he should understand the body which had belonged to the seed—but as this identical body cannot be got, according to bro. Weir, the “resurrection” he maintains becomes impossible—that is, if words could make it so.

I see no need for entering upon the metaphysical question of Will as suggested to me by bro. Weir. I have my own notions about Will, but its consideration does not affect the nature of “the spirit in man,” which spirit or *ruach* existed before the creature called man put in his appearance upon this globe of ours, and which *ruach* will continue to be after “flesh” has disappeared.

“THE DEVIL.”

“THE DEVIL” pamphlet is on the eve of publication, and it would indeed have been in the hands of subscribers ere this had my indisposition not interfered with the writing of the *Introduction* and compilation of an *Index of Contents*—which will both add considerably to the value of the pamphlet, making it more useful as a work of reference on the subjects there treated of directly and indirectly.

It was originally expected that the cost would be 9d. or 1/ per copy; but through the generosity of a brother here the price—which, in view of a larger edition being determined upon, had been first reduced to 6d.—has now been reduced to 3d. (postage 1d. extra on single copies). Accordingly, those who ordered on the assumption that it would cost 1/ will receive four copies, and post free; and so with those who ordered one copy at 6d. two copies will be sent.

Not a few sent cash with their orders; others, differently circumstanced, are expected to remit to the Publisher (on or before receipt of the pamphlet), who, himself paying cash, requires the same of all subscribers. Agents also will, in the circumstances, recognise the need of short credit, and remit, say, within a month.

Those who shared the risk attending publication, and by their guarantees enabled us to proceed with the publication of *The Devil*, and who have already responded with the cash, will, as soon as sales justify the same, have the full amount of their guarantee returned to them by the Publisher; or, failing the early disposal of the edition, they will

receive the equivalent in a corresponding supply of the pamphlets at *printer's price* to Publisher; which they may dispose of as they think best, or hold for redemption by the Publisher at the *published price*. This redemption is, however, a matter which will be governed by the sale of the pamphlet.

MISCELLANEA.

There is no portion of Scripture which does not afford matter for much study, careful consideration, and—if we can

*WE MUST
DO OUR OWN
THINKING.*

—assimilation. The Scriptures are not as other writings, although some writings approximate to them in their capacity, affording similar, if not so extensive, food for investigation—and diverse conclusions. But such writings can be exhausted; not so the apostolic writings—to particularise a section only. Who has exhausted the teaching these contain? Who has found out all that is there to be discovered? No man living—nor dead! It is the same here as in human things: "What man knoweth the things of a man save the spirit of man which is in him? Likewise also knoweth no man the things of God save the spirit of God which is (come to be) in him!" If such an one existed he might fairly claim, as Jesus did, equality with God. God was in him; he became a son of God. Before, God had spoken *through mere mouthpieces*—"prophets"; now he had come to speak "in a Son." Scripturally the sonship of Jesus in relation to God involves divinity or deityship. I know this is not the usual, or what may be termed the orthodox, view; but I look at the matter this way: son and father are terms of relation—co-relative terms indeed—and just as Jesus became related to the Father as his Son he could claim equality with God—he did not need to regard this as a thing stolen (Phil. ii. 6), but as a divine acquisition and right—"coming to be in a mould of deity he thought it not robbery to be equal with deity"—it was the fact. It seems to me that the fact of deityship is clearly reflected from the apostolic page, and after such a fashion as to leave no room for escape, even for those who at times play fast and loose with Scripture, because, forsooth, it antagonises their sect-views, and therefore—so they argue—the conclusion to be logically drawn therefrom cannot be true. This procedure is dignified by phrases. It is said to be reasoning "according to the analogy of the faith." That is to say, "the faith" is first determined to be such and so, and anything which the Scriptures may seem to teach contrary thereto is rejected, as necessarily an erroneous interpretation; for

does not the faith as already determined definitely exclude such an interpretation? Yes! but who determined the faith to be just what we have held? and whence its source? The conclusions were professedly drawn from Scripture by so-called teachers. If this be so, it is always competent for us who follow to test their conclusions, by application to the source of their authority. They possess no authority of their own, they need claim none, although some have not scrupled to do this for them. It has been claimed by one that "God raised up Dr. Thomas," leaving it to be inferred by the simple that he was, like John the Baptist, a "man sent from God," and that in some way his deductions are to be accepted, rather than some other opposing deductions which our own mental processes provide us with—that, in short, "our faith should stand in human wisdom not in divine power." But every evil brings its own cure *if we get enough of it*—too much acts as an emetic, and I think we have had such administered more than once, and are all the better of the operation. It helps us to see more clearly where we are individually when we come to consider less the community, as such, and the self-appointed heads of the community still less—we can then draw our own conclusions more peacefully and logically, than when disturbing factors assert themselves in the shape of our fellows—our fellow-worms. God gives no man authority over men's souls—the pity is that many willingly place themselves under human authority to think as that authority thinks, to act as that authority acts, becoming thereby mere secretaries and no more Christians than ever. The dog is returned to his own vomit again. From one authority he frees himself only to come under another. Can we be saved by proxy? Will another man's thinking enlighten us? Not a bit. The thinking must be our own. We must do the thinking. We may not accept the conclusions of others because they are theirs, or we cease to be "followers of God, as dear children." T. N.

The apostle Paul in the fifth chapter of his second epistle to the Corinthians is not writing about the dissolution of his own physical being, nor of the physical being of those to whom he was writing. Death is not the subject of his discourse. At least not death in the sense of losing animal or soulical life. Far less has he before his mind the notion of being transported into the realms of Elysian bliss when he speaks of "having an house of God not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." Paul never looked for this, neither at the hour of death nor at any other time. The sentiment contained in the language of the 51st Paraphrase, which

*DISSOLUTION
NOT
DEATH.*

purports to be a reflex of what the apostle says in this chapter, is entirely foreign to the subject. And it is not true that he speaks of better mansions waiting the just prepared above the sky. Such sentiments, I say, are foreign to his theme and belong to that category of things alluded to in the 10th chapter as "imagination," exalting themselves "against the knowledge of God." But if not speaking of these things, what is the chapter really dealing with? So far as I am aware, I have never seen a thorough and satisfactory explanation of this particular portion of Scripture. We have all, I dare say, heard it dealt with after a fashion; that particular fashion being to show what it *does not* teach rather than what it *does* teach. It is one of the mainstays of the popular belief to which I have already referred. And the manner in which it is generally handled in combating that belief, is to show that the various texts which are taken from it in no way support that belief. But this is the mere *negative* aspect of the matter, and when we have satisfied ourselves upon the negative side we are, unfortunately, too apt to rest contented. This should not be so. Have we really grasped the apostle's subject? I have recently been putting this question to myself—I have often put it to myself—and I must confess I have found it difficult to assure myself that I fully understand it. What I have to say must be more of a suggestive character than anything else. After I am done, it will be necessary to adopt the apostolic practice of "Proving all things, holding fast that which is good." A. W.

I have said that the apostle in this chapter is not writing about the dissolution of his physical being. When, therefore, he says: "For we know that if the earthly house of our tabernacle be dissolved we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, *aionian* in the heavens," of what is he speaking? It seems to me that he is speaking of a corporate house or dwelling, whose characteristics were that it was not only a temporary affair, meant to be taken down like a tabernacle or tent, but that it had those constituent elements in it which made it "of the earth earthy," as opposed to that "building of God, a house not made with hands, *aionian* in the heavens." May the key to the understanding of the matter not be found in the concluding words of the 4th chapter, where we read: "We look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are *temporal*; but the things which are not seen are *eternal*." The temporal things were the things to be dissolved or loosed down, as you would unloose the cords of a

tent whose stakes were fastened in the earth. They are spoken of as "temporal" because they were only "for a season" (*proskaira*), and having served their purpose were to be dissolved, or, more correctly, "taken down." But what were these temporal things, these things which were seen, but at which the apostle, and those in association with him in the apostolic ministry, were not aiming or looking at as worthy of giving attention? It seems to me they have to do specifically with that constitution of things which in the apostle's days were about to "vanish away"—that house of which Moses was so faithful a servant. It is worthy of notice, at all events, that the writer to the Hebrews contrasts the things which belong to that order with the new order of things in Christ Jesus. He speaks of the things of Christ—the "*aionian* things"—as good things to come through a greater and more perfect tabernacle "not made with hands," while he speaks of Christ himself as a minister of the Sanctuary or Holies, and of the true tabernacle which the Lord fixed and not man. So that it seems to me to be quite a legitimate view of the matter to conclude that "the things seen" and "temporal," referred to in the last verse of the 4th chapter, are identical with the earthly house of us of the tabernacle, which, "though it be taken down," would still leave in existence "a building of God" "*not made with hands*," that is to say, as the writer to the Hebrews remarks, "*not of this creation*"—viz., the Jewish. I think the argument for this view of the matter is further strengthened by a reference to what the apostle says in the 3rd chapter. Speaking of the Mosaic order of things he says (7th verse): "But," or "Now" (I quote from the *Emphatic Diaglott*), "if the dispensation of Death engraved in Letters on Stones was attended with Glory, so that the sons of Israel were unable to look steadily into the Face of Moses because of *The Brightness of his Countenance*;—which (dispensation) *Is Passing Away*;—how rather shall not the *dispensation of the Spirit* be attended with Glory? For if the *Ministry of Condemnation* be Glory, much more does the *Ministry of Righteousness* abound in Glory. For if *That is Being Annulled*—caused to cease, taken away—through Glory, far superior is this *remaining in Glory*." This is manifestly referring to the order of things, or "the House," in which Moses was "the faithful servant," but which was now, in Paul's day, in the last stages of decay; spoken of as passing away, being annulled, ceasing to exist, its glory being excelled by something else far superior and "remaining in Glory." A. W.

A wise man's heart is at his right hand.

ON PRE-EXISTENCE AND A FEW OTHER TOPICS.

Pre-existence—Praying over a wrong translation—Arguing and disputing—Ever learning—Prejudice—Not son of God at birth—At twelve years of age—Goings forth of old—In a form of God (Phil. ii. 5-8)—He who was rich—The angels of Heb. i.—He took on him (Heb. ii. 16).

[I re-produce below portion of a correspondence which passed between an English brother and myself after a conversation on the subject of the nature of Christ. I have suppressed the name of my correspondent, as I do not think that when he penned these objections, which he urges against my attitude in the matter, he contemplated their publication.—EDITOR.]

MY CORRESPONDENT'S CONCLUSIONS AND REASONS.

I have been thinking over our conversation on the nature of Christ, and I must say that to me the only conclusion I can come to to sustain the harmony of the Scriptures is that Christ did exist before his manifestation on this earth. Perhaps at the outset I ought to tell you that the only method, I believe, of understanding the Scriptures is that laid down in James i. 5—"If any of you lack wisdom, let him ask of God, that giveth to all liberally, and upbraideth not, and it shall be given him." Also, John vii. 17, Psalm xxv., with many others. I have faith in what God has spoken, and I feel sure if we will but let the Scriptures be their own interpreter we shall surely be *guided into truth*. And, dear bro. Nisbet, I think much of this arguing and disputing over the exact way in which certain passages should be translated leads to confusion, for, after all, it is merely one man pitting his opinion against another's translation. Such, I believe, come under the condemnation of the apostle Paul, as expressed in 2 Tim. iii. 7—"Ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth." So on this matter of the pre-existence of Christ, if the brethren would but consider it in a child-like disposition, putting aside all prejudice (although, from experience, I must acknowledge that this is easier said than done), their difficulties would vanish, and the Scriptures would unfold themselves in a beautiful and perfect harmony. I have the *Investigator* for July, 1897, before me as I write this letter, and I have just read bro. Weir's article, par. 2, which, I think, you, in your comment thereon, do not answer. That idea of Isaac's birth, being regarded as equal with Christ's, is to me preposterous. A careful reading of the narrative shows that the only part Jehovah took was in removing Sarah's barrenness, Isaac's conception being as natural as possible, for, from the 25th of Gen., we learn that Abraham afterwards begat several sons, proving that

he, at all events, was virile for some time after.

Bro. Weir's argument on the testimony of the angel to Mary is, I think, a sound one; and personally, I can see no other inference than that Mary would regard Jesus "as that holy thing . . . which shall be called the Son of God." See also Matt. i. 23. Further, if Jesus was not son of God till his baptism, how can you understand him at the age of twelve disputing with the wise men at Jerusalem, and, in his reply to his mother, acknowledging his relation to God in the words, "Wist ye not that I must be about *my Father's*' [not future father] business?" Also, on the strength of 1 Cor. ii. 11-14, Jesus must have had the *spirit* to enable him to understand his "Father's business." I would like to point out one (although not the only one) Old Testament reference to this matter, viz., Micah v. 2, 3, which reads—"But thou, Beth-lehem Ephratah, . . . out of thee shall one come forth unto me that is to be ruler in Israel; *whose goings forth are from of old, from everlasting: Therefore will he give them up, UNTIL the time that she which travaileth hath brought forth,*" etc. I take it that his, Jesus's, goings forth as from ancient days (see margin of R.V.) shall be abandoned until the (or his) birth of Mary, when he shall complete his purpose with Israel, etc. Philip. ii. 5-8 is unintelligible to me apart from the pre-existence theory. For the object there is to teach humility by reminding us of how Christ for our sakes took the "form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and being fashioned as a man," etc. Where is the example if he did not exercise his liberty in choosing the lowly and humble position he occupied upon earth? Also, as we have another reference, "He who *was* rich, for *our* sakes became poor," the question that must arise is, *When* was he rich, and *when* did he become poor? Again the first of Hebrews is a mystery to me apart from the pre-existence of Christ. Regarding the 2nd chap. of Heb., ver. 16, where you disputed the interpretation of "angels," preferring "message-bearers," I do not see that that affects the case, for the idea here is to contrast the nature of angels (or "message-bearers") with the nature of the "seed of Abraham," and most certainly implies that he had the choice, and took the "nature" or flesh and blood of Abraham, that he might bring to nought him that had power over flesh and blood—that is, "the Devil."

COUNTER CONCLUSIONS AND REASONS
FURNISHED BY THE EDITOR.

(1) *About the "pre-existence" of Christ.*—To be consistent, you will have to grant the possibility, if not the probability, of our own "pre-existence;" for to postulate our pre-existence would explain in a very simple way the expression of the disciples—"who did sin—this man or his parents, that he was born blind" (Jno. ix 2)? Simple enough as a solution, but not sound!

(2) *As to prayer.*—I do not see what good this can do us towards the elucidation of Scripture, if we do not make use of all God "gives liberally." You make use of a more or less imperfect translation of Scripture; I examine the Scripture itself. You could soon do this if you would but appreciate at its worth all that God has given you. What is the use of praying over a wrong translation, when, with a little application of the powers and opportunities God has given and put in your way, you could approach more closely to the fountain-head itself? No doubt the Scriptures are "their own best interpreter"; but you are thinking about a translation of them merely when you say this—I speak of the Scriptures themselves—a translation, too, which is necessarily largely inducted by the preconceptions of the translators themselves. I am not content with this, and I cannot understand how any young man can rest content with what is not even the truth at second hand, but very frequently more or less a travesty of it.

(3) *"Arguing and disputing over the exact way in which certain passages should be translated leads to confusion,"* you say. Well, what does arguing and disputing lead to over what a passage means of which, to begin with, you haven't got the right translation? If, however, arguing as to what the right translation is leads to confusion, that is but an additional reason for each of the readers being "fully persuaded in his own mind" by having recourse to the original itself. If you say this is too big an order for you, you would not think that if you realized that it spells s-a-l-v-a-t-i-o-n to you—defining "salvation" as not merely a prospective salvation but as importing deliverance in the present from traditions of men, as reflected from the pages of the English version or from those of the brethren's writings.

(4) *The passage in 2 Tim. iii. 7* refers to "silly women ever learning and never able to come into an exact knowledge" (or clear apprehension) "of truth." Knowledge is not here excluded, only "exact knowledge" (*epignosis*). I do not see what it has to do with an endeavour to give a more faithful reflex of the Word in an English dress, for such a course means an endeavour to second God's own efforts, "who will have all men to

be saved and to come to an exact knowledge of truth." An exact knowledge of truth is impossible prior to "salvation," but it may follow after—some believers never attain it.

(5) *As to prejudice:* You see I look at it this way—you are not able to lay aside your prejudice for the Authorised Version (or the Revised, which is sometimes better, sometimes worse, than the Authorised). Now, I have got so far beyond that, that I never think about reading the Authorised Version in order to understand the Scriptures. I may consult the English version so as to refresh my mind as to how the Translators render any particular passage, but that is about the extent of it.

(6) *Re the 2nd paragraph of bro. Weir's remarks* on the birth of Jesus in the July (1897) issue of the *Investigator*, p. 58. I have not wished to suggest that Isaac was the equal of Jesus, but simply that the parallel is sufficiently close to dispose of the conclusion drawn from the fact of power from on high operating upon Mary constituting in itself the evidence that Jesus was thereby God's Son: that is, in a sense in which Isaac was not. Neither was Son of God on this simple score, for both were sons of women—the one Mary's "first-born son," the other Sarah's. Of the latter it is said she received "power to cast down seed," which, on account of her age, she had ceased to do. Isaac was therefore a "son of power," or "son of God," as Dr. Thomas contends in *Phanerosis*. I think you are mistaken in thinking that Keturah's sons were born after Isaac; but be that as it may, it does not affect Sarah's condition in the least.

(7) *"Not Son of God till his baptism."*—I have not so expressed myself, nor have I thought this, as you will see from the conclusion of my remarks in the October issue of the *Investigator* (1897). It was on the banks of the Jordan that he was publicly "called Son of God." I do not even deny that he was Son of God at twelve. God was his Father, and he was his Son even then—to the extent that he recognised the growing relation—but he still needed to "grow in wisdom and stature and in favour with God and man" (Luke ii. 52).

(8) *"How can I understand him at the age of twelve disputing," etc.*—I do not deny "sonship" in the circumstances, for no doubt Jesus himself recognised the relationship—I doubt if his mother did so, however.

(9) *"Whose goings forth are from of old."*—Whose "goings forth"? Not those of the Son of God, but "goings forth" of Jehovah—he who was to be (or become) whom (or what) he should be (or become). The babe Jesus was a manifestation of the power of God, who had spoken from of old of the

"goings forth" of this one, as revealed in the memorial name, and individually referred to in Eden as the coming destroyer of Evil. This one, Jesus, was the cherub when born of Mary in whom God would dwell, and who would accordingly become Emmanuel—God-with-us; for "God was in Christ reconciling a world unto himself." This is the Eternal Purpose, or "Purpose of the Ages," but it is the purpose of the Most High, not of the Son of the Most High. The "them" in the case who are to be "given up" are quite evidently the children of Israel, not the "goings forth"; these "goings forth" have never been "given up."

(10) *Phil. ii. 5-8* is quite intelligible to me apart from postulating pre-existence in heaven. I grant Jesus was in "a form of God" (*morphē theou*) before he "humbled himself and became obedient unto death," only it has to be determined what "a form of God" amounted to in Paul's estimation. But you do not believe that the pre-existent one died? whereas I believe that the one who was in "a form of God" was the very one who died on the cross, wherefore God had highly exalted him—the self-same one who died—and given him "the name above every name."

2 Cor. viii. 9.—Christ Jesus was "rich" and at the same time "poor" in the very same sense as Paul, who "while poor made many rich"—rich in the truth as in Christ Jesus. His "riches" and his "poverty" co-existed, as did Paul's. But pre-existence isn't in it. A literal translation tells us that Christ was humble all through: he never

presumed upon the exalted relationship in which he stood to the Father: hence the lesson to us.

Heb. i. is no mystery, but a most intelligible composition, when we understand that Jesus was the highest of all God's representatives on earth: hence in the future all God's message-bearers ("angels") of the Ages will worship (or bow the knee) to him. We know that to none of them has it ever been said, "This day have I begotten thee": we cannot speak so confidently of the angels of other orders who are all sons of God—which they cannot be apart from some chief-begotten one of their own order—who certainly was not Jesus of Nazareth, the Son of whom the gospels testify.

Heb. ii. 16 does not in the least justify your contention that Jesus exercised a choice as to what order he would be born into. I admit, however, that Jesus existed before he made his choice; but his choice had to do with *office*, not with "nature." The term "nature" is supplied by the Trinitarian translators. What Jesus chose was to be the "seed of Abraham," which is not a fleshly but a spiritual relation. An accurate translation of *Heb. ii. 16* tells us: "For you know that nowhere is he laying hold of messengers' things, but he is laying hold of Abraham's seed's things."

Jhos. Nickef

THE ATONEMENT AS TAUGHT BY BRO. STAINFORTH.

(a) I accept with thanks the Editor's improved reading of *Rom. ix. 2, 3* on cover, Oct., 1898. It supplies another instance of Paul's habit of inserting parenthesis in his writings, the absence of which from "Hebrews" is one of the arguments disproving his alleged authorship of that epistle.

(b) I do not think our readers will desire much more on the question of "native" justice. Let me just refer to an incident. When I was about nine years old I was sauntering along, and a boy threw an unprovoked stone and just missed me. On the *cultivated* principle of strict and swift justice, I threw it back and hit him on the head. His parents, believing their son to have been a martyr, complained, and I was condemned at home to give the young brat a ship for which I had just paid 10s. I believe they also were liberally compensated. That is my experience of street arab justice, from the street sheik downwards.

(c) W. D. J.'s reference (p. 19, 2) to "Acts xxii. 25" (*i.e.*, Roman citizenship) as an illustration of the justice of Gentile laws is most unfortunate, for the regulation was doubtless just on a par with that Popish (Roman again, you see) institution "Benefit of clergy," as to which says Froude: "From the 12th to the 16th centuries the clergy were a separate caste; they made and administered their own laws. They could neither sue nor be sued in any secular court. They had contrived, on one plea or another, to stretch their privilege till 'Benefit of Clergy' was extended to everyone who could read; it had even been ruled to cover priests' concubines. The effect was that crimes of the darkest dye could be and were committed by clerks in order with perfect impunity. They might be taken in the act of rape, murder, or robbery. The magistrates could not commit them; the judges could not try them; they were claimed by the Bishop's Ordinary, and were handed

over to the Bishop to be dealt with. Ex-communication had no terrors for felons; they could not be hanged or whipped; to cage them up for life was costly and inconvenient, so they paid with their purses as much as could be got out of them, and were then turned adrift. The result was that there were a number of dangerous wild beasts about, who could neither be killed nor shut up" (Froude's "Trent," p. 16). No doubt the "Roman citizen" immunity from law was worked in much the same style. We see the chief captain was afraid to take the usual course with a privileged "disturber of the peace," as he suspected Paul to be. I quite fail to see the justice of such licenses; that one man may steal a horse while another must not look over the hedge.

(d) Now, do we not all tacitly recognise that justice is unnatural to us, and only observed with reluctance, from the self-approbation we feel on its performance? But, with all due respect to Mr. Jardine, if "justice is as native as eyesight," how is it that, while seeing is freely exercised, justice "being without works is dead in itself?" Is not dishonesty rampant all round us?

(e) The centurion was not an example of native morality; he was instructed in the law, a "proselyte of the gate," which, I think, was the nearest approach a Gentile could make to Judaism, and, as regards salvation, was on a level with Paul before his conversion, I suppose. I am sorry to find my little joke about "good old Homer" so utterly unintelligible, but let it go.

(f) The doctrine of Vicarious Atonement—the death of the Just for the Unjust—the fact that while we were yet sinners Christ died for the ungodly—is the question at least nominally in view, and it should not be smothered with disquisitions as to the nativeness of justice. Let bro. J. answer my previous assertion and question. I say that it was perfectly reasonable and just that God, in his position as the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, should invite him to lay down his forfeited life as a sacrificial substitute for such condemned sinners as would thankfully avail themselves of his kindness; promising him thereupon restoration to life and the amplest compensation for his sufferings and reward for his services; and that Jesus—recognising the necessities of the case, its justice, and its ultimate advantages to the human race and, above all, to himself—"for the joy set before him endured" all that was necessary. Where is the flaw of injustice in this arrangement?

(g) I also ask him to explain—in view of the Divine Covenant in the Law to those who keep it—upon what principle was the

only Man who ever did keep the Law permitted—nay, commanded—by the Law-giver himself to submit to the identical "indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish" which are the declared due of the "contentious and of those who do not obey the truth"?

(h) I object to have to spend time and space in correcting misrepresentations. I have repudiated, and carefully avoided saying, that Jesus was "punished," nor have I said that God "punishes" the children for the father. I have said that fathers often act so that natural consequences blast their children's lives, so that they thus suffer for their fathers' sins. But though the father is the author of their sufferings, I do not think bro. J. will say that he punishes his children for his own sins. So we see it is a common thing for people to suffer for the sins of others, while it would be absurd to say that they are punished for them; yet the effect on the sufferers appears like punishment to them and to us.

(i) The fact which I stated "that the Hebrews never made Wills" shows that the writer to the Hebrews could not have had a Will in view; so *diathékē* should always be rendered by "Covenant," with no marginal alternative. Dr. Thomas erroneously taught that the New Covenant was, in fact, God's Will (or Testament) covenanted with Man, and since God could not die to bring the Will into effect, it was ratified or came into force by the death of Christ! But a Will is not a Covenant any more than is a cheque drawn on a bank. They are both merely orders to transfer property, and seldom contain any conditions for fulfilment by the legatees. The "death" of Heb. ix. 16 has been explained in our Magazines as Dr. Young renders the passage: "For where a covenant is, the death of the covenant-victim is necessary to come in, for a covenant over dead victims is steadfast, since it is of no force at all when the covenant-victim liveth." "The calf must be cut in twain," see Jer. xxxiv. 18.

(j) I have never been able to make out what were the things of the Law which the Gentiles did by nature; as I suppose they would not have been satisfied with a stone for a stone, as I was in my encounter.

(k) *Re* this unimmersed believing woman (47, 1). She could not produce acceptable works until *after* Immersion. Immersion being a precious privilege, what can there be meritorious in laying hold of eternal life? Works do not save us. Being all more or less imperfect (mostly *more*), they are worthless as the purchase of salvation; their sole value lies in the proof they afford that the faith that produces them, however weak,

is genuine. Immersion, like the Lord's Supper, being merely an outward expression of belief in that which we find is infallibly true, can hardly be seriously classed as meritorious. The true value of Immersion, I think, is correctly shown in my parable of "The Drowning Man and the Rope," on p. 96, No. 52, to which I call bro. Jardine's attention. He appears to regard salvation as a process jointly worked out by the Sinner and the Saviour.

R. R. STAINFORTH.

THE INTERLINEAR TRANSLATION OF I Cor. xv.—This has been stereotyped after careful revision and correction, and may be published as a 12-page tract (with a useful explanatory *Introduction* added) at 3d., post free. If this meets with acceptance I shall afterwards publish translations of the Epistles (separately), but without the interlinear arrangement—simply a translation with notes.

DR. YOUNG'S BIBLE—No. 2

1 Sam. xxii. 19: "And Nob, the city of the priests, he hath smitten by the mouth of the sword" (Dr. Young's version). The same figure appears in the N.T.—"They shall fall by the mouth of the sword," Luke xxi. 24 (*Young*). So of the symbolic appearance of Christ—"Out of his mouth went a sharp two-edged" (*Greek*, two-"mouthed") "sword"; Rev. i. 16, also ii. 12, "He who hath the sword, the two-mouthed, the sharp." This idea, that the edge of a sword is its "mouth," adds force and consistency to the expression that the death inflicted therewith constitutes a devouring. Accordingly, we read in Deut xxx. 42, "I will make my arrow drunk with blood, and my sword shall devour flesh;" and Isa. i. 20: "If ye refuse and rebel ye shall be devoured by the sword." This being so it seems appropriate that in the Apocalyptic vision John should see the sharp two-mouthed sword proceeding from the mouth of the symbolic Christ; and it likewise coincides with Isa. xlix. 2, which reads like a reminiscence of Deut. above: "He hath made my mouth like a sharp sword, . . . and made me a polished shaft; in his quiver hath he hid me." R.R.S.

CORRESPONDENCE.

NO AUTHORITY TO PREACH.

DEAR BRO. NISBET,—As one having passed through the phase of thought indicated by the above title, I would like to add a word or two which may be of interest.

Very much depends upon what we mean when we speak of having authority to do this, that, or the other. It is one thing to be specially appointed and invested with power to do a certain work, and another thing merely to exercise our individual right to perform certain actions.

The apostles had a direct command given to them: "Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to the whole creation" (Mark xvi. 15), and

it is stated that certain signs should follow them that believed. Moreover, they were told: "Tarry ye in the city until ye be clothed with power from on high" (Luke xxiv. 49).

We know from the Acts of the Apostles that on the day of Pentecost the Holy Spirit rested upon them in the form of cloven tongues of fire, "and they were all filled with the Holy Spirit, and began to speak with other tongues as the Spirit gave them utterance" (Acts ii. 4).

Christ had also told them, that when they should be brought before kings and rulers, they should take no thought what they should say, since it would be given them in that hour by the Holy Spirit what they should speak.

They were thus specially appointed and adequately equipped for the work to which they had been called; and then authority to preach was manifest by the signs and wonders they were able to perform. In the expressive words of Mark, "They went forth and preached everywhere, the Lord working with them, and confirming the word by the signs that followed" (Mark xvi. 20).

This choice, preparation, and equipment of the apostles was special and peculiar to that time, and in the development of God's purpose with the human family, was a necessity. In this position they could say with Paul, "We are ambassadors therefore on behalf of Christ, as though God were entreating by us; we beseech you on behalf of Christ be ye reconciled to God" (2 Cor. v. 20), and also, "For if I preach the Gospel I have nothing to glory of; for necessity is laid upon me; for woe is unto me, if I preach not the Gospel" (1 Cor. ix. 16).

In this important epoch nothing was left to the frailty of unaided humanity. The establishment of the Church, and the work of recording God's last message to man through His Son and of Christ's revelations to his servants for the guidance and upbuilding of the Church, were committed to men specially ordained and authorised by Divine power. This authority to thus preach the Gospel and found churches has not passed to any successors of the apostles, but ceased with them, the work for which such extraordinary power was manifested having been accomplished.

To-day the circumstances have altered very considerably. In our search for the Truth as in Jesus, we have to pass over the multitude of teachers who have succeeded the apostles, and go to the records that have been preserved for us of their doings and sayings, and learn from

them the good news which shall be to all peoples. As individuals from among a great host of men and women who are earnestly seeking to know the will of God, it becomes us, as we get to know the Truth and experience the blessedness of that freedom which the possession of Truth brings to us, to make known to our fellows the results of our labours, and invite them to a share in the benefits we have received. This is not only our right and privilege, but our duty, inasmuch as we, without doubt, have benefited by the labours of others. The maxim, "Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you," is our authority for thus making known our conception of the Truth.

It will be obvious, however, that this right or authority to make known our ideas of Truth is far different from that which was at the back of the apostles. The words of the apostles were the words of Divine inspiration. With them it was not an appeal to their fellows to place their opinions alongside their own, and endeavour by mutual discussion to decide which was the nearest to the Truth or their conception of it, which, at most, is all we can lay claim to in the present age. But they could say, "I make known unto you the Gospel . . . wherein ye stand, by which also ye are saved . . . if ye hold it fast" (1 Cor. xv. 2).

Mankind had to accept the message of the apostles as being the word of God to them: "Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God," and until the appearance of the apostles with the good news of the kingdom, the heathen would have had little or no chance of hearing the word of God.

Hence it was well written of them, "How shall they call on him in whom they have not believed, and how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard, and how shall they

hear without a preacher, and how shall they preach except they be sent" (Rom. x. 14, 15)?

This question, however, cannot be asked in the 19th century. To-day the word of God is scattered broadcast over the whole world practically. Wherever any individual has access to the Scriptures, and can read them for himself, he is not dependent on others teaching him the way of salvation. Doubtless the help of others would be of great value, and enable him to gain a more correct view of Scripture teaching; but his salvation in no way depends upon his contact and association with any of the religious bodies that surround him. Devoting himself to the study of the sacred writings, and diligently seeking to become wise unto salvation, he may rest upon the promise, "If any man lack wisdom, let him ask of God, who giveth to all men liberally and upbraideth not, and it shall be given him" (James i. 5).

Our authority to preach, therefore, is not supported by quoting passages of Scripture which have relation to a special time and circumstances. The subject is well worthy the consideration of the brethren, for there seems to be a tendency to confuse the very import and distinction between the authority of the apostles in their proclamation of the Gospel and our right to make known our idea of Truth. Likewise, there appears to be an idea with some that the preaching is the sum and substance of a Christian's work. In consequence, many worthy brethren undertake a work for which they are totally unfitted, and under a mistaken sense of duty occupy a large proportion of time, which could be more profitably spent, both to themselves and the community to which they belong, in other equally useful spheres of activity.

GEO. F. BERRY.

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REMARKS.

No doubt it is as bro. George F. Berry says: "It depends upon what we mean when we speak of having authority to do this, that, or the other." If by "authority to preach" one means an *express commission from Christ to proclaim the Gospel in his name*, then I should say the man does not live who can legitimately lay claim to this; but if by the term "authority" one simply means *moral right or privilege*, then I should say the possession of truth gives one the right to, nay, imposes upon one the duty of, making it known to others.

But, while this is so, we have other and greater privileges than the right to proclaim the Gospel; these may be briefly included in the expressive phrase, living it. And I may add, that I have considerable sympathy with the note sounded by bro. Berry in his concluding paragraph. I have often thought that much of the time and attention given to the public proclamation of the truth might be more profitably applied to our own improvement in divine things. In connection with this subject and his remarks at the beginning of the paragraph, I should be glad to receive contributions for reproduction in the *Investigator* from brethren who have considered the subject.—EDITOR.

DID GOD SLAY JESUS?

DEAR BRO. NISBET,—Regarding "The Atonement:" In the "Law of the Lord," which was a "*perfect law*," we find the oft-repeated words, "Thou shalt not kill." Now, popular advocates of "the Atonement" boldly maintain that the death of Jesus was deliberately planned by God Himself. To my idea of right and wrong it seems strange that God would first

raise up the man Christ Jesus to do "His will," and then, when his work was finished, to have him become the subject of the *foulest crime ever committed*, and then stamp it with the seal that this is the only way in which God will forgive sin.

I believe that God *allowed* Adam to eat of the forbidden fruit, and that He *allowed* the nation of Israel to *wreak their vengeance* on Jesus. But that the death of Jesus was deliberately planned by God *I do not believe*, and I am strengthened in that belief from the manner in which the atrocious deed is spoken of even when *the blood* of Jesus was yet warm, so to speak (Acts ii. 23). By *wicked hands* ye have *crucified, slain* (iii. 15) and *killed the Prince of Life* (vii. 52) of whom ye have *been now the betrayers and murderers*.

The deed attributed to God is inconsistent with his character as revealed by Moses and the Prophets, and is a flat contradiction to Pro. xvii. 15, which says—"He that *justifieth the wicked*, and he that *condemneth the just*, even they both are abomination to the Lord;" also, Ex. xxiii. 7—"Keep thee far from a false matter, and the *innocent and righteous slay thou not*, for I WILL *not justify the wicked*." No idea of substitution can be gathered from these verses.

The majority of the brethren may not be willing to acknowledge the terms—substitution, satisfaction, or compensation, as *lurking* in their theology, still the idea of a *proxy* is there all the same in its native deformity: I sin, and Jesus, an innocent man, suffers (not a very comforting thought). From this innocent man's sufferings we have the fanatical notion of *imputation*, from which the following *outcomes* may have arisen:—"The merits of the slain Lamb" (A. M.); "He became us that we might become him;" "Thou hast accepted us as justified through the death of Jesus" (J. M.); "Jesus died as a satisfaction

to satisfy divine justice" (A. G.). If it be worth while to examine our belief, we would require to begin and learn the moral character of the Being "who has given us life and breath and all things." This Being has proclaimed himself to be "the Lord God merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth" (Ex. xxxiv. 5, 6). One with such attributes certainly knew what was best adapted for us; and being merciful, would never call upon us to do anything that he had not enabled us to do; neither would he propose to us a reward which he knew we could not attain, or a punishment which we could not avoid. If this be granted, it is in the power of man to do the will of God; and His commandments are not grievous (1 John v. 3). Moral precepts abound in the Scriptures with express rewards and punishments for their observance, and men are invited in a most earnest manner to their proper attention.

In the history of Jesus we learn that he sought not his own glory, but only the "will of Him that sent him." Nowhere is it stated that Jesus came to appease God, or to do something which might enable Him to grant forgiveness of sins, which He would otherwise have been compelled to punish. The whole life and service of Jesus is suited to produce an important change in the mind of man; but man's condition is painted in frightful colours by orthodox ideas, which cast unspeakable dishonour on the character of God, evidently for the sake of magnifying the greatness of Jesus; for not a few ascribe to Jesus a greater compassion towards mankind than God is disposed to feel. But Jesus did not come to make God merciful. On the contrary, Jesus was sent because God is and ever was merciful and gracious. He was sent to proclaim God's inherent goodness, and to

announce the conditions on which His blessings would be dispensed.

The Apostle Peter (1 Ep. ii. 21) says that "Jesus left us an example that we should follow his steps." His life was a life of rectitude, though opposed by the most dreadful trials possible; his triumph over temptation may therefore encourage us to withstand in hope of similar success.

Acts iii. 26: "God having raised up His Son Jesus, sent Him to *bless you in turning every one of you from his iniquities.*" Acts x. 34, 5: "God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation he that *FEARETH Him and WORKETH righteousness is accepted with Him.*"—Fraternally yours,

JAS. WALLS.

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Aberdeen.

A QUERY AND A CRITICISM.

[This communication was intended to appear in previous issue, but was "crushed out." This will explain the reference to "last issue"—bro. Saunders refers, of course, to the January number.—EDITOR.]

DEAR BROTHER NISBET,—I am much interested in your translation of 1 Cor. xv., and, if I had my finger in your button-hole, would have a few questions to ask you, such as, How would you, in view of your translation, interpret verses 3 and 4? In what sense did Anointed die off over the errors of *us* (apostles, I presume)? Then, in view of the *arousing* of verse 12, how would you explain that of verse 4, compared with that of verses 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17?

Last issue of *Investigator* is, to my mind, a very poor affair. Your "rejoinder" to Stainforth is the best thing in the magazine. But alas for the two writers on what they have been pleased to call the "Spirit in Man!" Both seem to me to be sweltering in confusion, and the longer they write the more confused will they become.

Each requires to turn back to the beginning—a start was *not* made there. If it was recognised that Adam was the son of his father and mother, who eventually became a living soul through inhaling the culture of Elohim, which they blew into, or set before, his face, it would seem that *prior* to this he had no spirit other than is common to every living creature and plant—*ruach*. Having imbibed the teaching of Elohim, he thereby acquired somewhat of the spirit or disposition of the One whom he was to imitate, which, however, was not man's spirit. Then, both seem to designate Jesus (Adam Second) as one "unbegotten"—the son of a woman only—a natural impossibility, if God changes not. From such an unnatural and impossible standpoint neither writer can perceive that John was sent to set before the face of Joseph's son the straight and narrow way to the Father. John proclaimed to the son of Joseph (among others) a baptism upon thinking with Deity unto release from the thralldom of that institution which did not think with him because of sin, and to which he (Jesus) stood by birth related. Thus, by inhaling the teaching of John (*neshamah*, eh?) Jesus became the chief-begotten from the dead (surroundings) to *aionian* life, and was there-upon openly acknowledged and declared to be my Son, the Beloved! In this way he acquired a spirit—the spirit or disposition of Deity. To think with Jesus, and do as he did, is the only way to gain the up-standing to which he attained; the only way in which man—the natural man—may acquire a spirit, which spirit is that of the anointed.

To imitate Jesus is the alpha and omega of the whole matter—only by so doing can anyone acquire a spirit acceptable unto Deity.—Your brother in strife,

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Gilmerton,
Near Edinburgh.

The Investigator.

"All things, put to the test; the good retain."—1 Thess. v. 21.

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No. 56.

THE SPIRIT IN MAN (*Discussion*).

I AM sorry, but not surprised, to learn, through July *Investigator*, that bro. Nisbet's health has given way under strain of work. A pen so facile as his could not fail, in time, to sap an "organisation" however robust. I trust that attention to the doctor's advice will soon counteract the tendency to collapse which he experiences. Meantime, he has handed his "brief" to bro. Paris, "to complete the discussion," and to him we must now look. It is to be regretted, however, that this change of generals should have been necessary when the campaign was all but ended. I expected (as the result of bro. Nisbet's "cud chewing") to see in July *Investigator* a careful and comprehensive examination of what was held over from the previous issue; so that my present contribution, which had been promised to be my last, might have dealt with his observations in full. As matters stand, I shall have to confine myself to what appears in his editorial and footnotes, with whatever else may be deemed essential to a proper leave-taking.

In the editorial, then, par. 2, bro. Nisbet says,—“It seems to me that the most charitable view to take of the matter would be to think that bro. Weir understands neither the lexicographers nor Sir William.” Strange to say, bro. Nisbet's next sentence reads—“I do not, therefore, deny the lexicographers' definitions as being conventionally correct, but I by no means feel thereby under an obligation to admit the existence of that of which a given term is the correct sign or symbol.”

This sentence contains (1) the admission that the term I employed is “the correct conventional sign or symbol” to express my meaning; but (2) he denies the existence of that (*viz.*, life) to which I applied it. How, then, could he say that “bro. Weir understands neither the lexicographers nor Sir William,” when he feels compelled to admit the *correctness* of my use of terms; to establish which was my only reason for citing these authorities? It seems to me that the most charitable view to take of this matter would be to think that bro. Nisbet was too unwell to read, with due care, what I had written, or to reflect upon the logical bearing of what he himself was writing.

But (2) as to the existence of “life” in a *latent* form in the “seed”; although I have more than proven this, a few more lines may be borne with, in reply to bro. Nisbet's animadversions.

He says—“I find fault with bro. Weir for thinking that when he combines the term ‘latent’ with the term ‘life’ he thereby proves that a something—which something is life—actually exists while latent.”

Bro. Nisbet here “finds fault” with me for what I am not guilty of. In view of what I have written hereon, no unbiassed reader will regard his statement as even approximately correct. To merely combine the term “latent” with the term “life” would, of course, prove nothing; but I have

done much more than simply "combine" these terms. At the commencement of this discussion, I carefully defined my terms and position. On p. 49, par. 5, *Investigator* 47, the "human spirit" is defined as "that occult factor of man's constitution which, *in unison with body*, produces soul or life." From this I have not swerved in the slightest, though having, with great frequency, referred to the relationship of the "spirit" to the "life," in the course of my argument. Take one example—*Investigator* 53, pp. 3 and 4. Here life is shown to be a "quality of the 'spirit'—where the 'spirit' is 'life' is, either *active* or *latent*." That is to say: the potency of the "life" is *resident in the "spirit"*; and, when favourable conditions are furnished, activity obtains—otherwise *latency* continues; or, in other words—the "spirit" remains *inactive*. "Life," then, strictly speaking, in the *active* sense, is but a manifestation of the presence of the "spirit," and when said manifestation is not forthcoming—provided the "spirit" be not destroyed—it is strictly correct to speak of the "life" as *latent*. Nothing is known of "life" excepting what is gathered from these manifestations. In a case, for instance, of suspended animation, friends anxiously watch for a pulse-beat, or a movement of any muscle. Such movement is interpreted to mean that "life" still lingers—or in the form of my contention—the "spirit" is still there. To be particular, then, "body" and "spirit" may be regarded as the *constituents* of the man; while the term "life" is the name given to the *sign* or manifestation of their *union*, and, on the contrary, "death" is the term indicative of their *separation*. Hence the phrase, "Spirit, soul, and body" (1 Thes. v. 23) as applied to a *living* man.

Prior's use of the term "latent" is a *poetic* use—an extreme. There are modified uses, as we have seen from Webster. One of these applies to the "seed" in question, and may be fitly illustrated by a grape-vine. Happening to possess a vinery, I can speak from experience on this point. Owing to the severity of last winter, about twenty per cent. of my vines died; yet so closely did they resemble the living ones that it was impossible to tell the one from the other until spring came, when life becoming *active* in the living ones enabled me to distinguish. So far as appearances went there might as well have been fifty as twenty per cent. dead. In the living ones the "life" was "hidden," "dormant," etc., awaiting suitable conditions in which to manifest itself, *i.e.*, to become *active*.

Now, bro. Nisbet, in his editorial, admits that the "seed"—the connecting link between parent and offspring—living soul and living soul—man and man—is *not* "dead." What then? It must be alive: there is no middle state. If alive, the "life" is not *active*; therefore, it must be *latent*. And, further, as "apart from the spirit the body is dead" (Jas. ii. 26), "life" is dependent on the presence of the "spirit," so the presence of "life" in this "seed" argues, necessarily, *the presence of the "spirit."* Bro. Nisbet, then, has reluctantly admitted all that I have been contending for; and, in the light of this admission, all his arguments about the "block of marble," etc., fall to pieces—so much waste of time and space.

MIND.—Bro. Nisbet objects to Paul's use of the term "mind" (*nous*), in Rom. xiv. 5, being classed by me in the same category as that of Sir William Hamilton, or of Dr. Reid—*viz.*, as a power—or faculty of the person, or Ego. I may mention—what I suppose bro. Nisbet knows—that Webster so classes it, and with him I agree. Bro. Nisbet quotes 1 Cor. i. 10 as "on all fours" with Rom. xiv. 5. He seems to mean that *nous* is used by Paul, in both passages,

in the *same sense*. If so, in both instances it applies to the "Producer" and not to the "product." If we consult Luke xxiv. 45—where *nous* first appears in the New Testament—we shall see this:—"Then opened he their mind (*nous*) that they might understand the Scriptures." Obviously the term *mind* here denotes the *faculty* through which they "might understand." Correspondingly, Rom. xiv. 5 deals with the *faculty* through which they might be "persuaded." In neither case can it, reasonably, be held to mean anything else; as they both involve a *mental process*. It may be that the same meaning attaches to 1 Cor. i. 10, although it might be reasonably explained as signifying the *product*: the two passages are not, necessarily, parallel. To cite Rev. xiii. 18, and comment on it as bro. Nisbet does, is very wide of the mark. If he will re-peruse what I have written on pp. 57, 58, in answer to his question, he will see that, while I claim that the term "mind," *primarily*, signifies the *faculty of man* by which he perceives, thinks, wills, desires, I also allow that it has *derivative* meanings. And, further, I know that one of these appears in Rev. xiii. 18, which renders *pointless* his comment. It may be added that there are but 24 occurrences of *nous* in the New Testament, all of which, excepting this one, are rendered "mind" by Rotherham, and the large majority of them apply to the *thinking faculty*. Moreover, Robinson, in his Greek and English lexicon, gives as the literal or primary meaning of *nous*—"the seer, perceiver, *i.e.*, the intelligent or intellectual principle, *the mind*": and, generally speaking, all authorities in learning agree with him. It is, therefore, useless for bro. Nisbet to continue to "kick against the pricks."

RESURRECTION.—It does not appear to me that my theory "fails to stand present tests," as these have been applied to it by bro. Nisbet; though he seems to think otherwise. Still, I should feel dissatisfied if it did not also stand the "*Resurrection Test*," which I regard as indispensable for the vindication of a *correct theory of the nature of man*: because, however plausible in the light of "present tests," a theory which fails to land its subject on the further shore of *Sheol* must be worthless.

Then, as to the remainder of this paragraph, bro. Nisbet will see, should he read afresh pp. 4 and 5, *Investigator* 47, that what he imputes to me is entirely wrong.

WILL.—Bro. Nisbet doubtless has his "own notions about the Will," and has a right, if he so elect, to keep them to himself, but when he says, "its consideration does not affect the nature of the Spirit in Man" question he takes an untenable position. On pp. 80 and 81 the question of the function of the Will was treated at considerable length, and his attention to it respectfully solicited. Request followed request, to the same effect, but no attention was given until he wrote the refusal now under review. What is the explanation of this silence? It is simply that, in the light of Scripture, bro. Nisbet is unable to formulate a reasonable theory of the Will which would not destroy his case. By the Will is meant, "The faculty of choosing or determining." Scripture treats man as possessing this faculty: "Choose you this day whom ye will serve: . . . as for me and my house we will serve the Lord" (Jos. xxiv. 15). And the "spirit" is the basis of it (Psa. lxxvii. 6; Matt. xxvi. 41; 1 Cor. ii. 11). But, bro. Nisbet says—"The spirit in man" is that "spirit or *ruach* which existed before the creature called man put in his appearance upon this globe of ours, and which *ruach* will continue to be after 'flesh' has disappeared" (p. 61). This can be no other than the "all-

pervading *ruach elohim*—"Spirit of God." But, as this is "everywhere and in everything," it cannot *belong to man*, in any *personal* sense—as *the body does*: therefore, as the human Will, and all associate mental and moral qualities, are attributes of the "spirit in man"—as has been proved—they are attributes of God: hence, all responsibility for man's actions belongs also to God—man being a *mere automaton*. How, then, can we understand the Scriptures, which always shew man to be amenable to judgment, and related to reward and punishment? Well might bro. Nisbet hesitate to present a theory of Will involving such awkward conclusions.

Turning now to bro. Paris, I find on inside of cover some "short observations *re* the 'marble' and the 'grain,' " which he "felt moved to jot down." As these, no doubt, indicate the bent of his mind, I shall examine one or two of them, as a means of guiding him in what he may hereafter write.

THE GRAIN.—It is puzzling to read that, "The water placed in contact with the grain establishes a necessary connection—completing, as it were, the circuit—by which the 'spirit of life,' pervading and surrounding both the water and the grain, passes over, electric-like, as by a bridge, and gets into active and vital contact with the organised grain, and so setting up the process we call life."

How the "spirit of life" (the "*ruach elohim*"—for that is what both he and bro. Nisbet contend for), which is here, properly, said to be "*pervading* the grain" (as, in fact, it *pervades* everything (Psa. cxxxix.), requires "a bridge to *pass over and get into active and vital contact* with the organised grain," is a problem for an oracle to solve. It might pass current in a world where two and two make five; or where "things equal to the same thing" are not "equal to one another," but it is too profound for this world.

He next says—"Life itself may not necessarily have been in the grain." That is to say, "maybe it *was* there, though not necessarily." Well, the one "maybe" is as good as the other; but both are ruled out by the evidence already advanced, as well as by bro. Nisbet's admission that the "seed is *not dead*." It is useless, therefore, for bro. Paris to further indulge in this speculative chemical negation: it can accomplish nothing. Should he intend to write any more on this subject, let him *grasp*, and deal with, my argument *as a whole*. If, on the contrary, he follow bro. Nisbet's example,—evading the Will and Resurrection tests: the *tests* chiefly calculated to expose the weakness of his chemical plea; I shall refrain from reply. Chemistry may be a very convenient instrument to conjure with this side of *Sheol*, but at the *grave's mouth* its usefulness, in that respect, ends. The chemistry of *Sheol*, thoroughly demolishes the "organisation," on which brn. Nisbet and Paris both lay so much stress. Something more than "organisation" is necessary to meet *all demands*.

The following summary may be helpful to readers, now that the end has been reached:—

(1). Man is composed of two factors—a "body" and a "spirit." "Life" or "soul" is the name given to the *sign* or manifestation of their *union*; whereas the term "death" indicates their *separation*. If the term "*latent*" be joined to the term "life," it indicates that, while it is the *nature* of the "spirit" to *live*, it is not its nature *always* to be putting forth "signs" of "activity." The phrases "life latent," and "spirit inactive," both express the same thought.

(2). Both "body" and "spirit" were, at first, "*formed*" by "The Lord

God," (Gen. ii. 7) ; Zec. xii. 1) ; and, by Him only can both be "destroyed" (Mat. x. 28). Gen. ii. 7 is not, as bro. Nisbet, himself, admits (*Investigator* 53, p. 9)—a complete account of the make-up of man. "The spirit in man" is, according to Paul, "The spirit of man" (1 Cor. ii. 11) ; and is as much a *part of his constitution*, as his body is: *both* belong to God.

(3). The "body" is formed of the dust—*inert*—having neither "life" nor "mind" apart from the "spirit," of which they are qualities.

(4). The term "soul" (Heb. *nephesh* ; Gr. *psuche*), while simply the synonym of the term "life" (Lev. xvii. 11 ; Mat. xvi. 25 R.V.) is very often applied (synecdochically), in both Old and New Testaments, to the entire person.

(5). Each creature—animal or vegetable—was furnished, by the Creator, with the means of reproducing itself (Gen. i. 11) ; a "living seed" being the connecting link between parent and offspring—a fact which suggests a *psychical*, as well as a *physical*, reproduction.

(6). "Death" introduces man—"body" and "spirit"—to Heb. *Sheol* ; Gr. *Hades*—lit. "The unseen," or "The state of the dead : " "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was ; and the spirit shall return to God who gave it" (Ec. xii. 7). The "body" soon dissolves, but not so the "spirit" ; God alone, who "formed," can *de-*"form" it. Man may send man to *Sheol* : God, only, can "destroy him in Gehenna."

(7). Besides vitalising the "body," the "spirit" is also the "basis of the mind" (1 Cor. ii. 11) ; hence, man's record—his "memory," &c., is registered (phonograph-like) therein ; and, thus, it constitutes the means of *preserving* and *restoring*, his identity—"God giveth it a body as it hath pleased Him" (1 Cor. xv. 38).

(8). As man's "spirit," and *not his "brain,"* is, according to Scripture, the "basis of his mind," it is, therefore, the *medium of his redemption*. The Word—which "is spirit"—may be "engrafted" on it—"spirit" on "spirit" :—"Receive with meekness the engrafted word which is able to save your souls" (Jas. i. 21). And, as the Will is a prominent power of the mind, man contracts responsibility by means of the "spirit"—*if it be his* ; but if it be God's "spirit"—and *not man's*—then man *cannot* be responsible.

It is now nearly three years since I began writing in connection with this discussion—a much longer period than I had any expectation, or intention, of devoting to it. Whatever its effect upon others may have been, I am happy in being able to testify, along with my respected opponent, bro. Nisbet, that "I have myself benefitted by the discussion." His criticisms, though at times disappointing, caused the examination of many points, which, otherwise, would not have been thought of ; but are now squarely before our minds for individual treatment. Bro. Nisbet's habit of giving competent writers an opportunity of stating their views, whether he can agree with them or not, is worthy of commendation, and cannot but do good. Letters received regarding the discussion, lead me to think that a widely-felt need has been met by it ; and, now let us hope, that a question so seriously affecting the foundations of belief, will be canvassed by the brethren in general, as its importance demands.

In conclusion, I heartily thank bro. Nisbet for the privilege of so fully and freely stating my theory ; and I hope, ere long, to hear of his adoption of it.

225 Clinton Street,
Toronto, Canada.

R. Nisbet

NOW READY—PRICE 3d.; BY POST, 3½d.

AN INTERLINEAR TRANSLATION OF 1 COR. XV.

BY THE EDITOR.

[I reproduce below a portion of the Introductory matter prefacing my Interlinear and Marginal Translations of the above. I am not able to reproduce it entire here, but what there is of it may be found useful to such as do not care to pay for the separate work.—EDITOR.]

FOREWORDS.

THIS fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians, of which I here furnish a literal translation with freer marginal rendering at side, is one of the most interesting in the New Testament: it is at the same time one of the least understood. Not that there is much New Testament teaching understood as yet, for this record which God has given us through men who "got to know God" in their day and generation seems to be as little understood as that other book which he has produced—the Book of Nature. And while it is true that "the things that are revealed (to us) belong to us," it remains true that "the things that are hid belong to God" (Deut. xxix. 29). And we do not need to go outside the Sacred Writings for "the things that are hid," for there is very much which although written there with pen and ink remains hid from the reader, and belongs as yet only to God—and to those to whom He reveals Himself. It is one of the witless assumptions of the age that Revelation and the Written Word are identical. But *revelation* implies two, the Revelator and the one to whom He makes Himself known. So that of a Revelator it may be said, as Paul, in Gal. iii. 20, says of a Mediator—substituting "Revelator" for "Mediator"—"Now a Revelator is not of one (but God is one)". There must therefore be more than God involved in revelation: where God is revealed there must also be man as the intelligent recipient; otherwise revelation is not an actual fact, but is a merely possible one. The utmost, indeed, that can in such a case be said with truth is, that Revelation is latent in the Book. It must, I think, be evident to any one who reflects for a little that the Book is not in itself a revelation of God; since, if it were so, every one who owned a copy would, when he opened it, "see God" revealed therein. But this is not so. Revelation is not there patent to all. And so it is that only to such as God has revealed Himself in his Son (Luke x. 22) is revelation an actual fact. Hence the great need for careful, patient study of what is written, and a constant endeavour to realise and apply what we read (for "if any one may be willing, the will of Him to be doing, he shall get to know of the doctrine"—Jno. vii. 17) so that with the better understanding of the "letter" of the Written Word we may more readily drink of its "spirit," and so "be getting to know the only real Deity, and whom he sent, Jesus Christ" (Jno. xvii. 3).

It was considerations such as these and the ever present conviction that more might be done to put the mere English reader into closer touch with apostle and prophet than has yet been done, which led me to undertake this interlinear translation in the *Investigator* where it originally appeared; and the desire of others to have it gathered up into a handy form for reference has led me to issue it, after careful revision and correction, in its present shape, prefaced by a few remarks explanatory, among other matters, of the system of notation employed in the interlinear and marginal translations furnished, and in the hope that it may serve as a beginning to some in this the most important of all subjects—the knowledge of God in Christ.

The Greek Text chosen is that formed by Westcott and Hort. Practically speaking—although there are a few notable exceptions—it is the text which underlies the Revised

Version. Square brackets enclosing a word in the Text (as "[*estin*]" in v. 17) indicate that that word has not quite the same support as the rest of the text, but is retained by Westcott and Hort as on the whole authentic. The most noteworthy *Various Reading* in this chapter is found in v. 49, where Westcott and Hort read "let us bear" instead of "we shall bear." Some may think that the omission of "the Lord" in the phrase "the Lord from heaven" (v. 47) is a more important variation. And from a certain standpoint it becomes very important, for it is then affirmed that "the second *man* is from heaven," *ex ouranou*. The true explanation of this verse will assist to an understanding of v. 49.

The word-for-word translation is extremely literal; and the marginal rendering is only a little less so, there being no good reason for doing otherwise when that would convey the sense. In both versions the reader will note many hyphen-linked words: in each case the combination represents one word in the Greek. Sometimes, in the version at the side, a word appears within reversed brackets, (") (" as in ver. 34 "do-)not(-be-missing-the-mark," which is the translation of *mē hamartanete*. Now as we do not say in English "not do-be-missing-the-mark," I have inserted the "not(" between "do" and "be." Other words within simple brackets, and standing alone, will be noted, as "(time)" in ver. 25. All such words, although not expressed in the Greek, are generally fairly implied by it; although a few may be open to question, as "(surroundings)" in ver. 12, where the reader may elect to supply some term other than the one I have selected. He may there prefer "persons" or "things." Each must decide according to his judgment of what the context indicates: there is no other authority in the case.

The order of the words in Greek cannot always be preserved in an English translation and at the same time convey the sense of the writer to a reader unacquainted with Greek. When the terms of a proposition occupy their normal or ordinary position in relation to each other, that is, with the subject occupying the foremost place in the sentence followed by what is predicated of it, as in the statement: *ho logos en pros ton theon*, "the word was with the Deity" (Jno. i. 1), then there is no difficulty. And even where, for the purpose of emphasis, the predicate—what is affirmed of the subject—comes first in the sentence, the English may often follow the order and both express the thought and exhibit the emphasis of the original, as, for example in the passionate outcry of the mob at Ephesus: *Megalē hē Artemis Ephesiōn*, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians" (Acts xix. 28). But since English is an uninflected language and dependent to a large extent upon the order of words for the grammatical sense, there is a limit to transposition of the terms of a proposition which is soon reached, and that which would be perfectly clear in Greek with its case inflections and altogether different grammatical structure cannot be rendered into English without departing from the order of the words in the Greek. Take for an illustration of what I mean the familiar proposition following the one already cited from Jno. i. 1: "and the word was deity." Here the order is different in the Greek: *kai theos en ho logos*. If the order were kept: "and deity was the word," we should not have the statement of John at all but an altogether different one. And yet that is the order in the Greek. But it may be asked, Why is this so? And the answer is: the natural order of the Greek is inverted so that the prominent thought in the writer's mind may receive the same prominence in the expression of his thoughts in writing. Hence although *theos* (deity) is really the predicate of the sentence and *ho logos* (the word) the subject, *theos* takes the lead because it is the idea uppermost in John's mind. What John wanted to say was: "and the word was DEITY." Hence the order: *kai theos en ho logos*. The emphatic order is thus the logical order in contradistinction to the normal order. This logical idiom characterises the diction of the Greek New Testament to an extent unsuspected by the mere English reader, and the observant student of the few pages which follow these remarks cannot fail to notice its presence in this 15th chapter of 1st Corinthians.

Where the English idiom allowed of it I have reproduced the logical idiom of the Greek:

when I have departed from it I have done so because to preserve the order in English would have destroyed or, at least, obscured the sense and so defeated the object I had in view. However, from the interlinear translation the reader can always ascertain the logical order, since it is there reproduced *verbatim*.*

The observant reader of the word-for-word translation will see that sometimes the personal pronoun gets independent expression, as in verse 36, *hēmeis allagēsometha*=we, we-shall-be-made-over. Now, as all verb forms except participles and infinitives contain in themselves the pronominal idea, the separate exhibition of the pronoun is always emphatic. This is a mode of emphasis which has nothing to do with position in the sentence, but is due to repetition.

The Greek tenses I have rendered as accurately as the nature of each case would allow. Sometimes this is easy, sometimes difficult; at times it is impossible to do so in conventional English. This is not seldom the case with what is called the *aoṛist* tense, the essential idea of which is *accomplishment*, without a limit as to time when, since that may be either in the past, the present, or the future. It is this latter characteristic, along with another which I shall refer to further on, which has given the tense its name of *aoṛist*, signifying *undefined*, or *without limit*, from *a*, not, and *horizō*, to mark off, define, limit. If the student will try and realise that time is not the essential idea of any one of the Greek tenses which, instead of describing acts as past, present, or future, describe these from the point of view of *process*, *prospect*, or *accomplishment*, he will find himself in a better position to understand the force of any given tense, and at the same time to realise the point of view of the writer, and to grasp his meaning. As was to be expected the *aoṛist*, since it signifies accomplishment, is often used of an act in past time, but the idea of time is merely brought in with the circumstances: it is no part of the function of the *aoṛist* to express that idea. The other indefinite characteristic of the *aoṛist*, to which I said I should refer, is one which brings it into strong contrast with both the *imperfect* (which is used of action as being in progress previous to the time of speaking) and with the *perfect* (which, while implying completed action, brings the action into the time of speaking, either as to itself or its results): the *aoṛist* suggesting but "a point in the expanse," representing the act simply as an event, neither picturing it in its progress, as does the *imperfect*, nor affirming the existence of its result, as does the *perfect*.

The *present* tense is, in Greek, a real present, as *gnōrizō* in ver. 1, "I-am-making-plain," and is not to be confounded with the English *indefinite present*, "I-make-plain." It signifies action in progress as a present fact, and of course incomplete. In this respect it differs from the *imperfect*, which signifies incompleted action in progress in the past. I have said that it is sometimes impossible to give a rendering of the *aoṛist* which shall express the thought of the original—in English which shall be recognised as such. I have therefore found it necessary to call to my aid a few *barbarisms*, and, in order to soften the same, have inserted within brackets the sign of the *perfect*, viz., "(have)" as in verse 52 in the phrase "(to-(have)-clothed-itself." The bracketed word "have," it must be understood, forms no part of the form *endusasthai*, which, being the *aoṛist infinitive*, middle, means "to-clothed-itself"—this in contradistinction

(For remainder see the Work itself.)

120 DIXON AVENUE, CROSSHILL,
GLASGOW, September, 1899.

Jhos. Nisbet

* On this interesting and instructing subject of emphasis the reader may profitably consult Rotherham's *Emphasised New Testament* (1st or 2nd edition), where he will find the subject expounded and illustrated from that writer's point of view. The third edition of that work, recently published, does not contain an exposition of the subject, that being left for treatment in the *General Introduction* which will preface the Old Testament portion, soon to be published. See also Part II. of *The Spirit's Thesaurus* (and Part III., to be published shortly) on "The Indication of Emphasis," Secs. 101 to 120.

CRITICISMS

OF THE EDITOR'S TRANSLATION OF
I COR. XV.

[Bro. W. D. Jardine sends on behalf of a friend who prefers to be *incognito* the following remarks, in which exception is taken to some of my conclusions as reflected from my rendering of the above portion of Scripture. His friend's strictures refer particularly to the terms *ana*, *anistemi*, *anastasis* and *nekros*. I have numbered the paragraphs for convenient reference, and have also put—within brackets—the English equivalents underneath the two diverse phrases of Paul, for the information of such as otherwise would see no distinction between them.—EDITOR.]

he anastasis ton nekron
[The up-standing of-the dead(s)]
he anastasis ek nekron
[The up-standing out-of deads(s)]

(1) Does Mr. Nisbet deny that *ana*—used in composition with verbs and nouns—can mean anything but “up.” If so, he should study the Lexicon. It means also “again,” “back.” Compare:—

anaktaomai—to gain, recover.
ananemo—to divide anew.
ananeomai—to renew.
anapneo—to breathe again, and then, to breathe; Latin, *respiro*.

These are a few instances I find by a minute's glance at the Lexicon.

(2) Now, *anistemi* means either “to raise, to set up,” or “to raise again.” *Anastasis*, too, means (1) a setting up, (2) a rising up or again.

All these senses are found in other writers. Homer uses the word in common with the Attic tragedians in the sense of raising from the dead.

(3) So the word *anastasis* may mean (1) rising up, (2) rising again.

How are we to determine? One

good way is to obtain from other languages the word with which they translated the Greek before us. And the best and most obvious instance is the Latin. The Latin word for *anistemi* is *resurgo*, the word from which our word “resurrection” is directly appropriated. Now *resurgo* can mean absolutely nothing except “to rise again.” And we must remember that the Church at Rome had the companionship of Paul for two full years at least. Is it possible they could have so misunderstood him as to mistranslate such a word. Surely not.

(4) But again Mr Nisbet, to make his idea perfect, has to mistranslate the other word, *nekron*. *Nekros* has no meaning except a corpse. It is save with one exception, where Paganus, a writer of the second century A.D., uses it as an adjective qualifying the sea (the dead sea)—it is never used at all with any other meaning in other writers. And it would be a gross violation of the Greek language to say that “rising up (or again) from corpses” can mean “upstanding from spiritually dead surroundings.” To the Greek, “*nekros*” is an actual *dead body*. It would be an impossible metaphor even in English, a language more poetical and far more developed and advanced than the Greek. *Nekros* is a corpse, and only a corpse.

(5) It may be said that there is another passage, where *nekros* means “spiritually dead,” the one in which Christ says “Let the dead bury their dead” (Luke ix. 60). But this is a disputed passage. Besides being somewhat of a harsh utterance to come from Christ, it is impossible that the word should have two so distinct meanings in one sentence without any additional words to explain.

(6) The plain meaning of the word is seen in Luke xxiv. 5. “Ti zeteite ton zonta meta ton nekron”:

Why seek ye the living among the dead?

(7) Again when the words are used of Christ's resurrection they cannot mean any moral upstanding *in Him*. It is true that by Baptism man is "upraised," and that from *spiritually dead surroundings*, but these words do not translate the Greek. The Resurrection is antitypical to Baptism, but they are by no means the same thing; and, if the early Romans believed in the Resurrection, and if the words *do* have sense when translated literally, what need is there to differ and translate mystically. The whole notion even apart from its error, is unnecessary.

ANONYMOUS.

REJOINDER BY THE EDITOR.

(1) If bro. Jardine will direct his friend's attention to an article of mine, entitled, "The Facts about *Anastasis*," which appeared in the *Investigator* for Jan., 1893, he will find that I have not ignored the Lexicon, and that I do not propose to assert that *ana* cannot mean anything but "up." As a matter of fact *ana* in composition may sometimes mean even less than "up," "back," or "again," since it very often merely adds intensity to the theme with which it enters into composition. The instances adduced from the Lexicon by your friend with the intention of showing that *ana* in composition means "again" or "back" do not prove that *anistēmi* means to raise AGAIN. This could only be established if it were shown that *ana* in composition with verb or noun always means *again*, or *back*—which is not the case, as the article above referred to abundantly proves. As there demonstrated the term *ana* often means neither one nor the other, but is, as I have said, often merely intensive in force. The terms *anaginōskō* = to know to a certainty (from *ginōskō*, to know), *anaphainō* = to exhibit (from *phainō*, to show), *anablepō* = to perceive (from *blepō*, to look), *ananggelō* = to show (by telling)

(from *anggelō*, to tell are only a few among many which show that *ana* when it enters into composition with a verb frequently merely intensifies the thought already present in the theme. In the article referred to it is also demonstrated that *anistēmi* is used in the N. T. in such a manner as to exclude the idea either of "back" or "again" from it. See Acts v. 36, 37; vii. 17, 18; Heb. vii. 15, where it is evident that no more than "up" can be put into the word—if even "up" is admissible.

(2 and 3) Then the question is not what Homer may be supposed to mean by his use of *anistēmi*, which my attitude does not call in question, but what by an induction of facts it may appear the apostle meant by his use of the terms in question—*anistēmi*, *anastasis* (and *nekros*). Your friend's mode of determining the sense in which the N. T. writers used *anistēmi* is peculiar. He goes to the Latin *Vulgate*, which can only determine the sense in which the Latins understood these words; but, more than that, the exclusive meaning attached by your friend to *resurgo* is by no means beyond question. *Re* does not mean of necessity "back" or "again" any more than *ana* does. It has the same intensive force in Latin as *ana* has in Greek. Besides the Latin translation will at best but determine the *interpretation* put upon the original Greek: the result being *nil* as between your friend and me.

Your friend seems to swear by the Lexicons, and yet needs a little more acquaintance with them. Now I don't follow the Lexicons slavishly, although I find them useful, for I prefer to consider the facts upon which Lexicons are presumably built, and draw my own conclusions; and our friend should study these facts in order to ascertain what the term *anastasis* means in the hands of New Testament writers. Then the Church at Rome which Paul knew was doubtless a very different body from that which existed at the time that the earliest Latin versions were made.

(4) *Nekros* is not properly a corpse; *nekus* is. *Nekros* is an adjective; it is not a noun in

the exclusive sense of your friend's contention. That "it is a corpse and only a corpse" is disproved by its use in the N.T. as the *Englishman's Greek Concordance* shows.

(5) Does your friend mean to say that the passage in Luke ix. 60 is possibly spurious when he says "it is a disputed passage," or does he mean that he disputes the explanation offered by some? I quite agree with his dictum that it is impossible that the word *nekros* should be used in two distinct senses in the same sentence. The simple question is, What is Jesus' meaning?

(6) There is no dispute as to the "plain meaning" of the word *nekros*: the question is—Has it always such a "plain" meaning attached to it? Just as surely as the term *zōn*=living (one) has often more in it than mere physical being, so is the term *nekros*=dead significant of more than the mere absence of such life. And I think Luke xxiv. 5 may very well be taken as an example of this pregnancy of thought. For surely the term "the living (one)" means more than that he is physically alive. And if so the term *nekroi* here is not less pregnant of thought.

(7) The objection to a "moral upstanding" in Jesus' case is based upon and grows out of the misconception regarding the terms rendered *raise* and *resurrection*. If those faithful ones who "are alive and remain unto the coming of Christ" are not to die and yet are to "attain unto the resurrection," then resurrection (*anastasis*) is possible without physical death preceding it; and there is thus no difficulty in apprehending how Jesus could be the subject of a "moral upstanding," without a previous condition opposed to that state being predicated of him. Then it is not a case of "translating mystically" but of translating literally and apprehending intelligently the meaning of the apostle.

EDITOR.

"If there be a profound mystery in the fact of material qualities exciting states of consciousness, there is a still profounder mystery in states of consciousness acting, as they do act, upon our material organisation."
—CUNNINGHAM.

"THE DEVIL."

AN APPRECIATION AND A SUGGESTION.

DEAR BRO. NISBET,—The *Devil* pamphlets I received.

Since receiving them, I have read through a copy, and I am exceedingly pleased with the handling of the subject—so pleased that I reckon the Christadelphian body, and all seekers after exact truth, should be heartily indebted to you for republishing the same, and for your preface as well. The whole is most excellent, and worthy of a very wide circulation. I think a club should be formed, or rather call it a committee, in your midst, to further a gratis distribution of it to such as would appreciate it. Each member should bring 3d. with him and the postage of course. This amount would constitute the title to membership, and necessarily the right to give an opinion. Then certain persons should be named as likely to read, study, and appreciate the book. Ministers and certain members of churches who are reckoned liberal in their views, thoughtful, and studious men; other people who are scientific and religious in their mode of dealing with subjects: men of thought among the Secularists, men earnest, not given to ridicule and rudeness; thinking men of all denominations. I would avoid all Revivalist and so-called evangelistic men, Salvation Army men; though no doubt there may be one here and there among the many who would read and study it. Also, certain members of Parliament of earnest and religious temperament: members of the House of Lords, aye Royalty itself.

There are among these and the members of Parliament a good few who would read it. The Marquis of Salisbury and the Duke of Argyle; Balfour, the leader of the House of Commons; Chamberlain, and others,

but in posting these it would be necessary to be guided as to the season and the best day for sending their copies. It probably would be unseasonable to send these copies just at present while the war scare is exercising their minds, and it might be unseasonable to send copies on any day of the week, but sending them so as to reach on a Sunday morning at the residences where they are likely to be. All this would be for the committee to judge of, think about and decide, inquire about.

Each member should suggest a name, and be able to say something of the person named. The ministers who labour on the Sunday should have their copies to reach them on the Mondays—a day the most thoughtful of them are most at leisure. Let all be done with consideration and judgment, taking care that no copy shall be sent gratis to any one who would from indifference, or from having too much on hand, cast it aside.

The addresses of the persons to whom the copies are sent should be kept. And nothing should be enclosed in the book to give a reader an idea that it comes from a Christadelphian source or from a sectarian source. There is enough on the book itself to enable an enquirer to find the source, without ostentatiously setting the source forth.

All the suggestions given would be that for the consideration of the committee. Certain members should be appointed to address the copies and post them.

Now suppose there should come together for the committee fifty brothers and sisters, and each bring 3d. and postage, thus would fifty copies be sent in a manner that would be satisfactory.

Of course this would not militate against private distribution by those who please, but certainly the com-

mittee would do well to commend all to exercise judgment in their distribution that indiscrimination might be as much avoided as possible. It is mischievous to throw pearls before swine; and I think the book is a pearl. Its treatment of the subject throws light upon many puzzling passages in the New Testament. Hence, Sunday School teachers should be advised to read it. It is unique in Christadelphian literature.

I hope to send on a further order probably next week, and I will include the carriage in my remittance, and the 6d. I see you have paid for the parcel received.—I am, yours faithfully and true,



7 Farm Road, Sparkbrook,
Birmingham.

NOTE.—I have printed the above letter as it may be acted upon elsewhere as well as in Glasgow, and if addressed wrappers or suitably sized envelopes, with 4d. in stamps, are sent to the office the copies can be sent direct as indicated.—EDITOR.

“PRIEST” AND “HIGH PRIEST” AS APPLIED TO JESUS CHRIST.

(See “Investigator” for April, 1899.)

THAT which you have written in answer to J. M. is according to the testimony of the Records, or it is not. And to arrive at conclusions by means of a process of reasoning about the teaching, may be a different affair from the teaching itself, as placed on record. The latter challenges our faith, the former does not. I quote: “As Jesus was a priest before he was High Priest” This assumes the thing to be proved. I have failed to find any passage of Scripture where it is affirmed that Jesus was, at any time during his life on earth, priest according to the law of a fleshly command, or according to an oath of God—“the power of an imperishable life.” On the other hand: the Records affirm that, “If he were on earth he should not be a

(Continued on page 87.)

The Investigator.

OCTOBER, 1899.

Editorial Department: THOMAS NISBET, 62 St. Vincent Street, Glasgow.

Publishing Department: JAS. PARIS, Inverkeithing, Fife, N.B.

The time has again come round when those who wish the visits of the *Investigator* continued to them another year should renew their subscriptions. Two shillings is a small sum, and I know no good reason why it should not be paid in advance or paid promptly on receipt of the January issue; while there are several good reasons why this should be done. These should need no enumeration, however. But with the experience I have had during fourteen years' issues I cannot help wondering sometimes whether the *Investigator* is really wanted by a number sufficient to justify its continued existence—and to pay for it: for there are readers who do not pay. Personally I should not object to be relieved of the labour involved, one way and another in putting such a magazine into the readers' hands, and unless it becomes more apparent than it has been for some time that the *Investigator* is really wanted and that it would be missed I may feel impelled to cease producing it.

At present there are not as many *paying* readers as will enable the printer's bill to be paid, and those who have taken the magazine for the current year, not to speak of those who have taken it for two—or more—years, without paying for it, do not seem likely to "tak' a thoct and men'" or even to realise their responsibilities. Perhaps they have never reflected on the fact that they owe the office two, four, or six shillings each as the case may be. As a partial remedy for this last phase of the matter it has been decided that none who are in arrears for the current year will receive the January issue.

Attention is drawn to the fact that the *Devil* pamphlet is now ready, price 3d., or post free 4d.

The *Interlinear Translation of 1 Cor. xv.*, by the Editor, is also now ready, and may be had of the Editor, price 3d., or post free 3½d.

THE SPIRIT IN MAN.

Bro. Weir having now brought to a conclusion his argument in support of a separable spirit in man—for that is *the* question between us—I feel I cannot do less than occupy some little space in referring to some of his strictures upon my criticism of his contention and his argument in support of the same, which I was precluded from doing in last issue by my illness.

My attitude towards his contention does not preclude me from believing that there is *ruach* ("spirit") in man (Job xxxii. 8) as there is in every creature, in every thing; in all matter; and everywhere. Nor am I precluded from believing that subsequent to the coming into individual existence of the creature man, God "formeth the *ruach* ("spirit") of man within him" (Zech. xii. 1); but I deny that *ruach*, in either of the aspects in which it thus presents itself to my understanding constitutes, specifically, the thinking part in man, as bro. Weir contends is the case with the "spirit in man." The thinking mechanism is but another of the many forms which *ruach* assumes—according to the will of God.

So far as my reading and study have led me I see no grounds for believing, as bro. Weir does, in the existence in man of an entity distinct from the material of the body and possessing the faculty of thought—while in conjunction with the body—and termed by bro. Weir "the spirit of man"; which "spirit" after death, and the dissolution of the organism, constitutes in his apprehension the sole basis for a renewed existence on the part of the man. The theory which bro. Weir has advanced is put forward as reconciling all the Bible facts and statements regarding man in his present life and offering a rational basis for a renewed existence beyond the grave. That his theory, as far as it affects the question of man's present existence, is not justified by the facts of the case I have endeavoured to show in my criticism of his argument. In opposition to his contention, which he has epitomised in his concluding remarks, I maintain that:—

1. Man is a living soul—a unit, not a duality compounded of "body" and "spirit."

2. *Soul* is descriptive of creatures which live by breathing, of which man is the most highly organised type on earth. Given time and opportunity—

3. Man becomes a living soul—in Moses' sense of the term (Gen. ii. 7) when he comes to possess, acquire, or develop a "spirit" which takes its character from the kind of knowledge assimilated by him, and

is appropriately styled "the spirit of his mind" (Eph. iv. 23).

4. Sometimes God formeth a "spirit" within the man consequent upon the appropriation and assimilation of divine ideas.

5. Such spirit (*ruach*) is to be distinguished in thought and in fact from the Formative Spirit (*ruach*) which constitutes the basis of all forms of life, and which in its Free and all-pervading form is essential to the continued existence of every form of life, and of every thing; and which is distinctively spirit of God (*ruach elohim*).

6. The natural man is thus a form of *ruach* (spirit), but "alienated from the life (*zoe*) of God" through native ignorance—a form which in death passeth and cometh not again, the *ruach* thus "returning to God who gave it."

7. The spiritual man or "new creature" is a form of *ruach* (spirit) which does not pass away because owing its being to a knowledge of, and faith in, God as one who "exists and becomes a rewarder of those diligently seeking him."

8. This "new man" has thoughts and aspirations altogether different from those which characterised the "old man," and he has, therefore, a different, because new, Will* in relation to things "seen" and "not seen" which comes into exercise as a result of the new spiritual motives which now rule in the understanding (*nous*) and give shape to the life (*bios*) of the one possessing the mind (*phronēma*) of the spirit (*pneuma*)—Rom. viii. 6—and who has thus become renewed in the spirit (*pneuma*) of his mind (*nous*)—Eph. iv. 23) that he may work out his own salvation recognising that it is the Deity who is inworking in him both to will and to work.

9. LIFE is not an entity but is inseparably

* Having mentioned *Will* here perhaps a word or two on it may not be out of place.

Will does not mean to me a separate independent faculty as pictured by bro. Weir, who evidently regards *Will* as a king who presides over and determines what shall be the action or purpose of the person who wills; but is a term which I use to describe the ultimate preponderance mentally in any one direction rather than another, which, becoming possible in view of diversity, becomes actual in the direction of the strongest motive or motives. Will is entirely dependent upon motive: but I had not thought it worth my while to formulate a theory of Will, there being so much else more directly bearing upon the question under discussion which bro. Weir asked me to give my attention to.

Bro. Weir complains that I have ignored his repeated invitations to deal with the subject of the Will, and says on p. 75 of the present issue on the subject of Will that on pages 80 and 81 he had treated the subject of Will at considerable length, but I have been unable to find this and I have no recollection of such treatment. He asked me twice (once on page 34, April 1899, and once on page 59, July 1899) to give some attention to the subject of Will, but he himself never yet told us what the Will is.

connected with organism: it is "organisation in action." Being no entity it has no personality; no individuality, no consciousness. SOUL, on the other hand, being the self or person is nothing if not personal; individual and conscious. Life being thus but a quality of the soul, or person, the two terms "life" and "soul" are not, as bro. Weir affirms, equivalent or synonymous terms. To substitute "life" for "soul" as a rendering of the Hebrew *nephesh* or the equivalent Greek term *psuchē* would certainly not assist the reader to an understanding of the biblical meaning of these terms in many places.*

Bro. Weir's theory breaks down at the very point where it should be strongest. I refer to the preservation of identity—the absence of any natural means for the preservation of which he thinks the weak spot in my theory. No doubt bro. Weir speaks in the present issue, page 77, of "preserving and restoring identity," but his theory does not preserve it. For what is identity? It is "the state of being the same." Now, the retention of consciousness—which involves the exercise of memory—is essential to identity, for that which has ceased to be conscious is in a most essential particular no longer the same—identity is not preserved, and cannot indeed be, according to bro. Weir, without the body; for bro. Weir's "spirit" loses its consciousness when man dies: he has plainly admitted this. These are his words: "Consciousness is entirely dependent on the union of spirit with body"—the italics are his (see *Investigator* for October, 1897, page 79). Now, identity cannot both be lost and preserved; therefore, if it is to obtain again it can only be by what he calls re-creation, and he has told us that re-creation is a very different thing from restoration—re-creation resulting in a new creation, a creature which had not existed before. So that from his own standpoint he cannot have Abraham, say, resuscitated without re-creation taking place; in which case he argues you would not have Abraham, but in his stead a creature which never existed before.

Of course bro. Weir may still amend his theory—he said he might be "compelled by the force of logic, at a later stage in this discussion, to take the position" that consciousness is independent of the body—which amendment indeed seems to me a logical

* For illustrations and proof of this assertion see *Investigator* for November, 1885, page 24. One or two illustrations may be here quoted: Luke xii. 19—"I will say to my life, 'Life, thou hast much goods,' etc.; Acts iii. 23—"Every life which will not hear that prophet"; 1 Cor. xv. 45—"The first man, Adam, was made a living life"; Rev. xx. 4—"I saw the faces of them that were beheaded."

necessity on his part if he wishes to *preserve* identity, so that it may be *restored* to the man who lost it when the spirit carried it off from the body. Of course, holding by his original position, he has not shown us how the "spirit" could even carry off the identity much less preserve it, seeing it needs the body in order to be conscious. But if he should resile from his position he may find himself more awkwardly placed than before, for fresh difficulties will crowd round about him. Assuming, however, that bro. Weir still holds by his original position, which seemed to him to be essential to a continued belief in what he calls "resurrection"—meaning by that the return of the man from *sheol* or *hades*—the admission that "consciousness is entirely dependent on the union of spirit with body" would lead one to conclude that the body, which is "matter," must after all have something to do with the function of thought seeing that thinking, according to bro. Weir, cannot go on without the body. Of what practical value, then, is this "spirit" if it ceases to be the same when without the body, and only resumes its identity with the resumption of the body? It would seem, after all, that the Christadelphian position that the organized body is the man, rather than a duality composed of body and spirit, is if anything a better theory than his.

My experience in the course of this discussion with bro. Weir has led me to think that either I must express myself in most obscure fashion or bro. Weir does less than justice at times to what I do say. It has seemed to me that he has both misunderstood and misrepresented me, and this after a manner and to an extent which has occasionally surprised me. Misunderstanding and consequent misrepresentation may not have been all on the one side, but I am free to affirm that it has been patent to me as true in bro. Weir's case.

He has not understood me at times because he has not given due consideration to my words. Phrases which are qualifying to the thought expressed by me are ignored both in his reading of them; and even in his quotation of them, where one would expect to find verbal correctness, he has failed. This may be due to some idiosyncrasy of the mind which leads him to notice the less essential instead of dealing with the real and material parts of my argument or criticism. Occasionally, too, I have been disappointed with him because he did not grapple with the real point raised but occupied himself with something else which I had either said or he had considered to be logically implied in what he had read into my remarks—with the result that so far as he is concerned I

might almost as well not have written much that I did. Anything else that I might have to say I must leave to a future occasion, But perhaps I have written as much as I should on the subject, and unless something seems to call for it I may not return to the subject.

"PRIEST" AND "HIGH PRIEST."

(Continued from page 84.)

priest at all," and reasons are given. And the thought of "self-sacrifice" being the one sacrifice offered for sins, does not seem to meet the question.

The quotation, "I, o, I come to do thy will," which will be did in order to the glories—"The joys set before him"—including the Chief Priesthood "according to the order of Melchi-Zedek" (Heb. xii. 2; Psa. xvi. 11, ex. 1, 4; Jno. xvii. 4, 5; 1 Peter iii. 22, and references).

The doing of God's will is considered apart from, and contrasted with, sacrificial offerings for any purpose. (Consult Heb. x. 5-10; and ix. 12, 25, 26, and other references.) All previous offerings were worthless as to the object for which the one offering of Christ was made. And God's will was not done short of the Crucifixion: "Not my will, but thine be done." It was the disciples who were directed to offer their "bodies a living sacrifice" in not being "conformed to the world" (Rom. xii. 1). The sacrifice for the removal of sin, by "the offering of the body of Christ once," is quite another thing. Because, "Without shedding of blood there is no remission of sins";* and short of his death his obedience would have been incomplete. It took all his life to perfect his character under discipline; and though being a son he learned obedience by the things which he suffered, and having been perfected he became an efficient cause of that salvation pertaining to the age. The phraseology of 1 Peter ii. 5, 9 indicates a style of expression highly figurative: "A living stone," "living stones," "a spiritual house," "a holy priesthood to offer up spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God, through

(For Conclusion see page xv. of Cover.)

* This statement is universally misunderstood and misapplied. The writer to the Hebrews is saying what was true "under the law" and not "under grace." What he says in ch. ix. 22 is: "And according to law, I may almost say, All things are being cleansed in blood, and apart from blood-shedding remission is not taking place." To say that it is the literal blood of Jesus which brings about remission is to make the Law not merely a type—a shadow, but "the very image of the good things to come" (ch. x. 1). But as a matter of fact no one really believes that it is the literal blood of Christ which purifies us.—Ed.

CORRESPONDENCE.

"DID GOD SLAY JESUS?"

No. 1.

DEAR BRO. NISBET,—I read with surprise and regret the letter under the above title in the *Investigator* for July, and some of the ideas expressed in it appear to me so unscriptural that I am impelled to pen a few words in reply.

In the first place, I take exception to the title, which puts the question raised in a very repulsive form. But I will not dwell further on that.

If I understand the first paragraph rightly, it means that if God "planned" the death of Jesus he was acting inconsistently with the law he had previously given, which said "Thou shalt not kill." In other words, the writer judges God's actions by the standard He has laid down for man. This is an error which lies at the root of many human criticisms of actions or commands attributed to God, which men strive to show cannot have come from Him. They do not recognise the fact that God is above all law; that He, being perfect, cannot be judged by a law which He has given to imperfect man. These criticisms apply especially to commands and actions involving the taking of life, in apparent forgetfulness of the fact that God, being the Author of all life, has the right to take away that which He has given, to destroy that which He has made. As Hannah said in her song of rejoicing, "The Lord killeth, and maketh alive: He bringeth down to the grave, and bringeth up." (1 Sam. ii. 6). It is for want of realising this truth that so many objections have been taken to such events as the slaughter of the Canaanites and of the Amalekites. A needed correction to these objections would probably be supplied by a careful perusal of Isaiah xl., especially verses

13 to 17, and 25, and of Romans ix., especially verses 20 to 23.

With regard to what seems so "strange" to the writer's "idea of right and wrong," I may say that, taking a comprehensive view of God's plan as revealed in the Scriptures, it does not seem at all strange to me; and I may remind the writer that, so far from the crucifixion of Christ being something that took place after "his work was finished," it was really a necessary part of it, for He did not say "It is finished" till He was at the very point of death. (John xix. 30.)

But the most remarkable thing stated in the letter is this:—"That the death of Jesus was deliberately planned by God *I do not believe.*" The writer has read Acts ii. 23: "Him, *being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God*, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain" Why does he omit the words I have italicised, whilst quoting the latter part of the verse? and how does he explain these words in harmony with his ideas? Again, in Hebrews ix. 14: "How much more shall the blood of Christ, *who through the Eternal Spirit offered himself* without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?" That this does not refer simply to the spotlessness of Christ's life, but to his death as a sacrifice, is, I think, shown by the reference to "the blood of Christ."

It is impossible to gather from the letter in question what is the writer's belief with regard to the purpose of Christ's death as set forth in the Scriptures. Apparently he regards it as not being an essential part of God's purpose for man's redemption. Now it was either essential or not essential. If it was *not* essential, can the writer explain why, to use his words, God "*allowed* the nation of Israel to wreak their vengeance on

Jesus"? If it *was* essential, can it be possible that He would leave it to chance whether it should take place or not? Then, why object to the idea that "the death of Jesus was deliberately planned by God," or, in the words of Luke in Acts ii. 23, which mean the same thing, that he was "delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God"?

If I were to attempt to give even half the testimony of Scripture to the effect that the death of Jesus was an essential part of God's purpose, and was pre-arranged by Him, I should probably require much more space than you could well spare. Let a few passages suffice:—

Luke ix. 22: "The Son of Man *must* suffer many things, and be rejected of the elders and chief priests and scribes, *and be killed*, and the third day be raised up."

Rom. v. 6: "Christ died for the ungodly."

"Rom. v. 8: "God commendeth *His own love* toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." (R.V.)

1 Cor. xv. 3: "Christ died for our sins, *according to the Scriptures*;" that is, the Scriptures of the Old Testament, in which God had caused it to be foretold. Having foretold it, did He leave its taking place to chance?

2 Cor. v. 15, 18, 19: "He died for all, that they which live should no longer live unto themselves, but unto him who for their sakes died and rose again. . . . But *all things are of God*, who reconciled us to Himself through Christ, and gave unto us the ministry of reconciliation; to wit, that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself, not reckoning unto them their trespasses."

Further on the writer says, "From this innocent man's sufferings we have the fanatical notion of imputation."

Do we not rather get the idea of imputation from Rom. iv. 22-25?

I will not now enter upon what the writer says respecting substitution. With regard to the 5th paragraph in his letter, I quite agree with what he says in opposition to the ideas that Jesus appeased God, and that Jesus had more compassion towards mankind than God had. But I do not know any brethren who hold these ideas.

I observe that the writer addresses you as "Brother," and signs himself "fraternally yours," and therefore I conclude that he regards himself as a brother. But I am at a loss to understand how he came amongst us holding views concerning the sacrifice of Christ so completely at variance with those held by the brethren generally; or how, if he held the same belief that we hold when he came amongst us, he can have departed so widely from that belief. Perhaps he will explain this in a further letter.—I am, yours fraternally,



64 Marney Road,
Clapham Common, London, S.W.

"DID GOD SLAY JESUS?"

No. 2.

Bro. Walls, on p. 70, takes an erroneous view of the Ten Commandments. He looks on them, not as a list of Laws given by the Judge of all the earth to his creatures, but as a Covenant equally binding on both parties; for he quotes "Thou shalt not kill" as implying an undertaking on God's part to abstain from taking human life! Suppose then bro. W. commands his son, "You must not stop out after ten o'clock"; would Walls junior be justified in the next day calling his serious attention to that law, and adding, "But you yourself were not in till eleven!" Would

Walls senior own to the inconsistency?

I fail to see the special "foulness" of the murder of Jesus, for crucifixion though a terrible death was the usual Roman punishment for political insurgents, and quite possibly the two "thieves" were not inexcusable, considering the state of affairs under the Romans.

It is difficult to believe bro. Walls serious in his "denial that the death of Jesus was deliberately planned by God" (was it not so, just as the death of the Atonement goat was deliberately planned and inflicted by the high priest?), for he quotes Peter's words against the Jews, "By wicked hands ye have crucified, slain" (*sic*). But in Acts ii. 23 this is immediately preceded by "Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God ye have taken," etc. These words, so carefully avoided, unhesitatingly rest the entire responsibility for the death of Jesus upon the Father. The same fact, however distressing to a tender sense of rectitude, appears in iii. 17: "I know that through ignorance ye did it, but those things which God shewed before by all his prophets that his Christ should suffer he hath so fulfilled." With regard to his life Jesus said, "No man takes it from me, I lay it down of myself." If, then, God was not the author of Jesus' loss of life, if Jesus had not His authority "to lay down his life and receive it again," His command to do so, then bro. Walls makes him out a suicide! In what light does he regard the fact that God "destroys" countless innocent babes for ever? But since Jesus said he had "a command" (*entolē*) to lay down his life, is it not plain that laying it down was an integral part of the Will of God he came to do?

But what is the use of this raving about "the foulest murder ever committed"? The excuse that it was

done in ignorance was freely admitted by God Himself, speaking through His messenger Peter (Acts iii. 17, above). Jesus likewise based his recommendation to mercy on the plea that "they know not what they do." Was not that unconsciousness reasonably admitted in extenuation of their conduct? Compare it with the Inquisition's foul murder of an unfortunate "heretic" by inflating him with bellows till he burst, or choking him with excrements. A terrible error was indeed made in Christ's execution; but they regretted it, changed their conduct, and were freely forgiven on immersion into his name. But bro. Walls writes just in the style of the orthodox when they discuss "the awful mystery of the death of the Second Person in the Trinity." This was the death of the prophet like unto Moses.

With regard to par. 3 *re* "justifying the wicked." Justification means "declaring righteous" (*Young*), so that when a wicked man is declared righteous by one of us it *is* a lie; but when God declares a wicked man righteous it is *not* a lie, because God has covenanted to forgive a man's sins by accepting a sacrifice, and by giving him a new heart to change his future conduct. All this is effected by believing immersion into the name of Christ. "If any man *be* in Christ he is a new creation; old things have become new"; "I will put my laws into their mind and on their hearts I will write them, for they shall all know me, for I will forgive their iniquity" (see Jer. xxxi. 31-34). Accordingly, Paul teaches that by (efficient) baptism believers are immersed into the death of Christ, "they are united to him by the likeness of his death" (R.V., Rom. vi. 5). This union must purify the sinner, so that Paul was directed "to immerse himself and wash away his sins, calling on his name." But in Rev. i. 5 we are said to be "loosed

from our sins in his blood," so that it is evident that by immersion in water we get the benefit of his sacrificial death and are sprinkled with the cleansing blood. "Being justified (declared righteous) by his blood we shall be saved from the wrath through him" (Rom. v. 9).

Well, suppose Jesus had not died but had ascended to Heaven instead. Having for the previous three years "died daily" (?) * his example would still remain just as complete. But how could we then be justified in his blood? Are we not assured by certain brethren that it is Jesus' daily death that is the death that saves us through our imitation; and that the literal death of Jesus was merely the foul murder of an energetic missionary, and had no bearing on our salvation. Since, then, bro. Walls (with others) repudiates Jesus as our substitute, how is he as a sinner to become justified while repudiating all virtue in the sacrificial blood of Christ? How can he be "loosed from his sins" except "by Christ's own blood"? (Rev. i. 5). Can it be, as stated, that the example set by Jesus is equally potent with this "blood for cleansing us from all sin"? (1 Jno. i. 7). Observe, it is our *past* sins that have to be disposed of. But what retrospective effect can even a perfect following of Christ's example have upon them? When the Just died for the unjust what was the good of that sacrifice if it was not "instead" of the unjust? "While we were yet sinners Christ^d died for the ungodly"; in what way did the ungodly benefit if the death was not vicarious? It is comforting to me to know that an innocent man has suffered my fatal punishment, and has been raised again none the worse, but what good could a fellow-sinner's death do me?

* See, on the contrary, "Christ's a Life of Happiness," in October 1897 number, p. 86, par. 3.

It is true "God is Merciful" as quoted from Ex. xxxiv. 6, but why omit the other fact that "He will not entirely clear" (*Young*). What is proved by these half-quotations? "The moral precepts in the Scriptures" were addressed to those alone who participated in the annual and other appointed sacrifices, not to the godless Gentiles.

"Nowhere is it stated that Jesus came to appease God." John says "I write to you little children because your sins have been forgiven you through His name," (1 John ii. 12). These then were "babes in Christ," freshly-immersed believers, recent "justified through His blood." I they had not been thus justified they must have remained sinners "on whom the wrath of God abideth," John iii. 36. For Paul says "that to such God will render indignation and wrath." On the other hand he says that the justified in Christ's blood are saved from the wrath through him," Rom. v. 9. If "saved from the wrath" is it not plain that in some way God's wrath must have become appeased? And does not John connect that salvation from wrath with Jesus' justifying blood in his title "The Lamb of God who bears away the Sin of the World?" What fault then can be found with Dr. Watts' hymn,

"Sweet were the drops of Jesus' blood
That calmed God's frowning face,
Which sprinkled on the burning throne
Have turned his wrath to grace."

Of course we must turn away from our iniquities, but that has merely a negative effect, it only removes a hindrance to salvation, it has no intrinsic merit. For suppose some evil-doer when apprehended promises to turn from iniquity for the future; would the law relax its grasp? No, for that would in no way affect the *past*. Let him first fully atone for that, and *then* let what's left of him go and sin no more. Jesus did not

come primarily, as taught so sedulously in these pages, to induce people simply to follow his example; no, he came by first releasing them from their past sins through his sacrifice to give them a chance of amendment, to give them a completely fresh start. Our past sins must be disposed of before any imitation of Christ can be attempted. No doubt under John's baptism a sacrificial offering for their cleansing would follow as a matter of course.

Bro. Walls is distressed, par. 1, "that when Jesus' work was finished the Father allowed him to become the victim of the foulest crime, &c." Well, he said himself, "The good shepherd giveth his life for the sheep." "I lay down my life . . . this commandment I received of my Father." From this it is plain that his work finished simultaneously with the completion of that crime. His obedience included the "giving his Life a Ransom for many" ("for" here is "anti" instead of, by way of purchase, in exchange for; an eye for an eye, for a fish a serpent), finishing in death it was a part of that work which lasted until after he had suffered as our Ransomer the sinner's due of indignation and wrath in the garden mentally, and tribulation and anguish physically on the cross. (It will be remembered that the thieves did not share in the agony in the garden; possibly Judas drank or will drink more or less of that cup in his own right.) When that was fully accomplished and not till then, not till the last drop of the cup was drained was he ready to say with his last gasp, "It is finished!"

And all the thanks he gets from "His Brethren" (John vii 5) is to be told that his agonizing sufferings including his mental agony (!) were a mere circumstance, perhaps valuable as an example (in case ourselves might some day be crucified?) but that it is

infinitely to be regretted that such a foul crime was ever perpetrated, for if Brethren Walls, Saunders, Jardine had been present they would have prevented it or perished in the attempt.

Under just such circumstances, when Peter was seeking to render a sufficiently arduous task impossible when he did his utmost to prevent Christ's vicarious sacrifice and our redemption — Jesus thundered out "Get thee behind me, Satan! thou stumbling block! thou savourest not the things of God but those of men."

How history repeats itself; Peter's was indeed the human line of thought and conduct which will last as long as mortal man.

MEM.—I rejoice to hear that there is a Christadelphian who believes that "there were merits in the Slain Lamb." I shake hands mentally, with A. M., J. M., and A. G.

R. R. S.

P.S.—Of course "Jesus did not come to make God merciful." He came to provide for God an atoning sacrifice so that He might be enabled in accordance with His Law to extend mercy to repentant sinners, and finally to endow with incorruptibility those whom He had sworn should die! This Jesus effected for Him by simply carrying out to its logical issue the principle on which the justification of the ancient Hebrews was based—by the substitution of the life of an innocent and perfect animal for that of the sinner. R. R. S.

"Perfect correspondence would be perfect life were there no changes in the environment but such as the organism had adapted changes to meet, and were it never to fail in the efficiency with which it met them there would be eternal existence and eternal knowledge."—HERBERT SPENCER, in his *Principles of Biology*.

"Nothing keeps its youth like truth."

THE ATONEMENT AS TAUGHT BY BRO. STAINFORTH.
HIS CRITICISM CRITICISED.

REPLY TO HIS ARTICLE ON PAGE 66, No. 55.

REFERRING to his paragraph "a" and also to his paragraph "h," Bro. Stainforth in the first thanks the Editor of the *Investigator* for his "improved reading" of Komans ix. 2, 3, set forth on pages xiv., xv. of the cover, No. 52. This is so far satisfactory. It is equivalent to his withdrawing those passages from his argument, because he finds them of signal disadvantage to him in discussing the subject. See his dealing with those passages on page 94, and my reply to it on page 44 of No. 54. There I shew that these passages clearly involve the substitute with the punishment due to the sinner:—a fact with which the said "improved reading" does not come into collision: but, on the contrary, accentuates it. Hence, looking at what he complains of in his paragraph "h," his objection there falls lamentably to the ground. He objects "spending time and space in correcting misrepresentations," because he in sundry paragraphs in former articles has "repudiated and carefully avoided saying" that Jesus in being crucified "was punished." But all this is inconsistent with his dogma of substitution. For, he must needs know, that when a man so dogmatically as he does, lays down a proposition for belief—and this he certainly does in no unemphatic style—he must abide by the logical results of his dogma, and be responsible for the consequences of it; however much he may stamp and rage, repudiate and protest against what he did not foresee, think of, or imagine. He must needs see that in those very passages he himself chose to illustrate *his* meaning of Substitution, in relation to Christ—a meaning which no other example in Scripture or elsewhere could better illuminate—he must needs see, that had Jesus died after the fashion, there so "strongly expressed" (his own words), Jesus the innocent would have suffered the punishment due to sin. What more plain? and considering this from his own point of view as afforded by his own illustration, it presents to me the most cogent evidence that I have in no sense misinterpreted or misrepresented him. It is from his own reasoning about substitution, and his own illustration of it, I judge him.

Next, we take his paragraph "b." In this, we have presented to us a specimen of prejudice, how it originates, and how it expands. He tells us, that when he was a boy of nine years, a wicked urchin threw a stone at him, and he, boy-like, threw it back; but

unfortunately it hit the "Arab." This brought trouble in return, from which Bro. S. came out a loser: and so I am convinced, that he then begat an experience, which evidently all through his life had biased his judgment against street "Arabs," culminating in a prejudice unfavorable to the class. Let us illustrate this. There lives an old lady not far off, who has a great aversion to dogs. She cannot do with them. "I don't like dogs," she says. "When I was a child, I was fondling one, as children will do, and it bit me. Since then, I have entertained; great objection to them." Yonder, another old lady, on the contrary, is very favourable to them. When she was a child one saved her from drowning. Just so. In the one case the aversion referred to would mean, were it of any proof, that all dogs are bad. The other contrary to this, on the same basis, would mean that there were no vicious ones about. And so the like would have happened with Bro. S., had he in his boyhood fallen into a pool, and a ragged street arab had helped him out.

These are trivial remarks, hardly worth the penning, had they not been made necessary by his rehearsing his story of a boyish incident, to make more effective his assertion that there is no native sense of goodness in street arabs. The fact is: there exists a certain amount of goodness and badness, in all classes as well as among dogs,—a goodness so releasable from badness that it needs but the sunshine of favourable circumstances to call it forth—a goodness, even among street arabs, ready to respond *in*, and *to*, little deeds of kindness. And this on one side we see clearly manifested through schools of industry and moral suasion, in and by which many a street arab has risen to comparative honour, integrity and trust. Hence, my allusion to them at all, was to show that even without a spiritual awakening there is in them, as well as in all classes a goodness susceptible of the greatest improvement—an improvement calculated to the better receive, and more firmly hold higher truths. Does Bro. S. deny this? However, to prove ourselves right need we go further than the parable of the sower? A sower went forth to sow, and the seed he sowed fell on different qualities of soil, but the ground in which his seed took the deepest root, and brought forth fruit, was called "good." So I ask Bro. S. to show what this "good" means, seeing he

is so bold as to assert that there is nothing naturally good in any man. In this parable, it must be admitted that the ground so called "good" was not of Holy Spirit, it was not spiritual good, yet all the same it was so good as to respond to the moral and spiritual teaching of the Sower's seed. And the wickedest of men, judging them to be so, from the wicked acts they do, may have within their hidden natures a something answering to the call of truth, otherwise, why have teachers at all moral or spiritual? Why should a gospel be preached if there are none in the world so naturally or natively good to receive it?

But, says Bro. S., referring to the centurion—"He was a proselyte of the gate, and, therefore, he was no example of native morality." Indeed! How came Cornelius to be so good as to think of becoming a proselyte? And even when he did become one, did this make him spiritual? Were all native-born Jews spiritual? If not, why assume that a proselyte of the gate should be one? "Art thou a master in Israel?" said Jesus to Nicodemus. "and knowest not these things." What things? "That except a man be born of water and the Spirit he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." Was Cornelius before he heard the Gospel from Peter's lips born of either the water or the spirit? Will Bro. S. answer this question and also the following? What about Sergius Paulus? He was a prudent man, both before, and while, he was influenced by the sorcery of Elymas. He evidently was an enquirer after truth, and through his desire to learn he fell into the hands of that child of the devil. But evidently, not satisfied with all he had seen from the hands, and heard from the mouth of the Sorcerer, he sent for Barnabas and Saul. Here was his prudence exercised and manifested. Was this prudence not something native to him? Was it a thing spiritual or a sense natively good? Will Bro. S. answer?

Next, read his paragraph marked "c." In this he calls my reference to Acts xxii. 25 "most unfortunate." The misfortune is—he does not understand the relationship between law and justice: otherwise, he would not have said that the law there set forth "was doubtless on a par with that Popish (Roman) institution, namely, 'Benefit of Clergy.'" And to justify his statement he quotes from Froude, a description of the state of society during the period between the 11th and 17th centuries—a description as derogatory to the principle of justice in that item of Roman law enunciated in the passage referred to from Acts, as anything contrary can be. What is the principle there laid down, pray? "Is it lawful?" say the words: "Is it lawful to

scourge a man that is a Roman and uncondemned?" What law could better express justice than these words? What could be more just in the laws of any nation? So just is it that it is universally applicable in its beneficence to all nations and all men. It was a prominent feature in the Mosaic law (though not always observed), as said Nicodemus, "Doth our law judge any man before it hear him and know what he doeth?" And though by the Romans it did not apply to those outside their citizenship, this did not make it unjust. It was justice all the same within narrow bounds, and so emphatically this, that in relation to it, the Romans were chargeable with injustice in not extending the law to all and sundry throughout their empire: yet, they did this, and it is another example of the justice which prevailed amongst them—they did this, namely: that, set forth by Paul (Acts xxv. 16). As for that to which Froude refers, viz.—"Benefit of Clergy"—this was an abuse of law, an abuse in which injustice was perpetrated in its very enactment. It was purely selfish; purely of sectarian origin; adapted purely for individual party purposes; clerical in the extreme, and as inimical to justice in its limited extension and in the universal aspect of it, as slavery or bondage is to every man's individual freedom. Where do we find "Benefit of Clergy" more prominent, prevalent, and offensive, than in the countries, amongst the people, most subordinated to priestcraft. As for the justice our reference expresses, it is that which of all things pre-eminently distinguishes the character of the highest civilization. Compare Britain and her civilization with Spain and her "Benefit of Clergy." In which of these states do we the more find—to quote from Froude—in which of these states do we the more find "a number of wild beasts" (men) "about, which can neither be killed or shut up." And yet in the face of facts like these, Bro. S. has the effrontery—it may be an inanition of mind—to tell us that, doubtless, Roman law in the particular referred to was on a par with that institution called "Benefit of Clergy." A man who reasons thus on a matter so plain can hardly be trusted to reason correctly on a matter so important, so deep and so sublime, as that of the Atonement.

Again, says he: "How is it that, seeing is freely exercised, justice without works is dead in itself? Is not dishonesty rampant all around us?" True, our law courts expose much, and our press, with a watchful solicitude, often with a nauseating repetition, greatly publish the same, and from this we gather, as from heralds specially appointed to cry out each occurrence in every street—from this we gather that much evil greatly abounds.


But what of the mass? It has no heralds like these to proclaim its virtues. Sir Edward Fry, a man greatly distinguished, formerly one of our judges of appeal—and I take him as an authority much greater and more reliable than Brother Stainforth. He in a recent speech on the evils of corruption in mercantile affairs—and much of this certainly abounds—said “he was not so foolish as to attempt to impeach the morals of the great mass of the commercial population, because he believed the great mass was sound at heart.” So I believe. And, if we take his statement as applicable to other matters so far germane to it, and place these in contrast to our law court exposures, we can see that our great charitable institutions, our hospitals for the cure (if possible) of the deaf, the dumb and the blind, also our schools for these; our infirmaries for the relief from disease and for the binding up and healing of the wounds of the injured in the accidents which befall so many; our lifeboats to save the perishing; and our many societies for the amelioration of the miseries so common around us; not to speak of the well known and less known assistance the poor among themselves afford to each other: yes, if we look at all these and consider them, we can see that they furnish stronger evidence of the good which prevails than do the other so contrary, of the evil so rampant. We can see that society at large, in its collective capacity, apart altogether from mere individual efforts, is, as it were, within the compass of a high civilization—is, as it were, awakening to the imitation of Him who went about doing good and curing all manners of complaint and disease. Why, then, say there is no good in the world apart from that which spiritual mindedness dictates. In all that we have mentioned we have justice alive and its deeds manifested. And was not the centurion distinguished for this kind of justice, before he obeyed the Gospel? And what, may I ask, does society at large know about the Holy Spirit, or care for the Gospel? Yet it fosters justice: it keeps it alive.

The next paragraph we come to is that marked “f.” In this he complains that the main question, “the doctrine of vicarious atonement, the question nominally in view, is smothered up with disquisitions on the nativeness of justice.” Why should he complain? Would these disquisitions have been thought of had he not himself suggested them by his aberrations of judgment and outrageous remarks concerning what should not have entered into his criticism. He forgets the obstructions he has thrown in the way. He forgets his paragraph “a,” page 93, No. 52, in which he declares that “the natural man is as totally destitute of justice as a crocodile.” Was it not necessary for me to

demolish this conceit? and I have done so. He forgets his paragraphs “b” “c” “e” in the same and following pages which I have also set at nought. The same may be said of other paragraphs. And why did he try to excite prejudice against those whose tenets he opposes, by personal remarks which a just critic would have disdained to make? These are obstructions I have had to contend with, and as I had not taken upon me to do more than criticise his criticism, I have taken all in their course. The main subject I however have no intention of passing over.

In conclusion, shunting the paragraphs which do not call for any particular notice, at present at anyrate, I come to the sentence with which he finishes. He says that I “appear to regard salvation as a process jointly worked by the sinner and the Saviour.” To this I may say, Yes. It is scarcely exact, but it may pass. For “sinner,” in his sentence, I prefer “saint.” And by way of the exposition of it, I quote these words, namely—“By God we live a move and have our being” as true in physical life: but if we do not conform the laws of our being: if we do not eat, drink, and so forth, God ceases to keep us alive. So with the spiritual life. If we do not abide in the vine, we cease to be branches of it, we are cut off as withered, fit only for the burning. “If ye love me,” says Christ, “keep my commandments.” By keeping these, we thereby “work out our salvation with fear and trembling,” God working in us, both to will and to do of his good pleasure. He works out our spiritual life as he works out our physical; we have to do our part in both: the process of growth in each is worked jointly. The Atonement embraces this, and it involves a philosophy of clothes as well as of food. We have to put on Christ as well as learn from him. We have to eat his flesh, drink his blood, and put on his garments, lest we be found naked. Blessed, therefore, is he who keepeth his garments, lest his shame be seen.

In my next, I hope to address myself to the main question—the question bro. S., with little credit to himself, so ostentatiously sets forth as smothered up. All the same I believe bro. Stainforth better than his creed.



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"FATAL TO THE FROGS."

I see in your April number that a brother in Kansas sends a word or two against the Frogs solution, viz., that the salt water would be fatal to the frogs (therefore fatal to my suggestion). I think with him that it is quite possible that the oceans will prove to be the grave of many a gallant ironclad, when the three several mouths shall have spoken, and the nations gather for Armageddon. John writes, three unclean spirits like — similar to in appearance — frogs. Nothing said as to their habitat or duration. Their lives appear brief after issuing out of the three specified mouths; their mission finished, they are never mentioned again. It has occurred to me that Socialism, or Anarchism, might be one of the mouths, but three frogs symbol does not fit. I am quite of Dr. Thomas' opinion that he has so fully set forth in *Eureka*, III., 553, that "Paganism is the Dragon, or Serpent Power, in conflict with Christian Eve and her seed."

France is at present *one* of the second rate, iron-clay toe powers; and the banner of Clovis appertained to the 3rd century—we are on the verge of the 20th. The world has become replenished, and I believe the Deity has followed the White Race—made in Elohist image—and directed its movements for 6,000 years, aye, far beyond the longitude of Greenwich. Religion and Politics are the prominent features of the Bible, coupled with history, prophecy, pedigree and advice.

1. Then, can we agree that Paganism is headed up in the Dragon, the far Eastern question?—*the first mouth*.

2. Then, can we agree that the False Prophet is the *near* Eastern question? The Sultan is the head of the vast Mohammedan population of the world. This the Euphratean phase, the Constantinopolitan — *the third mouth*.

3. Now, I conclude we all agree with the Doctor as regards the Beast mouth; but I am inclined to think it is a wider mouth than Rome, and is applicable to the whole of Christendom so-called. This, then, is *the second mouth* in the order of narration.

The attack made upon China by Japan attracted the attention of all naval powers—(1) *Russia* started in, land-grabbing as China became weakened, with soldiers and battle-ships; (2) *Britain's* jealousy brought her frogs to Chinese waters; and (3) *Germany* hers, with her "mailed fist," must have a bit: the three great powers of the ocean—Beast powers. France has not played a

conspicuous part in China, the pagan Dragon mouth; but this mouth has had much to say—and the Dr. says the frog action "causes the mouths to speak." China has butchered missionaries and protested against foreign interference in her affairs; but civilisation has commenced with her, and will go forward; the White Race will educate her for the Coming One.

The Beast mouth has spoken much upon this movement and has yet to speak, and cause the False Prophet mouth to speak later on. Then Armageddon! (See Rev. ix. 15-19; xvi. 21.) If fire and smoke, brimstone, and stones of a talent weight symbolise gunpowder, artillery, and battle, will some brother be kind enough to point out a better solution of the frogs than the mighty battleship that costs a million, and has the spirits of demons working such wonders on sea and land.

I invite them to tear the suggestion to tatters, and propose a better solution of this great mystery—sealed up and hidden until the latter days—as it is the very *last* sign, and designed to be unfolded by itself, when the end was at hand for those living at the time, who believe in the apocalyptic vision sketched by John some 19 centuries ago, and who might be "walking naked, and go un-blessed."

The time approaches when navies will blow each other to the sea bottom—(the Czar's olive branch must wither)—armies destroy each other, those who survive will spike their guns and stack arms in the presence of the Prince of Peace, the earth bring forth her increase, neither shall they learn war any more, for the lion symbol shall lie down with the lamb symbol—submissive for 1000 years.

F. HONGKINSON.

"SELAH."—In Geikie's *The Holy Land and the Bible*, I., 271, we read: "Two Mahomedans near us found it was one of their hours of prayer, and having spread their abbas—outer garment—on the ground, they turned their faces to Mecca and began their fervent devotions. In these the words "Allah is great" were repeated eight times, and then they kneeled down and touched the ground with their foreheads. It must have been much the same with the ancient Israelites, for the word "Selah" which so often stands at the end of a verse means simply "Bow," thus giving directions to the suppliant in this particular (*Hitzig* on Ps. iii. 2)."

[Possibly the Turkish word "selam" or "salaam," which means to bow to, or to pay one's respects to, may be identical with "Selah" in derivation.]—R. R. S.